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                                                         Abstract 
This thesis undertakes a comparative examination of South African and Kenyan 
auto/biographical narratives of crime and imprisonment. Although some attention is paid to 
narratives of political imprisonment, the study focuses primarily on autobiographical 
accounts by criminals, confessional narratives, popular fiction about crime and prison 
experience, and journalistic accounts of prison life. There is very little critical work at this 
moment that refers to these forms of prison writing in South Africa and Kenya. Popular 
prison narratives and to a certain extent the autobiographical in general are characterised by 
an under-theorised dialecticism. As academic concepts, both the popular and the 
autobiographical form are characterised by an unstable duality. While the popular has been 
theorised as being both a field of resistance to power and of consent to its demands, the 
autobiographical occupies a similar precariously divided position, in this case between fact 
and fiction, a place where the „I‟ that narrates is simultaneously the subject and object of the 
narrative. In examining an eclectic body of texts that share the prison as common 
denominator, my study problematises the tension between self and world, popular and 
canonical, political and criminal, factual and fictional. In both settings, South Africa and 
Kenya, the prison as a material and discursive space does not only mirror society but effects 
shifts and changes in society, and becomes a space of dynamic adaptation and also a locus 
that disturbs certain hegemonic relations. The way in which the experience of prison opens 
up to a fundamentally unsettling ambiguity resonates with the ambivalence that characterises 
both autobiography as genre and the popular as a theoretical concept. My thesis argues that 
during the entire historical period covered by the narratives that I examine there is a certain 
excess that attends on the social production of criminality and the practice of imprisonment, 
both as material realities and as discursive concepts, which allows them to have a haunting 
effect both on individuals‟ notions of „the self‟ and the constitution of national identities and 
nationhoods. I argue that the distinction between the colonial and the postcolonial prison is 
hazy. Therefore a comparative study of Kenyan and South African prison literature helps us 
understand how modern prisons and notions of criminality in contemporary Africa are 
intertwined with the broad European colonial project, reflecting larger issues of state power 
and control over the populace. In relation to South Africa, my study begins with Ruth First‟s 
117 Days (1963), and makes a selection of other prisons narratives throughout the apartheid 
era up to the post-apartheid period which was ushered in by Mandela‟s Long Walk to 
Freedom (1994). Moving beyond Mandela, I examine other forms of South African crime 
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and prison narratives which have emerged since the publication of Pumla Gobodo-
Madikizela‟s A Human Being Died that Night (2003) and Jonny Steinberg‟s The Number 
(2004). In Kenya, I begin with Ngugi wa Thiongo‟s Detained (1981). I then focus on popular 
narratives of crime and imprisonment which began with the publication of John Kiriamiti‟s 
My Life in Crime (1984) up to the first decade of the 21
st
 century, marked yet again by the 
publication of Kiriamiti‟s My Life in Prison (2004). Besides Kiriamiti‟s two narratives, the 
other Kenyan texts which I examine are John Kiggia Kimani‟s Life and Times of a Bank 
Robber (1988) and Prison is not a Holiday Camp (1994), Benjamin Garth Bundeh‟s Birds of 
Kamiti (1991), and Charles Githae‟s, Comrade Inmate (1994). 
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Opsomming 
 
My proefskrif onderneem ‟n vergelykende studie van Suid-Afrikaanse en Keniaanse 
auto/biografiese narratiewe van misdaad en gevangeneskap. Hoewel aandag tot ‟n mate 
geskenk word aan verhale van politieke gevangeneskap, is die primêre fokus van die studie 
eerder op autobiografiese narratiewe deur misdadigers, konfessionele narratiewe, populêre 
fiksie met betrekking tot misdaad en gevangenis-ondervindinge, sowel as joernalistieke 
verslae oor gevangenes se lewens agter tralies. Min kritiese werk is tot dusver in verband met 
hierdie vorme van gevangenis-narratiewe in Suid-Afrika en Kenia gedoen. Populêre 
prisoniers-narratiewe, en tot ‟n mate autobiografieë oor die algemeen, word deur ‟n onder-
geteoriseerde dialektisisme gekenmerk. As akademiese konsepte word beide die populêre en 
die autobiografiese vorme deur ‟n onstabiele dualisme gekenmerk. Terwyl die populêre tipe 
geteoretiseer word as sowel ‟n vorm van weerstand teen mag as van toegee daaraan, word aan 
die autobiografiese tipe ‟n soortgelyke onstabiele, verdeelde rol toegeskryf – in hierdie geval, 
tussen feitelikheid en fiksie, ‟n plek waar die “ek” wat vertel terselfdertyd die subjek en objek 
van die verhaal is. Deur middel van ‟n eklektiese versameling van tekste wat die gevangenis 
as verwysingspunt deel, problematiseer my verhandeling die spanning tussen self en wêreld, 
die populêre en die gekanoniseerde, die politieke en die kriminele, die feitelike en die 
fiktiewe. In beide kontekste, Suid-Afrika en Kenia, weerspieël die gevangenis as diskursiewe 
spasie nie alleenlik die gemeenskapsomgewing nie, maar veroorsaak dit ook veranderings en 
verskuiwings in die gemeenskap – sodoende word die gevangenis self ‟n ruimte van 
dinamiese verandering en ‟n plek wat sekere hegemoniese verhoudings versteur. Die manier 
waarop die ondervinding van gevangeneskap lei tot ‟n fundamentele versteurende 
dubbelsinningheid resoneer met die dubbelsinnigheid wat beide die autobiografiese as genre 
en die populêre as teoretiese konsep karakteriseer. My tesis voer aan dat, gedurende die ganse 
historiese tydperk wat gedek word deur die narratiewe wat ek hier betrag, daar ‟n sekere 
oormaat is wat die sosiale produksie van misdaad en die toepassing van gevangesetting 
begelei, beide as stoflike werklikhede en as diskursiewe konsepte, wat hulle toelaat om ‟n 
kwellende effek uit te oefen beide of individuele mense se sin van „self‟ en die samestelling 
van nasionale identiteite en nasionaliteite. Ek voer aan dat die onderskeid tussen die koloniale 
en die postkoloniale gevangenis onduidelik is, en dat ‟n vergelykende studie van Keniaanse 
en Suid-Afrikaanse gevangenes-narratiewe ons dus help om te verstaan hoe moderne tronke 
en idees oor misdaad in Afrika deureengevleg is met die breë Europese koloniale projek, en  
groter kwessies van staatsmag en beheer oor die bevolking weerspieël. In Suid Afrika begin 
my studie met Ruth First se 117 Days (1963), en maak dan ‟n seleksie van ander gevangenes-
narratiewe van die apartheid-era tot en met die post-apartheid oomblik wat deur Mandela se 
Long Walk to Freedom ingelui word. Ek vestig dan my aandag op ander vorme van Suid-
Afrikaanse misdaad- en gevangenes-narratiewe wat sedert die publikasie van Pumla Gobodo-
Madikizela se A Human Being Died that Night (2003) en Jonny Steinberg se The Number 
(2004) verskyn het. In Kenia begin ek met Ngugi wa Thiongo se Detained (1981), en kyk dan 
ten slotte na populêre narratiewe van misdaad en gevangeneskap wat hulle aanvang vind met 
die publikasie van John Kiriamiti se My Life in Crime (1984) tot en met die eerste dekade van 
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die 21ste eeu, nogmaals gemerk deur die publikasie van Kiriamiti se My Life in Prison 
(2004).  
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                                              Chapter 1: Introduction 
 “Today the destiny or fate of the prisoner weighs heavily on us. The prisoner‟s fate 
is always bound up with those of us who are not yet captured, regardless of whether 
this relation is acknowledged” (Avery F. Gordon 2008: 652). 
This thesis offers a comparative reading of Kenyan and South African auto/biographical 
prison narratives. It examines the depiction of the production of colonial and post-
colonial/apartheid and post-apartheid senses of citizenship and subjectivity in South African 
and Kenyan narratives of crime and imprisonment. The rationale for this choice is that the 
prison structures of both countries developed out of the British colonial model and also a 
large body of African prison literature has come from the two countries. South Africa and 
Kenya share a similar colonial history in the sense that both were colonised by Britain at 
different times. The Cape Colony was occupied by Britain as early as 1795, and officially 
made a British colony in 1806. The prison system inherited by apartheid was essentially a 
British one. Kenya, on the other hand, was effectively occupied by Britain in 1895. Among 
other things, my thesis investigates how this colonial heritage plays out in different social and 
literary contexts. I examine prison texts from both sites in order to explore the similarities and 
differences between the ways in which the British colonial prison model has been experienced 
and recorded in these two postcolonies. In other words, in addition to its interest in popular 
prison literature, the thesis interrogates how a similar prison structure impacts on the literary 
form and the representation of self in two different contexts. In this sense, it explores 
questions around the link between material institutions (such as the prison) and the production 
and performance of cultural forms (such as autobiography and popular fiction). 
The prison was an important tool in colonial governmentality and was driven by the need for 
new senses of time, space and subjectivity in the service of a broad agenda of domination. In 
the book A History of Prison and Confinement in Africa (2003), Florence Bernault argues for 
this inextricable link between the development of prison practices and the European colonial 
project in Africa. She argues that the prison “did not emerge [only] after European conquest 
had imposed full control over colonies, but served as a crucial tool to carry on colonial wars 
against Africans” (3). This suggests that colonial wars were not just won and lost on the 
battlefield but also in the realms of the ideological, the cultural and the spatial. This idea is 
also suggested by Yvonne Vera (1995), who says that, in colonial Southern Rhodesia, space 
was actively produced and that the prison, in particular, mastered space in order to articulate a 
colonial itinerary (35-36). Clearly, then, the prison and its regimes played an important role 
not just as place of physical confinement, but also in the constitution of the subjectivities of 
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colonial subjects. The prison was a potently crucial and versatile colonial instrument of 
subjugation in that it simultaneously served as a place of physical incarceration and also as a 
space for the production of specific colonial worldviews. 
My thesis examines the literary representation, conceptualisation and utilization of colonial 
power systems, notions of criminality and the prison at different historical moments in South 
Africa and Kenya. British and European imperialism in general was given impetus by 
Enlightenment ideas, which tended to crystallize human identity over time and often viewed 
humanity as progressing relentlessly to some ultimate religious and scientific truth. While 
these notions do allude to change, change is seen as predestined toward some final and 
preordained revelation. In the light of the above, I investigate how the prison as a coercive 
instrument and ideological state apparatus informs the formation of subjectivities not only of 
the prisoners, but also of the warders, prison officials and even of the larger society beyond 
the prison walls. To put it differently, although prison reflects certain subjectivities, one of the 
central focuses of my thesis is the exploration of the role of the prison in the production of 
subjective experience and the literary form. 
In exploring the prison‟s impact on the literary form, I examine the so-called canonical prison 
narratives alongside more recent popular narratives with the objective of tracing continuities 
or discontinuities in the ideological and material penology that has characterized these two 
former British colonies. For similar reasons, I accord equal literary value to both fictional and 
non-fictional auto/biographical accounts and narratives. This is inspired by H. Aram Visser‟s 
argument that “every expressive act is embedded in a network of material practices [and that] 
literary and non-literary „texts‟ circulate inseparably” (1989: xi). Similarly, in Culture and 
Imperialism (1993), Said develops this idea by pointing out that all types of narratives have to 
be interpreted and understood within their historical and cultural milieu (1993). What 
Quayson (2007: 647) calls “representational regimes” is a major concern of my thesis, since 
my focus is on the role of the prison in the production of notions of the self and the literary. I 
discuss material conditions insofar as these intersect with the experience of prison that 
explores ideas of introspection, contrition, reform and conversion; in other words, my focus is 
on the way the prison may cause the person to internalise its penal modes of control, which 
are, in turn, entangled with the broader project of colonialism and its aftermath in the 
postcolony. 
My discussion opens with Mandela‟s Long Walk to Freedom and Ngugi‟s Detained. I argue 
that in keeping with Mikhail Bakhtin‟s notion of the “chronotope”, these narratives mold 
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together space and time to produce linear narratives when describing circular and disjunctive 
time. These two autobiographical texts comprise an established canon of African prison 
writing, and any analysis of the contemporary role of the prison in African life and letters is in 
a sense compelled to begin here. In this chapter, I argue that Mandela‟s and Ngugi‟s 
narratives allow us to think about the reciprocal interaction of prison and community. These 
texts, and others that I examine in the later chapters of my thesis, allow us to examine how the 
prison as an exceptional technology for forging of subjectivity within its walls always 
influences and mirrors the larger processes for subject-formation in other social institutions. I 
approach Long Walk to Freedom, Nelson Mandela‟s celebrated prison narrative, from two 
perspectives. Firstly, I emphasise the allegoric, the symbolic, and the metaphoric; in other 
words the literary aspects of this narrative which, in my opinion, have not been afforded 
adequate critical attention. This allows me to argue that the prison provides Mandela with the 
impetus for imagining an ideal political community beyond apartheid, and to observe that 
Mandela symbolically dies in prison, to be born in his new post-prison self. In this chapter, I 
also point out that it is specifically because Mandela pursues a vision of an all inclusive 
society to replace apartheid that he fails to pay attention to post-apartheid political uses of the 
prison.    
Secondly, I take advantage of Long Walk to Freedom‟s stature in the prison literary canon as 
an entry point into the lesser known prison and crime narratives that form the principal part of 
my study. In my examination of Long Walk to Freedom, I apply and extend Frederic 
Jameson‟s (1986) notion that all third-world narratives are allegories of the nation, Roger 
Rosenblatt‟s (in Stone1982: 260) reading of autobiography as an extended suicide note and 
Giorgio Agamben‟s (1998) idea that the concentration camp, rather than the space of 
confinement such as prison, is the absolute space of exception. I examine how Mandela‟s 
narrative is influenced by and influences the prison space and the larger social space outside 
the prison. I explore how meaning in this and other prison narratives is connected to and 
informed by (and at times informs) place, space,
1
 time and various cultures; that is, the 
literary, material and ideological conditions that influenced the writing of these prison 
narratives. I use the term “ideological” in the Althusserian sense where this term is viewed as 
a representational structure that allows us to conceive or imagine our lived relationship to 
transpersonal realities such the social structure or the collective logic of history (Jameson: 
30). 
                                                          
1
 I am using the word place to refer to a “neutral” geographical location. By space I am alluding more to the 
constructed nature of every place and to how it is always experienced in discursive terms. 
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Ngugi wa Thiong‟o‟s Detained: A Writer‟s Prison Diary (1981) is an exemplary text of the 
so-called literature of engagement. While Mandela‟s project of reconciliation in Long Walk to 
Freedom makes him silent about the antecedents of the state over which he presides, Ngugi‟s 
engagement with the prison is informed by his realization that the post-colonial state wants to 
feign amnesia about the prison‟s colonial roots. Ngugi claims that the post-colonial Kenyan 
prison is an unmitigated extension of the colonial prison. He therefore commands African 
writers to “be with the people in burying the imperialist idol and his band of white and black 
angels, forever” (Ngugi 1997: 77). Ngugi argues that in post-colonial Kenya, as in colonial 
times, the prison is not just a repressive state apparatus but also operates at the cultural level 
as an ideological instrument for inculcating a culture of fear that ensures Western nations 
continued access to Kenyan resources with the help of corrupt ruling elites.  Using Bakhtinian 
terminology, I argue that among a few other momentous occasions, the year Ngugi spends in 
a post-colonial Kenyan prison is the turning point in his literary career.
2
 Thereafter, he 
abandons the heteroglosia, dialogism and polyphony of his earlier novels, and adopts the 
monologism, strident and declamatory tone of his later works exemplified in Detained. 
Admittedly, Ngugi‟s angry tone enables him to achieve a number of things which Mandela‟s 
sanguine and inclusive attitude cannot articulate. Unfortunately, unlike in postcolonial studies 
where the aim is to dismantle the imperial idea of linear time or the figure of linear 
development (McClintock 2007: 629), Ngugi fails to use the concept of the prison to 
transcend the Marxist conceptualisation of history as culminating in the grand victory of the 
oppressed classes. 
In Chapter Three, I extend the theorisation of the prison space to talk specifically about 
solitary confinement. Engaging with Ruth First‟s 117 Days, Emma Mashinini‟s Strikes have 
Followed Me, and Breyten Breytenbach‟s True Confessions, I contend that solitary 
confinement allows us to see the conditions and limits of the autobiographical selves 
presupposed in the act of writing an autobiography. While Breytenbach‟s immersion in the 
                                                          
2
 When I use “post-colonial” with a hyphen, I am using this term largely as a neutral time-marker of the period 
after independence from Western territorial colonialism. But when I use it without a hyphen, as in 
“postcolonial”, I do so with the additional sense of the postcolonial condition theorised in postcolonial studies. 
However, in both senses, I am employing it advisedly and guardedly since some critics have rightly pointed out 
to the homogenising way in which this term has often been used. For example, Anne McClintock (2007: 631) 
says it is “prematurely celebratory”. Claiming that the term is unsatisfactory, Gayatri Spivak (1990: 166) writes: 
“We live in a post-colonial neo-colonial world”.  Aijaz Ahmad also argues that “in periodising our history in the 
triadic terms of pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial, the conceptual apparatus of „postcolonial criticism‟ 
privileges as primary the role of colonialism as the principle of structuration in that history” (1995: 6). Anthony 
Appiah thinks that “postcoloniality is the condition of … a comprador intelligentsia: a relatively small, Western-
style, Western-trained group of writers and thinkers who mediate the trade in cultural commodities of the world 
capitalism at the periphery” (1991: 348).  
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intellectual and artistic milieu of existentialism and poststructuralism leads him to a broad 
rejection of stable identities, for First it is solitary confinement that debunks the notion of a 
bounded self that can be coherently narrated. Mashinini‟s narrative lacks the theoretical 
pretentions of Breytenbach and First. Interestingly, right from the time she is imprisoned and 
placed in solitary confinement, she views the self as “situated, embodied, gendered, 
sexualized and racialised” (Colin Davies 2004:169). Although an issue beyond the scope of 
my current project, Mashinini‟s narrative suggests that there are other understandings of 
autobiographical selves that are not necessarily founded on notions of Enlightenment. This 
leads me to the conclusion that the bounded self that is presupposed in the Enlightenment 
inspired autobiographical act, although not totally fictitious, is largely a creation of the 
narratives themselves, and that outside narrative it exists as an entity that recedes further and 
further away from all that is knowable. 
Chapter Four examines Steinberg‟s The Number, and asserts that, in his biographical narrative 
of Magadien Wentzel, Steinberg, with varying levels of success, attempts to offer an 
examination of the prison that seeks to break down the compartimentalisation and polarities 
associated with the study of the African prison. I argue that Steinberg is preoccupied with the 
“encounter with the singular, the specific, and the individual” (Gallagher and Greenblatt 
2000: 6), as these intersect and are informed by collective, national and global identities that 
are equally in a state of flux. In his brilliant study of the South African Number prison gangs, 
Steinberg suggests that these gangs do not just use the legal system to achieve what they term 
social justice within the prisons, but they possess and constitute the legal apparatuses in a 
menacingly ambivalent way. This takes us back to Bernault‟s (2003) observation that, since 
its inception as a tool to win colonial wars in Africa, the prison has reflected the power-effects 
of a system of which it is a product but it has also haunted the system, insidiously coming 
back and permeating it as its repressed. In a way, this chapter is the centre-piece of my thesis, 
because it is here that I bring together most of my major arguments. 
In Chapter Five, I explore Kenyan popular narratives of crime and imprisonment which 
emerged in the wake of Ngugi‟s Detained.3 An examination of these narratives helps us 
                                                          
3
 I am using the term popular narratives/culture guardedly since there are numerous debates about using it either 
as a descriptive category or just as a theoretical figuration. For example, Juan Flores (2005) points out that there 
is a generalised scepticism as to the persistence and theoretical utility of popular culture in its traditional sense 
because of the ideological manipulation of the concept of „the people‟ in the hands of populism in its various 
twentieth-century guises. He writes: “The recurrent appeal to „the people‟ in opportunistic political mobilizations 
of left, right, centre, whether in the name of democracy, national liberation, the free world, or labor, has so 
perverted that slogan as to empty it of all meaning, contestatory or otherwise” (73). Pierre Bourdieu (1983) notes 
that the term “popular” is always ambiguous because it comes to us inscribed with the history of political and 
cultural struggles. Karin Barber claims that the term “popular” is a “site of contested evaluations” (Barber 1997: 
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appreciate Karin Barber‟s (1987) perceptive and persuasive argument about how history is 
made. She writes: “History … was also made by the collective or aggregate struggles, actions, 
and reactions of the obscure majority of African people. Their experiences are history in their 
own right as well as making official history of the leaders intelligible” (8). Despite the 
proliferation of the popular “my life in crime” stories in Kenya, especially after the 
publication of Kiriamiti‟s My Life in Crime in 1984, there has been no rigorous scholarly 
effort that pays specific attention to the prison in order to develop a coherent theory of this 
historical and cultural phenomenon.
4
 A distinctive aspect of these narratives is not just their 
focus on crime and prison, but equally the manner in which the writers (re)inscribe the city 
from which they have been removed onto the minute and dreary spaces of the prison. These 
narratives exude and celebrate the individualistic ethos of urban society, and their 
autobiographical nature embraces the controversial confessional mode that characterizes most 
prison narratives.
5
 In these narratives, the city and prison exist in a symbiotic dialecticism that 
leads to the production and consumption of these popular narratives. Discussing African 
popular literature in general, Jane Bryce-Okunlola (1997) writes: “African popular writing 
provides a space for the rewriting of power relations, for transformation, above all, for 
pleasure in a harsh world where pleasure is not just an escape but a challenge” (187). In these 
narratives, the prison, just like the city, is depicted as a space of transformation, a harsh and 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
3). In light of the above, my use of the term popular culture is therefore more in line with the writings of de 
Certeau (1984), Bourdieu (1983, 1993) and Barber, who have used this term to refer to a complex signifying 
practice. 
 
4
 Jacqueline Bardolph‟s (1984) “The Literature of Kenya” is one of the few pioneering studies that try to 
understand the growth of Kenyan fiction from 1964 up to 1984. Interestingly, Bardolph says that Kenyan popular 
literature began in earnest with the publication of Son of Woman (1971) by Charles Mangua. In Urban Legends, 
Colonial Myths: Popular Culture and Literature in East Africa (2007), James Ogude and Joyce Nyairo include a 
number of articles that focus on popular culture and literature in general from East Africa. In this volume, Tom 
Odhiambo‟s article examines some of the crime narratives that I discuss here. Odhiambo argues that the popular 
narratives that he analyses “are both symptoms and consequences of a dysfunctional system of wealth and 
economic resource distribution” (243). Tom Odhiambo (2004) in his PhD thesis also problematises the concept 
popular literature in his examination of David Gian Maillu, one of the leading popular writers in Kenya.  In an 
ambitious study which tries to capture all the Kenyan novels since Ngugi wa Thiong‟o‟s Weep Not, Child (1964), 
in Urban Obsessions Urban Fears: The Postcolonial Kenyan Novel, J. Roger Kurtz has written a useful book for 
all those interested in the development of the novel genre in post-colonial Kenya. However, Kurtz‟s study, 
because of its extensive scope, obscures the subtle genre distinctions in what he calls the “Kenyan novel”. For 
example, the clearly autobiographical crime and prison narratives that I examine in this chapter are also 
problematically included under the list of novels. On Kenyan prison writing specifically, F. Maina Mutonya 
(2001) has written a Masters thesis on the works of Kenyan novelist Wahome Mutahi. Mutonya emphasises the 
satirical and fictionalized nature of Mutahi‟s representation of the prison in his two novels Three days on the 
Cross (1991) and The Jail Bugs (1993). 
 
5
 Quoting Hubert Damisch (2001), Mbembe and Nuttall argue that the city has historically been one of the most 
privileged sites of the emergence of the question of the subject and its articulation to reason and sensation. They 
then go on to point out that “as we now know, the subject itself is always en fuite (leaking, fleeing) – a fiction of 
ourselves and a fabulation of our world. So is the city” (Public Culture 16 (3): 353-354). Among other things, 
Chapter Five extends the exploration of this matrix of the auto/biographical subject, the city and the prison, 
which I begin in chapter one with political narratives. 
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challenging universe where, in a magnified way, power relations are contested and rewritten 
all the time. These narratives provide pleasure to the reader by depicting a world where 
lawlessness is both tantalisingly staged and completely contained.  
The last chapter examines prison texts that have been emerging since the demise of apartheid 
in South Africa. Some scholars have observed that the post-apartheid prison is a depoliticised 
space. In a way, these narratives reflect and participate in this “depoliticisation”. However, 
David Schalkwyk (2000) suggests that there is a haunting pervasiveness of the prison and its 
regimes that has spilled over into the post-apartheid era. He writes: 
 It is one of the sad truths of both the „new‟ and „old‟ South Africa that 
prisons form a major part of what we call the „culture‟ of the country … 
Apart from the empirical issue of continued overcrowding, violence, and 
deprivation, the theoretical issue of the prison and its relation to the broader 
concept of culture and community remains as pressing as ever. (279) 
In line with this thinking, I point out that although there have been unavoidable discursive 
shifts in the representation of the prison since 1994, the narratives I examine in this chapter 
are characterised by the paradox that while the prisoner/criminal is posited as “responsible for 
all the harm committed by that individual” (Dilts 92), the individual is simultaneously 
represented as a victim of his or her socio-political environment. To use Foucault‟s 
terminology, in these narratives we witness interdiscursive dependencies or clashes as the 
nation reels under numerous material and discursive transitional forces. What seems to be 
emerging in post-apartheid narratives is a prison, to quote Loïc Wacquant, that is increasingly 
being used as “a device for (re)generating, marking, and enforcing symbolic [and physical] 
boundaries” (2009: 196) between the majority underclass and the privileged minority. 
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Chapter 2: “Canonical” Prison Literature: Mandela’s Long Walk to 
Freedom and Ngugi’s Detained: A Writer’s Prison Diary 
Introduction 
This chapter examines two auto/biographical prison narratives: Nelson Mandela‟s Long Walk 
to Freedom and Ngugi wa Thiong‟o‟s Detained: A Writer‟s Prison Diary. Although I classify 
it as a prison narrative in this thesis, Mandela‟s Long Walk to Freedom is in fact an 
autobiography, albeit largely ghost-written, of Mandela‟s life from the time of his birth in 
1918 up to his inauguration as the first democratically-elected president of South Africa in 
1994. The Kenyan writer Ngugi wa Thiong‟o is one of the most celebrated but also most 
controversial living writers hailing from the African continent. His prison narrative, Detained: 
A Writer‟s Prison Diary (1981), shows that he belongs to a school of thought that Achille 
Mbembe (2002) calls “Afro-radicalism”, which “claims to have founded a so-called 
revolutionary politics, which seeks to break away from imperialism and dependence” 629). 
Detained, a narrative characterised by a pulsating moral urgency, is supposed to be a diary of 
the year Ngugi spent in Remand Prison at Kamiti, Nairobi, in 1978. However, rather than 
presenting everyday entries of the time spent in prison as the title of the book suggests, Ngugi 
explores, among other things, the role of colonial violence and the imposition of colonial 
culture during the late nineteenth century European invasion and conquest of Africa, and how 
Kenyans‟ resistance reached its zenith in the Mau Mau war that led to independence in 1963. 
His primary concern is trying to understand why the Kenyan post-colonial regime has failed 
to transcend and transform colonial culture and how and why it resorted to the use of 
repressive apparatuses associated with colonialism, such as the prison.  
On the one hand, these narratives have found a place in what in Foucauldian terms may be 
called the “power and knowledge-effects of scientific discourse(s)” (Foucault 2004: 6) 
because of the way the neat label „political prison literature‟ implicates them in a particular 
„field of study‟. Despite the fact that Ngugi has not attained the deified status of Mandela, he 
has enjoyed a fair amount of literary acclaim all over the world. On the other hand, because 
these two particular narratives are about prison, written by former prisoners, they do in fact 
constitute what Foucault calls “subjugated knowledges”. An attentive re/reading of them 
shows “blocks of historical knowledges” about how the prison functions both as a material 
place of incarceration and as an ideological space where human power relations are 
reconfigured to produce peculiar forms of culture and certain power effects which are masked 
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in the functional and systematic ensembles of the dominant literary criticism.
6
 These two texts 
represent an established canon that one needs to examine because they laid the foundation for 
a certain literary and political disposition towards the prison in African letters. The more 
“popular” confessional literature of criminal transgression, privation and redemption that 
surfaced in the last three decades has to be understood as something that emerged alongside, 
but also in conversation with, these political works. 
I also explore these narratives through M. M Bakhtin‟s notion of the “chronotope”, which he 
defines as “the intrinsic connectedness of temporal and spatial relationships that are 
artistically expressed in literature” (1981: 85). In his “Chronotopes of the Self in the Writing 
of Women Political Prisoners in South Africa”, Schalkwyk expands on this definition by 
arguing that chronotopes are “the distinctive molding together of space and time into 
representational form and substance” and argues that they “are informed by historical and 
ideological pressures” (2001: 1, 2). My main interest is in the historical and ideological 
literary-connected temporalities and spatialities of these narratives; thus, I am not necessarily 
approaching them as archives of gross human rights abuse advocating social and political 
justice. Long Walk to Freedom and Detained produce, draw and weave together chronotopes 
in a way that is particular to their political context and the elevated status of their protagonists 
as well as the material reality of their various penal regimes. To a certain extent, these 
narratives are grappling with how to meet the requirements of a linear narrative when 
describing circular or disjunctive time. Both Mandela and Ngugi make use of chronotopes, 
but they (re)invent them according to their different circumstances.
 
 
Mandela‟s Long Walk to Freedom can rightly be called an “autobiography of incarceration” 
(Schalkwyk 1994: 24). In a description which aptly captures what Mandela seems to be doing 
in his narrative, Schalkwyk writes: 
To write from “inside” is not simply to reflect the four walls of universal 
confinement, nor even to reflect on what is beyond those four walls, but also 
to refract the complex of social and historical relations that constitute the 
self both within and outside its conditions of incarceration. (24) 
                                                          
6
Foucault uses the term subjugated knowledges to refer to at least two things. First, it refers to “historical 
contents that have been buried or masked in functional coherences of formal systematizations”. In this first 
sense, it also refers to “blocks of historical knowledges that [are] present in the functional and systematic 
ensembles, but which [are] masked, and the critique [is] able to reveal their existence by using … the tools of 
scholarship”. In its second sense he uses it to refer to “a whole series of knowledges that have been disqualified 
as nonconceptual knowledges, as insufficiently elaborated knowledges: naïve knowledges, hierarchically inferior 
knowledges, knowledges that are below the required level of erudition or scientificity” (In Society Must be 
Defended 2003:7). 
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This complex nature of what can be called prison narratives, a complexity that Schalkwyk 
highlights in the quotation above, partly accounts for the popularity of Mandela‟s 
autobiography. The autobiography has had a tremendous impact on South African social and 
literary landscapes. The central role that the prison played in shaping Mandela‟s subjectivity 
is reflected in the narrative and largely contributes to its appeal across disciplines and to 
people of different cultural backgrounds. The narrative offers a rare moment that enables the 
reader to peer into the reciprocal interaction of prison and community, and the ways in which, 
in South Africa, the prison and its regimes structured and constituted, and in many ways 
continue to structure and constitute, individual subjectivities and the national narrative itself. 
Specifically, Long Walk to Freedom helps us think through the relationship between prison, 
the autobiographical and issues of subjectivity.  
In Long Walk to Freedom the prison plays precisely such a central role, and in fact, becomes 
an unconscious motif for Mandela, which in turn serves to organise the narrative structure of 
the text. Its auto/biographical nature, including those sections that do not directly deal with 
the narrator‟s prison experiences, is in fact informed by the space of the prison and by 
different notions of criminality that were espoused by both the colonial and apartheid states. 
Mandela‟s autobiography indicates that rather than being just time spent in a space of physical 
incarceration, his prison years become a literary device which he uses to organise his pre-
prison and post-prison experiences. In analysing Long Walk to Freedom, I draw attention to 
contexts and aims of Mandela by constantly emphasising his use of the prison as a central 
trope of his narrative.The colonial and apartheid notions of crime and criminality, prison and 
imprisonment are the axes upon which Mandela‟s autobiography hinges and revolves. To 
some extent the prison is the place and space that mediates between the Mandela of pre-1962 
and the Mandela of post-1990. Hinting at this central role that the prison has played in his 
construction of the self, Mandela says: “[P]rison gave me the opportunity to think through 
many issues. I also had time to debate issues with my comrades.” (in Schadeberg 1994: 83). 
Those sections that do not directly deal with the prison and imprisonment are therefore 
organised through Mandela‟s prison experience. Although Long Walk to Freedom was 
published in 1994, Mandela himself says: “I began writing it clandestinely in 1974 during my 
imprisonment on Robben Island” (vii). The original manuscript, in other words, was written 
and finished in prison. Although successfully smuggled out of prison, it was not published. 
Upon his release from prison in 1990, Mandela added to and improved on it. However, Long 
Walk to Freedom is not just a prison memoir. The prison is an important trope that Mandela 
invokes to develop other concerns that relate to reconciliation, nation building, and duties of 
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national citizens towards the state and towards each other and ideas of universal human rights. 
Read this way, Mandela‟s text is less of a historical account than a well-thought blueprint for 
the post-apartheid state. The narrative celebrates the inauguration of a post-apartheid state and 
seeks to provide it with a guiding vision. 
Detained presents some dilemmas about the uses of prison in post-colonial/post-apartheid 
settings which are not anticipated in Long Walk to Freedom. While Mandela is extending 
forgiveness and a hand of reconciliation to his former apartheid captors, Ngugi‟s Detained 
and all his post-1977 books are characterised by a distinctly angry and bitter voice. Ngugi 
explains the Kenyan prison and African history through the paradigm of Western European 
capitalism, which, from the late fifteenth century, and with varying intensities, expanded into 
most parts of the world. After the decolonisation of Africa, Ngugi does not see this global 
capitalism relenting: rather, it intensifies as capitalist industrialised nations not only search for 
markets, but also set up factories in the former colonies so as to take advantage of non-
unionised cheap sources of labour. In this neo-colonial scenario, the prison, depoliticised or 
not, continues to play an important role in the perpetuation of economic exploitation and 
unequal power relations within national and global contexts. Mandela does not meditate on 
the post-apartheid political uses of the prison and its entanglements with the exploitative 
capitalism of the neo-colonial environment. 
In Detained, the reader comes to the disturbing realisation that instead of being a culmination 
of the Kenyan history of resistance against foreign invasions, “the moment of decolonization 
both internalized and exemplified the multiple legacies of colonial governance” (Rao and 
Pierce 2006:18). In this prison narrative, Ngugi can be said to be exploring what Graham 
Pechey (1994) calls the post-colonial paradox, “that it takes anticolonial struggles to produce 
neocolonial conditions” (153). However, Ngugi‟s argument in Detained seems to be premised 
on his optimistic view that the pathological condition of post-colonial Kenya can and will be 
overcome through a concerted Marxist struggle, which will result in the victory of the 
peasants and workers and the establishment of a truly socialist government. Interestingly, in 
Long Walk to Freedom, Mandela‟s attitude towards communism ranges from ambiguous 
approval to outright rejection. On the other hand, Ngugi sees his prison narrative as 
participating in a cultural struggle for the decolonisation of the Kenyan minds, which will 
lead to the Kenya that the masses had hoped for in 1963 at the attainment of territorial 
independence from British colonial rule. 
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A brief examination of Ngugi‟s writing shows that his militancy, although intensified by his 
imprisonment, evolved over a period of time. The ending of A Grain of Wheat (1967) is a 
case in point. Mumbi, one of the main characters, closes the narrative with words that 
exemplify Bakhtin‟s (1981) notion of „dialogism‟ as a potentially liberatory form of speech 
because of its heteroglossic and polyphonic nature. Mumbi says: 
People try to rub things out, but they cannot. Things are not so easy. What 
has passed between us is too much to be passed over in a sentence. We need 
to talk, to open our hearts to one another, examine them, and then together 
plan our future we want. (213) 
Ten years later, Ngugi‟s openness to the fluidity of culture and the indeterminacy of the 
future, which is expressed through a style that is typically dialogic and polysemic, has been 
seriously compromised. In Petals of Blood (1977), towards the end of the novel, Ngugi‟s 
narrator declares: 
Tomorrow it would be the workers and the peasants leading the struggle and 
seizing power to overturn the system and all its prying bloodthirsty gods and 
gnomic angels, bringing to an end the reign of the few over the many and 
the era of blood drinking and feasting on human flesh. (344) 
The author‟s tone has become more strident and declamatory here. Both the angry tone and 
the problematic syntax of this passage indicate that the dialogism of A Grain of Wheat has 
become a disillusioned monologism masquerading as the inevitable march of history towards 
a socialist egalitarian society. Things have become too easy and solutions too obvious. The 
reader is now confronted with what Bakhtin (1981) calls essential monologism, which 
although not necessarily representing the “limited official discourse”, represents a limited 
form of Marxism discourse because the narrative voice is “talking down to the people or 
speaking for them – however much it may strive to be „one‟ of them” (Crehan 1995: 114). 
During his imprisonment, Ngugi writes on toilet paper his first Gikuyu novel, Caitaani 
Mũtharaba-inĩ, subsequently translated into English as Devil on the Cross, as a symbolic 
rejection of the corrosive neo-colonial cultural forces that he claims are illustrated by his 
unfair arrest and imprisonment.
7
 Relating a satiric version of Jesus‟ parable, he writes: 
                                                          
7
 Ngugi writes on toilet paper for the practical reason that it is the only writing material that is available to him 
during his imprisonment. However, the metaphoric significance of this act is powerful. In a way, by writing on 
toilet paper Ngugi is rejecting the Kenyan comprador bourgeoisie and their Western sponsors as only fit for 
wiping bums and for flushing down the toilet drain. 
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For the Kingdom of Earthly Wiles can be likened unto a ruler who foresaw 
that the day would come when he would be thrown out of a certain country 
by the masses and guerrilla freedom fighters … And it came to pass that as 
the ruler was about to return to his home abroad, he again called his servants 
and gave them keys to the land, telling them: „The patriotic guerrillas will 
now be deceived because you are all black, as they are …‟. (Devil on the 
Cross 83) 
By the time Ngugi is released from detention, without being charged, he has become openly 
confrontational and no longer wants any dialogue with the Kenyan comprador bourgeoisie 
and their Western sponsors. He is on a warpath because he has no uncertainties about the 
reasons for his incarceration, the task of a post-colonial African writer and the purpose and 
function of his writing. He writes: 
I am where I am (in prison) because I have written about and I have 
believed in a Kenya for Kenyans, because I have attempted to hold up a 
mirror through which Kenyans can look at themselves in their past, their 
present and perhaps their future … I am where I am because I was involved 
in the writing of a play in the Gĩkũyũ language, Ngaahika Ndeenda, a play 
that looks at the Kenyan history of struggle against imperialism with pride, 
delineating the traitorous role of those who sold out; a play which correctly 
reflects the true social conditions in Kenya today, especially in its 
comparative depiction of the styles of life of the „privileged‟ thieving 
minority and the labouring majority”. (Detained 188) 
It is this uncompromising attitude in speaking what he considers to be the truth that may have 
contributed to his arrest in the first place. For Ngugi, the Kenyan post-colonial rulers 
imprisoned him because they were traitorous thieves, and feared him because he was in the 
process of exposing them by empowering the people through his Gikuyu play. Ngugi‟s social 
realist stance about the role of the writer, his linear perception of history and his diagnostic 
and prescriptive approach to the problems that plague post-colonial Kenya, summarise not 
only his views in Detained but his entire post-1977 fictional and non-fictional ouevre.
8
 
                                                          
8
 Following his release from prison, besides Detained, Ngugi also published three non-fictional books. These 
are: Writers in Politics:A Re-Engagement with Issues of Literature and Society (1981), Moving the Centre The 
Struggle for Cultural Freedoms (1993) and Decolonizing the Mind: The Politics of Language in African 
Literature (1986). As for novels which have been translated into English, there are Matigari (1987), and the 
monumental 2006 satiric novel Wizard of the Crow.   
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While there seem to be unanimity that most post-colonial African states are characterised by a 
pervasive and apparently intractable crisis, not all writers are as hasty in apportioning blame 
for this sad condition.
 9
 For example, Basil Davidson says that the legacy of colonialism for 
newly independent African states “was not a prosperous colonial business [as suggested by 
Ngugi‟s parables in Devil on the Cross], but in many ways, a profound colonial crisis” (1982: 
182). More recently, Makau Mutua (2008) has observed: “At independence, many outgoing 
colonial powers left the machinery of colonial state intact, even though the new African elite 
was supposed to rule through the imposed constitution” (46). Discussing the imprisoning and 
almost inescapable nature of colonial legacies, Fassil Demissie (2007) observes: 
Throughout Africa, the physical imprints of colonialism are evident in the 
form of military garrisons, churches, hospitals, trading centres, prisons, 
schools, agricultural and mining barracks as well as urban centres. (3) 
According to these views, after independence African leaders did not inherit jewels from their 
erstwhile colonial masters which they then systematically smashed. Rather, they took over the 
captaincy of doomed ships whose captains had abandoned them because they had hit the 
proverbial iceberg, and which were quickly filling with water.10 
Bill Ashcroft (1997), a postcolonialist theorist, does not share this pessimistic view of the 
damage caused by colonial rule upon African societies. Focusing on culture rather than the 
physical violence on colonial bodies, he argues that during and after colonisation African 
societies often developed in ways that revealed a remarkable capacity for change and 
adaptation. He writes:  
A common view of colonization, which represents it as unmitigated cultural 
disaster, disregards the often quite extraordinary ways in which colonized 
societies engaged and utilized imperial culture for their own purposes. (2) 
                                                          
 
9
 For example Comarroff and Comaroff observe: “Lawlessness and criminal violence have become integral to 
the depictions of postcolonial societies, adding a brutal edge to older stereotypes of underdevelopment, 
abjection, and sectarian strife” (Law and Disorder in the Postcolony, 2006:6). See also Bade Onimode‟s (1988) 
A Political Economy of the African Crisis for a more nuanced discussion of the causes and possible solutions to 
the so-called “African crisis”. 
 
10
 In his book Architects of Poverty, Moeletsi Mbeki (2009:16) argues that “the states African political elites 
inherited from colonialists were flowed to start with, imposed as they were by force and by foreigners”. 
However, by acknowledging the fact that African nationalist governments inherited almost intractable problems 
imposed by colonial structures, Mbeki does not down-play their contribution to the current state of 
underdevelopment and other problems in Africa. He goes on to address both the culpability of African “political 
elites” and a myriad of other historical factors that have had an influence to what he calls African “poverty”.  
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In Detained, Ngugi depicts Africa‟s encounter with Europe as an unceasing heroic struggle 
for freedom and self-determination. He argues that “the modern [African] world is a product 
of both European imperialism and the resistance waged against it by the Africans” (Ngugi 
2003: 53). He blames Eurocentric historiography for casting Africa‟s encounter with Europe 
as a complete disaster, and claims that African ruling elites, and not colonial rule per se, are 
largely responsible for the pathological condition of post-colonial African states. 
Ngugi sees the prison as participating in both the cultural and physical violence of Europe‟s 
encounter with Africa and constantly refers to three defining moments that have a bearing on 
the state of affairs in Africa today: the trans-Atlantic slave trade; the colonial conquest of the 
continent by European powers in the last quarter of the nineteenth century; and, the post-
colonial take-over of political leadership by corrupt and self-serving African elites. In so 
doing, Ngugi seems to share Mutua‟s view that “Africa cannot be understood unless resort is 
had to its tormented history” (33). Ngugi emphasises that in its origin the prison was an 
abiding aspect of colonial culture and that the post-colonial prison is a reflection of a colonial 
mentality and the rapacious nature of the ruling African elites. This is a view shared by 
Crawford Young (1995), who singles out colonialism as having the most powerful effect on 
the present condition and future of Africa. He notes that the “colonial legacy cast its shadow 
over the emergent African state system to a degree unique among the major world regions” 
(19). However, Peter Childs and Patrick Williams (1997) sound a warning: “The important 
role of intellectuals as participants in, and theorizers of, anti-colonial and anti-imperial 
struggles risks giving intellectuals in general an unearned, or at least unexamined, heroic 
status in certain quarters” (14). My examination of Ngugi‟s Detained will explore these 
diverse views in an attempt to understand Ngugi‟s account of his imprisonment, together with 
the way he tries to negotiate the ambiguities of his own position in the power systems of the 
colonial, post-colonial and Western worlds that he has inhabited. 
1. Prison Autobiography as Suicide Note in Long Walk to Freedom 
Rosenblatt‟s notion of viewing every autobiography as a suicide note is useful in examining 
Mandela‟s autobiography.11 Rosenblatt points out that the life recorded in an autobiography is 
complete to a specific point, and is therefore as good as dead. According to Rosenblatt, the 
autobiographer is simultaneously engaged in a three pronged process of shaping, 
understanding and ending life (178). In order to fully apply Rosenblatt‟s theorisation, we have 
                                                          
11
 I must, however, hasten to mention that Rosenblatt‟s formulation has the singular weakness of failing to 
distinguish between various types of suicides and suicide notes. For the purposes of my argument, I use 
Rosenblatt‟s formulation as if there is just one kind of suicide and suicide note. 
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to try and understand what a suicide note is, particularly that of a physically and mentally 
sound person, and what it hopes to achieve. In my view, a suicide note serves an ambivalent 
purpose. Among other things, it both announces a cessation of hostilities and serves as a 
declaration of war. In other words, a suicide note acknowledges defeat on one level, but at the 
same time transfers the battle to another realm. This is why a suicide note is both a settlement 
and at the same time an unsettling document. In this light, a suicide note simultaneously bares 
and conceals, solves everything while at the same time solving nothing. It is at once an 
expression of hope and an expression of futility – futility in that it announces the unnecessary 
and untimely loss of a life; and hope in that its executor believes that humanity still has a 
conscience that can be pricked to some kind of revelatory shock by the needless waste of life. 
So the suicide victim, in some way, believes in a benign future if not for himself or herself, at 
least for the survivors. Eagleton (2003) points out that death teaches the living that life is 
ultimately unmasterable and therefore shows the bogusness of trying to master the lives of 
others (186). Following Eagleton‟s formulation, suicide can therefore be viewed as a 
benevolent act of self-sacrifice that holds valuable lessons for the living while at the same 
time remaining an unforgivable self-centred and selfish act. Eagleton further argues: “Tragedy 
is about wresting victory from failure” (186). In a similar vein, one can say that suicide is 
about the symbolic wringing of life out of death. One can therefore say that the body of the 
suicide victim, just like the suicide note, is inscribed with meaning, or at least the desire to 
mean something. 
Mandela‟s prison autobiographical account parallels Rosenblatt‟s formulation in a number of 
ways. First, an autobiography gives the impression of being a personal affair as much as a 
suicide note masquerades as a personal account of the suicide victim. However, upon careful 
analysis, a suicide note reveals itself to be a deeply communal activity. The suicide note 
writer‟s actions do not only come out of his or her psychology, but also from his or her 
relationship/s with other people. Additionally, the suicide note writer hopes that there will be 
an audience or readership for his/her missive. The above observations agree with the 
sociologists Edwin S. Shneidman‟s comments about suicide. He argues: “While the act may 
be regarded as a purely voluntary one, … suicide as a whole conforms to certain general laws, 
and is influenced by conditions other than mere individual circumstances or surroundings” 
(1976: 1). One of the fathers of sociology, Emile Durkheim, also famously demonstrated in 
his seminal work, Suicide: A Study in Sociology, that suicide is a social act that requires 
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explanation from social facts (1965: 309-310).
12
 In this way, Mandela‟s autobiography 
resembles a suicide note. The very word “autobiography” suggests a deeply personal account 
of an individual‟s life. However, upon closer analysis Mandela‟s autobiography emerges as a 
communal document in more than one way. Firstly, Mandela obviously writes his 1974 life 
story in response not only to what he has done with his life, but especially to what others have 
done with it. By 1974, he had already spent more than ten years in prison. Clearly then, 
Mandela writes his life story mainly in response to his prolonged imprisonment and the 
debilitating experience of prison, but additionally also in response to the repressive and 
oppressive apartheid regime responsible for his incarceration. Secondly, other people are 
directly involved in the writing or shaping of Long Walk to Freedom. The 1974 manuscript 
that Mandela refines after his release from prison in 1990 was not even Mandela‟s brainchild. 
He writes: “One day, Kathy, Walter and I were talking in the courtyard when they suggested 
that I ought to write my memoirs” (463). While Mandela‟s autobiography differs from a 
suicide note in that it is apparently a suggestion from his colleagues that sets him on the path 
of writing his life story, it is also true that this is a life story directly resulting and responding 
to the criminalisation of his activities and his subsequent imprisonment by the South African 
apartheid regime since his first entry into active politics in the early 1950s, as much as the 
suicide note is an explanatory statement detailing the physical and psychological pressures 
exacted on the individual that lead him or her to the act of suicide. Both Mandela and his 
friends view his imprisonment as martyrdom that will spur on, rather than dampen, the 
struggle against apartheid. A number of writers emphasise Mandela‟s surfacing out of the 
long prison years as a new person, and this suggests that the old Mandela symbolically dies in 
prison.
13
 
                                                          
12
 Durkheim persuasively argued that all the three major types of suicide; egoistic suicide, altruistic suicide and 
anomic suicide, which he enumerated, were a result of some kind of social disequilibrium (see Anthony 
Giddens‟s Durkheim, 1978: 42, also Robert Bierstedt‟s Emile Durkheim, 1966: 135-191). Of course Durkheim 
has been criticized, and rightly so, for excesses in argument in his effort to establish the scientific status of a 
sociological explanation of suicide. (see Kenneth Thompson‟s Emile Durkheim, 1982: 110-111). 
13
 For example Lodge (2006) argues that Mandela‟s “moral standing as a leader was enormously enhanced by 
imprisonment” (ix). Du Preez Bezdrop (2006) on the other hand portrays Mandela as Christ-like figure and the 
prison years are conceived as a symbolic grave from which Mandela was resurrected having attained enormous 
real power and some form of iconic immortality. Similarly, using panegyric terms, Brown and Hort (2006) see 
the long prison years as playing a crucial formative role in Mandela‟s character. They write: “Nelson Mandela 
became a great leader because he was in prison for 27 years … For Nelson Mandela, prison was the forge that 
strengthened his iron will” (66). Mandela‟s long prison years parallel the Christian ritual of baptism. The 
complete immersion in water is thought of as symbolic death. The apostle Paul writes: “Therefore we were 
buried with him through our baptism into his death, in order that, just as Christ was raised up from the dead 
through the glory of the Father, we also should likewise walk in a newness of life” (Romans 6 vs 4, New World 
Translation of the Holy Scriptures, 1984). 
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This reading of both the suicide note and Mandela‟s narrative closely resembles what 
Jameson calls the unconscious of narratives, whereby we analyse and explore “the multiple 
paths that lead to the unmasking of cultural artifacts as socially symbolic acts” (1981: 20). 
Although Jameson‟s idea of a „political unconscious‟ is a complex and slippery literary 
paradigm, it is nonetheless very illuminating in my examination of Mandela‟s Long Walk to 
Freedom. Interestingly, the prison itself has metaphorically been referred to as a space of 
death by a number of writers (Gready 2003: 153; Gordon 2006: 655). Therefore, one may 
argue that by writing his 1974 unpublished prison narrative, Mandela was wresting life out of 
the symbolic space of death and was calling not only for reconciliation but also for some form 
of reparation. A suicide note similarly anticipates and escapes death, its existence is testimony 
of its writer‟s desire to transcend death; it is evidence of a yearning which was physically 
unrealisable for its writer; a yearning that the writer hopes his or her death will somehow 
realise. 
Avery Gordon (2008), who views the writings of prisoners as a curse directed at the world 
outside the prison, writes: “The prisoner‟s curse … replies to the social death sentence in 
multiple voices. It asserts the life world and the life force, the anticipatory afterlife, of the 
ones whose existence has been denied, abandoned, forgotten” (655). This becomes clear when 
one considers the reason Walter Sisulu gives to encourage Mandela to write his story of 
imprisonment. Mandela writes: “Walter said that such a story, if told fairly and truly, would 
serve to remind people of what we had fought and were still fighting for. He added that it 
could become a source of inspiration for young freedom fighters” (463).14 So, as much as the 
suicide note writer does not hope to benefit directly from the victory that his or her note may 
wrest out of death, Mandela and his colleagues are by and large thinking about posterity when 
they embark on the project of writing the story of Mandela‟s life. 
Clearly then, Rosenblatt‟s formulation that an autobiography is like a suicide note in that it 
seeks to shape, to understand, to end life and anticipates a new birth has many parallels with 
Mandela‟s prison narrative. In a number of ways, Mandela‟s autobiography seeks not only to 
give shape to his life and build a new nation; it is also a creative process which results in the 
solid and complete life portrayed in Long Walk to Freedom. In the 1990s upon his release 
from prison, Mandela is at a vantage point in his life where he starts to see patternss and order 
replacing his fluid and tumultuous life of the past 70 years. The disjointed aspects of his life 
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 The audience of Mandela‟s narrative is eclectic and shifting. In the above example it is the freedom fighters, 
and at other times it is the entire nation, and at other times it is the anticipated new generation of the post-
apartheid period.    
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are brought together into a related whole. This reading is implied by the ending of Long Walk 
to Freedom. Mandela writes: 
I have discovered the secret that after climbing a great hill, one finds that 
there are many more hills to climb. I have taken a moment here to rest, to 
steal a view of the glorious vista that surrounds me, to look back on the 
distance I have come. But I can rest only for a moment, for with freedom 
come responsibilities, and I dare not linger, for my long walk is not yet 
ended. (617) 
Despite the disclaimer in this quotation which suggests that freedom has not yet been attained, 
both this quotation and the title of the narrative intimate some kind of arrival at some 
destination.
15
 The title is, after all, Long Walk to Freedom and not Unending Walk to 
Freedom. The last sentence of the above quotation also suggests that the destination of 
freedom has been reached; the narrator says, “for with freedom come responsibilities”, 
suggesting that whatever walking will be done henceforth will be a different kind of walking 
that largely involves the safeguarding of the already-attained freedom. The above quotation, 
and to a certain extent the title of Mandela‟s narrative, are of course deeply Marxist 
sentiments which foretell ultimate victory, despite also implying a never-ending struggle. The 
sentiments come very close to what I said Mbembe calls Afro-radicalism above. Mandela‟s 
above words unequivocally resemble Marx‟s famous words in “The Communist Manifesto”: 
The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles …  
oppressor and oppressed, stood in constant opposition to one another, 
carried on an uninterrupted, now hidden, now open fight, a fight that each 
time ended, either in a revolutionary reconstitution of society at large or in 
the common ruin of the contending classes. (Marx and Engels1961: 52-53; 
italics mine) 
To its credit, as much as the conclusion of Long Walk to Freedom registers a measure of 
triumph over tyranny and oppression, it also implicitly indicates that new tyrannies are 
already festering under the songs of victory, and therefore calls for a life long struggle and 
alertness. From its time of publication Long Walk to Freedom attained an independent 
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 One of these destinations seems to be the house that Mandela builds in Qunu his home village in the Eastern 
Cape. This house is based on the floor plan of his house in the Victor Verster prison. This seems to bear out the 
point that I made earlier on that Mandela‟s autobiography remains contained by the logic of the prison; that life 
after prison keeps reproducing its logic, even its architecture. 
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existence of its own, but also marks an end or death of one Mandela and the resurrection of 
another. 
2. Narratives and Subjectivity in Long Walk to Freedom  
The study of Mandela‟s Long Walk to Freedom can be further enhanced by a detailed 
application of Jameson‟s (1986) assertion that all third-world texts should be read as national 
allegories. Despite the embedded essentialism and totalizing scope of Jameson‟s assertions, 
his approach to literary analysis is very helpful.
16
 Approaching Long Walk to Freedom at an 
allegorical level, for example, allows not only for a rereading of this narrative, but also its 
symbolic rewriting. Reading this narrative as an allegory opens it up to “multiple meanings, to 
successive rewritings and overwritings which are generated at so many levels and so many 
supplementary interpretations” (Jameson: 29). Referring to personal and often intimate 
writing such as auto/biographies, Jameson argues: “[T]he story of the private individual 
destiny is always an allegory of the embattled situation of the public third-world culture and 
society” (69). In the following paragraphs I would like to explore Long Walk to Freedom 
using the Jamesonian formulation by first quoting Mandela‟s words that appear right at the 
beginning of this narrative. Mandela says: 
I was born in 1918 at Mvezo, a tiny village on the banks of the Mbashe 
River in the district of Umtata, the capital of Transkei. The year of my birth 
marked the end of a great war; the outbreak of influenza epidemic that killed 
millions throughout the world; and the visit of a delegation of the African 
National Congress to the Versailles peace conference to voice the 
grievances of the African people of South Africa. Mvezo, however, was a 
place apart, a tiny precinct removed from the world of great events, where 
life was lived much as it had been for hundreds of years. (Mandela 1994: 2) 
It is interesting to note that Mvezo is described in island-and prison-like terms. The narrator 
says it was “a place apart” and twice uses the adjective “tiny” to describe the village of his 
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 Jameson is not unaware of the pitfalls of his project. In The Political Unconscious Narrative as a Socially 
Symbolic Act (1981: 31-32) he argues: “As a matter of practical criticism, it must be clear to anyone who has 
experimented with various approaches to a given text that the mind is not content until it puts some order in 
these findings and invents a hierarchical relationship among its various interpretations. I suspect, indeed, that 
there are only a finite number of interpretive possibilities in any given textual situation, and that the program to 
which the various contemporary ideologies of pluralism are most passionately attached is a largely negative one: 
namely to forestall that systematic articulation and totalisation of interpretive results which can only lead to 
embarrassing questions about the relationship between them and in particular the place of history and the 
ultimate ground of narrative and textual production.” 
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birth.
17
 First, it is referred to as “a tiny village on the banks of the Mbashe River”, and then 
second, as “a tiny precinct removed from the world of great events”. According to the 
narrator, due to their geographical location which mimicked confinement and the resultant 
lack of access to world news, the people of Mvezo lived in apartheid-like intellectual and 
mental darkness.
18
 Due to their literal and metaphoric confinement, not only were they 
unaffected and unaware of the first world war, the Spanish influenza and the colonial 
oppression that lead to the formation of the ANC, and the dispatch of a delegation to 
Versailles in 1918, but they were also blissfully ignorant that a „messiah‟, in the form of 
Mandela, was being born right in their midst. The birth of Mandela in the tiny village of 
Mvezo was forever going to remove it from the invisible ignominy and place it alongside 
Versailles and Bethlehem; places where world‟s great events have taken place. There is an 
implied superiority that the narrator attaches to the knowledge of Europe and its disastrous 
and inhuman history of wars, epidemics and colonial oppression.
19
 The narrator is ambivalent 
about his Mvezo heritage. While putting it on the world map through his narrative, he 
implicitly despises it for its failure to make him part of the world of great events, and the 
world‟s great events are always and inevitably connected with Europe, and most often with 
Europe‟s unequal relationship with Africa. The narrator sees no contradictions in the ANC 
delegation‟s going to the oppressors of black people at Versailles to seek salvation from them 
when the Europeans had plunged themselves into one of the bloodiest war ever recorded in 
human history. 
Throughout his narrative Mandela shows this unquestioning trust in the goodness of the 
oppressor and the oppressor‟s capacity to transcend his or her wickedness and coming to a 
realisation of the humanity of his or her oppressed victim. For example, Mandela is deeply 
touched by the farewell words of Badenhorst, “one of the most callous and barbaric 
commanding officer [they] had had on Robben Island” (448). On the eve of his departure, 
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 Later on, Mandela characterises the prison as a microcosm of society as a whole; and in this respect Mvezo 
will seem the exact opposite. However, it must be noted that when Mandela refers to the entire South African 
society as a prison he is thinking about the restrictions of colonial and apartheid regimes placed against Africans. 
In comparing the village of Mvezo to a prison I am largely referring to its isolation and separation from the day 
today social activities that make it exist as a geographical island in the minds of many citizens.   
  
18
 One of the objectives of both colonialism and apartheid was to encourage the so-called separate existence and 
development of different cultures. But by distributing resources in a skewed manner in favour of the minority 
white groups, the actual aim of apartheid was to keep people of other races unaware of the world developments 
which would create a desire in them to fight for freedom. 
 
19
 Mandela himself is aware of his Anglophilia. He writes: “I confess to being something of an Anglophile. When 
I thought of Western democracy and freedom, I thought of the British parliamentary system. In so many ways, 
the very model of the gentleman for me was an Englishman … While I abhorred British imperialism, I never 
rejected the trappings of British style and manners” (Long Walk to Freedom: 291). 
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Badenhorst simply says to Mandela, “I just wish you people good luck” (448). These 
sentimental words of a departing man whose conscience is guilt-ridden as a result of all the 
abuses he has inflicted on his black prisoners, set Mandela along the path of one of his most 
sanguine contemplative homilies about humanity‟s capacity for goodness. Mandela writes: 
It was a useful reminder that all men, even the most seemingly cold-
blooded, have a core of decency, and that if their hearts are touched, they 
are capable of changing. Ultimately, Badenhorst was not evil; his humanity 
had been foisted upon him by an inhuman system. He behaved like a brute 
because he was rewarded for brutish behaviour. (448) 
Roux (2007: 129) attributes Mandela‟s penchant to idealise human relations to at least two 
factors. For most of his imprisonment Mandela was relatively insulated from the often vicious 
politics of the general section of the prison. Secondly, Mandela finishes his prison 
autobiographical account as a president-elect of a democratic South Africa. As a result of this, 
argues Roux, “both the narrator and the addressee become universalized; the voice that 
addresses the reader arises for no particular reason from some indefinable, interior space, and 
it addresses a vague, inclusive readership” (107). The above quotation, where the narrator 
deliberately places his time of birth alongside world-changing events, may hint at this attempt 
at universalising his experiences, and also at the optimistic post-1990 years during which 
Mandela‟s prison narrative was completed, and it may be evidence of Mandela‟s awareness of 
his political power and mythical status as a symbol of forgiveness and reconciliation. 
Mandela writes his narrative with an ambivalent stance to his deification. Referring to the 
„Free Mandela Campaign‟ of the 1980s Johannesburg and London, Mandela recounts: 
The ANC had decided to personalize the quest for our release by centring 
the campaign on a single figure. There is no doubt that the millions of 
people who subsequently became supporters of this campaign had no idea of 
precisely who Nelson Mandela was. (493) 
Among other things, this quotation reveals Mandela as being very conscious of the power of 
myth and suggests that he is in fact engaged in mythmaking through his own prison narrative. 
This posits his narrative as a site of both power and a centre of resistance, a way of carrying 
forward the struggle against oppression through other means. In writing his autobiography, 
Mandela and his friends who encourage him to write it are not unaware of the power that the 
Mandela image already possesses at this point in time. We have seen that one of the reasons 
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why the 1974 unpublished manuscript was written was in order to inspire young freedom 
fighters with courage and enthusiasm. Mandela and his friends are aware that his narrative has 
the potential to serve as a blueprint for the next generation of freedom fighters. 
Due to the power of the mythical halo that Mandela already possesses at this time, partly as a 
result of a number of historical coincidences, it may be argued that through writing his 
autobiography he is already engaged in lawmaking. Walter Benjamin‟s observation that there 
is an intimate and often reciprocal relationship between law, power and mythmaking makes 
sense when one considers the above. He argues: “Lawmaking is power making, and, to that 
extent, an immediate manifestation of violence [and] power [is also] the principle of all 
mythical lawmaking” (1978: 295). Mandela‟s autobiography can be read as a means through 
which he exposes how a racist state, once having acquired some measure of power, goes on to 
consolidate that power through numerous laws which are meant to further entrench the 
privileges of the white minority. Mandela‟s narrative also aptly shows that the laws and the 
legalities of apartheid South Africa were embedded in violence since they aimed at 
dispossessing black people and other non-white races of their freedoms and means of 
livelihood. His autobiography also becomes “law” in that it animates the entire logic of the 
post-apartheid state. 
The irony of course is that by attaining a certain measure of power, as a result of his ability to 
wrest power from the oppressor through writing his life story, Mandela is not only 
lawmaking, but he is also on the verge of manifesting violence. The fact that Mandela and the 
ANC are walking on the precipice of violence is evident in a number of ways. Firstly, 
Mandela and his colleagues are serving prison life sentences mainly for forming Umkhonto 
we Sizwe, a machine of terror and violence. Secondly, when in prison Mandela‟s narrative 
shows the the difficulties that the ANC encounters when it has to deal with dissenting voices 
even before it ascends to state authority. This is not only seen in the ANC‟s bitter rivalry with 
other anti-apartheid organisations, especially the PAC at Robben Island, but it is also 
dramatised by the numerous clashes between political prisoners and common law prisoners. 
For example, on one occasion when common law criminals started to taunt and mock political 
prisoners through songs, purportedly at the instigation of white warders, Mandela tells us how 
they responded: “Although the more hotheaded among us wanted to confront them, we 
decided to fight fire with fire” (393). So from then on they spent days on end fighting their 
battle through songs
20
. Mandela later plays down the obvious potential for violence against 
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 In My Fight Against Apartheid (1987) Michael Dingake actually talks about the way prisoners at the Fort in 
Johannesburg used to sing loudly to drown out the screams of cellmates who were being abused. This is an 
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those who do not subscribe to the ANC when he writes: “I saw the gang members not as 
rivals but as raw material to be converted” (394). Mandela‟s use of imagery is curious. His 
tone is disparagingly condescending and there is an implicit dehumanisation of those who do 
not see the goodness of the ANC way. They are not humans who can, in their difference from 
and disagreement with the ANC, contribute positively to the fight against the racist apartheid 
state until they are converted to ANC. Despite Mandela‟s post-1990 enthusiasm about 
converting his rivals, his narrative fails to provide a solution regarding those who obstinately 
refuse conversion. Later, after his release from prison, this was to become a serious problem 
which almost derailed all plans for black majority rule. Mandela himself reports that the 
period between 1990 and 1994 became one of the most violent episodes in the South African 
history as rival black political organisations jostled for sovereign authority. 
It is interesting to note that by a curious coincidence, while people outside prison were busy 
creating a demi-god of Mandela by their personalised campaign to free political prisoners, in 
prison a similar process was also taking place. Probably this is one of the instances where we 
witness the prison possessing and constituting the state and vice versa (Rodríguez, 2006: 
43).
21
 Mandela himself tells us of how the prison authorities had been increasingly making 
him the unelected representative of the Robben Island prisoners. For example, when General 
Steyn visited the island in the 1970s, it was Mandela who was called to the office as a 
representative of all prisoners. Apparently, his friends also acknowledged his uniqueness and 
leadership qualities, for as we have seen Mandela began to write his autobiographical account 
in 1974 after being encouraged by his colleagues, who believed that his life story would serve 
the interest of the struggle. Earlier, I referred to Lodge who points out that Mandela‟s iconic 
and celebrity status is not solely attributable to his long imprisonment. Lodge argues: “In the 
South Africa of the early apartheid era, Mandela was one of the first media politicians, 
„showboy‟ as one of his contemporaries nicknamed him, embodying glamour and a style that 
projected visually a brave new Africa world of modernity and freedom” (ix).22 This shows 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
interesting counterpoint to Mandela‟s benign notion of the harmony of song displacing the disharmony and 
chaos of a physical argument.  
  
21
 Mandela explicitly shows the intimate relation of the prison and the state, and of state and prison when he 
paraphrases Dostoevsky: “No one truly knows the nation until one has been inside its jails. A nation should not 
be judged by how it treats its highest citizens, but its lowest ones” (1994: 187). Hugh Lewin, another political 
prisoner who spent seven years in apartheid prisons argues that Pretoria Central Prison was “a mirror of the 
outside South African society: a rotten regime, devoid of moral justification, maintaining control through deceit 
and double-dealing, and, in the process, befouling everyone” (Bandiet 1974: 176-7).   
 
22
 Mandela himself enables us to trace his rise to fame. As early as 1962 it appears as if Mandela had attained an 
iconic figure that angered his political competitors. For example, Stephen Tefu, a prominent communist trade 
unionist and PAC member who was imprisoned together with Mandela in 1962, was so annoyed by the attention 
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that Mandela‟s ascendancy to fame cannot be fully understood without considering a complex 
interplay of forces such as Mandela‟s own personality and personal heritage, the political and 
social environment of Johannesburg in the 1950s and the overall world situation, the general 
prison system and conditions in apartheid South Africa, and the specific and peculiar 
conditions of Robben Island in the 1960s and 1970s, and along with other factors. 
Mandela‟s first encounter with Robben Island also reveals this crucial importance of myth or 
storytelling in the construction of meaning, which is inextricably entangled with space in 
power contestations. He writes: 
The island. There was only one. Robben Island … It was still light when we 
were led on deck and saw the island for the first time. Green and beautiful, it 
looked at first more like a resort than a prison. „Esiquithini.‟ „At the 
island‟… Robben Island was well known among the Xhosa after Makanna 
… the six-foot-six-inch commander of the Xhosa army in the Fourth Xhosa 
War, was banished by the British after leading ten thousand warriors against 
Grahamstown in 1819”. (327) 
We can detect at least four narratives that are woven together in the above words. First we 
have the experiencing voice of the novice Mandela telling us about his initial reaction when 
he first saw Robben Island from the shores of Cape Town. Then this voice is overlaid by the 
numerous voices of the Xhosa people expressing their mythical perceptions and sentiments 
about the Island. We have Mandela‟s narrating voice, which has gone through the harsh 
realities of the Island after spending eighteen years incarcerated there. Lastly, we have 
Mandela‟s narrative voice which is attempting to merge its story with those of the legendary 
anti-colonial fighters such as Makanna and Autshumao. 
The description of Robben Island reminds the reader of Mandela‟s depiction of Mvezo in the 
opening pages of his narrative. It is therefore very tempting to consider parallels and points of 
divergence in the portrayal of these two places. It is ironic that although being inland, Mvezo, 
even after being popularised by Mandela‟s narrative, is still less known than Robben Island. 
With regards to Robben Island, the narrator says that if you say “the Island”, everyone knows 
which island you are referring to. He tells us that he himself had heard of Robben Island as a 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
that Mandela was getting from the warders and declared in disgust: “Mandela is a little boy who is afraid of the 
white man. I don‟t know who he is. One morning, I woke up and found every newspaper saying, “Mandela, 
Mandela, Mandela”‟ and I said to myself, “Who is this Mandela?” I will tell you who he is. He is a chap built up 
by you people for some reason that I don‟t understand. That is who Mandela is!”.When one remembers that 
Mandela unilaterally entered into negotiations with the apartheid leaders in the 1980s, Tefu‟s sentiments start to 
take a new meaning which Mandela may not have intended when he wrote the above words. 
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child. So then, among the Xhosa people at least, the mythical stature of Robben Island 
preceded but was also surely enhanced by Mandela‟s incarceration there. Before Mandela‟s 
incarceration, Robben Island attained its legendary status from two related incidents having to 
do with two heroes of anti-colonial struggle. The first was Nxele or Makanna who led a ten 
thousand men strong Xhosa army against the British imperialists in Grahamstown in 1819 (as 
Mandela points out in the above passage). He was captured and incarcerated at Robben Island 
and drowned while trying to escape by boat. The other story is older than that of Nxele. It 
concerns the heroic exploits of Autshumao, the Khoi Khoi warrior who was banished to 
Robben Island in 1658 by Jan van Riebeeck and became the only known person to have 
successfully escaped from the island by rowing to the mainland in a small boat. Interestingly, 
though, Robben Island attains its mythical status as a result of a relationship, albeit a 
confrontational one, between Africans and European imperialists.
23
 Nxele, Autshumoa and 
Mandela partly derive their legendary status as a result of stories which largely and without 
their active participation in the process are circulated by the imperialists themselves. Of 
course the imperialists circulate these stories for their own purposes, but once in circulation, 
stories are appropriated by the colonised and used ambivalently both as reminders of the 
oppressor‟s power and ruthlessness but also as propaganda for fostering a desire to break free 
from the oppressor‟s chains. Mandela‟s prison narrative, which as we have seen has been 
appropriated and re-appropriated by different interest groups, also serves a similarly 
ambivalent purpose. However, this appropriation of stories is never a once-off event; it is a 
contested and contestable process usually without a definite victor. 
A further juxtaposition of Mandela‟s memories and description of Robben Island when he 
saw it for the first time, with those of his birth place of Mvezo which opens his autobiography 
is very revealing. It is significant that like Mvezo, Robben Island is spatially and 
geographically a land apart and is depicted as an inconsequential piece of land where the 
world‟s great events cannot take place. The narrator refers to it as a “narrow, windswept 
outcrop of rock”. Interestingly, some writers have noted the ambiguity with which islands are 
often viewed in the West. For example, Elizabeth McMahon (2005) says that within the 
Western colonialist tropism island territories are ambiguously seen as condensed sites of 
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 From 1652 onwards, Robben Island attained a mythical status due to the number of African leaders who were 
banished there for resisting colonial invasion. Starting from 1855 with the imprisonment of the Xhosa Chief 
Siyolo, by 1874 more than six prominent Xhosa chiefs had been incarcerated in the Island for resisting British 
colonial rule.(See Jürgen Schadeberg‟s Voices from Robben Island, 1994: 8; see also Smith Charlene in Robben 
Island 1997: 15). Smith further catalogues other instances of human rights abuse that were connected to the 
Island way before 1855. As a result of this she concludes: “The Island thus became entrenched as a symbol of the 
denial of human and political rights” (11-12). 
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acquisition, containment and control
24
. She further argues that the island is a paradoxical and 
contested space, one that represents a condensation of the tension between land and water, 
centre and margin, and, relative to a national perspective, between reflective insularity and an 
externalising globalisation (20). In Mandela‟s above words all these contradictory perceptions 
and meanings of Robben Island can be discerned. For example, when in 1982 Mandela 
suddenly found himself in Pollsmoor, he was not pleased by his new surroundings and found 
himself nostalgic about the island. He writes: “We were now in a world of concrete. I missed 
the natural splendour of Robben Island” (502). Mandela‟s words remind the reader of Colonel 
Aucamp‟s curious announcement on the midnight of 12 June 1964 after Mandela had been 
sentenced to life imprisonment by Judge De Wet. Aucamp told Mandela that he was being 
transferred from Pretoria Local Prison to Robben Island. Without any trace of sarcasm in his 
voice he approached Mandela‟s cell and inquired: “Mandela, are you awake? You are lucky 
man. We are taking you to a place where you will have your freedom. You will be able to 
move around; you‟ll see the ocean and the sky, not just grey walls” (367). Similarly, one 
writer talks of the biblical beauty of Mvezo, which, however, is just skin deep (Mandela 
Foundation 2005: 38). To both Colonel Aucamp and Mandela, Robben Island, and by 
extension Mvezo, are incongruous and contested spaces where the individual is 
simultaneously insulated and exposed, not only to the brutal forces of nature but also to the 
oppressive political system that is responsible for his castaway condition in the first place. 
That the mythical status of Robben Island as a site of political struggle is not merely a post-
apartheid construction is evident from Walter Sisulu‟s words: “[W]e were very conscious of 
the legacy of Robben Island and the political leaders who had been imprisoned there … 
Makana, Maqoma, Harry the Strandloper. We were inspired by these great leaders” (in 
Schadeberg 1994: 27). Although the idealisation of Robben Island as a kind of struggle 
paradise is obviously a post-apartheid trope, it is clear that the tenaciously ambivalent 
signification of this island goes all the way back to a past that probably lies beyond a full 
scholarly archival retrieval. 
When the depiction of Mvezo and that of Robben Island are put side by side, as I have tried to 
do above, the reader is struck by the centrality and importance of these two “insignificant” 
places in Mandela‟s most critical and formative years. From 1918, the year of his birth to the 
beginning of 1937, Mandela was in and about the vicinity of Mvezo, a place where life was 
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 The complete containment and isolation suffered by the unwilling inhabitants of Robben Island is captured in 
the words of Ethelreda Lewis in her book The Harp: “For there is no prison safer than the island. And all, all are 
caged that live there. All see the broad heavens striped with bars. All are held in unseen chains to the body, the 
mind, the soul” (in Schadeberg 1994: 12). 
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lived much as it had for hundreds of years. From 1964 to about 1982, again a total of 18 
years, Mandela was at the “the island”, a place where “watches and timepieces of any kind 
were barred [and where] each week resemble[ed] the one before” (375). Mandela‟s free years 
before going to prison were spent either in traditional and conservative places, such as at the 
palace at Mqhekezweni, where “the two principles that governed [Mandela‟s life] were 
chieftaincy and the Church” (18), or in highly hierarchical and militarized institutions of 
learning, such as in Clarkebury Institute, Heldtown or the University College of Fort Hare, or 
training as a lawyer in a frigid and rigid British colonial-style environment. Interestingly, 
during most of his early years in Johannesburg, he was taught contemplative thoughtfulness 
by poverty and hunger and was also training for the formal and highly conservative court 
career as a law advocate. The above observations suggest that critics such as Boehmer (2008), 
Brown and Hort (2006), and a number of others, while correct in seeing the prison years as 
being decisive in the transformation of Mandela from an impulsive politician and militant 
activist into a calculative and meditative statesman, fail to recognise the resemblance of 
apartheid prison environment to most of the places where Mandela spent his formative years. 
Tom Lodge (2006) offers a much more attentive reading of Mandela‟s life story. He argues: 
“Generally in Mandela‟s career there are no sudden turning points; rather key decisions 
develop out of lengthy incremental processes of thought, and are often influenced by 
Mandela‟s recollection of precedent” (viii). Reflecting on his political career, Mandela 
himself writes: 
I cannot pinpoint a moment I became politicized, when I knew that I would 
spend my life in the liberation struggle … I had no epiphany, no singular 
revelation, no moment of truth, but a steady accumulation of a thousand 
slights, a thousand indignities and a thousand unremembered moments 
produced in me anger, a rebelliousness, a desire to fight the system that 
imprisoned my people. (89) 
The above words depict a Mandela with an evolutionist rather than revolutionary political 
approach. However, Lodge‟s argument about the continuities in Mandela‟s political career 
becomes even much more telling when we recognise the correspondence of pre-colonial and 
colonial mythical modes of appropriating power through the spatial act of reclusion or of 
isolating certain individuals for a certain period of time. One of the aims of the prison is to 
remove individuals with socially undesirable behavioural traits from mainstream society and 
to place them in a place of isolation. In apartheid prisons, however, prisoners often found 
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themselves suffering from double isolation. On a number of occasions Mandela found himself 
in solitary confinement for transgressing certain prison regulations. Mandela and many other 
prisoners found this to be the most formidable of all prison punishments. However, in a later 
chapter, I examine how the 27s and the 28s, some of the so-called „Number Gangs‟ in South 
African prisons, often sought the isolation cell by stabbing a warder because it served as a 
place of initiation where the „manhood‟ of a potential gang member could be severely tested. 
So a place that symbolises pain and degradation in the eyes of prison authorities and many 
other prisoners is transformed into a ritualised space that one ought to pass through if one is to 
enjoy certain privileges in prison as a „man‟. The circumcision initiation ritual that Mandela 
describes in detail also helps us to understand some of the ambivalent mythical conceptions of 
the prison and the isolation cell that were held by both the oppressed Africans and by their 
white oppressors in colonial and apartheid South Africa. In Long Walk to Freedom, places of 
reclusion, in this case the circumcision site and the prison, are simultaneously viewed as 
places of punishment and penitence and as factories for the manufacture of „real men‟ and 
heroes. 
The isolated location of the circumcision site that Mandela describes in relation to the 
inhabited villages is instructive in this regard. He writes: 
Early in the new year, we journeyed to two grass huts in a secluded valley 
on the banks of Mbashe River, known as Tyhalarha, the traditional place of 
circumcision for Thembu kings. The huts were seclusion lodges, where we 
where to live isolated from society. It was sacred time; I felt happy and 
fulfilled taking part in my people‟s customs and ready to make the transition 
from boyhood to manhood (24). 
The secluded circumcision site is a place full of figurative significance, not only for the young 
initiates but for Xhosa people as a nation. As a result of the myth that surrounds this site and 
the circumcision ritual itself, the place is transformed from one where intense pain is inflicted 
on the young initiates‟ penises to one that fills them with happiness since the occasion marks 
conversion into manhood. Mandela‟s narrative shows that manhood is such a desirable thing 
among his people because it symbolically constitutes the individual as a subject. This is seen 
from Mandela‟s comment below: “The foundation of self-government was that all men were 
free to voice their opinions and were equal in their value as citizens. (Women, I am afraid, 
were deemed second–class citizens)” (20).  I discuss this point in more detail in my later 
chapter when I examine Steinberg‟s explanation of he ways in which humanity is equated to 
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manhood within the prison gang community. Mandela consistently shows that place and 
space are always tied to a certain kind of emblematic transition and transformation, such as 
moving from boyhood to manhood. For example, we see this when he gets his own house 
with Evelyn, his first wife: “Early in 1946, Evelyn and I moved to a … house of our own in 
…. Orlando West … I was mightily proud … A man is not a man until he has a house of his 
own” (98). Mandela‟s narrative suggests that place and space are not just neutral geographical 
locations, but they are narrations which always come laden with multiple connotations which 
have real consequences on how the individual or a group of people live their lives and how 
they experience their reality. 
We observe a similar pattern of ritualised behaviour when, in 1956, despite the encroaching 
darkness and his pessimism about apartheid government‟s policies, Mandela returns to 
Transkei to purchase a plot of land in Umtata near his rural home. Defending his 
incomprehensible decision Mandela writes: “I have always thought a man should own a house 
near a place he was born, where he might find restfulness that eludes him elsewhere” (178)25. 
What Mandela does reminds us of the deeply symbolic act that was performed by the prophet 
Jeremiah when Jerusalem was under Babylonian siege and was on the verge of destruction. 
Jeremiah bought a field from Hanamel his paternal uncle. Explaining his actions, which 
apparently went against common sense, the prophet says: “[T]he God of Israel, has said, 
„Houses and fields and vineyards will yet be bought in this land [after the exilic period]‟” 
(Jeremiah 32 vs 8–15). So whether Mandela realised it or not, his buying land in Umtata when 
the thick clouds of apartheid were gathering on the horizon was a figurative affirmation of the 
certainty of the demise of the apartheid state. Although it was to be two long months after his 
release from prison before Mandela would have the opportunity to travel to Qunu, it is 
interesting that his strongest desire had been to go there straight away after stepping out of 
prison. His wish to build a house in his rural home territory was eventually fulfilled in 1993. 
The irony of course is that the house he built resembled the one he had occupied at Victor 
Verster Prison from 9 December 1988 up to the time of his release on the 11th of February 
1990. This dramatises the power of place and space over the individual‟s consciousness. 
Clearly, the self, is among other things, constituted by the organisation and arrangement of 
the individual‟s locale. 
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 This seems to be a very pastoral ideal rooted in a long tradition of Xhosa pastoralism. Ironically, this 
pastoralism would be intelligible to the colonial pastoralist imagination as well, making this one of those rare 
moments of agreement between traditions – an agreement that resulted in constant warfare for land. 
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So far it must be clear that I am arguing for a collapsing of the roughly three life phases of 
Mandela that are related in Long Walk to Freedom, such that, instead of there being sharp 
divisions, we have a life that is seamlessly interwoven. The matrix and point of interface for 
Mandela‟s narrative is of course the space of the prison and the prison-like spaces that 
constitute an important part of his formative years. Through the two quotations about Mvezo 
and Robben Island, I have shown that it is in the construction of a narrative, in trying to make 
sense of what has happened to the individual that blocks of temporalities are created around 
place and space. These chronotopes are intrinsic to narratives: they are the building blocks of 
narratives; without them there cannot be any narrative. 
Lodge notes that “[f]or Mandela, politics has always been primarily about enacting stories, 
about making narratives” (ix). Although the prison years are clearly crucial in consolidating 
his childhood experiences, it is significant that Mandela claims that he did not learn about the 
rudiments of democracy in prison, but at the palace in Mqhekezweni as a young boy. The 
young Mandela was quite enthralled by the tolerant and democratic manner in which the 
regent exercised his power. Describing one of the sessions where the regent met his subjects 
to discuss issues of state, Mandela says: “Everyone who wanted to speak did so. It was 
democracy in its purest form … People spoke without interruption and the meetings lasted for 
many hours” (20). This romanticisation seems to be a veiled lesson in democracy for the 
citizens of the newly liberated Republic. However, Mandela suggests that this democracy 
imbibed at a tender age guided his dealings with his fellow political prisoners at Robben 
Island. For example, he explains that he often disagreed on a number of issues with his 
colleagues but once a decision had been democratically arrived at, he supported it more than 
its advocates (409). Although Mandela seems to entirely ascribe this discipline to his teenage 
years that he spent observing deliberations at the regent‟s palace in Mqhekezweni, it is clear 
that his childhood memories are now coloured by his prison experience and a desire to 
consolidate the then-emerging democratic political dispensation. Still enamoured by past 
African methods of conflict resolution, Mandela also attributes his spirit of accommodation 
towards malicious gang members, competitive PAC members, and abusive and cruel warders 
to his early years when he observed the running of government by the regent, a milieu he 
escaped from for its parochialism the moment he could. However, it is largely the space of the 
prison, mediated through the narrative, which enables Mandela to create these continuities in 
his political career. Nevertheless, it is important to note that stories and the theatrical seem 
always to have captured Mandela‟s imagination. For example, he talks of occasions when 
chiefs and headmen who would have come to the palace would, after their serious 
40 
 
deliberations, have time to tell stories. It is the manner in which they told their stories that 
captivated and fired the young Mandela‟s imagination. He writes: “Their speech was formal 
and lofty, their manner slow and unhurried, and the traditional clicks of our language were 
long and dramatic” (21). In the light of the above, it would be a futile exercise to try to 
determine which formative space was the most important in creating the meditative and 
calculating politician that Mandela turned out to be. What seems crucial in the constitution of 
the self for Mandela, as Lodge points out, is that space and events seem largely accessible to 
him through stories or narratives. 
3. Scaffolds of (I)legalities 
Mandela‟s depiction of Robben Island allows us to utilise and interrogate Agamben‟s notion 
of the camp as the absolute space of exception. Agamben praises Foucault‟s perceptive study 
on biopolitics, by which Foucault meant the growing inclusion of people‟s natural lives in the 
mechanisms and calculations of power in 18
th
 century Europe. He also applauds Foucault in 
his examination of the process of subjectivisation or how, beginning in the 18
th
 century in 
Europe, the individual objectified himself or herself, making himself or herself 
simultaneously subject and at the same time an appendage of external power control. 
However, he criticises Foucault for failing to apply his study to the only phenomenon that 
Agamben considers to be the exemplary place of modern biopolitics: the phenomenon of the 
camp, that characterised the politics of the great totalitarian states of the twentieth century 
Europe. Referring especially to Nazi concentration camps, Agamben argues: 
What happened in the camps exceeds the juridical concept of crime that the 
specific juridico-political structure in which those events took place is often 
simply omitted from consideration. The camp is merely the place in which 
the most absolute conditio inhumana that ever existed on earth was realized. 
(166) 
Agamben goes on to argue that the concentration camp, and not simply the space of 
confinement such as the prison, is the absolute space of exception.  Although there were no 
camps directly comparable to the Nazi concentration camps or the Soviet gulags in South 
Africa, some writers have nonetheless classified apartheid South Africa alongside the great 
totalitarian states of the twentieth century Europe.
26
 Mandela‟s Long Walk to Freedom sheds 
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 Interestingly, in South Africa of the late years of apartheid (1980-1990), there were death squads that operated 
secret internment camps. A division started to develop between “normal” prisons and these secret locations of 
torture and destitution, where the rule of law simply ceased applying altogether. For example Pumla Gobodo-
Mdikizela describes the Vlakplaas, a farm outside Pretoria where Eugene de Kock presided over a secret 
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interesting insights on Agamben‟s claim that the camp, and not the prison, is the place of 
absolute conditio inhumana. 
The South African prisons of the 1920s and 1930s, as portrayed in Bosman‟s Cold Stone Jug, 
and of the 1950s and early 1960s, as portrayed by Mandela in Long Walk to Freedom, are 
racist places characterised by physical degradation and psychological trauma. For example, in 
Cold Stone Jug Bosman relates the physical pain of the stone yard gang and the near 
starvation prison diet which threatened the physical health of all inmates. He also relates the 
psychological distress that almost drives him mad, and actually leads to the madness of quite 
a number of other prisoners. He talks of a place that dehumanises the individual so much that 
he loses his power of speech and is reduced to the howls of a trapped or dying dog. It can, 
however, be argued that, despite all its deprivations, Bosman‟s Swartklei Great prison is still a 
space of privileged white man, who can still be rehabilitated and be reintegrated into 
mainstream society. Certain laws and regulations that respect the value of human life still 
apply in Bosman‟s Swartklei Great Prison, and what happens within its walls although 
inhuman, is nevertheless, at least for white prisoners, still within the juridical concept of 
crime that the specific juridico-political structure of apartheid South Africa could 
comprehend. 
However, an examination of Montagu Slater‟s The Trial of Jomo Kenyatta (1959) shows that 
in colonial Kenya something that nears an absolute state of exception started to obtain. Earlier 
in this chapter, I mention that Mbembe defines politics as a project of autonomy and the 
achieving of agreement among a collectivity through communication and recognition. Based 
on this normative theory of democracy, both the British colonial invasion of Kenya and the 
Mau Mau activities are located outside juridico-political structure; they lie in some zone of 
indistinction where the British juridical notions of justice undergo a radical redefinition. In 
The Trial of Jomo Kenyatta, Slater points out that the British colonial government did not 
even pretend that it was implementing the same legal standards in the colonies as in Britain.  
In order to fight their rebellious subjects, the British instituted something not entirely 
dissimilar to Nazi concentration camps in Kenya, in which by 1954 over 100 000 Kenyans 
were incarcerated under the suspicion of being Mau Mau or supporters of Mau Mau.  
Incidentally, it is not the great totalitarian states that instituted the use of concentration camps 
(as it is usually assumed), but they were introduced by the very torch bearers of 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
apartheid hit squad. Although apartheid authorities obviously knew about the existence of the Vlakplaas, its 
activities were not governed by any known legislation (Human Being Died 2003: 104-108). 
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enlightenment, the British, during the Anglo-Boer War of 1899–1902.27 It is interesting to 
note that on both occasions, in South Africa (1899 – 1902) and in Kenya (1952 - 1956), when 
Britain‟s colonial project was threatened she resorted to the creation of concentration camps. 
In view of Agamben‟s claims about the camp as a space where an absolute state of exception 
obtains, this often glossed over historical fact takes a new dimension when we realise that 
both South Africa and Kenya inherited British juridico-political structures. This makes it clear 
that the British colonial project, which was linked to notions of humanist enlightenment, was 
in fact entangled with the emergence of the concentration camp in Africa. Agamben‟s 
assertion that “[t]he camp is the space that is opened when the state of exception begins to 
become the rule” (168) is evident in the two above occasions when the British colonial project 
was put under siege. What is more disturbing, however, about Agamben‟s argument is that he 
says the camp is not a historical fact, but a “hidden matrix and nomos of the political space in 
which we are still living” (166). If this is true, it becomes imperative to determine whether the 
prison narratives under review bear out Agamben‟s obersevations. 
The question that I seek to answer now is this: can these observations about the camp be 
brought to bear on our understanding of Mandela‟s portrayal of the prison in Long Walk to 
Freedom? On this issue, the narrative can be read at a number of levels. The first analysis of 
the depiction of the prison reveals an apartheid state which treated its citizens, especially 
black ones, with increasing inhuman cruelty, while nonetheless still operating within some 
form of juridico-political framework in dealing with the law‟s transgressors. In their study of 
postcolonies, Comaroff and Comaroff (2006) argue that these polities are engaged in the 
fetishisation of law. They point out that postcolonies are by no means lawless, but instead 
“their politics and popular cultures, even their outlaw cultures, are infused with the spirit of 
the law” (19). Mandela‟s narrative as a whole suggests that insofar as the fetishism of the law 
is concerned, postcolonies mimic both the colonial and apartheid state. The apartheid state 
that Mandela depicts is by no means lawless: instead it is a state that suspends legalities when 
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 A recent historical work makes the following observation about the British use of concentration camps during 
the Anglo-Boer War of 1999-1902: “The conditions in these camps were appalling, Epidemic diseases, 
malnutrition, insufficient medical care and dreadful sanitary arrangements resulted in high death rate. In the 
white camps, the death toll rose to 26 370 of the approximately 100 000 inmates. In the Black camps the official 
British figure was just over 14 000, but recent research proves that a figure in excess of 20 000 deaths among the 
120 000 inmates of these camps is acceptable”. “The Centenary of the Anglo-Boer War, 1899 – 1902”, www. 
Icon.co.za/ 2009/02/11. In these camps, in Foucault‟s words “[d]eath was now something permanent, something 
that slips into life, perpetually gnaws at it, diminishes it and weakens it” (Society: 244). The colonial authorities 
had both the means to make life, through providing services that would ensure the health and safety of their 
subjects, and also the mechanism to let die through deliberate physical neglect, starvation, lack of medication 
and at times through painful bodily torture which resulted in slow death. 
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this suits its objectives,
28
 or deploys them to authorise predation and criminalise opposition 
(Comaroff and Comaroff: 11). One interesting feature of Mandela‟s narrative is its attempt to 
show the clear distinction that regulated the behaviour of state authorities in their dealings 
with two categories of prisoners which increasingly became the hallmark of apartheid South 
Africa: the common-law criminals on one hand, and political prisoners on the other.  For 
example, in his initial arrest and subsequent imprisonment Mandela suggests that a semblance 
of shared rule of law was still in existence. He writes: 
I was handcuffed and taken to Pretoria in an old van in the company of 
another prisoner … The choice of companion was curious: his name was 
Nkadimeng and he was a member of one of Soweto‟s fiercest gangs. 
Normally, officials would not permit a political prisoner to share the same 
vehicle with a common-law criminal, but I suspect they were hoping I 
would be intimidated by Nkadimeng, who I assumed was a police informer 
… I was put in a single cell with this fellow. I demanded and eventually 
received separate space so that I could prepare my case. (307) 
The above extract suggests that up to about this time, political prisoners were treated 
differently from common-law criminals, and hence indicates that the apartheid prisons still 
maintained a mock adherence to a juridico-framework. If Mandela‟s claim is true that the 
apartheid authorities were working hand in hand with dangerous gang members like 
Nkadimeng, this may suggest that law and lawlessness were conditions of each other‟s 
possibility not only in the postcolonial polities that Comaroff and Comaroff examine, but also 
in apartheid South Africa. Interestingly, Mandela says that even at Robben Island prison 
authorities worked in cohorts with gang members in an attempt to break the will and the 
solidarity of political prisoners. Mandela writes: 
To counterbalance the effect of these new political allies, authorities also 
put a handful of common-law prisoners in our section … These men … 
were members of the island‟s notorious criminal gangs, either the Big Fives 
or the Twenty-Eights, which terrorized other prisoners … Their role was to 
act as agents provocateurs, and they would attempt to push us around, take 
our food and inhibit any political discussions we tried to have. (393) 
                                                          
28
 Mandela‟s predicament with the law is exacerbated by the fact that as a lawyer, he can never entirely lose faith 
in the power of the law: this is almost the guiding contradiction of his narrative. Nor can Mandela afford to 
denigrate the law in the difficult moment of transition during which Long Walk to Freedom was published. 
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At one point, prison warders even instructed these prisoners to sing a song with the lyrics 
which said, “What did you want in Rivonia? Did you think that you would become the 
government?” (393). This song was a taunt directed against all political prisoners but 
especially the Rivonia trialists who were interned on the Island at the time. All these instances 
where authority seems to ally itself with the criminal element suggest that “politics and crime, 
legitimate and illegitimate agency, endlessly redefine each other” (Comaroff and Comaroff: 
11). In fact, Mandela indicates that at one time, especially before the enactment of the Ninety-
Day Detention Law, which specially targeted political dissent, going to prison was viewed as 
an act of heroism since it was seen as a form of resistance against apartheid. One had to 
commit a crime in order to be jailed, and this was not just a way of resisting authority: it also 
enabled one to gain some form of legitimacy and authority in the eyes of fellow freedom 
fighters, rather in the way circumcision rituals which I discuss above enabled Mandela and his 
peers to become „men‟. In this way, the resistance of freedom fighters became dependent on 
state authority. This debilitating binarism can also be seen from the fact that during apartheid, 
a court appearance was often the only place where political activists could air their views 
freely. For example, during both his first trial and his subsequently sentencing to five years 
for inciting people to strike and for leaving the country without a passport, and also during the 
Rivonia trial in which he was sentenced to life imprisonment, Mandela was allowed to spell 
out his political beliefs. Among other things, Mandela addressed the court with the following 
words: 
I am prepared to pay the penalty even though I know how bitter and 
desperate is the situation of an African in the prisons of this country … 
More powerful than my fear of the dreadful conditions to which I might be 
subjected in prison is my hatred for the dreadful conditions to which my 
people are subjected outside prison throughout the country …. I have no 
doubt that posterity will pronounce that I was innocent and that the 
criminals that should have been brought before this court are the members 
of the government. (319) 
In the above quotation, Mandela is appealing to more than the legal or what is defined as 
lawful by the state. Rather, he is evoking the political issues behind his arrest and 
imprisonment and is appealing to what he believes are universal human ethical standards. To 
the apartheid state of Mandela‟s narrative one can apply Roger Berkowitz‟s (2005) 
observations about the modern world. He argues: “Lawfulness has replaced justice as the 
measure of ethical action in the world” (ii). Interestingly, writing about the use of law in 
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ancient Greece, Hannah Arendt (1998) evokes the architectural and theatrical and applies it to 
the juridical, and argues that the polis was never founded on the ethical and the just, rather on 
the lawful and the unlawful. She writes: 
Before men began to act, a definite space had to be secured and a structure 
built where all subsequent actions could take place, the space being the 
public realm of the polis and its structure the law. (194–195) 
In Mandela‟s trial, as we also noted in Kenyatta‟s, the courtroom, both in the apartheid and 
colonial systems, were not only places where law was enforced, but became microcosms of 
the state, where law became the structure which enabled people to resist the senseless and 
brutal actions of the oppressor. Unfortunately, this theatricalisation of justice in these two 
spaces of oppression must be equated to the performance of a tragedy rather than a comedy as 
it inevitably led to tragic consequences. Nevertheless, in the South African situation, it is clear 
that at this point in time, although political activists did not expect justice from the apartheid 
judicial system, they could still assume certain judicial formalities, and they often 
manipulated these for their own political ends, as is evident in Mandela‟s speech above. Here, 
as in Kenyatta‟s trial, although the acting within the court space plays out like a show for all 
parties involved, the space is clearly used to achieve different goals by the oppressor, on one 
hand, and by the oppressed, on the other. For the oppressor, the courtroom becomes a stage 
for the ritualised performance of justice for the benefit and satisfaction of a certain assumed 
audience, and for the assuagement of the conscience of the oppressor; for the oppressed, it 
becomes the only space were the political battle can be fought, or, to revert to Arendt‟s 
language of theatre, where political battles can be acted out with minimum bodily pain and 
injury. 
Interestingly, Comaroff and Comaroff (2006), referring particularly to postcolonies, suggest 
that the law or the legal is often used to sanctify and sustain criminally brutal modes of 
domination, “some of them highly rationalized, highly technicized, [and] highly sanitized” 
(2). They go on to argue: “The modernist nation-state … has always been erected on the 
scaffolding of legalities” (22). This is evident in all the cases when Mandela is confronted by 
the apartheid juridical state machinery. For example, during his 1962 trial, despite the fact 
that within the strictly legal there was no way he could have proved himself innocent, the 
state went on to call more than a hundred witnesses. Mandela himself tells us: “It (the charge) 
was indisputable – and in fact I did not dispute – that I was technically guilty on both charges 
[of illegally leaving the country and inciting African workers to strike]” (313). Since 
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Mandela‟s technical guilt was not being disputed, it becomes clear that in spending 
stupendous resources in this case, the state was not out to deliver justice, but to prove to 
onlookers that the state was built on a scaffold of legalities, as Comaroff and Comaroff have 
argued.
29
 
In a similar way, Slater shows how both the prosecution and the magistrate in Kenyatta‟s trial 
were preoccupied with the legal and not necessarily the political context and moral issues in 
their unswerving conviction that Kenyatta and his colleagues were guilty.
30
 However, what is 
most striking in the two instances is that both the accuser, in this case the state, and the 
accused are aware that they are engaged in some kind of play-acting ritual which is never 
meant to satisfy what can be termed the ethical and the just. Admittedly, the accused or the 
dominated are often thrown into this play-acting against their will. But as we have already 
seen, at times it is the oppressed that actually triggers this performance. For example, during 
the 1952 Defiance Campaigns, political activists deliberately dared arrest and imprisonment. 
This action was aimed at using the court as an arena for political battle since most avenues of 
political expression could lead to extreme bodily harm or even to loss of life. Secondly, the 
action was based on the assumption that despite the bitter and desperate situation of an 
African in the apartheid prisons, some kind humane respect for human life still governed the 
behaviour of prison officials and the government still operated within some kind of juridico-
political structure which restrained its law-enforcing agents from a flagrant abuse of 
prisoners. Seeking out imprisonment was therefore a safe way of continuing the struggle 
against the oppression of apartheid state, and a confirmation that South African jails at this 
time were not spaces where an absolute state of exception obtained. 
In Mandela‟s account, the prison is narrativised as a space that cultivates the stoic endurance 
of pain, and therefore becomes a place that is charged and invested with symbolic 
significances which are able to infuse an aura of visibility and invincibility upon its former 
occupants. We also saw earlier in this discussion how Mandela links circumcision and the 
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 More recently, Robert Mugabe, the president of Zimbabwe, has utilised this global obsession with legalities to 
remain in power despite the astounding pressure that has been coming from both within and without 
Zimbabwean borders. He has managed this feat by keeping on invoking the law, rewriting the law, working just 
barely inside its parameters. This tactic has disarmed most of his international detractors. 
  
30
  In the case of apartheid government, it never really acknowledged that “political prisoners” existed as a 
separate category. Political prisoners were just people who had broken the law, criminals like everybody else. 
Interestingly, what preceded the new political dispensation in 1994 was the decriminalisation of individuals like 
Mandela and black political organisations. While this process was publicised in the media, Mahmood Mamdani 
argues that the same process of decriminalisation of the apartheid state was taking place behind the scenes. 
(Mamdani “From Human Rights to Human Wrongs: An Alternative to Nuremberg as a Paradigm”. Public 
Lecture University of Western Cape, 24 May 2010). 
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possession of a personal piece of land or house to the symbolic attainment of manhood. 
Mandela suggests that in the case of the prison, the oppressed are able to subvert what the 
state designed it for. Commenting on the 1952 Defiance Campaign, Mandela writes: 
The ANC emerged as a truly mass-based organization with an impressive 
corps that had braved the police, the courts and the jails. The stigma usually 
associated with imprisonment had been removed. This was a significant 
achievement, for fear of prison is a tremendous hindrance to a liberation 
struggle. From the Defiance Campaign onward, going to prison became a 
badge of honour among Africans. (129) 
Clearly then, the Defiance Campaign was not a mere physically confrontation with the 
apartheid state, it largely aimed at demystifying the power structures of apartheid. It was 
meant to subvert what Mandela tells us the prison is designed to achieve: “Prison not only 
robs you of your freedom, it attempts to take away your identity. Everyone wears a uniform, 
eats the same food, [and] follows the same schedule. It is by definition a purely authoritarian 
state that tolerates no independence or individuality” (321). 
Mandela‟s narrative also suggests that a prisoner is not unlike a political activist who is forced 
to go underground by authorities. Describing the period when he was forced to operate 
underground, Mandela observes: “The key to being underground is to be invisible. Just as 
there is a way to walk into a room in order to make yourself stand out, there is way of walking 
and behaving that makes you inconspicuous” (225). Mandela seems to imply that what the 
authorities fail to achieve through imprisonment becomes a self-imposed state when one 
operates underground. Viewed in this light, it is operating underground, and not the prison, 
which forces one into some kind of state of exception. The state agents can eliminate the 
activist without fear of any judicial inquisition since the activist is officially missing anyway. 
The irony of course is that Mandela‟s narrative as a whole suggests that being underground in 
fact leads to intensified visibility. For example, during the period that he spent underground 
between 1961 and his subsequent arrest in 1962, he enjoyed amazing and unsolicited publicity 
which clearly contributed to the iconic status which Mandela would later enjoy during his 
Robben Island days and after his release from Victor Verster prison in 1990. For example, in 
June, before his arrest on the 5
th
 of August 1962, while Mandela was still as far away from 
South Africa as Addis Abba, Ethiopia, newspaper headlines sensationally declared, 
„RETURN OF THE BLACK PIMPERNEL‟. Black Pimpernel is the name that journalists had 
given Mandela during the period he spent underground as a wanted political activist. Mandela 
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subsequently acquired something of the status of a deity, partly due to his long imprisonment. 
Interestingly, during the Defiance Campaign, people capitalised on the social meanings 
attached to imprisonment to achieve a certain measure of resistance and some level of agency. 
I have already noted the paradox that is embedded in political prisoners‟ use of their new 
status acquired from prison to mobilise and rally people against the oppressive establishment; 
their resistance becomes inseparable from the power regimes of the state. 
However, with the enactment of the Ninety-Day Law and the brutality which it unleashed 
especially on black political prisoners, we witness a shift starting to take place as the officials 
begin to deliberately disregard their own conventions as a way of breaking the political will of 
dissidents. We start to witness South African jails becoming indistinguishable from camps, 
places where Agamben says a state of exception begins to become the rule. Mandela‟s 
narrative only hints at this brutality in passing, but other writers such as Ruth First foreground 
it strongly. Later, in Steinberg‟s The Number, albeit in a different setting, we will see the 
same process taking place, when the confrontational power of the Number gangs is gradually 
eroded by the coming in of democracy as prison authorities incrementally shift the unspoken 
conventions upon which the Number gangs previously derived their stability and authority.  
Mandela‟s Long Walk to Freedom can be read as a celebration of a life-long resistance against 
the apartheid regime. The twenty-seven years that Mandela spends in prison are narrated as 
participating in this resistance. The narrative considers that ugly chapter of South African 
history closed; and with it the end of arbitrary arrests and imprisonments of political 
opponents. Although written some fifteen years after Ngugi‟s Detained, Long Walk to 
Freedom refuses to engage with the idea of prison beyond apartheid. It is as if the prison is 
buried with the end of apartheid. Ngugi‟s Detained shows that the prison would continue to 
be used as an instrument for political battles by black governments that take over the reins 
from white racist regimes. In subsequent chapters, I will seek to show that the depoliticisation 
of the prison in post-apartheid South Africa does not mean that it is no longer central to the 
individual notions of the self and in national discourses that try to define what the new post-
apartheid state means. For now, let us consider how Detained, although published a decade 
and half before Long Walk to Freedom, sounds an alarm to Mandela‟s post-apartheid 
sanguinity. 
4. Post-colonial Prison and Colonial Violence 
One of Ngugi‟s aims in Detained seems to be the excavation of the archive of colonial 
violence against the colonial subjects as a means of understanding his own imprisonment by a 
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post-colonial regime. Ngugi makes this one of his urgent tasks because, as Makau Mutua 
(2008) observes, “there seems to be a rush of amnesia, a deliberate forgetfulness that wants to 
wish away this barbaric history” (33). Murunga and Nasong‟o (2007) also help us understand 
why the Kenyan post-colonial regime would feign forgetfulness of the violent colonial history 
when they observe: “Law enforcement agencies were created to enforce colonial rule over the 
natives and this role was inherited and perfected by the postcolonial state in fighting 
opposition” (13).  In Detained, Ngugi reminds his readers of the brutalities of colonial rule so 
that they can see parallels with the postcolonial state‟s violent excesses.  He exposes 
colonialism‟s savagery which was justified through the depiction of natives as savages who 
could only be subjected to humane European ways through the use of brutal force. On the 
question of colonial violence, Anupama Rao and Steven Pierce (2006) make a similar point 
by indicating that colonies were regarded as exceptional spaces were metropolitan norms of 
justice and civility could be disregarded (2). They argue: “Colonial subjects were ruled 
through violence; violated bodies were by definition colonial” (21). Like Ngugi, other writers 
have argued that postcolonial violence mirrors that of the colony. For example, summarizing 
Walter Benjamin‟s thesis, Comaroff and Comaroff (2006) propose that in the postcolony 
“violence and the law, the lethal and the legal, are constitutive of one another” (vii). 
Throughout Detained, Ngugi shows that this postcolonial violence has its roots in colonial 
rule. He argues that violence was not a temporary tool of subjugation, but rather, brutality was 
the very essence of colonial settler culture, and fear was its defining norm. 
Since colonialism was essentially violent, Ngugi reckons that all the cultural productions of 
this system should be interpreted through the same paradigm of brutality.  He writes: 
For the settlers in Kenya were really parasites in paradise … No art, no 
literature, no culture, just the making of a little dominion marred only by 
niggers too many to exterminate. (Detained 29-30) 
For Ngugi, therefore, it is not so much colonial violence as the colonialists‟ lack of culture 
itself which was destructive to African social structure. It was this vast “emptiness”, the 
inability to “produce a culture”, which resulted in the colonialists‟ resort to violence and 
coercion, exemplified by the prison, as the principal means of rule. Ngugi says that it is this 
legacy of cultural emptiness which the departing Europeans bequeathed to the African 
“comprador bourgeoisie” that needs urgent attention. He observes that, since colonialism did 
not only use physical violence but also engaged in a systematic attempt to impose a culture of 
emptiness masquerading as the rule of law upon the Kenyan social sphere, true emancipation 
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for Kenyans from the neo-colonial mentality lies in the revival of the Kikuyu cultural 
heritage, such as the use of Gikuyu and other indigenous languages in the arts and as language 
of instruction in academic institutions. Ngugi believes that this is one of the major ways of 
achieving an economically independent and culturally decolonised Kenya. His arrest and 
imprisonment by the postcolonial regime of Jomo Kenyatta, when he was engaged in what he 
perceived to be a Kikuyu cultural renaissance through the successful staging of Gikuyu 
performances of Ngaahika Ndeenda among the peasants of Kamĩrĩĩthũ, convinced him of the 
power of his people‟s culture in the fight against the forces of neo-colonialism. 
To prove his point that the repressive and violent postcolonial Kenya is a mirror image of the 
colonial regime, Ngugi gives numerous examples of autrocities that were committed by high 
ranking colonial officials against native Kenyans. One of the examples that he gives is a 
dispatch by an early colonial governor, Sir A. R. Hardinge. The governor wrote:  
Force and the prestige which rests on a belief in force, are the only way you 
can do anything with those people, but once beaten and disarmed they will 
serve you. Temporizing is no good … These people must learn submission 
by bullets – it‟s the only school; after that you may begin more modern and 
humane methods of education, and if you don‟t do it this year you will have 
to next, so why not get it over? … In Africa to have peace you must first 
teach obedience, and the only tutor who impresses the lesson properly is the 
sword (Detained 37-9). 
Through this quotation Ngugi implies that colonial imprisonment was the violent means 
through which the native was taught obedience. The governor‟s words also reveal not only the 
patronising generalisations that facilitated colonial invasion and its attendant violence, but 
also the kind of power systems that characterised the colonial encounter. This shows how 
colonial rule was facilitated by an othering discourse that was ambivalently pre-enlightenment 
in nature and yet rooted in enlightenment thought. Edward Said (1993) helps us understand 
the colonial governor‟s almost unforgivable condescending arrogance when he argues: 
“Throughout the exchange between Europeans and their „other‟ that began systemically half a 
millennium ago, the idea that has scarcely varied is that there is an „us‟ and a „them‟, each 
quite settled, clear, unassailably self-evident” (xxviii). It is also interesting to note that the 
governor believes that the colonised had to be subjected through two forms of power: first, the 
bullet which leads to disarmament and forced submission; and then the use of more 
enlightened and humane methods of education. On this matter Rao and Pierce observe: 
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The exigencies of governing the colonized ultimately produced 
uncomfortable similarities between the so-called barbarism of the native 
practices and the acts of terror and violence used to contain them. (2) 
So it would seem that the Foucauldian formulation of the spectacle yielding way to disciplines 
does not necessarily fit the colonial situation. Foucault says that the Europe of Antiquity was 
a civilization of spectacle, and defines spectacle as “render[ing] accessible to a multitude of 
men the inspection of small objects” (Discipline 216). Foucault points out that these 
spectacles were meant to unite people temporarily through the spectre of violence. He writes: 
“In these rituals in which blood flowed, society found new vigour and formed for a moment a 
single great body” (216). For the colonial governor, the bullet represents an all-out war 
against the entire recalcitrant native population and not just the rendering of few objects to a 
multitude. The colonised population becomes fearful and submissive upon the realisation that 
the coloniser has both the will and the means to exterminate them. Superficial peace and unity 
are achieved through the fear of being annihilated. By extension, then, Ngugi seems to imply 
that, in the postcolony, the colonial bullet has been superseded by the prison as a symbol of 
all repressive state apparatuses and has become “the only school” for those who oppose the 
neocolonial state. The bullet and prison are violent means through which precarious peace and 
unity are achieved and maintained both in the colony and the postcolony. 
Interestingly, Foucault claims that in Europe, from the eighteenth century onwards, the 
spectacular exercise of power with its attendant violence was gradually replaced by the 
“disciplinary modality of power” (Discipline 216). Foucault also refers to these dispersed 
modes of power which insidiously but systematically monitors its subjects through a complex 
connections of disciplines, as a capillary form of power. For Foucault, this transformation in 
the functions and uses of power did not lead to a lessening of the grip of power over the 
individual but rather its intensification. He argues that the development of a disciplinary 
society “assures an infinitesimal distribution of the power relations” (216). However, despite 
the development of the disciplinary modality of power, Foucault points out that the exercise 
of power remained Janus-faced. He writes: 
At one extreme, the discipline blocked, the enclosed institution, established 
on the edges of society, turned inwards towards negative functions: arresting 
evil, breaking communications, suspending time. At the other extreme, with 
panopticism, is the discipline-mechanism: a functional mechanism that must 
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improve the exercise of power by making it lighter, more rapid, more 
effective, a design of subtle coercion for a society to come. (Discipline 209) 
In Detained, Ngugi shows that the new form of societal power relations which Foucault calls 
a capillary form of power was not exported into the colony because the natives were regarded 
as savages who only understood the language of violence. He sets out to prove that the 
colonial rulers did not apply the European ideas of reform in the colony because Africans 
remained irredeemably other even after gaining what the colonial governor calls more 
“modern” and “humane” methods of education in the excerpt quoted earlier. Africans 
represented an extreme form of the other, such that the sword and the bullet did not just 
precede the use of disciplines but remained a permanent feature of colonial rule. Ngugi 
observes: 
[T]he colonial system did produce a culture. But it was a culture of legalized 
brutality, a ruling-class culture of fear, the culture of an oppressing minority 
desperately trying to impose total silence on a restive oppressed majority. 
(34) 
The colonial prison clearly participated in this attempt at imposing total silence on a restive 
oppressed majority. In the quotation above, Ngugi claims that the violent imposition of 
colonial rule was a negation of the humanity which the colonisers claimed they possessed and 
assumed the natives lacked. Ngugi reports how Meinertzhagen, a British colonial army 
Colonel, celebrates his brutality in his book Kenya Diaries. Colonel Meinertzhagen reports 
the capture and killing by the Kenyan warriors of one British colonial officer. Afterwards, 
Colonel Meinertzhagen and his men surrounded the nearby village “and ordered the massacre 
of every soul – a cold-blooded vengeance against defiant husbands and sons” (Detained 35). 
In his Kenya Diaries Meinertzhagen triumphantly and remorselessly wrote: “Every soul was 
either shot or bayoneted … we burned all huts and razed the banana plantations to the ground 
… Then I went home and wept for a brother officer killed”. These cowardly acts, and 
shameless brutality against unarmed women and children, Ngugi sarcastically observes, are 
regarded as “deeds of British colonial heroism” (Detained 34), and they are facilitated by 
what Said calls the unassailably self-evident „us‟ and a „them‟ mentality which permeates 
Europe‟s relationship with the rest of the world. 
Ngugi also demonstrates that in the majority of cases the British colonial commanders did not 
even make an attempt to hide their conceited arrogance and utter contempt for Africans under 
the rhetoric of bringing enlightened civilization to Africa. For example, one British military 
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commander, exasperated by the fierce resistance of the Kenyan Nandi guerrilla army against 
British invasion, wrote: 
I have used every effort to conciliate the tribes and have exercised the 
greatest forbearance in dealing with them, and at their own request have 
even gone as far as to make blood brotherhood with many of them; but the 
ignorance of the people is so extreme that it is impossible to convey to such 
savages that the occupation of their country is not harmful to them. 
(Detained 41) 
Ngugi argues that those controlling the colonial repressive state apparatuses such as the prison 
had a brazen and unquestioning sense of superiority over their colonial subjects. Logically, 
imprisonment was seen as a legitimate cure for the ignorance of savages. Ngugi forcefully 
asserts that the postcolonial Kenyan regime is a colonial mutant. Ngugi‟s aim in Detained is 
to show that the Kenyan people never accepted British colonial rule lying down, and therefore 
should not accept postcolonial abuse without resistance. He interprets his own imprisonment 
and prison writings as participating in this resistance. 
In 1902 Kenyans may have lost the battle, but the war continued unabated through other 
means over the years leading to the Mau Mau war of liberation. Due to the fierce resistance 
that the colonisers had faced during the initial invasion of Kenya, Ngugi says that Colonel 
Meinertzhagen predicted that the British would not be able to occupy the country for more 
than fifty years. After the initial violence of colonial invasion in Kenya, Ngugi shows that the 
coloniser continued to build upon this culture of legalised brutality against the colonised 
subject through the use of a biased penal system. Ngugi gives numerous examples of natives 
who suffered appalling injustices at the hands of respected white settlers after being accused 
of frivolous and ridiculous crimes. Ngugi notes: 
In March 1907, Colonel Grogan and four associates flogged „rickshaw boys‟ 
outside Nairobi court-house. The „boys‟ were later taken to hospital with 
lacerated backs and faces. Their crime? They had the intention of alarming 
two white ladies by raising the rickshaw shafts an inch too high! (Detained 
32) 
Another example: “In 1960, Peter Harold Poole shot and killed Kamane Musunge for 
throwing stones at Poole‟s dogs in self-defense” (33). And “[i]n 1918 … two British peers 
flogged a Kenyan to death and later burnt his body. His crime? He was suspected of having an 
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intention to steal property … The governor later appointed one of them to be a member of a 
district committee to dispense justice among the „natives‟” (33). Through these and other 
examples, Ngugi proves that the post-colonial Kenyan violence and arbitrary imprisonment of 
suspected political opponents is a continuation of the British colonial culture. This colonial 
culture was so violent that it was even condemned by some British citizens. Ngugi notes that 
both within Kenya and in Britain, there were always dissenting European voices against the 
brutality and self-congratulatory British imperialism. For example, one Eileen Fletcher, a 
Quaker social worker, who, after serving for a time as a rehabilitation officer in the Mau Mau 
detention camps, resigned in protest and flew back to England. This is what she wrote in The 
Tribune of 25 May 1956: 
I have just come back from Kenya were I was sent by the British 
government. I have seen Emergency justice in operation ... In a women‟s 
prison … I saw twenty-one people – including 11 and 12 years old – who 
were all condemned to this inhumane punishment, for supposed „Mau Mau 
offences‟. All of them, believe it or not, have been convicted by British 
magistrates. (Detained 38) 
Similarly, Barbara Castle, a Labour M.P., referred in The Tribune of 25 September 1955 to 
Kenya as a police state where the rule of law had broken down, where the murder and torture 
of Africans by Europeans went unpunished and where authorities pledged to enforcing justice 
regularly connived at its violation. In view of this indictment of colonial brutality by fellow 
British, Ngugi arrives at this sobering conclusion: 
Barbara Castle was, of course, wrong about what she termed the breakdown 
of the rule of law. This was the rule of law, the colonial rule of law, and it 
had been in operation, with differing degrees of intensity, since 1895 … 
Thus all these eruptions of brutality between the introduction of colonial 
culture in 1895 and its flowering with blood in the 1950s were not 
aberrations of an otherwise humane Christian culture. No. They were its 
very essence, its law, its logic, and the Kenyan settler with his sjambok, his 
dog, his horse, his rickshaw, his sword, his bullet, was the true embodiment 
of British imperialism. (Detained 39-40) 
As a result of the gory crimes committed by the settlers and tolerated and condoned by British 
colonial rulers, Ngugi comes to the conclusion that colonial justice was that of sword, bullet 
and sjambok. It is in this light that he views the postcolony as a transformed colony disguised 
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by the black faces that now occupy political positions. He shows that it is the colonial justice 
system which Kenyatta and his colleagues have not only inherited but admired and 
administered after the departure of the coloniser at independence from 1963 onwards. Ngugi 
strives to show that what Comaroff and Comaroff (2006:6) call the postcolonial condition of 
endemic “criminality with violence” was incepted at the colonial invasion of Africa and 
blossomed during the entire period of colonial rule. 
Like Florence Bernault (2003), whom I refer to in an earlier chapter of this thesis, Ngugi 
locates the birth of the prison in Africa at the very beginning of the violent invasion of the 
continent because he views all colonial institutions as violent. The prison is an exemplary 
institution in this regard. He writes: 
Detention without trial is part of that colonial culture of fear. It was 
introduced to Kenya by this racist settler minority, by Jesus-is-thy-Saviour 
missionaries, and their administrators … Detention was an instrument for 
colonial domination. In its origins and purpose, it is clearly a colonial affair. 
(44) 
For Ngugi, the fact that the post-colonial Kenyan government continues to use the prison to 
persecute its critics is evidence that neo-colonial conditions prevail in Kenya. He locates his 
own post-colonial arrest as providing an unbroken link between the early detentions of 
militant leaders of the patriotic armed resistance to British invasion at the turn of the twentieth 
century. 
5. Prison Narratives and the Excavation of Emancipatory Historiography  
Ngugi‟s extensive quotations from colonial historiography should be viewed as a writer‟s 
attempt to lay bare the forms of power and knowledge which the African comprador 
bourgeoisie and their former colonial masters would want to remain hidden and forgotten. 
The many citations of colonial historiography that Ngugi exposes and then challenges in 
Detained can be seen as performing a corrective function to the biased version of history of 
Kenya, which he argues is perpetuated by the postcolonial administration. For Ngugi, it is this 
distorted history that prevents Kenyans from engaging in a protracted struggle that will lead to 
cultural emancipation and ultimately to a truly patriotic exercise of power by the ruling class, 
and to an equitable redistribution of the material resources of the country. 
Ngugi insists that the coming of independence has not brought any change to postcolonial 
Kenya, as illustrated by the fact that both the colonial and postcolonial regimes use repressive 
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state apparatuses such as the prison to gag dissenting voices. Ngugi‟s Detained seeks to show 
that the criminalisation of a clearly political function of colonial prison regimes is maintained 
by Kenyatta‟s post-colonial regime, and this is what he refers to as a colonial affair. The 
banter that characterises the exchange between Ngugi and one of his jailers who reprimands 
him for breaching the regulation of switching off all lights at midnight is illustrative of 
Ngugi‟s understanding of these disturbing continuities in the postcolonial modality of power. 
The dialogue goes like this: 
“„Professor … why are you not in bed? …. What are you doing?‟ 
„I am writing to Jomo Kenyatta in his capacity as an ex-detainee‟. 
„His case was different,‟ the warder argues back. 
„How?‟  
„His was a colonial affair‟.  
„And this a neo-colonial affair? What‟s the difference?‟ 
„A colonial affair … now we are independent … that‟s the difference …‟ he 
says (4). 
Ngugi narrates his imprisonment by these numerous detours into the colonial origins, and uses 
of prison and imprisonment, in order to show that both the Kenyan colonial and postcolonial 
prison regimes were and are used in managing restive populations that are dissatisfied by the 
oppressive and exploitative manner in which power is exercised. He debunks the concept of 
an independent Kenya by showing that it is an empty signifier. 
Ngugi implies that the use of the prison by the British invaders is an indication that Kenyans 
did not welcome them with open arms as their long awaited saviours from the African forces 
of darkness, as subsequent European historiography would have Africans believe. The colony 
was founded on the blood of valiant Kenyans who were brutalised by the bullet and the prison 
of the coloniser into an uneasy submission. To substantiate his case Ngugi gives a long list of 
Kenyan warriors who valiantly fought the British invaders and were subsequently captured 
and killed in colonial detention camps and prisons. The first of these men was Waiyaki, who 
was imprisoned in the Fort Smith from 14 August 1892 and was subsequently shot and buried 
alive for his heroic defiance of colonial invasion. Then there was Nguugu wa Gakere, who 
was arrested and imprisoned in 1902 for leading his men against Nyeri Fort. He died in 
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detention in 1907, still defiant of colonial rule. This list includes women. Me Kitilili led the 
Giriama people to resist and fight British colonial rule up to her arrest and imprisonment in 
1914. Ngugi points out that his own arrest without charge was possible because “by 1966 all 
the repressive colonial laws were back on the books [coated in] sweet semantics” (Detained 
51). According to Ngugi, Kenyatta, who had previously fought against and as a result had 
been detained by the colonial regime, offers a bad example of individuals who were not only 
broken by prison, but were co-opted into the colonial system: a system which Kenyatta then 
perpetuated in independent Kenya under the guise of black rule. 
Summarising the ideology (or lack of it) that drives the Kenyan postcolonial regime Ngugi 
writes: 
Ideally, the authorities would like to put the whole community of struggling 
millions behind barbed-wire, as the British colonial authorities had once 
tried to do with the Kenyan people. But this would mean incarcerating 
labour, the true source of national wealth: what then would be left to loot? 
So then the authorities do the simpler thing: pick one or two individuals 
from among the people and then loudly claim that all sins lie at the feet of 
these few „power hungry‟ „misguided‟ and „ambitious‟ agitators. (13) 
Ngugi suggests that his imprisonment is a display, a means by which the ruling regime 
pummels the agitated masses into submission. Ngugi casts his arrests as a pre-emptive strike, 
an invisible spectacle, a Foucauldian rendering accessible to a multitude of men the inspection 
of small objects. Although not publicly displayed, Ngugi‟s imprisonment quickly became 
national and international news. Just as the bullet and imprisonment were to serve as violent 
and bloody instruments of submission for the colonial governor, secretly murdering political 
opponents and throwing some into prison becomes an important feature of the Kenyan 
postcolonial regime even after Kenyatta‟s death in 1978. Mutua observes: “[T]he state under 
Moi widely used extrajudicial killings, including the so-called ethnic clashes of the 1990s, to 
silence dissent” (286). 
In the same quotation above, Ngugi suggests that the colony became an experimental space 
where the colonisers tried forms of coercion that had never been practiced in Europe. This is 
seen in Ngugi‟s reference to the concentration camps in which the British colonial authorities 
confined entire villages in an attempt to curb the Mau Mau war of liberation in the 1950s.
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 At the onset of the Emergency, Kenya had 58 prisons and detention camps with a population of 9000 
prisoners. By 1959 there were 176 prisons and detention camps with a population of 99 000 detainees. Leonard 
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During the Mau Mau emergency, we see a manifestation of power which is neither spectacle 
nor panoptic. The Mau Mau phenomenon enables us to make sense of Bernault‟s observation 
that the prison was used as an early instrument of colonial conquest and in the subjugation of 
Africans (2003:3). Ngugi suggests that both before and during the Mau Mau Emergency, 
Kenyans experienced the prison not “as the auxiliary of justice in pursuit of criminals [but] as 
an instrument for political supervision of plots, opposition movements or revolts” (Discipline 
215). However, the irony of the situation is that the colonial authorities never admitted to this 
political function of the prison, and they even denied that the Mau Mau phenomenon was a 
manifestation of any genuine political aspirations. Instead they chose to view Mau Mau 
members as misguided criminals who needed psychological rehabilitation. This is seen from 
the fact that the Mau Mau detention camps remained under the supervision of the Kenyan 
Prisons Service well up to 1959 when they were eventually transferred to the Ministry of 
African Affairs (Kercher 1981: 27). 
Despite the subtle changes in the postcolony and its penal regime, Ngugi insists that it 
remains an unmitigated perpetuation of colonial rule. While the British colonial authorities 
had attempted a mass imprisonment of all black Kenyans in the 1950s, Ngugi depicts his own 
imprisonment as an inverted spectacle of power. He writes: 
[D]etention without trial is not only a punitive act of physical and mental 
torture of a few patriotic individuals, but it is also a calculated act of 
psychological terror against the struggling millions. It is a terrorist 
programme for the psychological siege of the whole nation. (Detained 14) 
Interestingly, Jeannine DeLombard (1995) calls Ngugi‟s imprisonment and that of other 
prominent figures in postcolonial Kenya “a spectacle of invisibility” (51). Probably, this is 
best illustrated by the fact that the police chose to arrest Ngugi at midnight on 30-31 
December 1977 “with an incredible show of armed might” (Detained 15). He spent one night 
in the police cell and then the next day at noon was transferred to Kamiti Maximum Security 
Prison. What happened when the car transporting Ngugi arrived at the gates of the prison 
exemplifies what is referred to as the spectacle of invisibility by DeLombard. Ngugi writes: 
The whole area around Kamiti was immediately put under curfew – and this 
in the noon of day. I saw innocent men, women and children dive for cover 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
C. Kercher says the Mau Mau Emergency (1952-1959) was “a unique and aberrant experience in the history of 
the Kenyan experience” (The Kenyan Penal System: Past Present and Prospect (1981:23). While Kercher 
suggests that the Mau Mau Emergency was an anomalous mutation of the British colonial prison regimes, 
Ngugi, on the other hand, thinks that it was a logical climax of a colonial system steeped in violence.     
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pursued by baton waving warders and within seconds there was not a single 
civilian standing or walking in the vicinity of Kamiti Prison (Detained 18). 
This suggests that Ngugi‟s arrest was simultaneously a spectacle and also an attempt at 
concealing it from the public. This vacillation between the visible and the invisible was 
characteristic of colonial rule as well. The fact that the officers who come to arrest an 
unarmed academic do so with an incredible show of force, suggests a spectacularisation of 
power. However, the fact that they do so at night and the subsequent unnecessary display of 
power by the warders who declare a de facto state of emergency outside the gates of the 
prison, all point towards a regime which is trying to prevent its criminal acts from being 
publicised.  Evidence indicates that early in his rule, Kenyatta combined lethal brutality and 
imprisonment as important tools of entrenching his corrupt rule. His opponents, depending on 
how dangerous they were regarded to be, were either imprisoned without being charged or 
were assassinated. For example, Pio Gama Pinto was assassinated in 1965, Tom Mboya the 
trade unionists and the likely successor of Kenyatta was killed in 1969, as well as J.M. Kiriuki 
in 1975. Under President Arap Moi, Robert Ouko, the urban foreign minister was killed 
(Mutua 2008: 286). It is ironic that Kenyatta perpetuates the brutality and injustices of 
colonial rule that he had been a victim of. Addressing the court which was about to sentence 
him and five of his colleagues on trumped up charges of being leaders of the Mau Mau, Jomo 
Kenyatta expressed his feelings of helpless submission, rejection and resistance of the entire 
colonial legal apparatus when he said: “I am asking for no mercy at all on behalf of my 
colleagues. We are asking that may justice be done and that the injustices that exist may be 
righted” (Slater 241). With the benefit of hindsight, it is clear that as Kenyatta was verbally 
rejecting colonial justice or the so called rule of law he was at the same time internalising its 
logic. 
Ngugi is at pains to show that postcolonial Kenyan regimes‟ attempts of imposing total 
silence on a restive oppressed majority through imprisonment and brutality will not succeed, 
since the culture of Kenya from the time of the imposition of colonial rule is not one of 
passivity but of struggle which culminated in the Mau Mau war of liberation.  He does not 
assume that agency and/or resistance is some “natural” human capacity that will inevitably 
emerge under oppressive conditions – instead, he locates resistance as part of a historical 
legacy in Kenya. After the Mau Mau war, Ngugi believes that the most potent tool for 
fighting neo-colonial forces are cultural productions in Kenyan languages such as the play I 
will Marry When I Want. Ngugi believes that this culture of defiance already exists among the 
peasants as demonstrated in their 1977 stage performances of his socialist play in Gikuyu. 
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Ngugi views his books as cultural interventions meant to fight a post-colonial disciplinary 
modality of power, where power relations are now distributed in an infinitesimal and subtle 
way through the selective use of the prison, nepotism, tribalism and appeals to false 
sentiments of patriotism. 
6. Fault-lines in Ngugi’s Vision 
However, Ngugi‟s stance in Detained is problematic for a number of reasons. While he is at 
pains to show that the Kenyan postcolonial regime is caught up in a colonial binary thinking; 
he believes that the peasant and himself can or have transcended this binary condition. We 
also saw how Mandela, although tolerant of other views, believes that given time everybody 
will eventually see the correctness of the ANC ideology. Both Ngugi and Mandela are 
advancing essentialist views. As I indicated in the introduction of this chapter, Ngugi‟s belief 
in the resilience and transformative capacity of the colonised people‟s culture of resistance is 
shared by Ashcroft (1997). Putting forward a highly contested postcolonial theory Ashcroft 
says that colonial rule was not simply an unmitigated cultural disaster: rather, the colonized 
societies engaged and utilised imperial culture for their own purposes (2). However, for 
Ngugi as we have seen, the struggle against colonialism did not just remain at a cultural plane 
but involved what became a trademark physical confrontation which ultimately drove the 
coloniser out of Kenya in the early 1960s. Ngugi‟s Detained is an attempt to show the masses 
that Kenya has an unbroken history of struggle which started as early as 1895 during the 
British colonial invasion of Kenya, and continued well into the first two decades of the 
twentieth century, when the natives were eventually brutalised into submission by the 
superior fire power of the coloniser. Ngugi argues that this struggle flowered with the heroic 
exploits of Mau Mau fighters in the 1950s. In Detained, Ngugi appeals to the Kenyans that 
this record of valiant struggle against oppression should not have stopped after the attainment 
of political independence in 1963. 
In Detained, Ngugi problematically assumes the role of a self-appointed representative of 
peasants, and the rest of the underclass. This position is complicated by factors which include 
his social position as a Western-educated university professor, and the fact that after his 
release from prison, Ngugi went into exile, first to Britain, and then to the United States of 
America where he still resides. Ngugi seems oblivious of the contradictions that his situation 
invokes. This can be attributed to the immense influence that Frantz Fanon‟s and Amilcar 
Cabral‟s works have had on him. Fanon writes: “While politicians situate their action in 
actual present day events, man of culture take their stand in the field of history” (The 
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Wretched of the Earth, 1967: 168). Cabral writes: “For with a strong indigenous cultural life, 
foreign domination cannot be sure of its perpetuation” (Return to the Source: Selected 
Speeches, 1973: 62). While Fanon overestimates the cathartic value of anti-colonial violence 
for the colonized subject, Ngugi, like Cabral, over-estimates the revolutionary capacity of 
anti-neo-colonial cultural strategies in eliminating postcolonial economic, social and political 
inequalities. Since he views himself as a soldier conducting a cultural warfare, he reckons that 
his geographical location is of no consequence. This contrasts markedly with nationalists such 
as Mandela who refused to go into exile, choosing to stay in the thick of events where the 
battle was actually being fought. 
Peter Childs and Patrick Williams (1997) indicate that the position of an intellectual is one of 
power which the intellectual needs to be aware of. They argue: 
In terms of post-colonial knowledge production and the refusal of tyranny of 
the expert, implications would include the need to be critically aware of the 
power invested in particular locations from which one speaks and writes. 
(23) 
The above suggests that Ngugi‟s imprisonment was a profoundly traumatic experience and it 
also became a moment of loss of anchoring for him, particularly since there are clear 
indications that it intensified his anger and disillusionment with the Kenyan post-colonial 
government, which in turn led to the impairment of critical reflexivity and literary creativity 
on Ngugi‟s part. Although Ngugi may not regard himself as a postcolonial theorist, Anthony 
Appiah‟s (1991) description of what he terms the postcolonial theorist embraces some of the 
contradictions that Ngugi as a person and his work inhabit. Appiah writes: 
In the West they are known through the Africa they offer; their compatriots 
know them both through the West they present to Africa and through an 
Africa they have invented for the world, for each other, and for the world. 
(348) 
The anti-imperialist militancy of Ngugi notwithstanding, the fact remains that his 
considerable Western education and training has alienated him from some of the Kenyan 
realities that he still so authoritatively writes about. The canonisation of Ngugi‟s writing in 
many institutions of learning in Africa and in many parts of the world, and Ngugi‟s own self-
perception as a dissident and subversive writer, puts him in a paradoxical position.
32
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 In Moving the Centre: The Struggle for Cultural Freedoms (1993), Ngugi argues that early African post-
62 
 
Said (1993) makes a perceptive observation about the difficulty of occupying one 
impermeable cultural position. He writes: “Partly because of empire, all cultures are involved 
in one another; none is single and pure, all are hybrid, heterogeneous, extraordinarily 
differentiated, and unmonolithic” (xxix). This suggests that in one way or another, Ngugi‟s 
radical voice may have been long co-opted into the disciplinary modality of power without 
Ngugi even being aware of it. 
In the light of the above, one of the greatest ironies of Ngugi‟s Detained may be that it reveals 
that he is implicated in the disciplinary functions of power that he criticises so much. In 
Detained, Ngugi suffers the ambiguity of embracing what Spivak has famously called the 
position of the “subaltern” and entirely rejecting the benefits that flow from being what 
Anthony Appiah calls the “comprador intelligentsia”. The three sections of the first chapter of 
Detained are an attempt to resolve this uncomfortable position. The first section of this 
chapter indicates that Ngugi is largely representative of the somewhat more privileged 
experience of political prisoners. He writes: “12 December 1978: I am in cell 16 in the 
detention block enclosing eighteen other political prisoners” (3). Further down he calls the 
cells occupied by political prisoners “Kenyatta‟s tiger cages” or the “block of „tiger cages‟” 
(3). That Ngugi chooses to call political prisoners tigers is curious but unsurprising. He is of 
course using this phrase in a sarcastic manner to imply that political prisoners are like 
ravenous tigers in the eyes of Kenyatta. However, Ngugi‟s tone makes it clear that he accords 
political prisoners a superior status. There are not the biblical sheep that can be led, 
unresisting into a pen. Rather, they are dangerous tigers, who through their pen and language 
can lead to the collapse of the neo-colonial regime of Kenyatta. So they have to be kept caged. 
Throughout his narrative, Ngugi gives the impression that “[i]t is the active few who, through 
their original ideas, leadership and guidance, transform the masses into creative agents, rather 
than the masses who, through their independent actions, transform the few into leaders” 
(Crehan 106). The peasants he claims literally took charge of the Ngahika Ndeenda failed to 
initiate new projects after his arrest and his subsequent imprisonment. His attempts therefore 
to try to put himself at the level of the peasants is as unconvincing as trying to equate a tiger 
to a sheep. 
Ngugi also presents his one-year stay in prison as a moment of profound revelation. For 
example, Ngugi wrote his pre-prison fiction in English. By contrast, all his post-imprisonment 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
colonial literature is “a series of imaginative footnotes to Frantz Fanon” (66). Notably, Fanon‟s work is 
characterised by its militancy against colonialism and all traces of imperialism, and Robert C. Young describes 
Fanon as the “father of anti-colonial theory” (1995: 161). Ngugi includes his own works alongside that of Fanon 
and sees it as participating in the struggle against neo-colonialism and imperialism.      
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novels are first written in Kikuyu, and then personally translated by the author into English. 
He attributes his transformed view of languages to an unsolicited lecture that he received from 
a Muugikuyu prison warder. The warder said:  
The trouble with you educated people is that you despise your languages. 
You don‟t like talking to ordinary people. But what use is your education if 
it cannot be shared with your people? … You people, even if you follow 
Europeans to the grave, they will never never let you really know their 
languages … Europeans will never let you into the secrets held by their 
languages. (Detained 129) 
Ngugi interprets the warder‟s words as an exposé of the betrayal of the people by the African 
western educated intellectuals who use European languages in their works of literature. The 
warder‟s words highlight an essentialist perspective which views language as an irreducible 
carrier of a people‟s culture.  Curiously, the warder – who has power in the prison – becomes 
the voice of the ordinary African people. So it suddenly dawns upon Ngugi that to privilege 
the English language in the production of Kikuyu cultural experiences is to place Kikuyu 
culture and its historical experiences in an inferior position in comparison to English culture. 
However, Ngugi is only using this encounter with the warder, whether real or imagined, as a 
stylistic tool to explain his own rejection of the English language as means of expressing the 
Kenyan people‟s experiences and worldview. This is made clear by the fact that it was his 
pre-prison experiment with the Gikuyu play that sought to displace the hegemonic position of 
the English in the arts, and the fact that he took it to the exploited peasants, which led to his 
imprisonment in the first place. This suggests that his understanding of the subtle manner in 
which the colonial culture had entrenched itself, not only through brutal violence but also 
using cultural institutions, was more of a gradual process, rather than the sudden moment of 
enlightenment implied in the above quotation. 
Ngugi constantly tries to attribute his journey of retracing his cultural roots back to the 
ordinary people as in the example of the warder‟s words above. Jennine DeLombard (1995) 
writes: 
As an imprisoned African former colonial subject who repeatedly has 
presented himself as an ally – if no longer a member – of the peasantry and 
the working classes, Ngugi is representative of a number of groups who 
have been marginalized in both political and literary terms. (52) 
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An example of this is when he attributes the finally script and performance of I will Marry 
When I Want, which he co-authored with Ngugi Wa Mirii largely to the peasants of 
Kamĩrĩĩthũ. He writes: 
[T]he whole project became a collective community effort with peasants 
and workers seizing more and more initiative in revising and adding to the 
script, in directing dance movements on the stage, and in the general 
organization. (77) 
A page before this statement, Ngugi tries to convince the reader that all his Western education 
had been of little consequence in comparison with the six months he spent with peasants 
preparing for the performance of the play. He says: 
The six months between June and November 1977 were the most exciting in 
my life and the true beginning of my education. I learnt my language anew. 
I discovered the creative nature and power of collective work. (76) 
A little later, he somewhat patronisingly comments: 
For myself, I learnt a lot. I had been delegated to the role of messenger and 
porter, running errands here and there. But I also had time to observe things. 
I saw how the people had appropriated the text … so that the play that was 
finally put on to a fee-paying audience on Sunday, 2 October 1977, was a 
far cry from the tentative awkward efforts originally put together by Ngugi 
and myself. (78) 
Ngugi is trying very hard to prove that he has “shifted the centre of vision because … [he is 
no longer] bound by the European Centre” (Ngugi 2003: 53). For Ngugi, true knowledge 
comes from the peasants and not from Western institutions of higher learning. But despite his 
assertions that he represents the peasants‟ views, what Ngugi succeeds in offering is often a 
constricted and over-determined socialist ideology and worldview. Some may also find 
offense in Ngugi‟s naïve condescending attitude, arising from having been alienated from the 
people in the first place, which now enables him to find fascination and fulfillment from the 
peasants‟ awkward attempt at scripting and directing a play. In the above quotation, Ngugi is 
speaking as an observer of peasants and not as being one of their kind. He is also obviously 
writing with a Western audience in mind.  
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Throughout Detained, Ngugi pits himself against Kenyatta. Unlike Kenyatta, who was broken 
down by the colonial prison to become a member of the comprador bourgeoisie, Ngugi 
clearly points out that he himself managed to resist Kenyetta‟s attempts to break him. But it 
can be argued that just like Kenyatta, who was a member of the Western-educated 
intelligentsia, and initially posed as someone who represented the aspirations of the people 
only to turn around after attaining political power, Ngugi‟s militancy is sustained by the fact 
that he is sidelined from political power. Ngugi tries by all means to show that unlike 
Kenyatta he truly represents the aspirations of the subaltern. Curiously, though, in order to 
illustrate that ordinary Kenyans realised the continuity of the repressive colonial ideology in 
independent Kenya, Ngugi includes photographs of Kenyan demonstrators who reside in 
London brandishing posters. One of them reads: “Waingereza walifunga Kimathi … Mzee 
anafunga Ngugi” (The white man imprisoned Kimathi … Kenyatta imprisons Ngugi).  It is a 
painful irony that it is not the peasants of Kamĩrĩĩthũ where Ngugi says I Will Marry When I 
Want was scripted and first staged, but the educated elite residing in the metropolis of the 
former coloniser who have the courage to protest Ngugi‟s arrest. The anti-apartheid 
movement that Mandela says ended up being personalised as the Free Mandela Campaign 
was also spearheaded in the West. In Ngugi‟s case this captures the contradictions that he has 
to negotiate in his quest to be both an equal and also a voice of the voiceless Kenyan masses. 
One of the questions that seems to preoccupy Ngugi in Detained is how KANU (Kenya 
African National Union), a party that had shown amazing anti-colonial zeal, quickly imploded 
into an oppressive machinery serving the interests of the ruling elite and those of foreign 
powers. He observes: “[T]he KANU of 1961, as an instrument of Kenyan nationalism was 
totally opposed to the sixty years of colonial culture of repressive violence and mass terror” 
(Detained 50). Ngugi is of the opinion that when KANU took over power on 12 December 
1963 it had a clean record. However, what baffles Ngugi is that “by 1966 all repressive laws 
were back on the books” (51). His answer to his own question: “What happened between 
1961 and 1966 to make KANU reintroduce all these undemocratic, unjust and arbitrary 
practices?” (51), is populist and informed by his unique Marxist understanding of history as 
having reached its consummation during the Mau Mau war of liberation. Since the masses 
had fought so valiantly to overthrow forces of colonial oppression, Ngugi puts the blame 
squarely on the “comprador bourgeoisie which had been growing in the womb of the colonial 
regime [and] desired to protect and enhance its cosy alliance with foreign economic interests” 
(53). According to Ngugi, this is the group of people who raised “Colonial Lazarus” from the 
dead. This view is also shared by Art Hansen (1993), who says that the ruling African elite 
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should be blamed for failing to transform the postcolonial state so that it would not forever 
depend on the norms of the colonial state apparatus. 
Other writers, however, have argued that Ngugi‟s Colonial Lazarus may not have died in the 
first place. For example, Ralph Benjamin Neuberger (1986) writes: 
KANU accepted the “Majimbo Constitution” because that was the condition 
for independence. It very soon eroded and abolished the federal system, and 
imposed a unitary regime strongly dominated by the Kikuyu bureaucracy. 
(175) 
This is an important observation because it suggests at least two things. While Ngugi paints a 
romanticised picture of the British who were vanquished and driven out of Kenya by the 
patriotic Mau Mau guerrilla forces, Neuberger implies that although the British may have 
been forced to the negotiating table by Mau Mau activities, Kenyan independence was by no 
means an unconditional surrender of the routed colonialists. Historical developments also 
indicate that despite Ngugi‟s efforts to show that the interests of the African ruling elite 
always converge with those of their former colonial masters, this may not always be the case. 
In the Kenyan situation, British attempts to weaken KANU by imposing a federal constitution 
indicate that they viewed KANU as a threat to British settlers‟ commercial interests.  As it 
turned out, KANU shrewdly played along with the British game as a means of attaining the 
control of the repressive state machinery. Once that had been achieved, within three years, 
they imposed a unitary regime which the British had opposed in the first place. While Ngugi‟s 
claim that the comprador bourgeoisies‟ “political inspiration and guidance comes from 
outside the country” (Detained 56) may be partly correct, historical evidence paints a much 
more complex picture. The interests of the African ruling elites and those of their former 
colonial masters can be perceived as running parallel, like the lines of rail tracks; co-operating 
whenever there are points of interchange to avoid fatal head on collisions or when there is 
need for a U-turn, but never really converging or significantly diverging. 
Robert H. Jackson (1992) suggests that right from its inception the postcolonial state has 
never enjoyed legitimacy and loyalty neither from its officials nor from its citizens, and as a 
result, its survival has largely been ensured by external factors and interests (1). According to 
this view, Ngugi‟s portrayal of Kenyans as a homogeneous rainbow nation torn to pieces by 
the greed of the ruling elite that co-operates with foreign multinationals has to be 
supplemented by a much more careful study of the African situation. For example, Ngugi 
accepts the principle of Kenyan nationalism and the notion of the state without interrogating 
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their imperial origin. Interestingly, Mutua tries to get to the root of the problem when he 
argues: 
The invention of the African state by colonialism, and the subsequent 
misapplication of the right to self-determination, stand at the root of the 
crisis of the postcolonial state. (2008: 8) 
Mutua further points out that the arbitrary nature in which modern African states were created 
by European imperialism (for example Kenya has over forty possible nationalities) made most 
of these states ticking time bombs. T. O. Elias also locates the origin of modern African 
problems at the Berlin Conference of 1884-5, which randomly apportioned the continent to 
competing European powers. He argues: “This event was the genesis of many present-day 
conflicts and virtually insoluble problems in the African Continent” (1988:37). While Ngugi 
foregrounds the destructive nature of colonial rule in Africa, his bitter experience of 
imprisonment at the hands of the Kenyatta regime seems to prevent him from acknowledging 
the basic fact highlighted by Rao and Pierce that “while decolonization does not mark an 
ultimate break in technologies of governance based on alterity, it does indicate an important 
moment in which such strategies began to move beyond the purview of the state” (18). All 
this, although not absolving the comprador bourgeoisie of the crimes that Ngugi accuses them 
of, nor the developed capitalist nations for complicity in keeping Africa poor, suggests that 
African problems and solutions thereof may lie deeper than Ngugi is willing to allow in his 
angry prison narrative. 
While an imaginative, ideologically independent and truly patriotic leadership is 
indispensable in the creation of economically and political viable African states, it seems as if 
there are other important variables that Ngugi glosses over due to his intention of settling 
scores with the post-colonial Kenyan regime which humiliated him through a painful one-year 
imprisonment. As suggested by Neuberger, the British, due to their vested economic interests 
and military supremacy, never contemplated ever granting full economic independence to the 
Kenyan black majority. According to Mutua, the “transition from colonialism to 
independence – if it can be called that – lasted a split of a second” (38). In the light of this 
comment, it would seem as if Ngugi underestimates the British political intrigue, power, and 
influence over Kenyan economic destiny during the process of transition and after the 
attainment of independence. This also suggests that African independence from colonial rule 
may have been one of the greatest political hoaxes of the twentieth century right from the 
start. As I have already argued earlier, Ngugi also fails to acknowledge that what he calls 
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Kenya was in fact “an imposed falsehood” (Mutua 37) since it is an amalgamation of 
heterogeneous tribes created by the British through deceit, fraud, intimidation and outright 
violence. Instead of glorifying the diverse nature of the tribes that constitute modern Kenya, 
these should be viewed as a real threat to national unity, and should be taken as a serious 
stumbling block in the efforts of overcoming Africa‟s many challenges. 
Curiously, Ngugi depicts the unity of the Kenyan people in their fight against foreign invaders 
in exuberant poetic terms. He writes: 
[Kenyan history] is the history of Kenyan people ceaselessly struggling 
against Arab feudalists and slave dealers; against Portuguese marauders who 
opened up Africa to her four-hundred years of devastating encounter with 
European domination, and later against British predators trying to embrace 
Kenya with claws and fangs of blood; yes, a history of Kenyan people 
waging a protracted guerrilla war against a British imperialist power that 
used to boast of its invincibility to man or God, a revolutionary culture of 
courage and patriotic heroism …  A fight-back, creative culture, unleashing 
tremendous energies among the Kenyan people. (Detained 64)  
As propaganda for spurring Kenyan people on in their fight against neo-colonial forces, this 
may be permissible. However, as a historical record, it is not very helpful because it is a 
blatantly romanticised version of history. The Kenyan people are described as “ceaselessly 
struggling” to fend off enemies of every sort. The British are called “predators … with claws 
and fangs of blood” preying on innocent Kenyans who have “a revolutionary culture of 
courage and patriotic heroism”. This description negates the participation of Kenyans, no 
matter how negligible, in the oppression and exploitation of fellow Kenyans during these 
heroic battles against foreign invasions.33 This is something that Ngugi is aware of, as his 
1967 novel A Grain of Wheat shows. Ngugi also problematically depicts Kenyans as a 
homogeneous group united against invaders. Mutua acknowledges that during moments of 
crises, such as the fight against colonialism such moments of unity could have existed, but 
they never ran deep enough to sustain the decolonised state. He writes: 
                                                          
33
 Moeletsi Mbeki captures these historical entanglements and the complicity of both ordinary and elite Africans 
to their own oppression and the continents underdevelopment by relating his experiences when he visited the 
Slave House on Gorée Island, off the coast of Dakar, Senegal. The curator showed Mbeki a musket that was sold 
to Africans during the slave trade. Explaining the apparent contradiction, the curator points out that Africans 
“needed the guns to protect themselves against the communities they raided for people to sell” (Architects of 
Poverty: Why African Capitalism Needs Changing, 2009:x)    
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Although the struggle against colonial rule within the borders of the colonial 
state created unity among different nations within it, such unity was shallow 
and insufficient to form a cohesive national identity … beyond race and 
oppression African nations within the colonial territory did not have much 
else in common. (38) 
This suggests that instead of idealising the African multifarious entities which are called 
„nations‟ today, and which were essentially constituted through European colonial violence, 
Africans should probably rethink the very notion of the nation and the concept of nationalism, 
and seriously acknowledge the central role that tribalism (both as a colonial construct and pre-
colonial reality) has played in Africa‟s seemingly intractable problems. 
Still pursuing an idealised vision, Ngugi suggests that the common fate of political prisoners 
at Kamiti forged an unbreakable bond of unity among them. He writes: 
[W]e all shared a common feeling: something beautiful, something like the 
promise of a new dawn had been betrayed, and our presence and situation at 
Kamiti Maximum Security Prison was a logical outcome of that historical 
betrayal. (Detained: 63) 
If we consider Matua‟s comments, the unity and amicable relations that Ngugi says existed 
amongst political prisoners during his stay at Kamiti may be viewed as people temporarily 
united by tribulation. Significantly, Ngugi‟s vision of a people who share an intense feeling of 
oneness is only limited to fellow political prisoners. His vision is not broad enough to 
encompass the entire prison population. The collective pronouns “we” and “our” in the above 
quotation clearly refers to political prisoners who were Ngugi‟s only companions during his 
stay at Kamiti. Since in Detained Ngugi largely represents the experiences of political 
prisoners in the jails of postcolonial Kenya, it is important to ask how representative he is of 
other subaltern voices, such as those of common criminals, the peasants and the urban 
underclass. In his book The Number (2004), Steinberg has shown that the political democratic 
transition in South Africa has not managed to alter the criminal landscape of the country 
significantly. As a result of narrow policies that only focused on overthrowing the apartheid 
political system, there has been a burgeoning of crime, which has come to threaten the very 
survival of the post-apartheid state. This suggests that African political programmes have to 
anticipate other challenges that stand in the way of creating socially, economically and 
politically inclusive and viable states. 
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The problems presented by Ngugi‟s posing as a spokesperson for the feelings and views of 
other prisoners notwithstanding, the above quoted passage leaves the reader in no doubt that 
Ngugi assumes that this shared feeling of betrayal that he talks about also embraces the 
society outside prison. Ngugi goes on to assume that this feeling is deep enough in post-
colonial Kenya to lead to a national unity and patriotism that would extricate the nation from 
its politics of patronage and oppression. However, the events after the successful 
2002democratic removal of KANU from power by the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) 
for the first time since independence in 1963 indicate that tribalism still poses a serious 
challenge to Kenyan national development. Before it even started to govern, this unlikely 
coalition of numerous factions and leaders with competing interests and ambitions was 
fractured along two major tribal lines. There was the Kikuyu group of Kibaki, and the Luo 
party of Odinga. This duo was to lead to the disputed 2007 elections which turned bloody as 
people started to kill each other along tribal lines (Mutuo 2009: 182, 287). On 24 January 
2008 Ann Talbot of the World Socialist Web Site reported: 
At least 700 people have died in the three weeks of violence that have 
followed the disputed election that returned President Mwai Kibaki to 
power in Kenya. It is estimated that a quarter of a million people have been 
displaced from their homes. The deaths are a result of intertribal violence 
and the police opening fire with live rounds on unarmed demonstrators (1). 
In 1981 Ngugi had made the following prediction: 
One day these wishes (of freedom riding to liberty) will be transformed by 
the organized power and the united will of millions from the realm of 
morality into people‟s chariots of actual freedom from naked exploitation 
and ruthless oppression. (12) 
Thirty years on after Ngugi‟s singing of the Kenyan people‟s deep feelings for national unity 
after their initial betrayal by the comprador bourgeoisie in his prison narrative, the bloody 
violence of late 2007 and early 2008 suggests that African problems need to be approached 
with caution and a soberness of mind. 
In the end, Ngugi tries to offer an inclusive solution to the Kenyan crisis of governance. He 
admonishes: 
Until democratic Kenyans, workers, peasants, students, progressive 
intellectuals and others, unite on the most minimum basis of a patriotic 
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opposition to the imperialist foreign domination of our economy, politics 
and culture, things will get worse not better, no matter who sits on the 
throne of power. (Detained xv)34 
This inclusivity remains at an abstract and problematic level.  It remains unclear who these 
democratic Kenyans are almost thirty years since Ngugi penned the above words. He seems to 
use the term democratic with the bold conviction that it has one definition, when in practice it 
is not so. The term democratic or democracy has suffered a lot of abuse throughout the world, 
and in Africa in particular from the late 1950s onwards. For example, Shadrack Wanjala 
Nasong‟o and Godwin R Murunga (2007) note: 
[T]he honorific nature of the concept of democracy is such that all manner 
of political systems claim to be democracies. Even countries that have never 
held an election in decades, such as the former Zaire, are conveniently 
called „democratic republics‟. Others without a competitive party system, 
such as Uganda (1986-2006), call themselves „non-party democracies‟. (4) 
What complicates the situation is that most of these “democracies” enjoy the political and 
economic patronage of most successful Western democracies. So, while Ngugi may be right 
in blaming Kenya‟s crisis on neo-colonialism and the predatory nature of the ruling elite, a 
theory that takes into consideration the changing dynamics of the internal structures of 
African societies, the impact of global forces on them, and the ways in which oppositionary 
politics and subversive discourse are always de-legitimated or co-opted into dominant 
discourses, is likely to lead to a more comprehensive explanation of Africa‟s problems. 
Probably to his credit, Ngugi refuses to engage with issues of confession and self-interiority 
that the prison aims to engender in its victims. He writes: 
A writer needs people around him … In this literary target I was lucky to 
have for teachers, detainees and warders, who were very co-operative and 
generous in sharing their different mines of information and experience (8-
9). 
Although he emerges visibly more bitter and angry after his one-year stint in detention, he 
consistently places the prison at the collective, material and historical forces that led to its 
                                                          
34
 Karl Marx acknowledged the powerlessness and vulnerability of peasants and argued that they did not 
constitute a class. Marx declared: “They (peasants) cannot represent themselves, they must be represented”. In 
Karl Marx. 1970: 170-171. “The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte”. Selected Works in One Volume.    
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birth in Africa, and never at the individual confessional level. He argues that the 
imprisonment of an activist “is not only a punitive act of physical and mental torture of a few 
patriotic individuals, but it is also a calculated act of psychological terror against the 
struggling millions” (14). He further calls it “a terrorist programme for the psychological 
siege of the whole nation” (14). 
Conclusion 
It is difficult to dislodge both Ngugi and Mandela from the domain of the “political” because 
they relentlessly refuse to engage the personal effect of the prison. For example Mandela 
dedicates only one paragraph to his solitary confinement experience and chooses not to dwell 
much on other prison privations. His autobiography is a public rather than a private affair. Yet 
the prison has, throughout its history, especially in the 19
th
 century focused on the person, the 
individual. The refusal to engage the personal is of course itself a political act, it is a refusal to 
participate in the confessional, personal (and apparently „rehabilitative‟) form of address that 
the prison sometimes demands. At the same time, there are dangers that attend on this erasure 
of the self, not least because it means that the insidious effect of the prison in recasting, 
aligning, speaking to, subjecting the individual is repressed. As we have seen, both Ngugi and 
Mandela make broad assumptions about the autobiographical subject and its ability to offer a 
coherent national narrative and the narrative of an identifiable and definable self. That this 
notion of the self is more complex than Ngugi and Mandela are willing to acknowledge is 
demonstrated in the prison autobiographical narratives of a number of South Africans. The 
next chapter examines First‟s 117 Days, Mashinini‟s Strikes have Followed Me, and 
Breytenbach‟s True Confessions in an attempt to understand some of the conditions that give 
birth to notions of a coherent bounded self and some of the limits that reveal this idea as 
slippery and complex. 
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Chapter 3: Prison and Solitary Confinement: Conditions and Limits of the 
Autobiographical Self in First’s 117 Days, Mashinini’s Strikes have 
Followed Me, and Breytenbach’s True Confessions. 
Introduction 
“Everything he has made pretty in its time. Even time indefinite he has put 
in their heart, that mankind may never find out the work that God has made 
from start to the finish” (Ecclesiastes 3 vs 11). 
The title of this chapter takes its inspiration from Georges Gusdorf‟s seminal article entitled 
“Conditions et limites de l‟autobiographie” originally published in 1956 and translated into 
English by James Olney in 1980 as “Conditions and Limits of Autobiography”. Gusdorf‟s 
article is an attack on René Descartes‟ famous dictum: “Cogito ergo sum” (I think therefore I 
am), and it also extends the Hegelian-Marxist view which claims that the self is only a 
product of the individual‟s interaction with society. Gusdorf‟s observations about 
autobiography are simple yet revolutionary in the understanding of the notion of the self. If 
Paul John Eakin‟s (1985) argument that “the writing and reading of autobiography presuppose 
the idea of the self” (198-9) is correct, then Gusdorf‟s following words go a long way in 
helping us locate the origins of the idea of the autonomous self. He writes: 
[T]he genre of autobiography seems limited in time and space: it has not 
always existed everywhere … it would seem that autobiography is not to be 
found outside our cultural area; one would say that it expresses a concern 
peculiar to Western man, a concern that has been of good use in his 
systematic conquest of the universe and that he has communicated to men of 
other cultures; but those men will thereby have been annexed by a sort of 
intellectual colonizing to a mentality that was not their own.
35
 (29) 
When Gusdorf further points out that the “conscious awareness of the singularity of each 
individual life [which autobiography assumes] is the late product of a specific civilization” he 
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 There is controversy as to what can be considered the first autobiography in the Western tradition. Gusdorf 
(1980:28-9) suggests that St. Augustine‟s (c. 398-400) Confessions marks the beginning of the autobiographical 
genre, while Huntington Williams (1983:3) and W.J.T. Mitchell (1990:648) see Jean Jacques Rousseau‟s 
Confessions (1770) as the pivotal starting point of the autobiographical genre.  However, the rudimental 
elements of the notion of a coherent bounded self suggested in Descartes‟ words is clearly much more 
established than some critics claim. However, what is at stake in Gusdorf‟s argument is the Western idea of a 
subject which comes to stand for, or perhaps even replace, earlier or other notions of the unity of individual 
identity. While Gusdorf usefully points out the socially constructed nature of the Western notion of a coherent 
bounded self, the idea of autonomous self is clearly not new, but it is also not stable: it has experienced all sorts 
of vicissitudes through the centuries. 
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suggests that the notion of an autonomous, coherent bounded self is but an idea. Using and 
extending Gusdorf‟s insights on autobiography and its interpellation of an autonomous self, 
the lives and autobiographical narratives of Ruth First, Emma Mashinini and Breyten 
Breytenbach allow us to explore and interrogate popular conceptions of confinement, self-
interiority and the related issues of subjectivity in the South African context.
36
 While Mandela 
and Ngugi essentially bypass the confessional mode, the writers in this chapter tend to evoke 
it. In this sense, for them, “the political” becomes more intricately bound up with the shifting 
and indeterminate terrain of subjective interiority, and therefore more difficult to objectify, to 
apprehend, to demarcate. If we are to talk about the literary history of prison writing in South 
Africa and Kenya, we have to acknowledge these different modes, two distinct trajectories 
that lead to the present moment, and that the present moment draws on as it recasts, rethinks, 
re-engineers the experience of prison. 
Building on Gusdorf‟s proposition, this chapter is framed by two main arguments both drawn 
from Eakin (1985). The central argument in Eakin‟s book is that “autobiographical truth is not 
fixed but an evolving content in an intricate process of self-discovery and self-creation, and 
… that the self that is the center of autobiographical narrative is necessarily a fictive 
structure” (3). I will argue that Ruth First‟s 117 Days: An Account of Confinement and 
Interrogation under the South African Ninety-Day Detention Law (1965), Emma Mashinini‟s 
Strikes have Followed Me All My Life: A South African Autobiography (1989) and Breyten 
Breytenbach‟s The True Confessions of an Albino Terrorist (1984) help us to appreciate that 
outside the narrative, the self of an autobiographical narrative is in fact in a state of mobile 
equilibrium and the process of telling the narrative helps the individual to half discover and 
half create the self. An examination of the autobiographical narratives of First, Mashinini and 
Breytenbach suggests that the bounded self that is presupposed in the autobiographical act, 
although not totally fictitious, is largely a creation of the narratives themselves, and that 
outside narratives it exists as an entity that recedes further and further away from all that is 
knowable. The fact that notions of the selves of all these writers almost totally collapse when 
the authors are placed in solitary confinement seems to support Gusdorf‟s observation that the 
bounded self presupposed in autobiographies is a purposeful culturally specific construct. The 
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 While my chapter specifically focuses on the relationship between solitary confinement and the 
autobiographical, a detailed study of such factors as historical sensibilities, race, education, language, culture and 
many others, in the depiction of prison experiences by South African women prisoners can be found in David 
Schalkwyk‟s “Chronotopes of the Self in the Writing of Women Political Prisoners in South Africa” (In 
Apartheid Narratives 2001: 1, 2).  
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experience of solitary confinement in prison, in other words, provides useful ground for us to 
think about what an autonomous “self” is, exactly, and where its boundaries are located. 
While Gusdorf insists that the autobiographical genre expresses an 18
th
 century European 
historical consciousness, it is interesting that J.U. Jacobs sees an emblematic relationship 
between imprisonment and the process of writing an autobiographical narrative. He argues: 
The stripping of the prisoner, both literally and mentally by a series of 
interrogators provides the metaphor for the compulsive baring of the self 
that is autobiography, conscious self-disclosure through narration (1992: 
124). 
One could take it even further than Jacobs and claim that the stripping of the prisoner is not 
just a metaphor. The “modernist” prison is itself an 18th-century invention. Its idea of solitary 
confinement is firmly based on 18
th
 century ideas about the value of solitary reflection and 
contrition. The Enlightenment prison is, in fact, the deliberate architectural expression of a 
cultural idea – the prison reflects the idea, but it also imposes it on people, it is one of those 
mechanisms that transform ideological abstractions to real experience. The caveat when we 
deal with African prisons is that they are not exactly Enlightenment prisons. They borrow 
some of the procedures, but not exactly the underlying ideas. 
In the above quotation, Jacobs couples prison regimes with the autobiographical act and 
assumes that both processes are painful and involuntary. While the prison, in the words of 
Breytenbach, is a place of “repression and of baseness where the lowest instincts prevail … a 
world of humiliation and whore‟s values” (346), Jacobs problematically assumes that all 
autobiographical acts participate in this same logic. Admittedly, there is something both 
compulsively heroic and humbling about the act of writing the self. Viewed in this light, the 
way Jacobs makes a metaphoric linkage between the way the prisoner writes about and is 
written by the prison regimes, and the way he or she writes and is also written by the 
autobiographical narrative, is thought-provoking. As a result of this connection that he makes 
between prisoner and the autobiographical act, Jacobs concludes that “the prison memoir is 
best approached within the general category of autobiography, and more specifically as a 
confessional narrative” (125).37 Jacobs‟ critical distinction encounters serious problems when 
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 Peter Brooks warns that the phrase confessional narrative is not unambiguous. He says that a distinction 
should be made between various kinds of confessional narratives (In Troubling Confessions: Speaking Guilt and 
Literature. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2000. p. 3). For example, confessions can be made under 
relatively free conditions in the presence of a priest or a psychoanalyst, or one can be forced to confess through 
torture or other coercive means by one‟s interrogators as was the case for First, Mashinini, Breytenbach and 
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applied to the strong tradition of human rights autobiographies, or autobiographies of personal 
suffering and triumph such as those of Mandela and Ngugi which I examine in the preceding 
chapter. Moreover, an examination of First‟s 117 Days, Mashinini‟s Strikes have Followed 
Me and Breytenbach‟s True Confessions allows us to interrogate some of the assumptions 
related to what Jacobs calls the “conscious self-disclosure through narration” associated with 
“the general category of autobiography”. These autobiographies are unique in that they are 
largely about, and emanate from, one specific chronotope; a period of solitary confinement in 
the police cells and prisons of apartheid South Africa.
38
 In this light, it is the interface of 
painful solitary confinement and the self-reflexive interiority that isolation is supposed to 
foster that seems to lie at the heart of what First, Mashinini and Breytenbach are grappling 
with in their narratives. 
The centrality of Ruth First‟s prison autobiographical account in South African prison 
literature is captured in Jacobs‟s observation that First is one of the pioneers of the tradition of 
the prison memoir (1992: 115). First was detained under the 90-Day Law on 9 August 1963 
and was kept in solitary confinement for 117 days. She spent 89 days in the cells of Marshall 
Square police station and 28 in Pretoria Central Prison. First was a member of the South 
African Communist Party and had been implicated in the Rivonia incident, which saw 
Mandela and others being arrested. Although escaping arrest at Rivonia, she was arrested and 
detained without charge just three weeks later. Like First, Mashinini was kept in isolation 
confinement first at Pretoria Central Prison, and later at Jeppe Police cells for half a year. 
Although not directly involved in politics, she was at the time of her arrest the outspoken 
Secretary General of the Commercial, Catering and Allied Workers‟ Union of South Africa 
(CAWUSA). Breytenbach, a founding member of an obscure organization called Okhela 
which sympathized with black resistance movements, was a white anti-apartheid political 
activist like First. He was arrested and sentenced to nine years in prison in November 1975 
when he entered South Africa from France to try and recruit members for his organization. 
Out of the seven and half years that he spent behind bars, almost two were spent in solitary 
confinement in Pretoria Central Prison. After their release from detention, First, Mashinini 
and Breytenbach wrote autobiographical accounts of their confinement experience. First‟s 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
other detainees during the apartheid era. Breytenbach is especially interesting because he insists on confusing the 
“literary” confession with the coerced police confession (in the process, perhaps, revealing a hidden dimension 
of coercion beneath the “literary” confession). 
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 I am using this Bakhtinian notion of chronotope as it is employed by David Schalkwyk in his “Chronotopes of 
the Self in the Writing of Women Political Prisoners in South Africa”? He defines chronotope as “the distinctive 
molding together of space and time into representational form and substance” and argues that “chronotopes are 
informed by historical and ideological pressures” (In Apartheid Narratives 2001: 1, 2).  
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117 Days, Mashinini‟s Strikes have Followed Me and Breytenbach‟s True Confessions have 
large sections which reflect on the psychologically debilitating effect of imprisonment in 
general, and of solitary confinement in particular. This confessional aspect of these narratives 
is what distinguishes them from Ngugi‟s Detained and Mandela‟s Long Walk to Freedom.  
Debunking the Notion of Bounded Coherent Self 
The solitary confinement of First, Mashinini and Breytenbach helps us to see that the 
individual autonomy that is valorised in certain autobiographical narratives is not as 
autonomous as we may have believed. This discovery helps us think through Gusdorf‟s 
assertion that the notion of a coherent autonomous self is largely a social construct 
popularized in the West in the eighteenth century. This also suggests that there is something 
destabilizing about the space of solitary confinement, enabling it to function as an 
experimental space in which notions of an integrated subject are put to the test and found 
wanting. While imprisonment in general exposes individual autonomy as illusory, First, 
Mashinini and Breytenbach‟s narratives specifically show that it is the space of solitary 
confinement that allows for the deconstruction of notions of an autonomous self.
39
 In 
addition, it appears that solitary confinement allows these writers, and by extension the 
reader, to reconstruct and reconstitute the notion of the self on entirely new grounds. These 
texts help us to see that the self is not autonomous and transcendent, and that it is not 
constituted through a lonely process of introspection, but rather at the intersection of the 
material world, individual mental capacity which is dependent on the healthy functioning of 
biological bodily processes, and an indefinable spiritual entity. These narratives help us see 
that these three units do not and cannot operate independent of each other without the danger 
of the dissolution of consciousness. These narratives facilitate the discovery of some of the 
conditions that permit, but also limit, individuals from attaining and narrating the imaginary 
autonomous self. 
What makes a comparative study of the confinement narratives of First, Mashinini and 
Breytenbach compelling is not so much of their authors‟ similarities as their differences. All 
of them were placed in solitary confinement for fighting against the social, economic and 
political injustices of the apartheid government. Mashinini stands out for being a black female 
who comes from an impoverished economic background and a disadvantaged intellectual 
tradition insofar as Western education is concerned. Financial challenges forced her to quit 
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 The irony is that the practice of solitary confinement is based on a belief in an autonomous self – Bentham‟s 
(1843)  idea with the panopticon was an attempt to remove “bad influences” so that inmates could draw on their 
interiority, employ their agency in the service of reform. 
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school before getting her Junior Certificate. First and Breytenbach share the similarity that 
they are both white persons in apartheid South Africa who benefited from a reasonably 
estimable modern Western education and an upbringing which promoted notions of the 
attainability of an independent and fully conscious individuality. They were also both writers 
of some note before their incarcerations. But what marks them different is that Breytenbach 
was a reneging male Afrikaner, while First was a female communist Jew.
40
  This means that 
despite being white and raised in a South Africa that fostered racial segregation and the 
superiority of the white races over all others, and the fact that both chose to ally themselves 
with the oppressed races and to fight for racial and social equality, their worldview was 
shaped by a number of different forces. Their different experiences of racial segregation were 
markedly dissimilar. Despite First‟s, Mashinini‟s and Breytenbach‟s disparate cultural, 
intellectual, political and economic backgrounds, their renditions of their solitary confinement 
experiences converge on the fact that the notion of an inherent bounded self that awaits 
narration is exposed as fiction. An examination of all three narratives reveals that subjectivity 
and the sense of the self are always processes in construction, both within and without an 
individual‟s control. 
Philippe Lejeune‟s definition of an autobiography is useful in the examination of these 
narratives and for developing the arguments that I have raised above. Lejeune defines an 
autobiography as: “A retrospective prose narrative produced by a real person concerning his 
own existence, focusing on his individual life, in particular on the development of his 
personality” (1982: 193). Neat definitions have the inherent weakness of falling into the trap 
of what Zygmunt Bauman (1991) terms “the world of tidy classifications and filing cabinets” 
(9) in that they disregard the polysemic and polyvant nature of the constitution of cultural 
processes such as the selves highlighted by the autobiographical narratives of First, Mashinini 
and Breytenbach. The restrictive nature of definitions notwithstanding, Lejeune is important 
as a point of departure for the examination of these prison accounts. At a glance, First‟s, 
Mashinini‟s and Breytenbach‟s narratives fit perfectly into Lejeune‟s definition. However, on 
close examination 117 Days, Strikes have Followed Me and True Confessions do not just 
match Lejeune‟s definition but also open it up and reveal some of its disturbing assumptions. 
 
                                                          
40
 For a gender and racially sensitive analysis of First‟s 117 Days see Daniel Roux‟s  “Presenting the Prison: The 
South African Prison Autobiography under Apartheid” in a chapter entitled “Women in Prison”  (PhD Thesis), 
2007, pp. 152-194, and David Schalkwyk‟s “Chronotopes of the Self in the Writings of Women Political 
Prisoners in South Africa” in Apartheid Narratives (ed.). Nahem Yousaf, 2001. 
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Three areas of discussion can be highlighted in Lejeune‟s definition. These are: the central 
role memory, language, and an individual with a conscious awareness of his/her life as a 
narrative construct play in the production of an autobiography. First, let us start with the issue 
of memory. The centrality of memory to subjectivity is captured in Edward Casey‟s (1987) 
observation that human beings are made of their memories and that memory makes human 
beings (290). James Fentress and Chris Wickham (1992) also concur and add that “a study of 
the way we remember is a study of the way we are” (7). The reliance of autobiography on 
memory is probably indisputable. What may be in question is what constitute memory and 
how it is used in the act of writing an autobiographical narrative. Richard Terdiman (2003) 
alludes to the futility of any attempts to define such a contested concept as memory. He 
writes: “Memory is so constitutive, so indispensable to our intellectual and practical activity 
to begin with that every cognitive or discursive act or fact is already tangled up in mnemonic 
realm” (186). Suffice to say that I subscribe to Clifford Geertz‟s (1973) argument that “human 
thought is basically both social and public” (45). This view is also echoed by Boyarin (1994) 
who observes that “[m]emory cannot be strictly individual, inasmuch as it is symbolic and 
hence intersubjective. Nor can it be literally collective, since it is not superorganic but 
embodied” (26). In light of the above, First‟s, Mashinini‟s and Breytenbach‟s solitary 
confinement experiences show that memory is indeed contingent on a number of factors in 
both the present and past, material and immaterial, and social and individual realms. For 
example, in the opening chapter entitled “The Cell”, First signals that as she reflects on the 
trauma of her solitary confinement her mind is subject to, but also a product of, the limited 
and desolate space of the police cell that she is subjected to. She writes: 
Seen from the door the cell had been catacomb-like, claustrophobic. 
Concrete-cold … The window, high in the wall above the head of the 
bedstead, triple thick – barred, barred again and meshed – with sticky black 
soot on top of three protective layers, was a closing, not an opening (7). 
First‟s language evokes images of death and entrapment, implying that narrative is impossible 
in such an environment. The cell resembles a cold, crammed lifeless cemetery where creative 
thought is rendered infeasible. The triple barred and blackened window is not an opening but 
has become a metaphor for closure that asphyxiates thought and memory. First‟s language use 
in the above passage suggests that the prison is already its own metaphor. It is a stylistic 
version of the claustrophobia of the space. First cannot find a better metaphor for being 
locked up in a tiny concrete cell since she is already locked up in a tiny concrete cell. 
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In contrast, Mashinini‟s notions of the self are ambivalent and more complex than those of 
First. At times her narrative implies that she imagines herself as having an incorruptible 
inherent bounded self. She writes: “Everything was taken ... Everything was removed ... I sat 
in that place with nothing to read. Just with myself. The bare me” (1989: 61). Above, 
Mashinini uses imagery that is surprisingly close to the thing itself to represent herself as 
possessing a self that endures even when its covering layers are removed. The physical 
stripping of her personal belongings is a metaphor for the layers that supposedly cover an 
essential self that no amount of stripping can compromise. At other times she seems be aware 
that the self is provisional and contingent. For example during the initial phase of her 
detention she suggests that her notions of the self are structured by the knowledge that she is 
detained under Section 22 of the General Laws Amendment Act which allows her to 
anticipate release after fourteen days. She is able to count days by the number of suppers she 
gets and after those fourteen days she declares: “And it was still Emma. I was still sane. I was 
myself” (62). These words anticipate her almost total collapse after she learns that she has 
been charged under Section 6 which provided for indefinite detention without trial.  
Radstone and Hodgkin (2003) propose an idea related to Gusdorf‟s about the link between the 
development of the conscious awareness of the singularity of each individual life and the 
emergence of autobiography when they argue that “[t]he history of memory is indissociably 
linked … with the complex story of the emergence on the historical stage of a bounded, 
coherent self who comes to be understood as the „container‟ or possessor of memory” (3). 
Breytenbach assumes that a coherent self is the product of a memory that forgets many things 
over time. He does not necessarily view this process of selective remembering as negative, 
since it allows for human creativity by letting the inessential details fall away. He writes: 
Naturally I have forgotten a lot – I wouldn‟t be human otherwise. That is 
why I try to structure my mind – the one incident carries the echoes of 
others – like death. There is no composition like decomposition: not just a 
rearranging or falling apart, but verily rotting to the bone to bring to light 
the essential structure. (157) 
Breytenbach‟s prison narrative seems written in a way that largely disputes the notion of a 
coherent self-contained memory that enables the individual to render a truthful and accurate 
account of an autobiographical self. For example, addressing the imaginary Mr Investigator of 
his narrative, Breytenbach writes: “You know that we‟re always inventing our lives. You 
know that what I‟m confessing now is also the instantaneous invention of what might have 
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happened” (17). Breytenbach‟s claim is very similar to Olney‟s insight that “the 
autobiographer half discovers, half creates a deeper design and truth than adherence to 
historical and factual truth could ever claim to” (1980: 11). When Breytenbach says that his 
narrative is an instantaneous invention he captures a fact also highlighted by Hodgkin and 
Radstone when they point out that memory is not just the past but is rather about the present 
and is very much live and active (2003: 1).
41
 Eakin (1985) also proposes that the 
autobiographical act should be understood “as both a re-enactment and an extension of earlier 
phases of identity formation [and that] these self-defining acts may be re-enacted as the 
autobiographical narrative is being written” (227).42 Breytenbach and his jailers may agree 
that certain events took place, but their narration of these events will differ. The power of 
Breytenbach‟s above statement lies in his realisation that a coherent self is not fixed for all 
time, but only exists in a state of mobile equilibrium that depends on factors which are both 
within and beyond the individual‟s control. Solitary confinement violently disrupts this 
moving balance of the self since it suddenly removes the individual from an environment that 
enables it and gives it a semblance of stability. 
The second aspect of Lejeune‟s definition is that an autobiography is created through 
language as a story. This is seen when he says that an autobiography is produced from 
memory through a prose narrative. This means that language is intricately linked to the 
problematics of representation as already suggested by Eakin above. Eakin notes that “[m]uch 
of the controversy about the ontological status of the self in the autobiography has tended to 
polarize into a self-before-language or a language-before-self set of propositions” (191). 
Elizabeth Bruss (1980) also similarly says: 
We were apt to take autobiography, for all its local variations of design and 
reticence, as at least expressive of a common underlying reality – a self 
existing independently of any particular style of expression and logically 
prior to all literary genres and even language itself. (298) 
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 Breytenbach was enamoured with structuralist and poststructuralist theory, so the extent to which he is writing 
from experience and speaking as an academic is difficult to determine. 
 
42
 About the autobiographical process Eakin further observes: “The autobiographer may even be drawn to 
suggest that in the completed narrative that such a re-enactment has taken place. Thus the act of composition 
may be perceived as a mediating term in the autobiographical enterprise, reaching back into the past not merely 
to recapture but to repeat the psychological rhythm of identity formation, and reaching forward into the future to 
fix the structure of this identity in a permanent self-made existence as a literary text. This is to understand the 
writing of autobiography not merely as the passive, transparent record of an already completed self but rather as 
an integral and often decisive phase in the drama of self-definition” (Fictions in Autobiography, p. 226)     
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Lejeune‟s definition suggests this polarity by implying the priority of the self-before-
language, which if one‟s memory functions properly can be unproblematically retrieved and 
expressed in the form of a prose narrative. An examination of the prison narratives of First, 
Mashinini and Breytenbach suggests that “[p]erhaps subjectivity takes shape by and in its 
language rather than using language as a „vehicle‟ to express its own transcendental being” 
(Bruss 298). In fact these narratives suggest that instead of operating as separate entities, 
language and subjectivity may be mutually constitutive. 
Furthermore, as we see in Breytenbach‟s words above, the ability to narrate or to use 
language implies invention, and inventions serve the present and not the past. But in order for 
the mind to narrate, it requires certain conditions, as First‟s and Mashinini‟s accounts show. 
Their confinement stories show that the ability to narrate, like subjectivity, is not inborn, nor 
is it learned once and for all time. This is dramatized by Mashinini‟s traumatic experience of 
failing to remember the name of her youngest daughter. First also realises that it is enforced 
isolation itself that inhibits self-narration. This is seen when she is transferred from Marshall 
Square police station to Pretoria Central Prison for 28 days. The Marshall Square cell with its 
catacombic shape and its grey dirty walls curtails First‟s agency and erodes her subjectivity. 
Although her new Pretoria environment is much cleaner and her cell more spacious in 
comparison with the Marshall Square cell, it does not make her more articulate. She writes: 
“Pretoria shone of bright polished steel and I grew increasingly subdued” (69). In Marshall 
Square Police cell, it was her memory, which she imagined to be the seat of the self, that was 
compromised; in Pretoria Central Prison, it is her ability to progressively and coherently 
articulate the self that she finds slipping away. She tries to conjure up her narrative ability 
through Bible reading, and when this fails she says: 
I devised a plot for a novel. The characters were me and my friends, all cast 
in heroic mould. We planned and organized in opposition to the 
Government, called for strikes and acts of civil disobedience, were harassed 
and chivvied by the police, banned, arrested. Then we were locked in prison 
cells and here I was again, grappling with life in a cell. (69) 
Caged as she is, and “bereft of human contact and exchange”, she discovers that her life story 
can only be narrated in circles. This is also made clear by the use pronouns in the above 
quotation. The first sentence begins with the singular personal pronoun “I” and attempts to 
move away from the self by the use of the collective personal pronoun “we” in the third 
sentence, but it eventually retains to the isolated and confined “I” in the last sentence. No 
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matter how creative she tries to be, her story ends up in a prison cell. Accidentally, through 
her solitary confinement, she discovers that without human contact and exchange the self 
becomes slippery and impossible to pin down. She realizes that beyond the communal the self 
becomes demented and impossible to narrate. 
Mashinini also discovers that it is contact with human beings which lifts her from a state of 
depression and mental inertia. When she is subsequently allowed visitors she observes: “After 
visits from my family or friends I felt restored. It gave me more strength than ever before” 
(86). Like First, she even looks forward to being interrogated. She writes: “And if they didn‟t 
call me for interrogation, I really wanted to remind them, because interrogation was better 
than to be isolated and all by myself for all those months” (85). But one moving incident of 
the importance of loving human contact to the emotional and psychological well-being of the 
individual is illustrated by what Mashinini calls “the kiss of life” which she got from Sisa 
Njikelana, a fellow detainee and trade unionist, who despite being under police escort showed 
extreme bravery by walking up to Mashinini, greeted and gave her a warm kiss. Mashinini 
reports: “I carried the kiss with me for a very long time ... he put life into me” (83). These 
moments suggest that instead of being eternally bounded and coherent the self exists in a state 
continuous construction as the individual interacts with fellow humans. 
In addition to being Breytenbach‟s general academic stance, the cryptic nature of the bulk of 
True Confessions might also be an indication of how solitary confinement becomes a barrier 
to the individual‟s ability to narrate the self coherently. The two years Breytenbach spent in 
isolation in Pretoria Central Prison are narrated in terms that defy any logic of an 
autobiographical narrative. This point is raised by Daniel Roux (2007) when he writes:  
Of his nine years in prison, he spent two in solitary confinement, and these 
are also the years that are described in the most fractured, convoluted and 
self-reflexive prose. The later part of the memoir, which chronicles his life 
at Pollsmoor Prison, seems more willing to employ the mimetic conventions 
of realist narration. (214) 
The following passage is characteristic of Bretenbach‟s narrative style when he tries to 
represent his arrest, interrogation and the two year stay in isolation: 
From room to room. Dying so as to be reborn. To die. To be reborn from 
room to room. From womb to space. From space to room. From room to 
coffin. From coffin to destiny of space. From space to nothingness (34). 
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Whatever Breytenbach is trying to say here about his detention experience, it amounts to a 
circling negativity. Probably we see here the influence of Zen Buddhism which Coullie et al 
(2006: 269) say permeates most of Breytenbach‟s work.43 Room, womb, coffin are all 
collapsed into a kind of imprisoning space. The life story of the individual is reduced to birth, 
death and nothingness, processes that tend to elude proper narration.
44
 The indistinct self that 
is implied in Breytenbach‟s above words is metaphorically represented in the metal mirror 
that he has to use when he shaves his beard during the period of his solitary confinement. 
Commenting on the hazy image of oneself reflected by this mirror he says: “In this surface 
one could see a vague reflection of yourself” (32). If the mirror as a metaphor for society, it 
becomes clear that a distinct sense of self is impossible in isolation. Popper (177) writes: 
[A] consciousness of the self begins to develop through the medium of other 
persons: just as we learn to see ourselves in a mirror, so the child becomes 
conscious of himself by sensing his reflection in the mirror of other people‟s 
consciousness of himself. (110)
45
 
As Breytenbach comes to realize in his encounter with the metal mirror in solitary 
confinement, throughout adulthood human interaction continues to act as a mirror that reflects 
a recognisable outline of the self. Sienaert (2006) points out that “[t]he mirror as a powerful 
metaphor of identity can be traced throughout [Breytenbach‟s] art and writing” (270). 
Breytenbach himself says that the shaping of identity and its resultant self-identification is the 
product of a given society. He argues: 
The sense of I … is dependent on interaction with some thing or some body 
“out there”. Community is usually the mirror … We identify/situate 
ourselves in our interaction with and in relation to cultural constructs such 
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 Marilet Sienaert dedicates an entire chapter in her book The I of the Beholder: Identity Formation in the Art 
and Writing of Breyten Breytenbach demonstrating the huge influence of Zen Buddhism in Breytenbach‟s work. 
(2001: 15-42).    
 
44
 Karl R. Popper and John C. Eccles propose that it was the invention of language which enabled humans to 
discover both the self and death. (The Self and Its Brain, 1977: 144). Paul John Eakin, on the other hand alerts us 
to the complexity of the situation. He argues: “Whether the self, that „certain intricate watermark,‟ is literally 
discovered, made „visible‟ in the autobiography, or is only invented by it as a signature, a kind of writing, is 
beyond our knowing, for knowledge of the self is inseparable from the practice of language” (Fictions in 
Autobiography 1985: 278).    
 
45
 In fact Jacques Lacan claims that it is at this mirror stage that infants develop the first sense of the self. He 
writes: “This jubilant assumption of his specular image by the child at the infans stage … would seem to exhibit 
in an exemplary situation the symbolic matrix in which the I is precipitated in a primordial form, before it is 
objectified in the dialectic of the identification with the other, before language restores to it, in the universal, its 
function as a subject” (Écrits, trans. Alan Sheridan, 1977: 2). This suggests that discourse or language acts as a 
mirror for adults in the constitution of the self.    
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as language, religion, ideology, a shared narrative of history or destiny, 
adherence or resistance to specific values. (in Coullie et al 2006: 274) 
That human interaction acts as a mirror for the individual to construct notions of the self is 
also suggested by Mashinini. She writes: 
And then, one day, the interrogations stopped ... And I missed them ... I 
didn‟t think I knew myself any longer. There was no mirror. It‟s odd what 
happens when you don‟t see yourself in a mirror for such a long time. You 
don‟t recognise yourself. You think, who am I. (87) 
Since both Breytenbach and Mashinini acknowledge that the self is constituted in social 
interaction, we can conclude that in solitary confinement the self is unhinged in ways that are 
difficult to enumerate. Breytenbach‟s own enigmatic prose that deals with his period of 
solitary confinement is illustrative of how without social interaction a coherent narrated self 
recedes into incoherence or, according to Breytenbach, into nothingness. But the 
autobiographical process that Breytenbach engages in can also be viewed as partially 
reversing this relentless march to nothingness by giving form to a life that may not have had 
the completeness that an autobiography bestows it. 
For Breytenbach, humans‟ capacity for self-reflection and the need for presenting oneself as a 
coherent self is the very essence of an autobiographical narrative. The inability to present a 
single bounded autobiographical self is dramatized by the digressions that occur in the 
statement that he is forced to write over and over by his interrogators. He writes: “You 
writing. Hoping that you are still reporting the same story which you have invented and 
knowing that you are now deviating from it gradually, but not knowing how much” (30).46 
Earlier, Breytenbach implies that a coherent and autonomous subject is always in a state of 
construction throughout an individual‟s life. He asks: “Isn‟t that the whole process of our 
being, this looking for a name?” (13). Breytenbach suggests that the stable and coherent 
narrator of an autobiography is a fiction of the narrative itself. This is what is also meant by 
Gusdorf when he argues: 
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 Mashinini is similarly interrogated by being made to write. While she is clearly aware that they are trying to 
make her contradict herself she does not adopt Breytenbach‟s post-structuralist attitude towards the 
autobiographical process. She writes: “They‟d make me sit down and write ... they wanted me to say things, but 
there was nothing I could write that would give anybody away” (75). She also reports that she found this form of 
interrogation tolerable than the verbal one. “I would sit and write; and write, and this was better for me. Maybe it 
was a way of being able to think what to say without for once anyone pushing me” (75). 
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[T]he original sin of autobiography is first one of logical coherence and 
rationalization. The narrative is conscious, and since the narrator‟s 
consciousness directs the narrative, it seems to him incontestable that it has 
also directed his narrative. (1980: 41) 
To counter the imposition of coherence and rationalization that he sees inherent in 
biographical narratives, and to try and make his story as close as possible to lived experience 
as it unfolds from day to day, Breytenbach adopts a fractured narrative style which defies a 
linear understanding of time. This can be seen in the following passage: “It was the second 
day or perhaps it was the third, no, it was the first day. Then it was the fourth day, I mean it 
was the second day, it must have been the morning of the second day” (34). And in the 
following passage: “The questioning continued. At one stage – it must have been the second 
day – on that morning of the fourth day, no, I remember now, it was the third day, I was taken 
into a second room, slightly bigger” (35). Breytenbach‟s narrative technique does not only 
show the impossibility of accuracy when events are recalled from memory, but also 
demonstrates that “autobiography is condemned to substitute endlessly the completely formed 
for that which is in the process of being formed” (Gusdorf 41). However, I have argued that 
Breytenbach‟s disjointed narrative style also suggests that the experience of interrogation and 
imprisonment were so traumatic that they elude any coherent recollection and narrativization.  
In Breytenbach‟s understanding, the confined spaces of the prison cell and prison 
confinement in general are violently anti-narrative places. He writes: “Whatever the detainee 
does or doesn‟t do whilst in prison is done under pressure” (28). For Breytenbach, the prison 
experience in general precludes rationality and coherence. This then implies that the 
completely formed narratives of former prisoners such as the ones that I examine in this thesis 
are mere substitutions of processes that were still unformed at the time the narrator was 
experiencing them. Hodgkin and Radstone (2003) suggest that the whole debate about 
narratives, be they historical, autobiographical or literary, comes down to the problematics of 
memory. They write: 
To privilege memory as a tool of truth, through which the statements of 
authority may be subverted or contradicted, we must assume a direct 
correspondence between the experience and how it is remembered [but this 
is not the case since] the past is constituted in narrative, always 
representation, always construction. (2) 
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Breytenbach‟s narrative seems to confirm this view. In the “Notes” section of his text, he 
says: “My account of what happened is neither objective nor complete … We are all subject 
to the fantasies of our world” (338). 
Significantly, Breytenbach argues that the self is progressively moving into nothingness, with 
or without social interaction. In a 2001 interview with Sienaert, he says: “Self is ever-
expanding emptiness … the awareness of the changing, making, and unmaking of “self” is a 
dilation of emptiness. One is always becoming nothing … one is always becoming death” 
(109). Mashinini characterises the interrogations by the security branch officers as a search 
for nothingness. She is frightened by the absurdity and the futility of the interrogations. She 
says that her interrogators sat “there in a room learning nothing, doing nothing, always 
questioning and never understanding what they were being told” (74). Their search for what 
they call the truth can be equated to the search of a bounded coherent autobiographical self 
that presumably resides in each individual. Mashinini‟s narrative suggests that both processes 
are exercises in futility. She writes: “Always they wanted the truth, when I had no more truth 
to tell. I don‟t think they ever understood that in fact there was nothing to give away. But they 
always tried to find it, this nothing” (74). If even in social interactions the destination of the 
self is always a vast emptiness as suggested by Breytenbach, solitary confinement merely acts 
as a catalyst of an inevitable process. But if we acknowledge that the self is formed in many 
forms of interaction, Breytenbach‟s pessimistic view of the self is also partly a result of his 
negative life experiences, especially his imprisonment and his two year-solitary confinement. 
The third aspect of Lejeune‟s definition of an autobiography assumes that an autobiographical 
narrative cannot be possible without a self that has a conscious awareness of its life as a 
narrative. The narratives that I examine in this chapter seem to simultaneously confirm and 
problematize Lejeune‟s assertion. When First is initially thrown into solitary confinement she 
assumes that it would offer a space for thinking “without diversion” (7). But no sooner is she 
left entirely alone in this confined space than she realise that something which seems as 
individualistic and personal as thinking is also, in fact, a socially and materially generated 
processes. She writes: “Yet, not an hour after I was lodged in the cell, I found myself forced 
to do what storybook prisoners do: pace the length and breadth of the cell” (8). Ironically, 
even this act of pacing the length and breadth of the cell does not completely emanate from an 
imagined self which excludes social encounters. In the absence of any meaningful social 
activity she says: 
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I played child-like games in my head: going through the letters of the 
alphabet for names of writers, composers, scientists, countries, cities, 
animals, fruit, flowers, and vegetables. As the days went on I seemed to 
grow less, not more proficient at this game. This was the time I should have 
been able to feed on the fat of my memory … I was appalled at the absence 
of my inventive and imaginative powers. (70-71)  
The Bible and stories she had read before her imprisonment sustain some form of coherent 
thought for some time during the early days of solitary confinement. Her suitcase full of 
clothes also becomes a point of fixation which allows her to keep some measure of her 
personal identity. Additionally, she uses it to while away time by unpacking and repacking the 
clothes in the suitcase endlessly. Later on, after her attempted suicide, she could even get a 
few books which had to be approved by the prison authorities. David Schalkwyk notes: 
“Confident at first that isolation will provide a much desired retreat from the public world, 
First soon realizes that „isolation and privacy [are] not the same thing by any means (27)‟” 
(2001: 9). Mashinini, who is stripped of all her personal belongings right from the outset, 
never imagines that solitary confinement will become a private thinking space. Her work as a 
trade unionist had always involved constant interaction with people, and she missed that as 
soon she was arrested. She realises that although she is not physically abused, isolating a 
person is an extreme form of “emotional battery” (77). First‟s solitary confinement allows her 
to realize that “[e]xperience is the prime matter of all creation, which is an elaboration of 
elements borrowed from lived reality, [and] that [o]ne can exercise imagination only starting 
from what one is, from what one has tried either in fact or in wish” (Gusdorf 45). 
The experience of solitary confinement of both First and Mashinini enables us to realize “that 
the self seems absent at precisely the moment its presence is most urgently required, that 
discursive knowledge seems radically incapable of giving presence or authority to the self” 
(Roux 2005: 29). The opening words of First‟s narrative indicate that, despite the existence of 
a cultural landscape where the individual has become conscious of the self, there are both 
material and immaterial conditions that destabilize one‟s ability to narrate a self-reflexive and 
coherent autobiographical self. First writes: “For the first fifty-six days of my detention in 
solitary I changed from a mainly vertical to a mainly horizontal creature” (7). First is of 
course reflecting on a past event. Nonetheless, in these words, we can still isolate some 
features associated with the Western notions of an autonomous subject that her solitary 
confinement arguably debunks. 
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Firstly, First‟s lack of meaningful human interaction heightens her awareness of how the 
notion of time is largely socially constructed, like the idea of the self. This is illustrated by her 
obsession with the accurate record keeping of days during her early days in solitary 
confinement. David Schalkwyk observes that the “very title of Ruth First‟s prison memoir, 
117 Days, attests to an intense preoccupation with time” (2001: 7). Although not necessarily 
showing her awareness that “[t]ime is a historical construct” (Radstone and Hodgkin (2003: 
15), First‟s above words can be read as an unconscious deconstruction of the Western notions 
of the development of linear, progressive temporality which emerged in the eighteenth 
century. This conceptualization of time views history as progress. Ironically, in First‟s case, 
she devolves to lower levels of being with the passage of time. After fifty six days in solitary 
confinement she has defied the evolution theory by digressing into a horizontal creature. In 
fact, towards the end of her solitary confinement she had ceased viewing time as linear and 
progressive at all. She says: “I had completely lost track of time and even interest in keeping a 
wall calendar” (129). After being placed under Section 6, Mashinini also becomes numb and 
completely loses her agency. She writes: “All my trade union experience of demanding to see 
and not being refused just fell aside. Even going to bed became an effort. I was just a lump” 
(63). Solitary confinement has rendered time cyclical and meaningless, and we can also 
assume that an autobiographical self is impossible in such conditions for it relies on culturally 
bound conceptualization of time.  
Moreover, the fact that the limited space forces her to spend most of her time lying on the 
uncomfortable bed makes her realize how self-consciousness is reliant on things that 
unrestricted and healthy people may take for granted. She suddenly realizes that people who 
are confined to bed, whether by imprisonment, as in her case, or by some physical ailment, 
can have a radically changed perception of the self and of the world. The vertical self and the 
horizontal self cannot have the same self-consciousness despite sharing the same cultural 
landscape mentioned by Gusdorf. First‟s account illustrates that a cultural environment that 
develops self-consciousness is a maze, since it is linked to many things. Literacy is 
supposedly one of the main determinants of a self that has the capacity of narrating itself 
autobiographically. With undisguised sarcasm Michael Lambek notes this, when he writes: 
The (triumphal) history or historical consciousness said to be uniquely 
characteristic of Western societies has often been associated with literacy. In 
such arguments, whatever the attention given to the poetics of oratory or the 
training in memory, the oral („pre-literate‟) society is inevitably 
characterized by an absence or lack. (202) 
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Mashinini indicates that white men who interrogate her have a challenge in accepting that a 
black person, and a woman for that, who did not complete junior certificate, can have the 
intelligence, organizational skills and courage to confront employers as she did. Their first 
assumption is that she is just a front for white communists. Mashinini says they would ask: 
“What was I doing with Alan Fine, and what was I doing with Neil Aggett, and what was I 
doing with Barbara Hogan?” (75). They also assume that Mashinini got her ideas from 
Marxist literature. She writes: 
They wanted to know if I had ever read certain books – I can‟t remember 
the names, because in fact I hadn‟t read them, but they were Marxist books, 
because Marxists were the sort of people who have that type of thought, of 
bringing people together (75). 
They insist “that somebody must have put this or that idea into [her] mind” (75). To use 
Lambek‟s words, the assumptions that guide these men is that historical consciousness is 
uniquely a characteristic of Western societies and that Mashinini‟s awareness of worker 
exploitation must be a Western ideological imposition. They condescendingly think that her 
black background is characterised by an absence or lack, an inability to individually feel 
oppression and exploitation. 
In First‟s case, she suggests that what exacerbates her disorientation in solitary confinement is 
partly her literacy in that she is unable to engage in sustained logical thinking without pencil 
and paper. She writes: “I had always had a bad memory … and had relied all my life on 
pencil, notebook, Press clipping, the marking in the margin of a book to recall a source, a fact, 
a reference” (70). In First‟s case, it is the lack of cultural props associated with the 
consciousness of the self which add to her experiencing her solitary confinement as a void, a 
nothingness where time eventually stops.
47
 As a product of a post-event of her confinement 
experience, when her narrative opens, First seems to anticipates her descent into a creature 
who is unconscious of time if her stay in solitary confinement were to be prolonged. She 
writes: “Left in that cell long enough, I feared to become one of those colourless insects that 
slither under a world of flat, grey stones, away from the sky and the sunlight, the grass and 
people” (7). Breytenbach, who was allowed to write and paint in prison, experiences time in 
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On the other hand, it can be argued that the suitcase that she is allowed to take into her cell is another kind of 
cultural prop – this time one that supports her enactment of racialised gender assumptions. Despite being a 
woman Mashinini is not allowed to enact her gender in the same way as First.  Patriarchal notions are at play in 
that while First is allowed a suitcase of clothes and toiletries Breytenbach is allowed to continue writing and 
painting. While the white woman must continue to look beautiful even in prison, she is not allowed to transgress 
her gender by being an architect of cultural thought through writing and drawing.  
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solitary confinement differently. He writes: “The Writer Destroys Time. I am a writer. I 
scribble … Writing becomes for me a means, a way of survival. I have to cut up my 
environment in digestible chunks. Writing is an extension of my senses” (154-5). First‟s rapid 
psychological collapse as evidenced by her attempted suicide can therefore be partly 
attributed to her being denied to write, something which had been an extension of her senses 
before her arrest. 
It is important to note that First writes the account of her solitary confinement in the relative 
comfort of exile and not in the claustrophobia of the cold concrete walls of the Marshall 
Square police cell. She writes in order to re-gain the trust of her political friends by showing 
that she had not betrayed them during her agonizing one hundred and seventeen days in 
solitary confinement. She also seems determined to show that the psychological tactics that 
she was subjected to through solitary confinement are as violent as the physical torture that 
black prisoners, and later also some white prisoners, were subjected to. In addition to being a 
product of a self-conscious individual, First‟s narrative becomes an unconscious plea for 
absolution. This is seen in her words after her attempted suicide precipitated by self–blame 
that she had betrayed her political colleagues. After some time she says she in fact had won:  
How desperate they were for a statement and I would not give them one! At 
last I permitted myself my first scent of victory. I determined to shake off 
the all-devouring sense of guilt at my lapse. I had been reeling towards a 
precipice and I had stopped myself at the edge. I had not been too late to 
beat them back. I had undermined my own resistance, yet I had not after all 
succumbed. In the depth of my agony I had won. (135-6)  
There is a dramatic shift from the collective to the individual in the above quotation. In just 
seven sentences First uses “I” nine times, “my” four times and “myself” twice. Despite her 
overt ideological intentions of casting her prison experience in the collective, in the end, First 
runs full circle and fails to escape the confessional logic of solitary confinement. Breytenbach 
is less self-congratulatory than First, and is very pessimistic about any victory that one may 
claim to have won by walking alive out of prison. He writes:  
People say, how did you survive? I say, I did not survive. People say, but 
prison is a clear instance of opposition, of resistance. I say, resistance, if that 
is what you want to call survival, is made up of a million compromises and 
humiliations, so subtle that the human eye cannot perceive them. (258)  
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What First‟s account does not reflect, and what is emphasized by Breytenbach‟s account, is 
that the self is largely a matter of re-constructing the past for the present needs. This idea is 
put across strongly by James Olney who claims that in writing an autobiography the autos or 
the “I” half discovers and half creates itself” (1980: 21). 
While First‟s account is preoccupied with her fear of losing a “bounded self” (Radstone and 
Hodgkin 5) that she assumes she inhabits, Breytenbach deliberately adopts a deconstructive 
stance that denies any possibility of understanding reality. He writes:  
One mustn‟t be like those who always simplify „reality‟ by attempting to 
understand it. One must live it; one should flow with the rhythm. You 
develop an awareness of the living structure – of that which is constantly 
doing itself: the patterns, the dialectic, the breaking points, the limits which 
are only the outer edges of pages and pages of silence, the relationships, and 
then where you lose all comprehension as the earth tilts away from you. 
Such is the structure of understanding. (308) 
So, for Breytenbach, human understanding will be forever partial. The differences in the 
conceptualization of „reality‟ between First and Bretenbach is partly a result of the fact that 
First was a committed Communist while Breytenbach‟s political ideology seems to have 
remained hazy even though he was involved in political activism against the apartheid 
regime.
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The irony of course is that Breytenbach‟s refusal to take a strong position about anything 
makes a mockery of the seven and half years he spent in prison accused of being politically 
dangerous to the apartheid state. It will appear then that his non-committal philosophical 
posturing is a result of the disillusionment he suffered as a result of his long imprisonment.
49
 
If this view is correct, Breytenbach becomes one of those who surely did not survive prison as 
he himself claims; instead he is broken by solitary confinement and prison experience. 
Despite the fact that the bulk of what he says in True Confessions is obscure and evasive, the 
reader cannot fail to detect Breytenbach‟s strong revulsion towards the prison and its regimes 
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 In the end Breytenbach was not even jailed on a political charge but on a criminal one – a combination of 
political indecisiveness and poor legal counsel. 
 
49
 Roux points out that Breytenbach may have come into prison with some of these ideas and the prison then 
reinforced them. He writes: “The self-reflexivity, philosophical digressions, formal experimentation and the 
insistence on the deeply personal nature of experience that characterise True Confessions are all evident in his 
earlier work in Afrikaans. To a certain extent, in other words, his experience of incarceration is inflected through 
the literary sensibility that he brings to prison” (“Presenting the Prison: The South African Prison Autobiography 
under Apartheid” 2007: 232). 
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and how it left permanent marks on his subjectivity.  Reflecting on his experience after being 
taken out of solitary confinement at Pretoria Central Prison and transferred to Pollsmoor 
Prison, he says: 
Prison, for me, is the absolute stripping away of all protective layers: the 
sounds are raw, sights are harsh, smells are foul. The scars are there, like 
tattoos on the mind. You are reduced to the lowest – common denominator - 
being alone (and scared and weak to the point of being suffocated by a self-
disgust) whilst always surrounded by others. (258) 
While for First it is only solitary confinement that has a debilitating effect on the self, for 
Breytenbach the communal cell and the solitary cell merge; both strip away all human 
pretences and reduce the individual to the lowest common denominator, the level of a 
vulnerable animal. 
For First, solitary confinement becomes a painful accidental experimental space which almost 
enables her to realize that the self is formed at the intersection of personal mental 
endowments, material environment and the social realm. She discovers that the formation of 
subjectivity is not a solitary process. However, on reflection, what she finds alarming is that 
the apartheid South African security agents may in fact have been consciously conducting 
experiments on human beings by subjecting them to solitary confinement and other methods 
of torture. She muses: 
Perhaps one day the South African Security Branch will plead that it used 
psychological torture for the benefit of science: that from its files one can 
study the case histories of its victims to discern „cracking-points‟, resistance 
to suggestion, the correlation of psychological types with will and ability to 
exist over long periods of time in isolation.(133) 
First herself, courtesy of the torture methods of the Security Branch, is peering into her own 
subjectivity and those of others who went through similar experiences trying to discern 
„cracking points‟. For example, reflecting on the experience of solitary confinement she 
observes: 
It is so difficult to know beforehand who would fare well or badly. Men 
holding key positions in the political movement, who had years of hard 
political experience and sacrifice behind them cracked like egg shell. 
Others, with quiet, reticent, self-effacing natures, who had been woolly in 
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making decisions and slow to carry them out, emerged from long spells of 
isolation shaken but unbroken. (132) 
So for the victims of apartheid cruelty, too: the brutal methods of the state security forces 
inadvertently worked as a refining furnace among their rank and file. The irony of course is 
that my own analysis of First‟s, Mashinini‟s and Breytenbach‟s solitary confinement 
narratives is a quasi-scientific study of the human condition that First postulates the apartheid 
Security Branch torture files may one day shed light upon. 
All the prison auto/biographical narratives discussed so far are about political prisoners. All 
these people were individuals with a fair amount of Western education, and except for 
Mashinini, they had at least been to university.  As a result, the concerns and selves that are 
presented in their narratives are largely shaped by either their political ideologies or by their 
academic background. This in itself is not a weakness, but it results in a partial understanding 
of what constitutes Kenyan and South African crime and prison experience. The next chapter, 
and others that follow it, are attempts to expand our understanding of power, criminality and 
imprisonment in Kenya and South Africa by exploring prison narratives about or by “non-
politicals” and “non-academics”. 
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Chapter 4: Crime, Prison and Narrative in Jonny Steinberg’s The Number: 
One Man’s Search for Identity in the Cape Underworld and Prison Gangs. 
1. Prison, Power and Representation 
The African prison has often been represented through polarities. One camp approaches it 
through the question of human rights and examines the inherently oppressive historical 
processes that attended the birth of the prison on the continent. For example, Florence 
Bernault in a History of Prison and Confinement in Africa (2003) argues that the post-colonial 
African prisons should be understood through the prism of exploitive and oppressive political 
and economic colonial and imperialist discourse of late 19
th
 century Europe.  Similarly, 
Jeremy Sarkin (2008) in Human Rights in African Prisons traces the trajectory of the current 
deplorable human rights abuses in most African prisons back to the way the prison first 
emerged as a tool of political and social subjugation of Africans when European nations 
scrambled to establish their political and economic dominance over the continent
50
. However, 
other writers seem to be more concerned with how the prison structures prisoners‟ 
consciousness, subjectivity and identity. This is largely the way Bosman in Cold Stone Jug 
(1949), Breyten Breytenbach (1994) in The True Confessions of an Albino Terrorist and Ruth 
First in 117 Days: An Account of Confinement and Interrogation under the South African 90-
day Detention Law (1965) explore their prison experience in South African colonial and 
apartheid jails. Interestingly, the divisions of these auto/biographical accounts seem to relate 
to racialisation. In the above texts the prison is understood as a purely social/political 
phenomenon by some writers, while other writers focus on the subjective experience of the 
prison. In contrast, The Number is a text that tries to engage both. My analysis of Steinberg‟s 
The Number: One Man‟s Search for Identity in the Cape Underworld and Prison Gangs 
(2004) asserts that in his biographical narrative of Magadien, Steinberg, with varying levels of 
success, attempts to offer an examination of the prison that seeks to break down these 
divisions associated with the study of the African prison. 
Steinberg‟s The Number is a self-reflexive and sophisticated re/presentation of Magadien‟s 
life story as it is framed by crime, prison and other exigencies that impinge on the lives of 
many coloured people during and after apartheid. The Number is the story that Steinberg tells 
about Magadien, a 43 year old coloured man from the Cape Flats who, at the time Steinberg 
meets him, has spent a quarter of a century in South African jails as a senior member of the 28 
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 The prison auto/biographical narratives of Nelson Mandela and Ngugi wa Thiong‟o that I have examined in 
chapter one can be viewed as participating in this discourse of compartmentalizing the prison alongside all 
historical oppressive processes and institutions that attended the violent colonial invasion of Africa. 
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Number prison gang. The narrative is also what Coullie et al (2006:4) would call a 
collaborative auto/biography or mediated testimony. I will refer to Steinberg‟s book as an 
auto/biography, because as Daniel Roux points out, “as much as Steinberg recounts 
Magadien‟s life story, he is … also producing an autobiographical narrative about his own 
encounter with Magadien and his world” 2007: 262). If I may corrupt the title of Roland 
Barthes highly deconstructive autobiography, Roland Barthes by Roland Barthes (1977) in 
order to reflect its collaborative nature and the instability of both Steinberg and Magadien as 
unitary self-knowing subjects, I may call Stenberg‟s book Steinberg and Magadien by 
Steinberg and Magadien. Coullie et al point out that in collaborative auto/biographies 
“matters can become less amicable … as struggles erupt for control over the narrative of a 
life” (4). Steinberg being an academic white man, and Magadien an underprivileged coloured 
man, The Number may be read as a book that explores the extent to which Steinberg‟s and 
Magadien‟s narratives harmonize or come into conflict over the issue of race and privilege. 
Gloria Anzaldúa claims that boundaries are sites of contestation (1987: 18), and Carole Boyce 
Davies argues that collaboratively written “life stories are boundary-breaking texts” (1992). 
The conflict between Magadien and Steinberg, which Steinberg faithfully records, may 
therefore be read as an inevitable consequence of the collaboration of two different stories 
colliding or pulling in different directions. Over and above this, The Number displays what 
Coullie et al refer to as “the heteroglossic nature of individual and collective identities shaped 
by the intersection of a web of narratives” (7). 
The Number bears out Coullie et al‟s (2006) observation that the “relationship between fact 
and fiction, truth and metaphor, and its particular inflection in auto/biographical accounts is 
another much debated feature of the genre” (52). In The Dialogic Imagination (1981) Bakhtin 
gives the name chronotope to this problematic of representation. He defines chronotopes as 
“the intrinsic connectedness of temporal and spatial relationships that are artistically 
expressed in literature” (84). This suggests that all narratives are by their very nature artistic 
expressions which attempt to capture an intrinsic connectedness of temporal and spatial 
relationships of one kind or another. Commenting on the challenges that attend any process of 
representation, Bakhtin observes that “the articulation of actual historical persons in … time 
… has a complicated and erratic history” (Bakhtin 84). Since The Number is an attempt to 
articulate the experiences of actual historical persons narratologically, it creates an interesting 
convergence of genres which leads to a text “whose importance resides in the fact that it flirts 
with the relationship between fact and fiction” (Coullie 52). Steinberg‟s book shows that 
prison and nation are intimately connected not only materially but discursively. In this regard 
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Bakhtin‟s notion of chronotopes is useful in trying to see how Steinberg‟s auto/biographical 
narrative grapples with the representation of time, space and place in relation to prison, 
prisoners and nation. 
Foucault‟s claims that power does not operate in a hegemonic manner is also useful for 
analysing the distribution of power in Steinberg‟s collaborative auto/biography and for 
discussing the distribution of power between warders and Number prison gangs that we see in 
The Number. This Foucauldian conceptualization of power, where it “is born out of a plurality 
of relationships which are grafted onto something else, born from something else, and permit 
the development of something else” (Foucault 1989: 187), is absent in most colonial and 
apartheid prison auto/biographical narratives.
51
 In these narratives the prison is depicted as 
unambiguously supporting a clear binary between subject and subjected. For example, Long 
Walk to Freedom portrays an unproblematic Manichean universe. Mandela and his fellow 
political prisoners are justly fighting against an oppressive, exploitative and dehumanising 
racist state apparatus. They are on the side of justice, therefore they will be victorious.  The 
protagonists use every means necessary, including the colonial justice system, to pursue the 
righteous agenda of national liberation from colonial or apartheid oppression. The Number 
problematises this simple binary of the oppressed versus the oppressor. Steinberg shows that 
the Number prison gangs do not just use the legal system to achieve what they term social 
justice within the prisons, but they in fact possess and constitute the legal apparatuses in a 
menacingly ambivalent way.
52
 The task of political prisoners seems straightforward because 
“[t]he dominant model power – and interest-relations in all colonial societies is the 
Manichean opposition between the putative superiority of the European and the supposed 
inferiority of the native [and the opposition is always between] white and black, good and 
evil, superiority and inferiority, civilization and savagery, intelligence and emotion, 
rationality and sensuality, self and Other, subject and object” (JanMohamed, 1985: 63). In 
Long Walk to Freedom, court appearance is viewed and employed for different purposes by 
both the oppressor and the oppressed. The oppressor uses it as a platform for giving his 
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 Instead of focusing on how power functions in complicity with the State, in his last years Foucault was 
interested in the way power is practised in marginal everyday social settings that have a bearing on the formation 
of the identities of individuals. William Chaloupka notes that Foucault studiously avoided theorizing a 
confrontation between “Power with a capital P, a kind of lunar occurrence, extra-terrestrial,” on one side, and 
“the resistance of the unhappy ones obligated to bow before power” on the other. But he then observes that this 
move is precarious, opening Foucault to charges of political evasion. Chaloupka in Getting a Life Everyday Uses 
of Autobiography (ed.) by Sidoine Smith and Julia Watson, 1996 (369-370). 
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 In addition to other theoretical thinking that I have already mentioned, this chapter also explores Steinberg‟s 
discussion of the complex Number prison gangs‟ lore and the tantalizing relationship between the warders and 
Number gangs through Bhabha‟s provocative notions of ambivalence, mimicry and hybridity as presented in The 
Location of Culture (1994).  
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oppressive and exploitative project a human face by going through the motions of justice. On 
the other hand, the “criminal” colonial or apartheid subject views it as another arena for 
extending the struggle against the evils of colonial or apartheid rule. The Number as a post-
apartheid text undercuts this distinction. Steinberg‟s narrative shows that the polemic binaries 
created by the Manichean world of colonialism and apartheid is misleading and become 
notably blurred and problematic after the demise of colonial rule and apartheid. The 
Manichean epistemological worldview of the colonial and apartheid worlds which produces 
diverse but uncomplicated binaries are exposed in Steinberg‟s narrative. The Number can 
therefore be regarded as critiquing both the Manichean worlds of colonialism and apartheid 
on one hand, and that of the anti-colonialism associated with the national project, on the other. 
In this light, Steinberg‟s narrative may be said to be participating in the post-colonial 
discourse which has often been associated with challenging both the colonial-apartheid and 
national Manichean dichotomies. 
The Number participates in, and comments on, a general post-apartheid inclination to retell 
South African myths and stories, this time devoid of polarized binaries. Similarly, the Number 
gangs are also engaged in a process of reinvention. When colonial and apartheid oppression 
were removed at the attainment of majority rule in 1964 and 1994 in Kenya and South Africa 
respectively, the Manichean categories of understanding relationships among citizens were 
destabilized. National liberation leads to a crisis in terms of national identity and subjecthood. 
It is as if, to quote from Yeats‟ famous poem, the centre can no longer hold. For South Africa 
as a nation “the first decade … was a transitional moment, a period in which new myths, 
symbols and political structures were generated” (Samuelson 2007: 1). With regard to the 
South African prison after 1994, Steinberg‟s The Number suggests that the underworld of the 
prison enters a transitional process and embarks on a search for new myths and symbols. 
Steinberg‟s narrative shows that in South Africa crime and the notorious prison gangs, the 
Number gangs, like any social institutions that have endured the test of time, possess a 
malleable history and are subject to changing material and discursive conditions. 
One of the astute observations that Steinberg seems to make is that the history of the Number 
gangs, both during and after apartheid, resists the official dichotomies between good and evil, 
political and common criminal. His account demonstrates that the emergence of these prison 
gangs is embedded in European imperial expansion and the conquest of South Africa. 
However, Steinberg suggests that the Numbers gang‟s fortitude and ubiquitous nature largely 
derives from a powerful narrative weaved by the prisoners themselves and the rituals that 
developed under peculiar prison conditions over many decades centring around Nongoloza 
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the chief bandit-cum-prison warder. Referring to the power of stories in prison, especially the 
ability to recite the myth of Nongoloza, Steinberg observes:  
[P]rison is a world nourished by stories. It would be no exaggeration to say 
that that the master story – that of Nongoloza, the God of South African 
prisoners – organises life behind bars. A prisoner‟s capacity to imbibe and 
retell that tale is probably his most potent weapon … Stories in prison are 
weapons, tools, the stuff of action; they are insinuated into the exercise of 
power. (The Number 7) 
This suggests that the prison as a social institution, and the Number gangs in particular, do not 
only depend on material conditions but also on narrative(s) for their emergence, propagation 
and persistence. In the mythical Number narrative as told by Magadien, Nongoloza, the father 
of the Number, is represented as an anti-colonial figure who begins his career as a robber 
because of the injustices of the exploitative and socially destructive capitalist culture ushered 
in by the discovery of gold at some undisclosed location in South Africa. However, 
Nongoloza surpasses the role of a mere anti-colonialist in that his criminal activities are not 
restricted to the robbing of the imperialists since he targets especially the vulnerable, the 
disposed and exploited African black mine labourers. Finally, his complicity with the 
oppressor is capped by the fact that the historical Nongoloza in his later years becomes a 
prison warder. Interestingly, both the mythical Nongoloza of the Number gangs and the 
historical one resist classification by occupying a space that is simultaneously envied, hated, 
despised and feared by both the colonial oppressor and the oppressed. Similarly, Nongoloza‟s 
progeny, the now country-wide Number gangs, see themselves as fighters for prison reforms 
and justice, but they are also perpetrators of heinous prison crimes and they tacitly collude 
with prison authorities to oppress and victimise their fellow prisoners. These disconcerting 
and uncanny insights question the simple binaries of political prisoners versus common 
criminals that have been evident in most South African prison narratives that emerged out of 
the apartheid prison experience. 
Steinberg locates the prison at the intersection of particular global narrative routes. He shows 
that the emergence of the prison itself, as well as certain narratives and subjectivities which 
have come to be inseparably associated with the prison, owe their existence, propagation and 
perpetuation to discourse, and more specifically to their ability to be mythologised and 
narrativised. For example, I have already noted that Bernault (2003) persuasively connects the 
birth of the prison in Africa with the colonial narrative which portrayed colonial prisons as 
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participating in the noble project of weeding out the incorrigible and unproductive African 
from society to facilitate the unhindered spread of enlightened European civilization. 
Meanwhile, the colonial prison as experienced by Africans was as a violent physical tool of 
colonial subjugation, a means of intensifying ideas of racial segregation, political oppression, 
and a way of extracting cheap and often free labour from the natives, especially in the case of 
South Africa (3-4). 
In apartheid South Africa, the prison was at the centre of the economic management of the 
country as the mass incarceration of mainly black and coloured people ensured that wealth 
remained firmly in the hands of one racial group.
53
 Steinberg reports:  
The tiny prisons that dotted the Western Cape hinterland were, in reality, 
stations for the distribution of cheap labour … farmers‟ district associations 
were permitted to build „prison farm-stations‟ which were managed by the 
Department of Prisons. Farmers throughout the district could employ 
prisoners in proportion to their contribution to building the prison. The 
inmates themselves were paid nothing. (The Number 172) 
Interestingly, Steinberg suggests that the coloured ghetto was also an economic management 
tool of the apartheid regime. He shows that ghettos created after the forced mass removals of 
the coloured and black people in the 1960s from areas that had been declared white were clear 
attempts by the apartheid regime to exercise power over the powerless through spatial 
reorganisation. The isolation and squalor of ghettos allowed them to function as prisons for 
whole communities of coloured people. Although few women were incarcerated in apartheid 
jails, Steinberg suggests that the ghettos were themselves forms of imprisonment. Steinberg‟s 
depiction of Rusthof, a coloured ghetto in the Strand, is instructive in this regard. Steinberg 
writes: 
Rusthof … is entirely flat. It is laid out in a symmetrical grid, some roads 
tarred, others sand, the houses one-roomed matchboxes, packed together in 
dense rows. There isn‟t a patch of grass in the township‟s public spaces; it is 
as if the place is forever a few days old, the soil just turned, the flora not yet 
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 Another example of the use of prison to regulate labour in South Africa is the use of the infamous Influx 
Control Act which led to the mass incarceration of mainly black people whose only crime was to be in an urban 
setting without a pass book. With regards to colonial Africa in general, Peté (2008: 44) also indicates that the 
imperialists constructed a narrative of the innately criminal African to justify the development of colonial prisons 
when in fact the controlling of crime was not the real agenda of these prisons.Sarkin (2008) also concurs with 
Bernault and Peté that “the subjugation and control of the local native populations for economic, political and 
social purposes” was always the real motivating factor in the development of colonial prisons (13). 
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planted … The combination of the flat, arid township, the gigantic peaks 
and the wild energy of the weather, leaves one feeling small and exposed 
(The Number 159). 
What is striking about the above description is the mechanised nature, lifelessness, 
claustrophobic quality and the hostile natural environment in which Rusthof is located. 
Steinberg seems to imply that this location was deliberately chosen, and the conditions 
engineered to engender feelings of psychological disorientation and powerlessness in the 
inhabitants of this ghetto. This suggests that the architects of apartheid wanted these ghettos 
to exist in splendid isolation under prison-like conditions. 
It is clear then that both colonial and apartheid regimes used the prison and spatial 
engineering not only to subjugate the majority African native populations, but also primarily 
as an economic tool. Said‟s observation that Africa is “a part of the world whose modern 
history is largely intelligible as a result of colonialism, and whose present travail cannot be 
detached from the operations of imperialism” (“Interview” 1976: 36) helps us to appreciate 
that we cannot fully study the African prison without acknowledging its link with European 
colonial expansion and the modern Western imperial regimes, an expansion that ultimately 
delivered the globalised world of today. 
In addition to prison and spatial organisation, Steinberg indicates that the apartheid state also 
used the welfare system as economic management tool. He shows that for the ghetto coloured 
communities in the Western Cape the prison and the welfare system served the same purpose 
of excluding the coloured people from playing a central role in the economic and political life 
of South Africa. Steinberg writes: 
The government of the early and mid apartheid eras locked itself … into a 
welfarist relationship with Cape Town‟s coloureds … The women of the 
Flats were bombarded with advice and child welfare cheques; industrial 
schools and places of shelter; many young men were imprisoned. Reading 
through the figures of incarceration rates of the 1960s and 70s is an 
astonishing experience; coloureds were incarcerated at twice the rate of 
Africans. (The Number 124) 
Loic Wacquant‟s (1999) notion of carceral-assistential complex helps us to understand the 
apartheid regime‟s use of both the prison and the ghetto to manage the economic and political 
landscape of the country. He argues that the United States of America is characterised “by 
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carceral-assistential complex which carries out its mission to surveil, train and neutralize the 
populations recalcitrant or superfluous to the new economic and racial regime according to a 
gendered division of labor, the men being handled by its penal wing while (their) women and 
children are managed by a revamped welfare-workfare system designed to buttress casual 
employment” (97). Steinberg shows that the apartheid state followed a similar system in order 
to perpetuate white economic privilege. 
When it comes to the South African post-apartheid prison, Steinberg indicates that it may be 
continuing the tradition which characterised the colonial and apartheid states where the prison 
was a major political tool of economic management. The post-apartheid prison may be 
participating in the global trends of modernist states, where Zygmunt Bauman (1998) claims 
prisons play a central role in the management of excess labour produced by the capitalist 
system. According to Bauman imprisonment is, for many post-modern states, “an alternative 
to employment; a way to dispose of, or to neutralize a considerable chunk of the population 
who are not needed as producers and for whom there is no work „to be taken back to‟” (111-
112). He argues that prisons are laboratories “of the „globalized‟ society, where the techniques 
of space-confinement of the reject and the waste of globalization are tested and their limits are 
explored” (111-122). Bauman points out that this excess labour is a resultant of the global 
changes that make it easy to translocate firms and factories to the parts of the globe where the 
production cost would be cheaper than in industrialized nations. 
Despite the strong link that Bauman argues for between mass incarceration in a number of 
late modern societies and global economic trends, in The Number Steinberg shows that in 
colonial, apartheid and post-apartheid settings prisons are both materially and discursively 
constituted. This coincides with Said‟s view that the concept of nation itself is largely 
constituted discursively and that the “power to narrate, or to block other narratives from 
emerging, is a very important to culture and imperialism” (1993: xiii). Similarly, the 
European colonial project was motivated by economic considerations, but it was also given 
impetus by its ability to effectively propagate notions of civilization which asserted the 
superiority of Western culture over those of the colonised. This is not to play down the 
economic considerations in the colonial and imperial projects and the constitution of such 
institutions as the prison. It merely emphasises the fact that we come to experience our 
material conditions through the medium of narrative. Steinberg shows that the prison becomes 
a revealing national story if it is read carefully. He shows that in the case of South Africa, 
especially with reference to the emergence of the Number prison gangs, the colonial prison 
metamorphosised and did not remain in the absolute control of its progenitors. While it 
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largely continued to be used in the service of producing a narrative of the criminal African, 
the colonial prison started to be haunted by forces that could not have been anticipated by its 
creators. Eventually, in the post-apartheid period, the haunted prison started to possess and 
constitute the state in ways that continue to baffle the South African nation. This suggests that 
power is never merely a totalising narrative imposed from above, even in coercive institutions 
such as the prison. Once power enters a network of people, it becomes disseminated and 
appropriated in unexpected ways. 
Locating the prison within the global discourses of colonialism and imperialism also allows 
us to read The Number through Said‟s views on the individual agency and the operation of 
knowledge and power in the colonised and formerly colonised world as articulated in 
Orientalism (1978) and in Culture and Imperialism (1993). The Number can also be read 
through Said‟s notion of being “in and out of things” or the fascination with in-between zones 
which, as Said himself points out, informs all his work (Edward Said Interview with Imre 
Salusinszky, 1987). Said‟s Orientalism is especially useful because in addition to 
transforming the way we look at the literary representation of the orient, it explores how 
knowledge is used to legitimize and defend power (Barsamian 2003: xi). In Culture and 
Imperialism, Said argues that “recent criticism has concentrated on narrative fiction, yet very 
little attention has been paid to its position in the history and world empire” (xiii). In his 
prison narrative of Magadien, Steinberg does not only show the centrality of stories in the 
constitution of national and individual identities and subjectivities, but he also interrogates the 
position of narratives in what Said calls “the history and world empire”. Said clearly connects 
stories or the ability to block or propagate them to the notions of the operations of power in 
both colonial and post-colonial/post-apartheid settings. What The Number shows, however, is 
that even amongst individuals relationships are negotiated or contested through the ability to 
make one‟s story heard. Steinberg‟s book dramatizes this through his relationship with 
Magadien and also the relationship between the warders and the Number prison gangs. 
In a way, Steinberg‟s narrative bears testimony to Foucault‟s observation that the introduction 
of the biographical was important in the history of penality and that power started to operate 
through the practices of autobiographical narratives (Discipline 252). Similarly, Spivak‟s 
argument that what complicates the process of representation is that it is impossible to 
represent one‟s life or experiences of other people without the mediation of ideology (1987: 
145) reverberates throughout The Number. For Spivak writing or storytelling is not only an 
exercise in theory but also praxis. Although Steinberg did not intend to invite power into his 
story of Magadien‟s life, both he himself and Magadien are intensely aware of its presence in 
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their daily interaction. Magadien complains that Steinberg‟s interrogative and detective-ike 
procedures of obtaining information cause him intense psychological pain. He rebukes 
Steinberg: 
You thought you could get me to tell my story without causing me pain. Are 
you mad? How can I talk about my life without feeling pain? (240)
54
 
Magadien experiences his encounter with Steinberg as a violent process that invades his 
private space through exposure and surveillance. This is the way the TRC‟s techniques were 
experienced by some victims of apartheid abuses.
 55
 Meanwhile Steinberg indicates that at one 
point he adopted the superciliousness of the TRC architects in thinking that the process of 
confession offers both public healing for the nation and private healing for the victims as they 
experience closure. He retorts to Magadien: “I‟m writing a book … I am sharing your pain 
with the world” (241). Magadien indicates that it is precisely the fact that Steinberg is telling 
his story for him that contributes to the pain that he feels. He says: “I want to write a book 
about my life, but I can‟t … I need you here ... And the result is that it‟s your book, not mine” 
(241). Spivak‟s question echoes strongly here, “Can the Subaltern Speak?” But we can also 
extend the question, “Can Steinberg Speak?” Both Magadien and Steinberg think that the 
privileged academic can. Nonetheless, Steinberg‟s intense consciousness of the theoretical 
caveats pertaining to power renders his speech somewhat provisional; always potentially 
under erasure. We have seen that Magadien is incapacitated by his position of weakness in 
relation to Steinberg. What complicates Steinberg and Magadien‟s relationship is that the 
stories they want to tell diverge and compete for space. 
What Georges Gusdorf says about an autobiographer is also true of a biographer like 
Steinberg. He claims that in his or postulating of meaning and deciding which facts to use or 
not use he or she is guided by a “preconceived intelligibility” (1980: 42). This is made clear in 
Magadien‟s following words: 
                                                          
54
 Antjie Krog is of the opinion that healing of individuals and nations aside, the stories that the TRC generated 
justifies their own existence. She writes: “Because of these narratives people can no longer indulge in their 
separate dynasties of denial” (Country of My Skull 1998: 89). Despite the glaring unequal power relations that 
are evident between Magadien and Steinberg, The Number‟s existence can probably be justified by the mere fact 
that it serves as an amazing archive of the under-researched Number gangs and their relationship with the prison 
regimes. 
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 Graybill reports that some 50-60 percent of the victims seen by the trauma centre had suffered serious 
difficulties after testifying. For example, Yazir Henry writes about his experiences after testifying: “I could not 
interact with anybody other than the members of my immediate family. It felt as if I had spent everything that 
was inside me and the slightest bit of external pressure would finally and completely crush me” (in Graybill, 
2002: 83). 
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I wait for ten o‟ clock, and I think, Jesus, what is he going to ask me 
now? Is he going to ask me something, something important, and I 
will have forgotten? … So, ja, every time you come into this cell, I 
am scared, scared to find that I haven‟t been there for most of my 
life, scared that you will have discovered something about me I 
can‟t afford to remember. (241) 
What causes conflict between Steinberg and Magadien is that they have different 
preconceived understandings of the stories they want to tell. Weintraub (1975) makes a 
similar point about an autobiographer who has gained a vantage point from which it is 
possible to offer a retrospective view of a life. He argues that such an autobiographer 
“imposes on the past the order of the present. The fact once in the making can now be seen 
together with the fact in its result. By this superimposition of the completed fact, the fact in 
the making acquires a meaning it did not possess before. The meaning of past is intelligible 
and meaningful in terms of the present understanding” (826). As it emerges Steinberg and 
Magadien‟s different pasts and their different understandings of the present make them arrive 
at completely diverse meanings of Magadien‟s life. 
As we have seen, what complicates Steinberg and Magadien‟s relationship is that Steinberg 
thinks that he is offering Magadien a therapeutic confessional space. Magadien on the other 
hand seems to be interested in what Gusdorf (1980) calls “a work of personal justification” 
(39), and realizes that as much as Steinberg is offering him the opportunity to tell his story, 
Steinberg‟s narrative also closes his mouth. In a statement that eloquently captures this 
conflict of interests, Magadien says: 
Do me a favour. Shut up and write your book. Stop saying Magadien 
this, Magadien that. It is giving me a headache. Just write your 
fucking book. Do it from your heart. Make it true to how you have 
experienced me. Do that and I will be proud of you. (242) 
While Steinberg seems not to doubt his ability to represent Magadien‟s life, he is nevertheless 
aware of the disturbing unequal power relations that characterize their relationship. 
Commenting on Magadien‟s above words where he completely surrenders over his story to 
Steinberg, he says: 
But he had, of course, told the “I” precisely what every “I” wants to hear. 
He had assuaged my bad conscience, had given me a licence to scorch his 
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heart and open his soul. The victory was mine, not his, and it left me feeling 
no less anxious than before. (241) 
Steinberg‟s emotional turmoil seem to support Schalkwyk‟s claim that “[e]ach “I” brings 
different rewards, explores different terrains, is able to withstand different pressures, … and is 
liable to complicit with very different structures” (2001: 35-36). Steinberg experiences the 
nagging dissatisfaction (a nagging dissatisfaction that Magadien seems to find affected and 
pointless) that most well-intentioned academics experience when trying to represent the 
subaltern. In comparison, one of the major dissatisfaction with the TRC was the inescapable 
ambiguity that resulted from trying to escape the penal regimes while utilizing its apparatuses. 
The perpetrators of past atrocities were tried and interrogated in public, and they were 
expected to fully disclose their crime and show that it had a political motive in order for them 
to escape imprisonment. In other words the TRC, while healing the nation hoped to produce a 
self-reflective and reformed subject. The South African poet Roshilla Nair, for instance, 
penned a poem entitled “an unforgiving poem” where she criticises the TRC for assuming that 
the perpetrators of apartheid atrocities would expose all in an unprecedented remorseful 
gesture which would then touch the hearts of the victims to a magnanimous act of 
forgiveness. She seems to suggest that the process failed specifically because confession and 
forgiveness cannot be tortured out of unwilling individuals. (In Seasons Come to Pass (eds.) 
Moffett and Mphahlele, 2008: 240). Although Steinberg cannot offer amnesty for Magadien‟s 
crimes, his narrative operates within the TRC paradigm. 
In the light of the above, at a more personal level, the discourse of the TRC ushers in an array 
forms of unequal power relations with regard to what Roux (2007) calls the “collaborative, 
interview driven memoir” (261), of which The Number is a good example. Although 
Steinberg‟s narrative can indeed be rightly hailed as a clear departure from polarized binaries 
that characterize the South African political prisoners‟ auto/biographies, and for its reflexive 
nature and being a poignant critique of post-apartheid prison narratives which have been 
“marketed as survival stories or as anthropological studies” (Roux 2007: 259), the narrative 
itself is riddled with ambivalences when it comes to the question of whose story the narrative 
is telling. Therefore, no matter how self-reflexive Steinberg‟s narrative is, it is still operating 
within the constraints of market forces that determine cultural productions and also emerges 
out of identifiable discursive fields. Steinberg‟s narrative seems, among other things, shaped 
by his background as a journalist in addition to drawing from the discourse of the TRC, which 
seems to exercise a pervasive shaping and driving force on most cultural productions of the 
first two decades of the post-apartheid era. 
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The TRC had a powerful discursive influence because it was putting forward an idea that 
reflected global ways of conflict resolution while at the same time informing and shaping the 
evolving and shifting power relations of the nascent post-apartheid era. As I have already 
pointed out, Steinberg is aware of his perilous position when it comes to his relationship with 
Magadien and the means through which he extracts his life story from him. He observes: “The 
relationship between a journalist and his subject is never a relationship between equals” (240). 
Steinberg‟s narrative can therefore be viewed as operating at once within and without these 
profound mutations of the penal logic that the TRC inaugurated after the demise of apartheid. 
As we have seen, Magadien himself is vaguely aware that in telling his life story to a 
journalist he is responding to the appellation of a force whose power and intentions he does 
not fully comprehend. 
The reader is constantly aware of the dependence of both Magadien‟s story and Steinberg‟s 
related meta-narrative on the overarching national narratives. However, the irony is that both 
narratives oscillate on the verge of collapse under their irreconcilable contradictions. The 
closure of the South African police museum in the late 1990s dramatises the difficulty of 
sustaining a coherent national narrative in times of rapid change which are often attended by 
the revelation of a past and an evolving present which elude narrativization by their sheer 
incompatibility. In trying to account for the closure of the police museum, Comarroff and 
Comarroff (2004) write:  
State museums, of course, are more or less blatant statements, conjuring up 
the national populations, subjects, and interests for which, and to which, 
they speak. In times of historical change, they offer glaring indictments of 
denatured ideologies, of a slippage between state and nation, signifiers and 
signifieds. (810) 
Since Steinberg‟s narrative relies on the South African national narrative, especially that of 
the TRC discourse, Steinberg almost abandons his project when Magadien‟s life first fails to 
fit into Steinberg‟s preconceived models. Steinberg is only able to proceed with the project 
when it dawns upon him that the national narrative itself is convoluted and haunted by similar 
ambivalences that are mirrored in Magadien‟s story. 
Just like the Pretoria police museum, which finally shuts its doors to the public, there are 
moments in Steinberg‟s narrative in which the menacing hybridity of Magadien‟s narrative 
threatens to rapture the boundaries of the meta-narrative that Steinberg has erected to make 
sense of Magadien‟s story, and of course his own and that of South Africa as a whole. I have 
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already emphasized how Steinberg is constantly haunted by the unequal power relations and 
the moral issues that are created by his unusual relationship with Magadien. After bringing 
documents which contradict the mythological Number narrative of a militant Nongoloza by 
showing that Nongoloza ended up as a prison warder, both Steinberg and Magadien become 
aware that the story that will be written is not a transcription of Magadien‟s words by an 
impartial journalist. Moreover, it becomes evident that in addition to Steinberg‟s and 
Magadien‟s, there are other narratives that are jostling for space. But what is deeply ironic is 
that none of these narratives can claim freedom from ideological constraints. This is so 
because Magadien‟s story of the self and the one that Steinberg subsequently tells in The 
Number mimic the way national narratives are selectively constructed through both conscious 
and unconscious gaps and silences, calculated omissions and strategic fabrications which to a 
large extent reflect a particular image of the nation at different historical periods. What upsets 
Magadien is that while advancing its vague ideological agenda, Steinberg‟s narrative 
threatens this sacred process of self-induced amnesia, partial and selective recall which is the 
basis of both national narratives and stories about the self. To his credit, Steinberg brings to 
light all these fascinating conflicts and aspects of narrative construction. 
Steinberg‟s The Number is an immensely sophisticated take on numerous issues related to 
criminality and imprisonment in South Africa. The next section discuses the notion of 
narrative and narrativity, and also expands on some of the issues discussed above by using the 
concept of transculturation in reading Steinberg‟s text.  
2. Transculturation and Narratives 
In addition to showing that crime and prison are inseparably linked to questions of power and 
representation, The Number describes a process of transculturation and how it has a bearing 
on the narrative structure of auto/biographies. Mary Louise Pratt‟s definition of 
transculturation as a process whereby “subordinated or marginalized groups select or invent 
from materials transmitted to them by a dominant or metropolitan culture” (Imperial Eyes 
1992: 6) is dramatised in The Number. This text offers a number of life narratives, none of 
which can be regarded more „ideal‟ than the other. The story of Po, Nongoloza and Kilikijan, 
that of Doggy Dog and Magadien, that of the numerous women that appear in Magadien‟s 
life, and indeed The Number itself; the encounter of Steinberg with Magadien, are all offered 
up as exemplary instances of model-free life stories which nevertheless reflect Steinberg‟s 
main preoccupations in his narrative. 
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A good starting point to illustrate my argument is the story of Po and Nongoloza. In The 
Number Steinberg recounts two parallel narratives of Nongoloza. There is what he calls the 
story of mythical Nongoloza which is recited in South African prisons today by the Number 
gangs, and a second narrative that relates to the historical Nongoloza of Steinberg‟s own 
research. Although the two stories differ slightly in detail they both contain what David 
Attwell considers to be two fundamental elements of transculturation; “cultural destruction 
followed by reconstruction on entirely new terms” (2005: 18).  Both stories converge in that 
Nongoloza‟s banditry was a by-product of European colonial industrial expansion which 
destroyed the traditional African way of life by separating husbands from their wives. In the 
mythical story, Nongoloza‟s recruitment into banditry by a Zulu sage Po is depicted as some 
kind of cultural reconstruction on entirely new terms. Po, a man who embodies the interests of 
all black people, intercepts Nongoloza on his way to find work in 1812 in the gold mines of 
the Delagoa Bay. Po, the aged Zulu seer, had journeyed to the mines to find out for himself 
why the young men of the village were not returning home after sojourning to the mines. 
After living and working in the mine compound himself, he began to understand the intensity 
of the exploitation of the young black miners. After leaving the mine compound, Po sets out 
to form a band of robbers who would get the gold from the white men without having to be 
mine labourers. To his first two disciples Nongoloza and Kilikijan, Po is reported to have 
said: “The gold of the white man is good. You must take it, but not from the ground. You 
must rob it from the white man himself” (The Number 45). Subordinated or marginalized by 
colonial industrial encroachment, Po‟s and his disciples‟ banditry becomes a selection or 
invention from materials transmitted to them by a dominant or metropolitan culture. Their 
criminality mimics the colonial violence which destroyed their way of life. Theirs is 
transculturation because they are “faced with the problem of disadjustment and readjustment, 
of deculturation and acculturation” (Fernando Ortiz 1995: 98). 
David Attwell also points out that a “transculturation relationship can and often does involve 
violence of every kind, both structural and direct” (20). Significantly, one of the first notable 
crimes committed by Po‟s first disciples was the murder of a white farmer named Rabie. 
Colonial structural violence on the culture of the natives leads to this direct violence against a 
figure who represents colonial violence and oppression. The Nongolozan story has it that the 
two bandits went down to Rabie and offered to buy his bull Rooiland, which he obviously 
was not selling. It would appear that this was an excuse meant to justify their subsequent 
criminal violence. As was to be expected, Rabie refused to sell his bull; and they then stabbed 
him to death with bayonets that they had previously looted from their encounter with the 
110 
 
colonial army. Subsequently, they took the bull to their master where the group of bandits, 
which had by now grown to 15 members “thr[e]w a tremendous feast as they slaughter[ed] 
Rooiland” (The Number 46). All three of transculturation processes described by Attwell, 
Pratt and Ortiz are illustrated in this mythical story. First, there is the deculturation of Po and 
his followers, and then the selective appropriation of the material and discursive culture of 
their conquerors. The visible aspect of this selective appropriation of the master‟s culture is 
the acquisition of weapons and the invention of a new culture of banditry which inevitably 
means that they subsist through violence. 
The same process of transculturation can be observed in what Steinberg calls the historical 
Nongoloza. Steinberg writes:  
Severed from his family and his ancestral home, and with no desire to go 
back, Mzuzephi (Nongoloza‟s birth name) abandoned his name and called 
himself Jan Note. The first name, „Jan‟ is Dutch, the second, „Note‟ is 
English. (The Number 36) 
Although Mzuzephi seems to change his name out of his own free will, this passage also 
foregrounds the violent disengagement with his cultural heritage that was involved in the 
process. While Nongoloza‟s choice of names indicates a desire to be like the dominant white 
man, it is also affords us a glimpse into the process of transculturation in the Prattian model. 
Later, Nongoloza was to name his band of robbers Ninevites, finding inspiration from the 
Bible book of Nahum where the Ninevites are described as rebels against the Lord. 
Nongoloza himself says: “I selected this name for my gang as rebels against the 
Government‟s laws” (The Number 38; Haysom 2). The ironies of transculturation are 
captured from the fact that Nongoloza found inspiration for his outlawry activities against the 
colonial government from a selective reading of the Christian Bible which teaches submission 
to governmental authorities.
56
 The Bible is also a book that was brought into Africa by 
missionaries who were often aligned with the colonial governments. 
Said seems to hint at this process of transculturation, probably not in Pratt‟s or Attwell‟s 
sense, but rather in Ortiz‟s sense when he claims that “nations themselves are narrations” 
(1993: xiii). He argues:“[S]tories are at the heart of what explorers and novelists say about 
strange regions of the world [and stories] also become the method colonized people use to 
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 For example, the apostle Paul commanded the Christians who were suffering from Roman persecution: “Let 
every soul be subject unto the higher powers. For there is no power but of God: the powers that be are ordained 
of God” (Romans 13 vs 1 The Holy Bible – King James Version).  
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assert their own identity and the existence of their own history” (1993: xiii). If this view is 
correct, it suggests a line of continuity between individual narratives, the prison and the ideas 
of the nation. Steinberg‟s narrative shows that the Number gangs use narratives or stories 
such as the Po one, to assert their own subjectivity and existence, and to gain some measure 
of agency within the prison setting. In fact, Freeman and Brockmeier (2001) argue that “there 
is no way to speak of what a life means, what life is, apart from narrative” (97). This implies 
that life itself is lived according to some narrative, whether articulated or not. However, this 
does not mean that the story of Magadien, that of the Number prison gangs and that of the 
nation all emerge out of a process with a pre-set logic. Unlike Augustine‟s Confessions, which 
has been called “the classic model of teleological self-understanding” (Freeman and 
Bockmeier 84), The Number shows that life‟s random events; its twists and turns are its main 
constituents, if not the constituents. Perpetual narrative construction by individuals, groups 
and nation marks the attempt at imposing order upon an essential chaotic situation. 
The prison itself is a space of transculturation. Imprisonment involves the forcible removal 
from one way of life to another. The prisoner has to reconstruct a new way of life on entirely 
new terms. The rigid and limited prison space presents a number of challenges to this process. 
One way in which the Number prison gangs reinvent a new culture is through stories. 
Steinberg suggests that the confined and confining space of the prison makes the prison 
Number gangs fantasise about expansive spaces. This is reflected in their ritualistic practices 
and language. Steinberg writes: “Everything about the metaphors of prison gang language is 
expansive. An overcrowded cell becomes a vast plain; a day becomes a year” (The Number 
149). Steinberg suggests that the claustrophobic conditions of the prison and its imposition of 
immobility lead to the Number gangs living a highly ritualised life. He observes: “South 
Africa‟s prison gangs are among the most ritualized structures you will ever find” (The 
Number 149). The extremely ritualised prison gang life should be seen as an attempt to re-
culture a deculturated environment. 
The process of transculturation can also be observed in the interpretive appraisal of the South 
African national narrative(s) and Magadien‟s life story that Steinberg offers. Steinberg writes 
that he chose to write about Magadien “because the cornerstones of his life coincide with so 
many of the beacons of modern South African history” (The Number xx). He claims that 
Magadien tempers with his formative years and associates his initial arrest with the Soweto 
uprisings of 1976, when in fact he may have been first arrested sometime in 1978. It is 
interesting that Magadien connects his initial arrest and recruitment into the Number with 
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1976, a significant year for all who were engaged in the struggle against apartheid.
57
 
Magadien chooses this important year in the fight against apartheid as a tool through which to 
impose order on his chaotic criminal life story. It is unlikely that Magadien lies deliberately to 
Steinberg. Jerome Bruner argues that “autobiography (like the novel) involves not only the 
construction of self, but also a construction of one‟s culture” (2001: 35). That is how the self 
and the nation construct their narratives. Consciously or unconsciously, events that have a 
potential for causing tensions and contradictions are conveniently relegated to a state of wilful 
amnesia or are reconceptualised and realigned with the prevailing discourses. Bhabha argues 
that what makes nations and narratives resemble each other is precisely this process of 
inevitable forgetting. He writes: “Nations and narratives, lose their origins in the myths of 
time and only fully realize their horizons in the mind‟s eye” (1990: 1). Bauman (1990) also 
alludes to the similarity of the operation of the human mind and the way a nation constructs 
its narratives when he says that they are both characterized by a quest for order, since they 
cannot tolerate ambivalence (1). Steinberg realizes this and comments:  
That [Magadien] has fiddled with his own formative moment, placing it in 
June 1976, one of the most formative moments in recent South African 
history, is poignant and telling. For he is doing with his personal history 
precisely what a nation does with its own; it freezes a moment in time, 
paints it in bold and gaudy brush strokes, and uses it as a device to explain 
where it has come from and why it has turned out the way it has. (137)  
What is deeply ironic of course is the fact that Steinberg‟s own narrative is engaged in exactly 
the same process as Magadien‟s and the nation‟s where narrative construction is concerned. In 
telling Magadien‟s life story, Steinberg engages in a form of transculturation. This is seen 
from the fact that when Steinberg first met Magadien, Magadien inhabited a no-man‟s-land, 
“a hell of identities not yet erased, and identities not yet formed”, which Steinberg at first 
mistook for madness (The Number 33). “Through its naming/classifying function”, 
Steinberg‟s narrative is driven by the quest to “impose order and deny or suppress 
randomness and contingency” (Bauman 1990:1), qualities which characterise Magadien‟s life. 
Steinberg struggles to fit Magadien‟s life in what Bruner calls “folk psychology” which is 
intrinsic in any given culture (2001: 30). In the story Steinberg eventually tells about 
                                                          
57
 In June 16, 1976 school children in the Soweto black township organized demonstrations against the 
imposition of Afrikaans to be a national medium of academic instruction, alongside English. The apartheid 
police opened live fire against these unarmed children and according to official figures 23 students were killed. 
In solidarity with their Sowetan counterparts students started to organize protest marches throughout the country. 
Magadien claims to have been arrested in one such demonstration as a student activist at the University of the 
Western Cape in July 1976. (See T. R. H. Davenport and C. Saunders‟s South Africa:  A Modern History, 2000) 
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Magadien in The Number, Magadien only features in it as a motif for the other stories that 
Steinberg‟s book is about. Steinberg alerts us of his intentions when he explains his choice of 
Magadien as the subject of his story: “Within the confines of a single life, he (Magadien) 
demonstrates the proximity of the history of crime to the central fault lines that shape the 
world” (The Number xx). This is a comment that registers a reflective victory of a biographer 
who has finally found a way of telling a story in such a way that it violates “canonical 
expectancy, but do so in a way that is culturally comprehensible” (Bruner 30). While some of 
Steinberg‟s considerations for choosing Magadien as his subject are clearly intentional, as the 
above words show, most of these considerations operate unconsciously at the ideological 
level. 
What complicates Steinberg‟s task of making Magadien‟s life story fit the folk psychology 
and also fit what Bruner calls the “criterion of tellebility”, that “is to say a story that is at once 
recognizably canonical and recognizably noncanonical” (30), is that the South African folk 
psychology at the time was mirrored in what Steinberg perceives as an intense identity crisis 
in Magadien. It is probably to Steinberg‟s credit that his book shows that at about the same 
time Magadien was in a vortex of identities, South Africa as a nation was also trying to 
emerge with a coherent story of the self after the traumatic apartheid years. The Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission represented but one visible manifestation of this search for new 
national ways of telling. The TRC was both an instrument and product of transculturation in 
the wider context of the nation. Similarly, Steinberg‟s narrative is also a tool through which 
he attempts to make sense of the diverse strands of Magadien‟s life, but at the same time it is 
a manifestation of the processes of transculturation in the Ortizian sense in that it constructs 
something new out of an environment that appears deculturated. Over and above being the 
biography of Magadien and that of Steinberg‟s encounter with him, The Number can be seen 
as reflective of the post-apartheid exploration for new national identities. 
That South Africa herself was going through processes of transculturation is aptly captured by 
Daniel Roux (2007), when he argues:  
Steinberg‟s book participates in a more general post-apartheid shift 
away from political prison autobiographies towards a more 
collaborative, interview driven memoir …One of the catalyst for the 
prevalence of this kind of auto/biography is perhaps the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (TRC), where the testimony of the 
victims and perpetrators of apartheid were assembled in a social and 
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legal space that foregrounded the idea of personal testimony as 
collective endeavour. (261-263) 
But as Lyn Graybill (2002) indicates, the South African TRC itself was participating in a 
global discourse where TRCs were in proliferation.
58
 She states that since the 1940s the 
“South African TRC brought the number up to twenty-one by 2000” (8). This would suggest 
that world-over, probably starting with the world-shaking events of world war one and two, 
there has been a serious global bruise on folk psychologies. This is not to argue for 
undifferentiated global patterns. Despite the fact that post-apartheid South Africa was 
participating in this proliferation of search for a stable folk psychology, Graybill points out 
that “these precedents (of TRCs) offered warnings more than guidance for South Africa” (1). 
The TRCs in other countries had either been used as instruments of dispensing harsh 
retributive justice to the perceived perpetrators of violence or as a way of offering blanket 
amnesty to perpetrators of violence while keeping the truth about the atrocities that had been 
committed hidden. The South African TRC could not entirely escape all these pitfalls because 
it was participating in a clear political discourse aimed at consolidating a so-called miraculous 
political transition which had ushered in a rainbow nation (Boraine and Levy 1995: 27). Roux 
(2007) also concurs with this view when he argues that the “TRC [was] really a machine for 
producing autobiographical accounts to serve a communal or national interest” (271). 
Although not necessarily legitimating the post-apartheid state through his narrative, 
Steinberg‟s modus operandi and his entire logic in The Number are heavily influenced by the 
TRC discourse and are implicated in the national transitional discourses that characterised the 
first decade of the post-apartheid state. 
Magadien‟s sanitising of his criminal record with a political narrative should not be simply 
mis/understood as a criminal who wants to escape the harsh public judgement of his life but 
should also be seen within the paradigms of what Jerome Bruner (1993) has called narrative 
truth (38). Bruner (1996) defines narrative truth as the combined result of specific ways of 
meaning-making that are highly flexible with respect to verifiability, truth conditions, or 
logical justifications (93). Magadien‟s pre-Number criminal activities and his criminal record 
as a Number gang member are indeed disturbingly superimposed with a militant anti-
apartheid narrative, just as his predecessor foster-ancestor Nongoloza‟s banditry had been 
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 I am using the term discourse in the Foucauldian sense. Ashcroft and Ahluwalia argue that “Foucault‟s notion 
of discourse is a firmly bounded area of social knowledge. For him, the world is not simply „there‟ to be talked 
about, rather it is discourse itself within which the world comes into being. It is also in such discourse that 
speakers and hearers, writers and readers, come to an understanding about themselves, their relationship to each 
other and their place in the world (the construction of subjectivity)”. (See Ashcroft, B. and Ahluwalia, P. Edward 
Said, 2001: 14).     
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driven by a fierce anti-colonial narrative. It is clear that for both Nongoloza and Magadien, 
their criminal activities are perceived and represented “as a means of production – or, rather, 
of productive redistribution” (Comaroff and Comaroff 2004: 806), for those alienated by 
colonial capitalism and the racist apartheid state respectively. In Magadien‟s case it is 
noteworthy that before joining the Number he claims that he stole mainly from the sturvies, 
the more affluent coloured people whom he viewed with a mixture of envy and hatred as he 
saw them as colluding with the white oppressors. After joining the Number, whenever he was 
out of prison he claims to have stolen from his employers and then donated the goods or the 
proceeds to his soccer team in the Cape Flats or distributed the loot among friends and 
relatives. 
At least according to the narrative truth of Magadien‟s story, the profound truth that emerges 
from Steinberg‟s narrative is that the criminal life stories of both Nongoloza and Magadien 
are indeed deeply political in more than one way. Magadien‟s and Nongoloza‟s weaving of 
their stories into that of the nation reminds us of Appiah‟s observation that the story of the 
nation is a crucial element in the way individuals and institutions make sense of themselves 
(9). Magadien himself equates the selective manner in which he narrates his story to how the 
apartheid state seemed to have fiddled with records which seemed to deny that he ever set 
foot at the University of the Western Cape in 1976. When he is confronted with the fact that 
there is no record that he was ever registered as a student at the University of Western Cape, 
in angry despair he makes this insightful observation: 
Who do I trust, my fucked up memory or the fucked-up record system? I did 
so much violence to my name and my history that maybe my word should 
mean nothing. My head was such in a mess that half my life passed me by. 
But the records are just as violent to me. Sometimes they remember me, 
sometimes they forget me. They treat me like a thing that can be kicked 
around, not a human being. All I have is the way I remember things. (136) 
It is telling that Magadien equates the way his personal memory operates to the way a state 
keeps its records and regards both processes as inherently violent in that they only save 
certain events for purposes of constituting a particular narrative. This seems to bear out Ernest 
Renan‟s observation that unity, be it of national narratives or individual subjectivities “is 
always effected by means of brutality” (1990: 11). For example, with regards to the Soweto 
1976 uprising, the state records at that time registered only 23 deaths. However, post-
apartheid sources put the death toll of children at the hands of the police between 200 and 
116 
 
500. Although none of these figures may be factually correct, the huge discrepancies between 
them show the subtle and selective ways in which state and individual narratives are 
constructed. Renan argues that forgetting “is a crucial factor in the creation of a nation” (11). 
Similarly, Steinberg‟s narrative shows that forgetting is important in the constitution of the 
self as a narrative. But this forgetting is not equivalent to complete memory loss. It is a 
forgetting that facilitates the construction of orderly and coherent narratives. The way 
Magadien constructs the self through amnesia and remembering, resembles the way Renan 
says the nation constitute itself. He argues: “[T]he essence of a nation is that all individuals 
have many things in common, and also that they have forgotten many things” (1990: 11). 
G.A.M Widdershoven (1993) suggests that in addition to forgetting, the merging of a number 
of narratives, be they individual or national stories, is an essential part of meaning-making. 
Widdershoven claims that our remembrance of the past has little value if it is not connected to 
narrative. He writes: “We only become aware of the significance of these experiences [that 
shape our narrative identity] by telling stories about them and fusing them with other stories” 
(7). This connecting or fusing of stories seems akin to the Ortzian process of transculturation. 
The inescapability of the fusion of experiences that shape an individual‟s identity is further 
seen by the fact that although he claims to be a Muslim, Magadien kept a Christian Bible with 
JR, his Number gang name, uncannily inscribed on it. This suggests that as much as nations 
are narrations, according to Said, and are always going through some kind of Ortzian 
transculturation, so are the subjectivities of individuals who constitute it, as Magadien‟s case 
suggests. Steinberg‟s narrative clearly parallels Nongoloza‟s story of transculturation with 
that of Magadien. He goes to great lengths to prove that Magadien‟s dabbling with the 
criminal world as a little boy is a result of a troubled childhood and muddled, but intense 
sense of social and economic exclusion which culminates in his staying in a children‟s foster 
home before he even becomes a teenager. Steinberg‟s narrative implies that it is Magadien‟s 
economic and social alienation that leads to his being caught up in the student activism of the 
late 1970s which leads to his initial arrest and his subsequent recruitment into the Number 
prison gangs. Through all these incidents, Steinberg demonstrates that Magadien‟s life story is 
indeed “intertwined with other stories” (Freeman and Brockmeier 2001: 81). 
After being initially arrested as a student political activist, Magadien quickly transforms into a 
prison gangster. Steinberg postulates that this shift is not difficult for Magadien because his 
life in the ghetto exposed him to the harshness and traumas which developed a tendency for 
gangsterism in most teenagers. Interestingly, Magadien does not connect his joining the 
Number prison gangs with the fact that he was a street gang member in his teenage days. 
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Instead he is struck by the similarity of the Number prison gangs with the political activists 
fighting against apartheid. He says:  
Meeting with [the Number] was an eye opener … I was shocked to see that 
they were as political as we were. They were fighting apartheid prison 
system. That is what they were about, before anything else. (The Number 
142) 
This seems to support Gusdorf‟s (1980) argument that no auto/biographer is engaged in a 
wholly objective and disinterested pursuit, but in a work of personal justification. He writes: 
“[T]he task of autobiography is first of all a task of personal salvation” (39). Freeman and 
Brockmeier also claim that “[a]utobiographical memory and interpretive appraisal … go hand 
in hand” (81). This alleged similarity of the Number gangs to political prisoners is not just a 
figment of Magadien‟s imagination, but the interpretive workings of auto/biographical 
memory. Furthermore, Steinberg‟s narrative shows that what has sustained the Number for 
the past one hundred years is a narrative of power and resistance which is almost political, but 
not quite. In Steinberg‟s book the space of the prison attains some metaphoric function in that 
it rarefies the identity narrative of the Number prison gangs. Reduced to its barest minimum, 
what has ensured the resilience of the Number gangs during apartheid years is a narrative of 
binary polemics that “the [prison] world is divided into bandiete and boere, and the boer is 
always the enemy” (The Number 23). This narrative is similar to the Manichean 
understanding of the world of the political prisoners that I mention in the opening section of 
this chapter.  However, the polarised nature of the narratives of political prisoners and 
Number gang prisoners is not cast in stone, they are both ambivalently malleable and 
responsive to discursive and material changes. The insight that we glean from Steinberg‟s 
book is that all narratives are constantly confronted with the problems of transculturation in 
the way Ortiz uses this term. 
As a way of further interrogating other strands of transculturation, narrative construction and 
the formation of identity as these intersect with criminality, imprisonment and nation I will 
now turn in more detail to Steinberg‟s depiction of David Ruiters, Nongoloza‟s alter ego, 
popularly known as Doggy Dog in the South African media. 
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3. Coded Narratives: Nongoloza, Doggy Dog: Narrating the Self and Nation  
Achille Mbembe‟s observation that “contemporary African modes of writing the self are 
inseparably connected with the problematics of self-constitution and the modern philosophy 
of the subject” (2002: 240), captures some of Steinberg‟s main preoccupations in The 
Number. But over and above this, through the story of Doggy Dog, Steinberg illustrates how 
narratives of the self, even obscure ones such as those of the prison underworld, are 
constituted and also constitute not only the identities of prison gangsters but are also 
possessed and haunted, and in turn possess and haunt the national and global narratives in 
very subtle ways. Doggy Dog is the gangster name of Dawid Ruiters, the man who lead a 
group of four men that murdered two women and a toddler and brutally stabbed a man and 
left him for dead in a farm near Nieuwoudtville in 1996. Previously, Doggy Dog had been a 
26 Number gang member but before being sentenced to an indeterminate prison sentence in 
February 1999, he spent a dramatic two year period at Pollsmoor Remand Prison which led to 
his metamorphosis into a 27.
59
 Through this story, Steinberg also shows that narratives, and 
not just material needs, drive crime and criminality.  
Steinberg tells the story of Doggy Dog in a way that demonstrates the power of narratives and 
how an individual‟s life experience and worldview are mediated through narratives. With 
Doggy Dog, Steinberg shows the implosion of the Nongolozan narrative. The story of  
Nongoloza, a bandit driven by a fiery but ambivalent anti-colonialist narrative, who wins the 
hearts and loyalty of many followers within a short space of time, has been recited again and 
again within the walls of South African prisons. Steinberg points out that it is this story that 
has created a community of prisoners known as the Number in almost all South African 
prisons, and that it is this narrative which largely accounts for the Number‟s resilience. When 
Steinberg asks Magadien early in their relationship which story best encapsulates what 
Nongoloza means for him, Magadien, without even posing to think, says the story of Doggy 
Dog. Magadien suggests that stories or narratives, especially those about crime that seem to 
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 According to the Number lore the founder of the 27s was Kilikijan, and Nongoloza of the 28s. This is so 
because he led a group of 7 or 27 bandits when he and Nongoloza quarrelled and split into two groups about the 
permissibility of homosexual relationships. Many years after going their separate ways, Kilikijan was the first to 
be arrested and incarcerated at Point Prison, Durban. When Nongoloza was subsequently arrested and also put in 
the same prison he found Kilikijan already a senior prisoner. He had quarrelled with and stabbed a warder, and 
had been saved from imminent death by a group of six franses (non-gangsters) who smuggled salt and other 
foods into his solitary confinement cell. These six franses were to become the 26s. However, the likely source of 
the name Number is the mines since most of Nongoloza‟s bandits had been former miners. One anonymous 
miner reportedly said that they were first given an identification Number. He went on to say: “They do not know 
your name, but they call you by the number” (In Workers and Warriors: Masculinity and the Struggle for Nation 
in South Africa by Thembisa Waetjen, 2004: 85). In colonial and apartheid prisons, prisoners were also largely 
identified by their numbers. 
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emanate from perceived injustices of the disadvantaged groups are very powerful since they  
constitute both the state and the prison and the subjectivities of individual prisoners. He 
illustrates his point through Doggy Dog‟s story. Magadien says: 
The whole country was talking about Niewoudtville, it was on the front 
page of every newspaper. And then Dog walks into prison and starts talking 
as a 27. It means the whole country is talking because Kilikijan is back. 
Because the Number is powerful. Every time he walked down the passage, 
26s would ask him for advice. They made him a god. And once that 
happened, the 28s had to accept him too … He could sabela (recount) the 
whole history of the Number on the valcross, just like an old and 
experienced 27 does, and so we could not question him. Nor could we deny 
the blood he took at Niewoudtville. (The Number 68) 
The dramatic and symbolic power imbued in the Doggy Dog story is seen from the fact that, 
12 years after Doggy Dog‟s “Flower Gang” murders, his name continues to make newspaper 
headlines. The Cape Argus of Tuesday November 4 2008 had the following headline: 
“„Flower Gang‟ killer seeks move „Doggy Dog‟ wants to be nearer home”. Earlier, on the 2nd 
of November  2008, the Afrikaans Sunday Newspaper Rappport had the following headline: 
“Doggy Dog en ander moordenaars sê hulle is eintlik glad nie gevaarlik nie … Ag, sjeim, 
hulle is nie honde nie. Bendes „hou tronke veilig‟. „Ons werk vir menseregte‟” (“Doggy Dog 
and other murderers say they are not really dangerous … Oh, shame, they are not dogs. Gangs 
„Keep prisons safe‟. „We work for human rights‟”). Steinberg observes that Dog understood 
the power of stories and “knew that if he acted out the most powerful story of all, he could do 
anything” (The Number 69). There is no doubt that Doggy Dog was exercising some measure 
of perverse agency as he acted out the Nongoloza-Kilikijan myth. However, Doggy Dog‟s 
agency is not a guarantee of “the autonomy and unmediated self-knowledge of the speaking 
subject” (Arnott 1996: 86). Moreover, it can be argued that his story had no meaning outside 
the lore of the prison: in the mainstream media, it was entirely subsumed by the hegemonic 
discourse of “the crime problem”. 
However, Steinberg suggests that Doggy Dog‟s crime seems to have gained a national 
audience as a result of the way the journalistic reportage of the time superimposed it on the 
template of the post-apartheid national narrative(s). In other words, it was the way that this 
crime was mediated performatively through journalistic narratives that enabled it to capture 
the imaginations of many South Africans. Comaroff and Comaroff observe that despite the 
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prevalence of real violent crime, South Africans are preoccupied with the mediated 
representation of law and order. Comaroff and Comaroff further point out that globally, “the 
spectre of illegality appears to be captivating the popular imaginations” (2004: 800-801). For 
the Comaroffs the symbolic power of crime in the postcolony lies in that it enables the state to 
spectacularly stage law enforcement. In a similar vein, quoting Thomas Mathiesen, Bauman 
argues that it is the illegalities or crimes of the “bottom” rather than that of the “top” which 
lend themselves to this spectacularization. Bauman argues: 
Whatever one may do about safety is incomparably more spectacular, 
watchable, „televisable‟ than any move aimed at the deeper, but – for the 
same reason – less tangible and apparently more abstract, layers of the 
malaise. Fighting crime, like crime itself, and particularly the crime targeted 
on bodies and private property, makes an excellent, exciting, eminently 
watchable show. The mass media producers and script writers are well 
aware of this. (1998: 118) 
In South Africa this preoccupation with the mediated depiction of law and order was 
dramatised at a national scale through the Truth and Reconciliation process (TRC). The TRC 
captured people‟s imaginations because it did not just encourage national healing by playing 
down retribution, but it also put forgiveness and reconciliation on stage, dramatised them and 
attracted large audiences to watch and listen to its hearings. In Bauman‟s theorisation, the 
TRC could be seen as participating in the global market forces aimed at selling South Africa 
as a safe investment destination by assuring international investors that the state is in firm 
control of the poor masses that could be tempted to violent crimes of appropriation after the 
demise of apartheid. On the other hand, for the local population, through its watchable and 
televisable shows of complete disclosure aimed at closure, the TRC gave the impression that 
justice was being done. This penchant for the theatricalization of law and disorder as seen 
both in the TRC process, and the way Doggy Dog‟s crime was interpreted and depicted both 
in and outside prison, seems to suggest that power functions more diffusely and is not as 
centralised as is described by Foucault‟s notion of panopticism. This also problematises 
Said‟s contention that power and discourse can solely be possessions of the oppressor (1978: 
7). 
Bhabha observes that at the narrative or discourse level, the relationship between the 
oppressor and the oppressed is permeated by a disturbing and destabilizing ambivalence 
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which ensures that power is never a preserve of the oppressor.
60
 This ambiguity that 
appertains to the location of power is very evident in Steinberg‟s narrative. During apartheid, 
people found novel ways of resisting the isolationist apartheid policies. For example, 
Steinberg indicates that the reformatories and prisons where young men from different ghettos 
were bunched together became the nerve centre that connected all the ghettos. In this way, the 
mega-street gangs that emerged in the 1970s were able to spread their influence throughout 
the Cape Town ghettos. Commenting on how the apartheid project of isolating the ghettos and 
saving its young men by putting them in institutions backfired, Steinberg observes: 
If the kids of the new ghettos were stranded in their isolated pockets, the one 
thing that brought them together, that created allegiances crossing ghetto 
boundaries, highways and deserted scrublands, was the magical tales and 
the exotic initiation rites of the reformatories and jails. (The Number 124) 
Although the prison, just like the ghetto, enforced a proximity of bodies, it is significant that 
Steinberg suggests that it is not merely this physical closeness of human beings which brought 
these young people together, but the stories, in other words the narratives, that issued out of 
such institutions. The way these institutions were perceived and represented as places where 
heroes were born by those who had passed through them is what made them enticing and 
intriguing to the rest of the young men. Under the deprivations of ghetto conditions, the 
young men who sojourned to the reformatories and prisons were able to wrest the official 
narrative away from these institutions which depicted them as places of penance, and and 
instead coloured them with a flamboyant ideology of manhood and heroism. This suggests 
that the way Doggy Dog manipulates his crimes to get power in prison enjoys some precedent 
in South African life. 
At both material and discursive levels, Steinberg shows that this symbiotic relationship 
between the state and prison has continued to haunt the post-apartheid state. He demonstrates 
that while the state has appropriated crime by turning it into shows in the public media, the 
underworld of prison gangsters has in turn constituted the state in subtle and pervasive ways. 
Steinberg observes: 
Prison is the great networking centre of criminal South Africa. Spend four 
or five years of your life in the 26s, and wherever you go after that you will 
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 Interestingly Bhabha has also been criticized for perching his discussion at a theoretical level which ignores 
the profound unequal distribution of power and the physical conflict and pain which characterizes the 
relationship of the colonizer and the colonized. (For example, see Abdul R. JanMohamed in “Colonialist 
Literature”, Critical Inquiry, 1985 (60-61). 
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always find a brother with whom to do business. Prison has taken the illicit 
market to every village in the country. (The Number 62) 
In the above words Steinberg paints a picture of a prison which serves as the heart, the source 
of life of the very crimes which it is set up to prevent. Steinberg‟s description of the post-
apartheid South African prison conjures a picture of a heart with its complex blood vessels 
that form a network which keeps the entire organism alive with its circulatory system. The 
irony of the whole situation is heavy indeed. Unlike the real heart, the prison does not 
distribute life-giving blood to the body, which is the state; it pumps the poison of crime to the 
remotest village of South Africa. 
The haunting effect of crime and prison upon identities of individuals and the South African 
national psyche as a whole may be illustrated by Mr „Whisky‟ Sisodia‟s drunken stammer in 
Salman Rushdie‟s Satanic Verses. He says: “The trouble with the Engenglish is that their hiss 
history happened overseas, so they dodo don‟t know what it means.” (Satanic Verses 1988: 
343). Steinberg‟s The Number shows that the trouble with the South Africans is that a large 
part of their history happened, and is still happening in prisons, so they do not know what it 
means, if I may appropriate Sisodia‟s words. Writing at the height of apartheid, Nicholas 
Haysom noted that the South African “general public [was] often indifferent to the plight of 
prisoners and not very interested in the prisons themselves” (1981:36). Haysom‟s general 
public was likely that section of the population that viewed all the incarcerated blacks and 
coloured as terrorists or indolent criminals who did not deserve any serious consideration 
except being locked away for life. Despite this mentality of denial, Roux argues that during 
the apartheid years the prison was at the centre of social visibility because of the large number 
of political prisoners. He writes: 
The massive influence of the prison in South African society has meant in 
effect that the prison defied narrow delimitation as a repressive institution, 
and started functioning as an instrument in the production of ideology. 
(2007: 255) 
This suggests that in South Africa the prison started to operate insidiously and pervasively at 
the level of the unconscious. Steinberg‟s narrative suggests that may still be the case in post-
apartheid South Africa. 
While the prison was forcibly brought to the social centre due to the large number of political 
prisoners that were incarcerated during the apartheid era, with the demise of apartheid, Roux 
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sees the same kind of general public indifference to the plight of prisoners and a lack of 
interest in the prison that was noted by Haysom among the white population in apartheid 
times now creeping into the entire nation as prisons are increasingly de-politicized. He 
observes: “Real prisons are increasingly forgotten as the material space of the prison loses its 
power to shape notions of self and nation” (279). Where does Roux then place Steinberg‟s 
narrative? He argues: 
For Steinberg, the prison remains a privileged space in society that remains 
deeply marked by mass criminalization and imprisonment of its citizens. 
The Number insists that the construction of identity in prison discloses the 
play of power in society in general. (270) 
Indeed, Steinberg‟s narrative demonstrates that no amount of denial will push the prison and 
the prisoner away from the societal centre. He shows that present and future generations of 
South Africans have to confront a haunting web of colonial, apartheid and post-apartheid 
national narratives which were told, and are being told by thousands of prisoners who moved 
and still move to and fro, from society into prison, from prison into society, and again from 
society into prison, in an incessant passage that keeps shaping and reshaping, and defining 
and redefining the identities not only of individual prisoners but the South African national 
narrative itself. In this regard, the prison and its regimes become an important institution that 
possesses and constitutes, and is similarly possessed and constituted by the state (Rodriguez 
2006: 43). 
The crime and the Pollsmoor remand story of Doggy Dog is illustrative of this incessant 
interactive passage between crime stories, prison, the individual and the state as a whole. The 
newspaper reportage of the murders at the time clearly linked the crime to the new democratic 
dispensation and the TRC process. Journalists emphasized the fact that the victims were 
landed whites and the perpetrators were black and self-styled outlaws. What made the killings 
uncanny is the fact that they seemed to be unrelated to robbery as such. The crime seemed to 
take the ambivalence of the Nongolozan banditry, which indeed was banditry, but received its 
initially breath of life from the racially exploitative colonial system. Similarly, Steinberg 
points out that what captured people‟s imagination about Doggy Dog‟s crime was not only its 
superfluous nature in relation to the criminal loot but also the political climate under which it 
occurred; the racial, class and political overtones that seemed embedded in it. Steinberg 
writes: 
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[T]he Niewoudtville murders carried a symbolic weight in 1996 that would 
have been absent several years earlier. To say, in 1996, that Kilikijan is 
roaming the countryside once again, that he has killed Rabie, is to say that 
nothing has changed, that authorities are still authorities, and bandits are still 
bandits. (The Number 70) 
This suggests that people saw the unravelling of the rainbow national narrative in this 
incident. As Steinberg points out, in the minds of most people who heard of this crime, it 
indicated that South Africans “were to pay dearly for the ordered political settlement that 
ended white minority rule; the price would not be open civil war, but an endless relay of 
quiet, inarticulate sniping from the margins of the new democracy” (The Number, 55). But 
crimes of the “bottom” like Doggy Dog‟s offer the state and its law-enforcing apparatus the 
opportunity to spectacularise crime, as noted above by Bauman and the Comarroffs. To 
demonstrate to the world that the rainbow nation was not going to be held hostage by 
criminals who murdered law abiding citizens and looted their property, the judge presiding 
over Doggy Dog‟s case handed down a dramatic sentence. Steinberg reports: “[T]he judge 
dusted off a law that had never been used; he gave them all an indeterminate sentence. Dog 
[was] told to return to court in 50 years” (The Number 74). 
While the national narrative was threading itself into the Doggy Dog‟s story, and the public 
was actively weaving this crime into the national narrative, Doggy Dog himself was merging 
it with the myth of Nongoloza in the remand prison. Steinberg shows that as Doggy Dog was 
killing three defenceless white people in Hendrina Louw‟s farm on the outskirts of 
Niewoudtville, in his mind he was re-enacting Nongoloza and Kilikijan‟s exploits at Rabie‟s 
farm which, according to the Number mythology, took place almost two centuries earlier. 
Doggy Dog‟s words when he commanded his lieutenants to start killing was: “Up bayonet!” 
(The Number 63). These words enable us to catch a glimpse of the hypnotic power of the 
Nongolozan myth on the prison Number gangs. However, Steinberg suggests that it would be 
wrong to simply conclude that Doggy Dog was mindlessly re-enacting a two centuries old 
myth. As much as his actions were laden with symbolic significance, they also translated into 
real physical action and real power for him in the here and now of prison politics. First, his 
actions led to the loss of three lives. Secondly, they transformed him and inducted him and his 
collaborators, who where all 26s before this incident, into the 27s. Up to that time, the 27s 
was the only Number prison gang that was joined through the spilling of blood. 
125 
 
These events also show the interaction of the prison, the state and global forces in other 
complex ways. According to the Number myth, the 26s were constituted in the four walls of 
the prison. Only the 27s and the 28s, in the form of Nongoloza and Kilikijan, started their life 
out of prison before being forced to retreat into colonial prisons by the crackdown of colonial 
authorities. The murder of Rabie had been a sacred event in that it defined who the enemy of 
the bandits was, but this murder also enabled Nongoloza and Kilikijan to undisputedly assume 
leadership positions of their respective gangs after Po‟s death. When the Number gangs‟ 
activities were restricted to prison during the long years of apartheid, one could only be 
inducted into the 27s or 28s through stabbing, usually of a warder. However, the warders‟ 
blood only represented that of Rabie, the exploitative and stingy white farmer murdered by 
Nongoloza and Kilikijan in about 1812. During their long incubatory years in prison the 
Number mutated and eventually the 27s emerged as the soldiers, the killers, and the defenders 
of the Number gangs as a whole. As a result of the stringent way in which one became a 27, 
the 27s were always a dwindling minority in every South African prison. 
In Doggy Dog‟s case, Nongoloza and Kilikijan had gone full circle. Nongoloza and Kilikijaan 
had started as bandits outside prison during colonial rule and ironically now, in 1996, two 
years after the vanquishing of what one would call the last vestiges of colonialism, Nongoloza 
and Kilikijan burst out of the walls that had imprisoned them for decades. Doggy Dog‟s crime 
and story played both a symbolic and a physical force in breaking down the prison walls and 
returning Nongoloza and Kilikijan back into society where they had originated from. 
Figuratively, the post-apartheid murder of the white farmers by Doggy Dog was an 
affirmation that Nongoloza‟s and Kilikijan‟s enemies had not changed. The end of apartheid 
had threatened to destroy the idea that had sustained the Number for many decades. Doggy 
Dog‟s actions revived it and re-affirmed once more that to the Number gangs the world is 
forever divided into bandiete and boere, and the boer is always the enemy (The Number 53), 
whether in prison or outside of it. It was a symbolic confirmation that the colonial conditions 
that had created Nongoloza were still in place in the post-apartheid South Africa. This 
continuation of the Number, albeit with a difference, challenges the notion of a definitive 
break embedded in the designation post-apartheid. 
The constitution of identity or identities of the nation and the subjectivities of individual 
South African prisoners ever since the inception of prisons at the dawn of colonial rule can be 
compared to the function of a bridge as it is lyrically expressed in the words of Heidegger 
below. He says: 
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Always and ever differently the bridge escorts the lingering and hastening 
ways of men to and fro, so that they may get to other banks … The bridge 
gathers as a passage that crosses. (1971: 152-3) 
As we have seen, the South African prison of Steinberg‟s narrative operates like a bridge in 
that it collects individuals and gives them an illusory sense of solidified subjectivity and 
agency, especially with reference to the Number gang members, when in fact these 
subjectivities are in a constant state of flux. This fluidity attends on the changing nature of the 
prison, which is shaped and reshaped by the state at different historical moments, and which 
in turn shapes and reshapes the state. In the case of Number prison gangs some of this 
vacillation and fluidity is cauterized through reference to a utopic, ethnically “pure” authentic 
moment of origin that the gangs have to strive to reclaim. The fact that the intrinsic 
connectedness of temporal and spatial relationships that are artfully expressed in Steinberg‟s 
narrative do not suggest a progression which leaves behind the past is suggested by the 
application of Showalter‟s observation that “[b]eginnings and endings may be the sustaining 
myths of the middle years” (1990: 2). These beginnings, endings and middle years are 
themselves constructed through narratives. Steinberg‟s narrative intricately connects the pre-
apartheid, apartheid and the post-apartheid prison narratives in an attempt to show that subject 
formation can never be concretized at a single historical moment except through a narrative. 
Steinberg‟s narrative suggests a strange connection between the criminal underworld and 
prison on one hand, and national and global politics on the other. The text also shows that an 
ambivalent relationship between narratives and material needs drive crime and criminality, 
and that there is both a discursive and material carry-over of apartheid in the post-apartheid 
state. In Long Walk to Freedom, Mandela also shows that as early as the beginning of 1980s, 
the apartheid state had already started ideologically to ingratiate itself with a possible post-
apartheid state. This is seen in Mandela‟s being transferred from Robben Island to Pollsmoor 
Prison in 1982, and the apartheid state‟s entering into secret and protracted negotiations with 
him up to his release in early 1990. Before that time the ideological gap between the apartheid 
regime and that of those who opposed it appeared unbridgeable. Interestingly, the demise of 
the apartheid state coincided with the demise of the Cold-war that culminated in the collapse 
of communism in the USSR and the fall of the Berlin wall. Steinberg makes it clear that the 
changes that were occurring in prison and in the criminal underworld were partly being driven 
by these national and global changes. For example, Steinberg points out that before the 
political changes of the late 1980s and the early 1990s, the wall that divided the world of 
street gangs and that of the prison Number gangs was almost impermeable. The materialistic 
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street gangs with their lack of any strong ideological conviction could not and did not desire 
to be part of the fiercely ideological and extremely frugal life of the prison Number gangs. It 
is as Steinberg puts it: “When a Born Free Kid (street gang) had finished his sentence, he left 
the 26s behind in jail, and when he came back to prison he left the Born Free Kids on the 
streets” (The Number 72). This double life had been the life of Magadien for almost two 
decades. But the altered national and global politico-economic environment led to the 
development of extremely wealthy street drug lords, such as those that led the Americans and 
the Firm. When these street drug lords went into prison bereft of their street armies, they 
found themselves at the mercy of the Number prison gangs who had little respect for them. It 
became one of their urgent tasks to make the prison look like the streets so that they would be 
safe. Steinberg points out: 
In the early 1990s, something strange began happening on the streets. The 
Americans took scraps and pieces of the ancient 26 ritual – recruitment, 
rank structure, and so forth – and began to emulate it, in a cobbled 
bastardized fashion. The Firm did much the same with the legacy of the 28s. 
(The Number 73) 
The legacy of the 27s was too bloody for any of the street gangs to appropriate, and that task 
was left to Doggy Dog. With his Niewoudtville reputation he was able within a few months to 
populate Pollsmoor prison with half-baked 27s who were all Americans who had been 
supplying him with free drugs to gain this very favour. In turn, these new 27s who were in 
fact Americans who had not shed any blood were soon released into the streets. In this strange 
manner, Kilikijan and his 27s, who had been forced into prison almost two centuries earlier, 
were back in the streets in the form the Americans. But now in addition to possessing and 
reconstituting the streets these prison-street gangs were networked with the global 
underworld. In this light, Kilikijan came out of prison into the streets as a virulent mutant that 
overflowed the South African borders. 
As Doggy Dog had surmised, once in prison, what he had done in the outside world at 
Hendrina Louw‟s farm was correctly interpreted by the Number gang members. He had come 
to typify the Number and as a result became a feared defender of the Number and the 
undisputed leader of the 27s not only by the virtue of the blood he had spilled, but largely 
through the story he had appropriated. The blood that Doggy Dog had spilled symbolically 
returned the Number to its original state and returned the battle to the place where it started 
and where it belonged, outside the prison. But the ironic pathos of course is that exactly as in 
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the case of the historical Nongoloza, whose banditry led to a long spell in prison, Doggy Dog 
instinctively prepares himself for his life imprisonment while he is still outside the prison. 
Magadien, the man about whom The Number is supposedly about, accurately reads Doggy 
Dog‟s mindset as he was committing the Niewoudtville crimes. Confiding in Steinberg, he 
says: 
You see, there comes a stage in your life when you know you will be 
spending more of your life inside than outside. So you plan for your future, 
your life in prison … Dog … did what he did outside to plan for inside (The 
Number 67). 
This is a disconcerting observation because what it means is that the prison plays itself on the 
outside. For the Number gang members who have come to regard prison as their real 
permanent home, the world outside prison is a somewhat unreal space, a theatre for the 
performance of iniquitous spectacles that ultimately serves the social world of the prison, 
which is awarded a kind of ontological priority. This mentality is also seen in Magadien for 
whom the few years he spent outside prison intermittently from the time of his inception into 
the Number in about 1978 were but a mirage, wasted time which could have been fruitfully 
spent climbing up the rank structure of the Number in prison. 
What is striking about both Doggy Dog and Magadien‟s mentality, which completely rejects 
the world outside prison in preference for prison life, is that it faithfully mimics what 
happened to Po and his two lieutenants. Po left home because he was chagrined by the loss of 
young men of the village to the early colonial industrialization. So, at first his narrative seems 
to be inspired by the need to save the village from extinction. But no sooner does Po discover 
what happens to the young men in the mines than he decides to form a gang of bandits who 
would never return to their homes. In this way, the wise old man of the village is transformed 
into a monster exactly like the one he initially intended fighting. The story speaks of 
disturbing discursive links between the oppressor and the oppressed despite their different 
material conditions. This reminds us of Paulo Freire‟s famous formulation that the desire of 
the oppressed is to be like. And to be like is to be like the oppressor (2004: 8). Doggy Dog‟s 
“deranged, maniacal road journey” (The Number 61) of crime which culminates in the 
Niewoudtville murders shows how former prisoners feel alienated in the outside world due to 
their incapacity to earn a living that does not depend on criminal underworld. So their desire 
to go back to prison seems to be the result of a pathological helplessness which rationalises 
that between the harshness of prison and the outside world, prison is the better option. This 
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helplessness led Po and his disciples to abandon their villages and live in holes and disused 
mines. During colonial and apartheid rule, for many South Africans this powerlessness meant 
abandoning their villages for hostile mine compounds and urban hostels, institutions that 
resembled and were managed like prisons. 
However, there is another ambivalent dimension to Doggy Dog‟s story. Steinberg shows that 
Doggy Dog is, indeed, producing a form of speech from the position of the subaltern. This 
“speech” further erodes the boundary between “inside” and “outside”, and effectively 
reinvigorates gang lore which is threatened by the narrative shifts and reinventions that 
attended on democratization. Steinberg himself alludes to this fact in his narrative. In contrast 
to Herman Charles Bosman‟s claim in Cold Stone Jug that prisoners “are merely battered 
receptacles of stories” (1949: 70), Steinberg says “[t]he prisoners are the djins. They emerge 
from their tales transmogrified, haloed by the magic dust they gather from the myths. And 
with this magic they garner real power in the politics of the here and now” (The Number 70). 
Through the “re-staging” of the Nongolozan myth, Doggy Dog is able to acquire power in the 
prison politics for himself. The appropriation of his crime and its spectacularisation by the 
state media also indicates Doggy Dog‟s possessing and constituting the state in intricately 
haunting ways. 
The importance of crime and prison stories of Doggy Dog, Nongoloza, Magadien and the    
Number prison gangs in general is suggested by Bhabha‟s assertion that increasingly, 
“„national‟ cultures are being produced from the perspective of the disenfranchised 
minorities” (8). Bhabha is wrong, of course, in assuming that this production of national 
cultures by the “powerless” is a recent phenomenon. Steinberg‟s narrative suggests subtle but 
unbreaking and unbreakable discursive linkages between prisoners‟ culture and that of the 
nation. The next section seeks to show that the South African Number prison gangs as “the 
subaltern” (Spivak 1998:7), develop their own disturbing papnotics to compromise the 
authority of the penal regime and keep it under surveillance.  
4. Inverted Surveillance and the Panoptics of the Subaltern  
The fact that Doggy Dog is able re-stage the Nongolozan myth suggests that he has some 
agency. We have already seen how he acquires power in the prison politics for himself 
through the appropriation of this story. I also alluded to the fact that his crime is apparently 
appropriated by the state by being theatricalised in the media. In this section, I explore these 
observations and other additional insights by largely using Foucault‟s theorisation of the 
panopticon. 
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In Discipline and Punish (1975), in a chapter entitled “Panopticism”, Foucault utilizes the 
Benthamite concept of the panopticon to explain what he thinks is the way power operates in 
modern societies, especially in total institutions.
61
 Zygmunt Bauman (1998) summarizes 
Foucault‟s concept of the panopticon as follows: “In its „ideal type‟, Panopticon would allow 
for no private space; at least for no opaque private space, no private space unsurveilled or 
worse still unsurveillable” (49). Foucault insisted that the panopticon should not be 
understood as a dream building but rather as “a figure of political technology that may and 
must be detached from any specific use” (Discipline 205). In The Number a myriad power 
forms may be disentangled through a critical and interpretive use of the Benthamite-
Foucauldian panoptic mechanism. This is vital because, as Bauman points out,“[b]eing a 
near-perfect metaphor for the crucial facets of modernization of power and control, the image 
of Panopticon may … dwell too heavily on the sociological imagination, thus preventing 
rather than facilitating, the perception of the nature of present change” (49).  In fact, despite 
presenting a sophisticated analysis of the plurality, transformations and operations of power, 
in the chapter “Panopticism” Foucault comes very close to viewing power as unmediated 
domination. Commenting on the use and effect of the Benthamite Panopticon on power 
relations Foucault writes: 
Hence the major effect of the Panopticon: to induce in the inmate a state of 
conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of 
power … The Panopticon is a machine for dissociating the see/being seen 
dyad: in the peripheric ring, one is totally seen, without seeing; in the central 
tower, one sees everything without ever being seen. (Discipline 202) 
This presupposes hegemonic, pre-existing and unequal power relations. This becomes clear 
when Foucault further argues that although the inmates of the Panopticon are “caught up in a 
situation of which they are themselves the bearers [of self-regulating power]” (Discipline 
202), the power that they bear is oppressive, undesirable and imposed upon them by the 
Panopticon mechanism. In Foucault‟s formulation, it is significant that while the panopticon 
automatises and de-individualises power, this power to observe is unidimensional, and is only 
exercised by those who have been co-opted into the dominant power system. Foucault writes: 
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 I am not going to summarize Foucault‟s entire understanding of the concept of power, its production and uses. 
I believe that this is a futile attempt since Foucault‟s ideas were still evolving at the time of his death. Although 
referring to his other works, I will largely limit my discussion to how Foucault discusses the notion of power in 
relation to total institutions such as the prison. 
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Consequently, it does not matter who exercises power. Any individual, 
taken at random, can operate the machine: in the absence of the director, his 
family, his friends, his visitors, even his servants. (203) 
Bauman argues that the Foucauldian panoptical techniques “called for the asymmetrical of 
surveillance, for professional watchers, and for such organization of space as would enable 
the watchers to do their job, and would make the watched aware that the job was being done, 
and could be done, at any moment” (1998: 49). Viewed in the above light, the panopticon 
metaphor leaves no room for resistance. The Number reveals a more complex operation of 
power than Foucault‟s panopticon model allows. The inadequacy of Foucault‟s panopticism 
as an all-encompassing model of power relations reflected in Steinberg‟s The Number 
demands that we juxtapose his views with those of Said and Bhabha in order to fully explore 
the operation and distribution of power in the prison and within the Number gangs of 
Steinberg‟s narrative. 
In Discipline, Foucault argues that, in Europe, by the end of the 18
th
 century, there was a 
sudden transformation in the exercise of power. He says that there was a movement “from a 
schema of exceptional power to one of generalized surveillance” and claims that this change 
was a result of historical transformation (Discipline 209). In Thomas Mathiesen‟s (1997) 
words, the introduction of panoptical power led from a situation where the many watch the 
few to a situation where the few watch the many (215)
62
. According to Foucault, then, there 
was a sudden shift from the theatricality of pre-modern operation of power to the implicit, 
internalised, capillary kinds of discipline in modern societies. Comaroff and Comaroff (2004: 
804) have argued that the depiction of crime, especially in the media in post-apartheid South 
Africa, inverts the Foucauldian model laid out in Discipline and Punish. I am therefore 
interested in exploring the extent to which Steinberg‟s The Number bears out Comaroff and 
Comaroff‟s observations about the workings and functions of power in colonial, apartheid and 
post-apartheid South African prisons. 
Steinberg‟s narrative suggests that the colonial modernity ushered into Africa in the late 19th 
century by European powers may not have lead to a transformed exercise of power whereby 
exceptional power shifted to one of generalized surveillance. In particular, in the case of the 
South Africa prison, Steinberg shows that the Number prison gangs‟ emergence was strongly 
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 In his essay „„The Viewer Society,‟‟ Mathiesen argues that surveillance in post-modern societies is equally 
distributed from the many onto the few – an opposing force to that of the Panopticon where the few watched the 
many. He points out that this development is largely the result the television (219). 
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linked to the colonial use or abuse of exceptional sovereign power in connection with the 
recruitment of Africans as a source of cheap mine labour. As I have already shown, 
Nongoloza and Kilikijan are depicted, in both historical and mythical narratives, as starting 
their banditry, which leads to their imprisonment in colonial jails, in direct response to, and 
rebellion against, an oppressive and exploitative capitalist colonial modernity. For example, 
Steinberg writes the following about the historical Nongoloza: 
It was, ironically, thanks to the brutal labour regime, the very system 
Nongoloza had spent his early life skirting, that the Ninevites (Nongoloza‟s 
band of robbers) were able to grow into a formidable force, a veritable army 
of working class and unemployed men. During the early years of the new 
century ... the new British administration developed a tight labour regime, 
enforced by a host of laws restricting the urban movement of black 
migrants. The result is that thousands of working-class men lived their 
urban lives being shepherded from prison to compound, compound to prison 
... And in compounds, the Ninevites would infiltrate and recruit among the 
ranks of the gold mine workers. As vast numbers of men were shuffled from 
one total institution to another, so the law of Ninevites spread (39-41). 
The fact that Nongoloza is produced by as much as responding to capitalist colonial 
modernity appears to be a Foucauldian point. However, Nongoloza overflows the 
Foucauldian model. Despite Steinberg‟s unsympathetic portrayal of Nongoloza and his 
original band of bandits – he calls them career criminals – it is clear that in the minds of many 
Africans back then they occupied a zone of indistinction. They were simultaneously feared as 
merciless outlaws but also revered for daring to challenge the colonial exceptional power and 
its system of capitalist exploitation. Nongoloza‟s brutality alone cannot explain why he was 
able to recruit such a large following in such a short space of time before his imprisonment, 
and the fast spread of his ideas once he and his men started to enter colonial jails. It is clear 
that they were peddling an ambivalent but appealing anti-colonial narrative which wooed the 
colonially embittered, victimised and abused African men. 
Nongoloza‟s banditry before his arrest suggests that Africans responded in varied ways to 
colonial power. It is clear that colonial power was not exercised in a panoptic manner 
suggested to be operative in Europe by this time by Foucault‟s studies. Although dependent 
on colonial power, Nongoloza and his men did not internalise it and become their own 
monitors. Instead, they found innovative ways to create alternative centres of power which 
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stood either in partial or complete opposition to the development of colonial capitalism. 
Moreover, once they had been overcome by the superior power of colonial administration and 
put in gaols, Nongoloza and his men do not completely submit themselves to the panoptic 
surveillance of the colonial prison system. Instead, they actively create their own surveillance 
mechanism which does not only mimic but also subverts and undermines that of the prison 
authorities. This is seen in the words of a black prisoner who was a witness at a commission 
of enquiry conducted in 1904 into conditions at Johannesburg prison. The prisoner stated that 
fellow black prisoners had their teeth drawn out, or were thrown up to the roof and then 
allowed to fall down to the floor of the cell ten, sometimes up to fifteen times, by Jan Note 
(Nongoloza‟s pseudonym), after being accused of being sell-outs. In the evidence of these 
events the witness-prisoner posed a profound question to the commissioners: “I wish to ask , 
how many Governors there are here in this jail, because I find there are a lot of officers 
besides the Governor who punish” (The Number 40). 
Haysom (1981) has also catalogued numerous instances where prisoners who were witnesses 
to the murders committed by the Number gangs and some witnesses who were actually 
murdered by the Number gangs in prison after giving evidence in court. He has also given a 
number of examples where prison gang members would rather face gallows than refuse to 
participate in suicidal murders. Pertinently then, Haysom asks a similar question similar to 
that asked by the prisoner of Nongoloza‟s day quoted above: “[W]ho actually wields power in 
the prisons [and] does it not seem that there are two authority systems operating in the 
prisons?” (32). Although Steinberg does not deny the power wielded by the Number gangs, he 
is of the opinion that they are a mere mirror image of their captors. He writes: 
They become, in essence, a mirror to their custodians. „We are what you are. 
You are an army, we are an army. Where you have a head of prison, we 
have a Judge. Where you have a head of section, we have a general. 
Whatever you do to us, we will do to you in turn‟. Far from resisting 
authority, they are locked onto it like a deer in the highlights; their aim is to 
mimic it eternally. (The Number 180) 
This view is close to Fanon‟s appraisal of what he calls the national bourgeoisie who take 
over power after the departure of the colonialists. He observes: 
Since the middle class has neither sufficient material nor intellectual 
resources it limits its claims to the taking over of business offices and 
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commercial houses formerly occupied by the settlers … The national middle 
class discovers its historic mission: that of intermediary. (Fanon 1963: 122) 
It is true that the Number gangs are not revolutionaries and they lack any desire to be out of 
prison because they have rationalised that conditions on the outside do not favour their 
survival. Despite their considerable power in the streets since their merging with the street 
gangs, their violent tendencies prevent them from being a force for positive change in their 
impoverished neighbourhoods. To again use Fanonian language, their situation becomes that 
of mere intermediaries who lack all ambition of getting out of prison and their imprisoned and 
imprisoning mentality. They are content with indulging themselves in scant prison luxuries 
and loot from drugs, and exercising terrorist power over the helpless prison and impoverished 
street populations. 
However, their choice of the prison as their permanent home over the “free” outside life is a 
serious indictment of South African‟s social, political and economic environments in general. 
This view contrasts dramatically to white prisoners‟ experience of the penitentiary that 
Herman Charles Bosman relates in Cold Stone Jug. This may as well change as race and class 
become increasingly uncoupled in the post-apartheid state. Despite Steinberg‟s observations, 
there is a sense in which the Number gangs resist the prison, especially by forcing warders to 
acknowledge their power. Since they have made the prison their permanent home, it logically 
follows that they are fighting for recognition and social justice within the prison. This 
suggests that the power of the Number gangs is not a straightforward co-opted mimicry of 
prison authority, but rather, it is a Lacanian mimicry which is able to reveal something 
because it is not only different from what it mimics but it is also a form of subtle resistance.
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While in the examples that Steinberg gives it is obvious that the warders were aware and 
probably tolerated the underhand prison activities of the Ninevites, possibly because it was 
brutality of “kaffirs against kaffirs”, the setting up of the above-mentioned commission of 
inquiry indicates that on the whole colonial authorities viewed prison gang activities not as 
harmless “mimetic activity” but rather as “a travesty, camouflage [and] intimidation”, (Lacan 
1977: 99) that threatened their sole right to exceptional power. 
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 Jacques Lacan writes: “Mimicry reveals something in so far as it is distinct from what might be called an itself 
that is behind. The effect of mimicry is camouflage, in the strictly technical sense. It is not a question of 
harmonizing with the background, but against a mottled background, of becoming mottled – exactly like the 
technique of camouflage practised in human warfare. („The line and light‟, Of the Gaze, The Four Fundamental 
Concepts of Pscho-Analysis, 1979: 99 (ed.) Miller, J.). Lacan thus understands mimicry as a tactical move of 
survival and resistance and not as a mindless imitation of the superior Other. Developing Lacan‟s ideas Bhabha 
says “mimicry is the desire for a reformed, recognizable Other, as a subject of a difference that is almost the 
same, but not quite … the discourse of mimicry is constructed around ambivalence; in order to be effective, 
mimicry must continually produce its slippage, its excess, its difference”.   (See Homi Bhabha‟s “Of mimicry 
and man: The ambivalence of colonial discourse” The Location of Culture, 1994: 122) 
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This suggests that their being trapped in the sterile prison and prison-like environment does 
not mean that the Number gangs have simply been co-opted into the prison power system as 
may be suggested by Foucault‟s understanding of the panopticon.64 No matter how closely the 
Number gangs resemble the prison authorities, what marks them as different is the gangs‟ 
desire for a reformed, recognizable Other, to be subjects of difference which are almost the 
same as warders, but not quite. If their power completely matched and merged with that of the 
authorities, they would cease to exist as the Other, as subjects of difference. What can be 
called the slippage, the excess and the difference of the mimicry of the Number gangs, is their 
ability to invert the official panopticon mechanism, or rather to create alternative observatory 
towers; other centres of power which stand ambivalently opposed, but also in a 
complimentary position, to the official centre(s) of power. That is why Bhabha says that 
“mimicry is at once resemblance and menace” (1994: 123). The power of the Number gangs 
simultaneously strengthens and threatens the power of the prison authorities and by extension 
that of the state.
65
 
Steinberg suggests that from the times of Nongoloza the history of South African prisons has 
been characterized by this contest for power by prison authorities on one hand, and by the 
Ninevites-cum Number gangs on the other. Commenting on the words of the black witness in 
the 1904 prison commission of inquiry, Steinberg says: “[The words] embody so much of the 
next hundred years: these parallel, quasi-judicial structures, warders on the one side, [and] 
gangs on the other, vying to control the prison population” (41). It is in the light of the 
foregoing that a strategic and selective application of the panopticon mechanism, what 
Foucault calls a figure of political technology, opens up Steinberg‟s narrative to various 
insightful interpretations. 
Contrary to the Foucauldian formulation of a panopticism that is only wielded by prison 
authorities to paralyse inmates into self-imprisoning surveillance, Steinberg‟s narrative 
suggests that both in the case of Johannesburg prison of the early 20
th
 century, and the 
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 Interestingly, the Number prison gangs do not simply mimic the prison authority. Haysom notes: “They have a 
structure, ranking and disciplinary code that pre-dates the South African Prisons Department … Each rank  a 
symbolic replica of position in the white military, police, or justice administration ” (1981:1, 12). Their rank 
structure and disciplinary code is an odd syncretic mix of the Zulu regiments, British colonial and Afrikaner 
armed forces. This is because they started as outlaws outside prison. When they were finally forced to retreat into 
prison they then incorporated some of the prison authorial structure. 
 
65
 This idea is also suggested by Haysom who argues: “It may be suggested that within the prison context the 
gangs have positive functions. They control and discipline their members. They offer some status and 
commitment to people who might otherwise have nothing to live for. However, they are also parasitic in the 
sense that they live off the backs of their fellow inmates” (1981: 34). 
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Pollsmoor prison of the early 21st century, from lock-up time until the next morning the 
panoptic power of surveillance shifts from warders to the Number gangs. This fact is 
acknowledged and even often tacitly approved of by prison authorities.
66
 Andrew Bosch, one 
of the warders who acts as Steinberg‟s tour guide and seems to be privy to the workings of 
Pollsmoor prison‟s underworld, points out:  
There is a high-ranking position common to all three major prison gangs 
called the Glas … He has two imaginary tools: a pair of binoculars that hang 
from his neck, and a bunch of keys tied to his waist. The binoculars mean he 
can see everything that happens in the prison. The keys mean he can go 
anywhere in the prison; he can open any door.
67
 (The Number 8) 
Rather than a unitary panopticon mechanism as suggested by Foucault, this suggests a 
sedimented panopticon system with varying and often antagonistic objectives. While the 
warder does indeed possess real keys to every cell, the Glas‟s imaginary tools; binoculars and 
a bunch of keys, do not give him any lesser control of the prison population, both the inmates 
and warders
68
. If anything, the Glas inspires more awe and fear in the prison population than 
the warder. The role of the Glas cannot simply be dismissed as prison-authority co-opted 
mimicry. His “mimicry is at once resemblance and menace [because it is a] sign of double 
articulation; a complex strategy of reform, regulation and discipline; which „appropriates‟ the 
Other as it visualizes power” (Bhabha 123, 124). What makes the Glas‟s warder-like 
resemblance menacing is that it has appropriated the real functions of the warder, but it 
surpasses the warder in that it has incorporated mythical powers which operate at the level of 
the mystical which the warder cannot hope to have. The warder‟s real keys make his power 
limited since it only operates within the predictable realm of the physical, and therefore it can 
easily be anticipated and countered. On the other hand, although producing real physical 
consequences, the Glas‟s imaginary bunch of keys and binoculars operate in pervasive and 
indeterminate ways which are extremely difficult to fathom, anticipate and prevent. 
Another instance where we see this anti-official Panopticon and diffuse workings of power is 
in the incident described by Steinberg in the prologue. The incident involves the murder of 
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 This suggests that the “official”, public face of the Law is underpinned by disavowed and illegal but secretly 
tolerated forms of violence. It would appear as if Foucault misrecognises the repressed violence required by the 
panopticon to function. 
 
67
 This compares with a warder Ruth First calls “the Key Man” in 117 Days. 
 
68
 The same of course can be said about other ritualised aspects of the Number prison gangs such the imaginary 
“uniforms” and the military rank structure that is strictly adhered to. 
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one Marthinus Hollander at Victor Verster prison in Paarl in 1978 by the Number gangs. 
Hollander‟s blood was to be the ransom for peace between the 26s and 28s who had been 
engaged in a bloody war since 1974. He was chosen to die a ritualistic death on arbitrary 
grounds because he was “decreed to be a vuil mpata, „a dirty nothing‟, and the spilling of his 
blood was to symbolize the cleansing of the prison” (The Number xii). This incident is 
important in illustrating the limits of the Benthamite-Foucauldian Panopticism and also in 
showing how power is not just imposed upon “the unhappy ones who are obligated to bow 
before it” as suggested by the Foucauldian panoptic mechanism (Foucault Live 187). Foucault 
argues that the Panopticon is a seeing machine designed like a dark room into which 
individuals spy, but it is also “a transparent building in which the exercise of power may be 
supervised by society as a whole” (Discipline 207). The Hollander incident related by 
Steinberg render these Foucauldian notions of power problematic in relation to the workings 
of South African prisons. 
Clearly then, the Foucauldian claim that the “panopticon mechanism arranges spatial unities 
that make it possible to see constantly and recognize immediately” (Discipline 200) is 
compromised by the Glas‟s reversal of the process, which renders the victim the victimizer, 
and by the Hollander incident.
69
 The Hollander case adds another dimension to our 
understanding of the Benthamite-Foucauldian panoptic establishment. Commenting on how 
the Hollander‟s murder and the subsequent trial of his murderers, Steinberg observes: 
Perhaps the story is apocryphal. But it is legendary; the old Number 
veterans talk of it with pride  – the day the coloured man in the gallery stood 
up and began shouting at a witness in prison language, the white prosecutor 
and judge staring at him in bewilderment, the meaning of their own trial 
suddenly unintelligible to them. (The Number ix) 
Foucault claims that the panopticon machine serves to dissociate the see/being seen dualism. 
The inmates who occupy the peripheric ring of the panopticon are completely visible without 
ever knowing who their watcher(s) is or whether they are being watched at all. The person 
who occupies the central tower is able to see everything without being seen. In other words, 
with the development of the panopticon mechanism power is exercised in a Godlike manner, 
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 Thomas Mathiesen criticises Foucault for failing to describe the development of what he calls the Synopticon 
model of power in modern societies. He says that the television has developed new ways in which many watch 
the few.  (Mathiesen, T. “The Viewer Society: Michel Foucault‟s “Panopticon” Revisited”, Theoretical 
Criminology, 1997, pp. 215-34).  Bauman adds that the few who are watched are the celebrities. Bauman also 
points out that while the Panopticon forced people into position where they could be watched, the Synopticon 
needs no coercion – it seduces people into watching (Bauman, Z. Globalization: The Human Consequences 
(1998: 52).    
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where one automatically knows that no matter how hidden one is, one is being watched. One 
then begins to police not only one‟s own actions and behaviour but one‟s very thoughts and 
intentions. The Hollander murder and trial contradicts this Foucauldian formulation. 
The Number gangs did not only refuse to be the self-bearers of the permanent surveillance 
power of the panopticon by carrying out an internecine war for five years, they also 
demonstrated that the occupier(s) of the central tower of the panopticon do not possess a 
permanent and all seeing eye. They went on successfully to plot how to solve their own 
problems without the authorities knowing or discovering what was afoot. But they did not end 
there: they even made the authorities complicit with their act without these authorities being 
fully aware of the role they were being forced to play in this ritualistic drama. In the quotation 
above, where the coloured man in the gallery started shouting at a witness, the reader catches 
a glimpse of the reversal of the panoptic mechanism. It is the Number gangs who are in the 
know and it is they who watch carefully to see that there is no deviation from their plan. Had 
the witness not slightly strayed from the guidelines given to him by his Number bosses, this 
incident that Steinberg relates would not have being recorded in the court archives and the 
power of the Number gangs which Steinberg‟s narrative tries to excavate would have 
remained inaccessible darkness. Even with this revelation it is doubtful that the state 
authorities became aware of how deeply involved they were in the enactment of some drama 
which they themselves were not authors. As Steinberg notes, the meaning of their own trial 
suddenly became unintelligible to the white judge and prosecutor. What this suggests is that 
the trial had never been in the control of the authorities in the first place. The Number gangs 
had been running the show behind the scenes right from the onset. 
The Hollander incident demonstrates how the Number prison gangs invert Bentham‟s two 
principles of power, that is, power should be visible and verifiable with the use of the 
panopticon. If the “parliament of the 26s, 27s and the 28s, South Africa‟s three national prison 
gangs, operative in every jail around the country” (The Number xi) had had constantly before 
its eyes the tall outline of the central tower from which they are unceasingly spied, they would 
not have been able to meet and decree that an informer be killed as a symbolic gesture for 
ending their brutal conflict. Had the power issuing from the imaginary tower of the 
panopticon been truly unverifiable to the Number gang inmates they would not have been 
able to stage such a cruel performance right under the nose of the prison authorities. In this 
instance, in an ironic reversal of roles the power of the Number gangs is rendered invisible 
and unverifiable to the authorities. 
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This invisibility and unverifiability of the power of the Number gangs is dramatised in the 
language that the coloured man from the gallery uses to angrily rebuke his straying protégé. 
Steinberg reports:  
Judge and prosecutor strained to understand what was being spoken. Some 
of the words spewing out from the court spectator‟s mouth were clearly 
Zulu, others derived from Afrikaans. Still others entirely unintelligible.
70
 He 
was emphatic and angry. The witness stood still in the box, staring at his 
hands, listening intently. The man set down and the witness tried to resume 
his testimony, until the judge interrupted him and asked what the hell had 
just happened. (The Number xi) 
The polyglot language developed by the Number prison gangs which only the initiated can 
understand renders the often unintelligible legal jargon absurd, and its elitism ridiculed, since 
now the judge and the prosecutor will need the Number gangs to interpret and explain to them 
what is happening in what they thought was their space. In this way, the South African prison 
gangs do not only possess and constitute the prison but they also haunt its regimes through 
these stage-managed court cases. 
Explaining the rationale behind the actions of the Number gangs, Steinberg says: “The prison 
gangs regarded the courts as their only public platform ... the witness stands of South African 
courts were their press galleries, the witnesses their spokespeople” (The Number xii). Through 
these insidious actions the Number gangs initiate a process where the prison starts to possess 
and reconstitutes the entire state. This haunting effect was also demonstrated by the story of 
Doggy Dog which I discussed above. Elsewhere, Steinberg observes: 
Despite the extraordinary continuity of myth, structure and meaning that has 
characterised prison gangs throughout the 20th century, the gangs are 
malleable: they are keenly responsive to changing historical forces in 
society at large and to the changing conditions of prison life itself. 
(Nongoloza‟s Children 2004: 3) 
The mutations that occur to the Number gangs that become evident in the 1990s show that 
they are responsive to change and this may be a useful pointer to how not only prison 
authorities but the entire society may prevent or minimise the chances of the development of 
such necrophilic social institutions. 
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 This language is similar to fanakalo the lingua franca in colonial and apartheid mines. (See Thembisa Waetjen, 
2004: 85).  
140 
 
Commenting on the power that gangs wield at Pollsmoor the Centre for Conflict Resolution 
observes: “Gangsterism is a potent feature of Pollsmoor Prison life … Due to the fact that 
warders are present in the sections for less than two-thirds of the day, the gangs are 
enormously powerful in the communal cells” (2009: 1). Number prison gangs also exercise 
enormous power over the warders themselves. Any warder who does not toe the line is 
stabbed with a short blade that is not meant to kill him, but rather to inspire fear and respect of 
the gangs. Talking about how a troublesome warder is disciplined, Magadien aptly captures 
the power that both warders and the Number gangs wield in prison. He says: 
It was like a game. The question is who‟s afraid of whom at the end of the 
day? We chose warders we needed to fear us, and we stabbed them. Sure, 
they fuck us up afterwards, but put yourself in the shoes of the individual 
warder, the one who has been stabbed. You go away for a while on sick 
leave, maybe a little longer on stress leave; but then you are back. When 
you walk in the yard, with all the prisoners around you, you are worried. 
When you walk alone down the corridor, or into a cell, your heart is beating 
fast. Maybe, in the front of your mind, you think these people stabbed you 
because they are animals. But at the back of your mind, you know why you 
were stabbed. You do not shout; you do not scream; you do not clip a 
prisoner on the back of the ear. You are afraid. (The Number 178)  
It is this ability to propagate strategic fear among both warder and fellow inmates that allow 
the Number gangs to exercise considerable power within the prison walls.
71
 Haysom points 
out that the power of the Number prison gangs is not just localised within one prison. The 
Number gangs are powerful because they are nation-wide and no prisoner or warder is beyond 
their reach. They even have “a communication system that relays information and orders 
between prisons” (Haysom 1981: 14). Although the Number gangs are trapped within the 
prison walls and often have no desire to escape, their power is not merely symbolic. They 
dispense both within and without the prison walls their brand of justice. As we saw in the case 
of Doggy Dog, with the demise of apartheid, the power of the Number gangs has been 
transformed and expanded reaching all the way beyond the South African national borders. 
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 In a poem titled “the night train” the South African poet Fhazel Johennesse depicts the apartheid state as a 
night train whose passages are paralysed by the fear of the pervasive terrorism of the state and that of those who 
claim to be fighting for freedom. In a similar way, most citizens of the post-apartheid state are so paralysed by 
the fear of crime that only a few dare-devils and the extremely desperate would take a night train. The more 
affluent exhibit this fear by flocking into super-secure housing estates.    
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Steinberg‟s narrative does not suggest an uncomplicated polarity of power relations within 
Pollsmoor prison: that of the prison authorities versus that of the Number gangs. The Number 
gangs‟ exercise of power is characterised by multiple layers. Significantly, each of the 
Number gangs, the 26s, the 27s and the 28s has its own complex rank structure. Among the 
Number gangs themselves there is a lot of rivalry, some of which dates back to the days of 
Nongoloza and Kilikijan, the two mythical fathers of the Number. As we have seen, 
Steinberg‟s narrative opens with an account of an internal power struggle between the 
Number gangs at Victor Verster prison which raged for five years until it was solved by the 
gruesome ritual murder of a prisoner who had nothing to do with the conflict and the 
subsequent hanging of those selected by the Number to stand in the dock by the state. 
Steinberg clearly indicates that this was a power contest. He calls this conflict a “war” and “a 
violent contest to rule the prisons” (The Number xii)72. 
It will be naïve, however, to think that the Number gangs are characterised and sustained by a 
single narrative of violence and wanton destruction of life. As I have pointed out, in the 
mythical Number narrative, Nongoloza is represented as an anti-colonial nationalist who 
begins his career as a robber because of the injustices of the exploitative and socially 
destructive capitalist culture ushered in by colonial administration. The Nongoloza-Kilikijan 
myth is clearly anti-Saidian (Said of the pre-1978 period) in that despite the glaring power 
disparities between Nongoloza and colonial authorities, it acknowledges the existence of 
counter narratives or discourses to the hegemonic colonial discourse. In a similar way, his 
progeny, the ubiquitous Number prison gangs, also weave a narrative which portrays them not 
as mere villains but as fighters for prison social justice. 
This can be seen in the instance where Steinberg tells of the occasion when the Minister of 
Correctional Services visited Pollsmoor prison in 2003. The minister spoke of rehabilitation, 
of employment, of growing vegetables for the impoverished children within prison grounds. 
But he also did not forget to moralise. Addressing the prisoners directly he said: “You are 
here because you have done terrible things to people on the outside. Don‟t do terrible things 
to people on the inside. Don‟t rape people here. The gangs are unacceptable and must go” 
(22). Then Steinberg makes a perceptive and disconcerting observation. He says: 
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This civil strife within the Number has its parallels in the acrimony that characterised relations between anti-
apartheid movements. In Long Walk to Freedom Mandela chronicles a long history of conflict which turned 
extremely bloody just before the democratic elections of 1994 between organizations that claimed to have a 
common enemy.  
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The prisoners listened in polite silence. They always listen. They always 
imbibe the words of authority and churn them around with their own words, 
making a strange mixture of the two; Number Generals talk of the 
imperatives of the reintegration, and their soldiers speak of growing 
vegetables for the children of the poor. (The Number 22) 
This suggests that Bhabha‟s observations about the ambivalence and hybridity of colonial 
discourse is also applicable to post-colonial/post-apartheid situations. What makes the 
Number gangs disturbingly uncanny is that they do not perpetually stand opposed to authority 
and officialdom; they absorb it and blend it until the distinction between the two becomes 
problematised. On one hand, they commit atrocious crimes against their fellow inmates and 
against each other. On the other hand, they view themselves as zealots; fearless soldiers 
against the evils of the state. Interestingly, Steinberg shows that the Number gangs are not the 
only contenders for power within the prison. The Firm, The Americans and The Big Five, 
although first emerging from the impoverished streets of the Cape Flats, have, since the early 
1990s, infiltrated the South African jails and added other rings around the imaginary tower of 
the prison panopticon. Discussing the way in which the prison regime has come to possess 
and constitute the state in America, Loïc Wacquant (1999), talks of “the fusion of ghetto and 
prison culture [and] the melting of street and carceral symbolism, with the resulting mix 
being re-exported to the ghetto and diffused throughout society via the commercial circuits 
catering to the teenage consumer market, professional sports, and even the mainstream 
media” (116; emphasis in the original). Steinberg‟s The Number recounts a similar process 
taking place in South Africa. 
Steinberg‟s account of Nongoloza‟s life is also illustrative of the permeability of the prison 
and the streets that we see taking place in post-apartheid South Africa. Steinberg notes some 
interesting facets of Nongoloza‟s life after his capture and becoming a prison inmate. At first 
Nongoloza is uncooperative and prefers to talk to the prison authorities through an interpreter. 
But when it dawns on him that his interpreter may be misrepresenting him to his captors he 
decides to cooperate, with the result that he renounces his past criminal way of life and ends 
up becoming a warder himself. But Nongoloza‟s intriguing multi-identities do not end there. 
Upon his retirement from the prison service he fails to live a straight life and finds himself on 
the margins of mainstream society and resorts to his old criminal self from time to time to 
supplement his income. This leads to a life-long confrontation with the law enforcing state 
agents. This suggests that Nongoloza becomes a prototype, a model of the now ubiquitous 
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Number prison and street gangs which all owe their existence and resilience to the 
Nongolozan narrative. 
The assimilation of the once feared robber into the repressive prison apparatus adds a 
disquieting layer to Nongoloza‟s already multi-layered personality and implies that 
oppositional forces are always on the brink of co-optation. Interestingly though, Steinberg‟s 
narrative shows that even the dominant authority, that which in Foucauldian terms we can call 
the panopticon central tower represented by the warders, is not a unified force poised against 
the dissenting power of the Number gangs. As much as Nongoloza and his progeny can be co-
opted into prison authority, this same authority suffers from punctures and dents inflicted on it 
by its daily contact with the corrosive social environment which gave birth to the Number 
gangs in the first place. 
Steinberg‟s narrative shows that what is called prison authority is a strange amalgam of 
parallel, counter-parallel and undefined webs of power forms that all give shape and character 
to the everyday operations of power in South African prisons. For example, the warder prison 
structure, especially that of the apartheid prison, was characterized by racialised power 
struggles which mimicked and sought to legitimize and reproduce power forms which 
characterised wider society. For example, prison warders were sharply divided along racial 
lines which ensured the supremacy of the white warders (The Number 322). After apartheid, 
when Freddie, a coloured man took over as Pollsmoor Area Commissioner in 1996, and tried 
to implement some reforms, there was an exodus of high-ranking white warders. Appearing 
before the Jali Commission of Inquiry into Prison Corruption in 2002 Engelbrecht, the then 
Pollsmoor Area Commissioner, said: “All in all (within a year), 40 senior staff cleared out: 23 
on medical pension, 14 severance packages, and the remaining three resigned within 48 
hours‟ notice” (The Number 322). In both the apartheid and post-apartheid prison, power 
becomes “something like the stratification, the institutionalization, the definition of tactics, of 
implements and arms which are useful” in all the specific everyday struggles that happen in 
the contestation of issues of identity (Foucault Live: Interviews, 1966- 1984: 187). 
Therefore, instead of the simple panopticon mechanism suggested by Foucault, the situation 
that obtains in the South African prisons of Steinberg‟s narrative may be better understood 
through Shil‟s metaphor of the composition of societal power relations. Shil argues that the 
power structure of any given society has neither a centre nor a periphery but comprises a 
succession of overlapping “onion leaves” (in Nikos Papastergias 1996: 182). But even Shil‟s 
schema falls short of fully accounting for all the complex power plays in South African jails. 
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As Steinberg shows, South African jails seem to have at least two centres; that of the prison 
authorities and that of the Number prison gangs; to which all the other power forms respond 
and revolve in varying subordinated positions. But these power centres themselves are not 
impermeable, since through a complex process of diffusion they confront and at times 
compliment each other. This description comes closer to Foucault‟s later understanding of 
power where he emphasized its plurality and pervasiveness rather than seeing it as the 
possession of one dominant group who use it against the less powerful ones. The Number 
prison gangs do not perceive themselves as helpless victims who are always at the receiving 
end of the prison authority. Rather, they rule the prisons and to a large extent influence the 
decisions that are made on how the prisons are run. 
However, as I noted earlier, in Discipline and Punish, Foucault‟s description of the 
panopticon in Discipline and Punish seems to imply hegemonic power on one hand, and on 
the other hand, its pervasive and almost a self-sustaining operation in the rest of the society. 
He argues: 
The Panopticon mechanism arranges spatial unities that make it possible to 
see constantly and to recognize immediately … Each individual, in his 
place, is securely confined to a cell from coming into contact with his 
companions. He is seen, but he does not see; he is the subject of 
information, never a subject in communication. The arrangement of his 
room, opposite the central tower, imposes on him an axial visibility; but the 
divisions of the ring, those separated cells, imply a lateral invisibility. (201) 
Steinberg‟s description of the Number gangs shows that they assert their subjectivity in ways 
that are denied by Foucault in the above words. The imaginary binoculars of the Glas are not 
only meant to observe fellow inmates, but they are also for breaking down the works of the 
official Panopticon. The binoculars of the Glas are for reversing the one-way visibility 
imposed by the official Panopticon and make the prison authorities themselves objects of 
unceasing surveillance of the Number gangs. Each warder walks the corridor knowing that he 
cannot escape the Glas‟s all seeing binoculars. Furthermore, the Glas‟s imaginary keys are for 
the annulment of segmented confinement. Instead of having individuals locked-up in 
separated cells rendering communication with fellow inmates impossible as the Benthamite 
Panopticon requires, the Glas opens it up and makes it one big communal cell. All this is aptly 
captured by Steinberg‟s discussion with warder Bosch who gives him his orientation tours 
around Pollsmoor prison. In Pollsmoor the prison kitchen becomes the imaginary tower of the 
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Number gangs‟ unofficial Panopticon. It is from the kitchen that the lines of communication 
are kept open and orders issued. From the different Number gangs the Glas appoints the right 
gang members to the kitchen and these become his eyes. Bosch understands this arrangement 
perfectly. He says: 
You can‟t keep the gangsters off the food teams … If you cut off the ability 
of gangs in your section to communicate with other sections, they get nasty. 
We have the safety of our members to think about. (8) 
One has here a situation where the Number gangs have developed a series of panopticon 
mechanisms of their own which run parallel to the official one(s). Steinberg seems to 
understand this apparently post-Foucauldian situation. Echoing but also interpreting warder 
Bosch‟s comments, he observes: 
Seems to me it‟s big game … Your job is to keep the prison closed, the 
sections separated from each other. Theirs is to keep the prison open. But if 
you won, if you really kept the prison closed, they would stab you. So you 
lose on purpose. (8) 
The warders do not lose on purpose though, but yield to what Foucault calls the diffuse 
institutional acts of power. However, whether they realise it or not, both the warders and the 
Number gangs are involved in a great performance of power which is a clear inversion of the 
panopticon mechanism. At least Magadien, the 28 gang member whose story The Number is 
largely about, realises that what happens between the prison authorities is some kind of tragic 
play, but a play nevertheless. After relating how he had to stab a warder before being 
recruited to be a 28, and how he allowed himself to be beaten almost senseless by the warders 
without retaliating, he says that “[i]t was a bit like a game” (178). Referring to how both the 
warder and the Number gangs had come to an unspoken consensus of inflicting non-fatal 
bodily injuries on each other, Steinberg also suggests that the relationship has become some 
kind of performance. He writes: 
What struck me … was not so much the brutality of the relationship 
between warders and inmates, as the delicate filigree of the unwritten rules 
and corresponding tactics … the violence was ritualized, formulaic. (178-9) 
Both Magadien‟s and Steinberg‟s words suggest that when it comes to the relationship 
between warders and Number gangs the panoptic surveillance becomes bi-cameral. There is a 
mutual but unspoken acknowledgement of each side‟s power. Magadien says the warders 
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“sensed the atmosphere; they knew that, for their own safety, they are places they must not 
go” (179). Entering into dialogue with Magadien‟s boastful logic, Steinberg also observes: 
“Inmates, too, knew that there was a threshold they must not cross” (179). Unlike in 
Foucault‟s panoptic mechanism, where inmates have completely lost all agency to the ever-
visible power symbolised by the central tower, the Number gangs of Steinberg‟s narrative 
have some agency, even if it may be considered circumscribed agency. The Number gangs do 
not expect the prison authorities to completely give up their power, for that would not only be 
detrimental to prison authorities and state power in general; it would render the operations of 
Number gangs impossible, since they thrive in prison and in the stalemate situation that 
obtains between themselves and the prison authorities. The highly ritualised system of the 
Number reveals a deep seated desire for a stable and predictable existence. In prison, they 
have created a community that ensures not only their survival but their power as well. 
5. Concluding Remarks 
Our examination of The Number has confirmed Bhabha‟s argument that “[t]erms of cultural 
engagement, whether antagonistic or affiliative, are produced performatively” (1994: 3). The 
Number gangs‟ interaction with the warders suggests that the Foucauldian panoptic power 
relations do not operate in most South African jails, if Steinberg‟s study (of mainly Pollsmoor 
prison) can be considered as fairly representative. That the relationship between the warders 
and Number gangs is made possible by an unspoken delicate performance or theatricalisation 
of power is seen in two incidents that Steinberg relates. The first one has to do with the 
situation that obtains when hardened Number gangs are transferred from Pollsmoor prison to 
Robben Island. Steinberg writes that Robben Island “was a place where prison life as inmate 
knew it was suspended” (201). This description of Robben Island strangely resembles what 
Georgio Agamben (1998) says obtained in the Nazi concentration camps. He argues: “[T]he 
camps constitute a space of exception in … which not only is law completely suspended but 
fact and law are completely confused – everything in the camps is completely possible …”. 
(170). Interestingly, Magadien describes Robben Island in terms that closely resemble 
Agamben‟s camp. He says: “At Robben Island there was one phrase: „Everything dies at sea.‟ 
Nothing that happens reaches Cape Town. You know that if you stab a white warder at that 
place you die …” (202). The juridical protection that enables the Number gangs to function in 
the mainland prisons such as Pollsmoor is inexplicably suspended at the island prison of 
Robben Island. This account illustrates that the relations between warders and Number gang 
inmates are not regulated by an unceasing panoptic surveillance but by a subtle and ritualized 
understanding which is regulated by certain well-known but unofficial chronotopes. These 
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roles have been learnt performatively in an antagonistic cultural engagement between warders 
and the Number gangs, if I may use Bhabha‟s terminology. 
I have also argued that the self, the nation and national institutions are narratives in the sense 
that there is no reality that is not mediated through a narrative. The legendary status of 
Robben Island again enables us to see that geographical spaces are themselves read and 
experienced through stories that are told about them. For example, the legendary status that 
suddenly suspends the normal warder-inmate behaviour on Robben Island is not only a result 
of the island‟s unique geographical position which indeed sets it apart. It is, more than 
anything else, the narratives that have been constructed first by the coloniser, and then 
appropriated by the colonised, that has shaped people‟s perceptions of Robben Island. To 
once again use Said‟s words, we can say Robben Island itself is a narrative. When warders 
suspend all penal conduct that regulates the interaction of warder and prisoners by giving 
hardened Number gangsters knives with which to hunt abalone and crayfish, this is a 
dramatisation of the power of narratives. As Steinberg observes, Robben Island becomes an 
experiment which shows a complex interface of the narratives that are told about geographical 
space and the way it affects people‟s real physical interaction. 
Within the paradigm of the power of narratives, I tried to understand the claims of the 
Number that there was a holocaust in South African apartheid prisons which their activities 
intended to counter. While there is nothing in the recent South African prison history that may 
compare with the Nazis holocaust, it cannot be denied that something insidious, a compelling 
haunting spirit pervaded colonial and apartheid prisons, leading to the emergence and 
resilience of such an uncanny social phenomenon as the Number prison gangs. The 
understanding of the construction of the narrative of the self and that of the nation makes us 
see that rather than concerning ourselves with a factual comparison of the numbers that were 
killed in colonial and apartheid South African jails, and those executed in Nazi camps, the 
issue for a literary critic is to try and understand what it is about South African prisons which 
leads to some of its inmates, to believe or perceive themselves to have entered a camp, that 
“place in which the most absolute conditio inhumana that ever existed on earth was realized” 
(Agamben 166).  Agamben‟s ideas are illuminating in this regard. He argues: 
Who ever entered the camp moved in a zone of indistinction between 
outside and inside, exception and rule, licit and illicit, in which the very 
concepts of subjective right and judirical protection no longer made sense. 
(170) 
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As we have seen, to the Number gangs, all South African prisons are camps in the Agamben 
sense. To both warders and Number gang prisoners, Robben Island was also a place where 
individuals occupied the very peripheric position so that the application of subjective right 
and juridical protection became an illusorily abstract concept. What makes the study of South 
African prisons pertinent, however, is that it is related to Agamben‟s argument that the camp, 
envisioned as a state of exception, is not a historical fact and an anomaly belonging to the 
past, but in some way it is instead the hidden matrix and nomos of the political space in which 
we are living (1998: 166). This reasoning is significantly similar to Bhabha‟s exhortation: 
As literary creatures and political animals we ought to concern ourselves 
with the understanding of human action and social world as a moment when 
something is beyond control, but is not beyond accommodation. (1994:18) 
 Said also claims that his exilic situation makes him feel that he is always simultaneously 
inside and outside things and for him this becomes a rich site of literary theorisation. The 
South African prisons, be they colonial, apartheid or post-apartheid, and issues of criminality, 
especially with regards to the existence of the Number prison gangs, can be viewed as 
phenomena that emerge and exist beyond control and are both inside and outside things, and 
as a result become rich sites of signification. My study of the prison and the Number gang 
culture, since they are often viewed as things beyond but still within our social environment, 
is a humble contribution to this exhortation of Bhabha and Said to focus our literary attention 
to the apparently peripheric social institutions. 
In South Africa a veritable genre of prison literature has emerged largely due to the writings 
of the victims of apartheid political imprisonment. Since the demise of apartheid political 
prison narratives have dried up. What has been coming out as prison literature are 
collaborative biographies such as The Number and A Human Being Died that Night, or short 
semi-autobiographical narratives collected in anthologies such as the ones I examine in 
Chapter Six. Post-colonial Kenya, unlike post-apartheid South Africa, has seen a proliferation 
of a recognisable genre of popular crime and prison narratives. Using mainly theories of 
popular culture and autobiography, in the next chapter I turn my attention to a small selection 
of this Kenyan literary phenomenon. 
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Chapter 5: Kenyan Popular Narratives of Crime and Imprisonment  
“„Prison is just like prison … I mean how can one describe a prison except maybe a whole 
chain of woes and lamentations‟” (Protagonist in Charles Githae‟s novel Comrade Inmate) 
Introduction 
In the above caption, Githae alludes to the difficulty encountered by both narrative and 
academic critics of writing about prison without falling into the cliché of discussing the 
appalling conditions and the abuse of human rights that characterize prison in most post-
colonial African states. While these larger issues of social justice cannot and should not be 
neglected, they usually lead to “instrumentalist and functionalist accounts” (Mbembe and 
Nuttall 2004: 358) of the prison which normally place less emphasis on various other facets of 
prison life and prison experience. This chapter departs from such renditions. It does so by 
reading the postcolonial Kenyan prison depicted in a number of popular crime and prison 
auto/biographical narratives written between 1984 and 2004 through theories of popular 
culture and those of auto/biography. The twin use of these theories is possible because both 
cultural and auto/biographical theorists describe popular culture and autobiography, 
respectively, as sites or arenas of struggle.
73
. The popular and autobiographical are sites were 
power is seized but also relinquished in analogous ways. 
The main texts that I examine to develop my argument are John Kiriamiti‟s My Life in Crime 
(1984) and My Life in Prison (2004), John Kiggia Kimani‟s Life and Times of a Bank Robber 
(1988) and Prison is not a Holiday Camp (1994), Benjamin Garth Bundeh‟s Birds of Kamiti 
(1991), and Charles Githae‟s, Comrade Inmate (1994). I argue that attempts by these writers 
to politicise their predicament is unconvincing. This suggests that the true site of „the 
political‟ might in fact be located in experiences and moments that seem personal, as when 
these authors are engaging with notions of personal confession and contrition. To state it 
differently, in these texts, we encounter the hegemonic power of the prison and its 
individualisation processes in its closest literary form, the confessional life writing. The more 
satiric texts suggest that the boundary between prison and society is completely arbitrary – the 
prisoners were just the unlucky citizens who got caught. This poses a major challenge to the 
whole confessional project and re-politicises personal experience. 
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 On popular culture see Karin Barber (1987, 1997), Stuart Hall (2005a, 2005b), John Storey (2003a, 2003b) 
and John Fiske (1989a, 1989b). Philippe Lejeune writes that “autobiography is not an act of analysis but a lived 
activity of synthesis” (1971: 104). For more on autobiography both as a concept and body of texts see Mary 
Jacobus (1984), Robert M. Young (1988), Barbara Johnson (1989), and Laura Marcus (1994). 
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1. Prison-City and Prison-warder Matrix and Popular Culture 
This section focuses primarily on John Kiriamiti‟s My Life in Crime (1984) and My Life in 
Prison (2004). Out of the five books by Kiriamiti, these two texts are the foremost crime and 
prison Kenyan popular narratives, respectively
74
. For this reason, and for the reason that they 
openly claim to be auto/biographical, my study of Kiriamiti focuses on these two narratives in 
particular. My Life in Crime can be said to be an exemplary prison narrative because it is not 
only about Kiriamiti‟s life of crime, but was written and published while he was serving a 
twenty year sentence in Naivasha Maximum Prison. In My Life in Prison Kiriamiti tells the 
reader how his first book was written and how its publication while he was still in prison 
resulted in his sentence to one hundred days in solitary confinement. He writes: “I 
experienced days of loneliness, hunger, bitterness and cold, sleepless nights … [in] solitary 
confinement, a prison within prison” (2004: 197). Ironically though, My Life in Crime is not 
about prison. It is specifically about Kiriamiti‟s precipitous journey to prison. Kiriamiti was 
aware of this omission of the prison, and as a result he promised the reader that some day he 
may be able to tell the prison story. After finishing the manuscript of My Life in Crime 
Kiriamiti tells the reader that he gave it to G.G, one of his partners in crime who was also 
serving a long term at Naivasha Prison. The dialogue that ensues after G.G has read the script 
is important in its anticipation of My Life in Prison, a book that Kiriamiti was to publish 
twenty years later. The exchange goes like this: 
„I did not know you could write that much. You really hit it while it is hot. 
But there is one thing I am not satisfied with‟. So I asked him, „And what is 
that old timer?‟ He said, „You haven‟t written about prison. You should at 
least write something concerning Naivasha Prison. We have come across a 
hell of incredible things. Think of it brother and write something about it. 
We still have plenty of time ahead.‟ At last I said, „Prisons? For God‟s sake 
don‟t remind me about prison, and the things man do to others! Let us leave 
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 Kiriamiti has also written My Life with a Criminal: Milly‟s Story (1989), Son of Fate (1994) and The Sinister 
Trophy (1999). Although My Life with a Criminal is Kiriamiti‟s autobiographical account of his life of crime 
told from the perspective of his girlfriend Milly, it is really a study of the negative effect of the criminal‟s 
activities to those dear to him. The other two are crime fictions that exploit the fame that Kiriamiti had attained 
through My Life in Crime and My Life with a Criminal (See Preface, Son of Fate). 
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it at that.‟ And for sure, we left it at that. But maybe … Tomorrow … 
tomorrow … you never know! (My Life in Crime 216; my emphasis). 
As G.G correctly observes, in My Life in Crime Kiriamiti fails to write about prison. In the 
above quotation Kiriamiti himself alludes to the fact that it may be the trauma of prison that 
prevents him from doing so. Besides trauma, it could be that his memory, an indispensable 
tool in auto/biographical narratives, has not yet managed to process the prison to position 
Kiriamiti as a likeable hero of the prison narrative. Jennifer Musangi (2008) observes that “in 
all his works Kiriamiti manages to make his fictionalized self so likeable that instead of being 
the villain that crime has turned him into, he becomes the reader‟s hero” (3). The long 
quotation above from My Life in Crime does not only bear out Musangi‟s observation, but 
also explains the reason why Kiriamiti could not write about his prison experience while still 
inside. Contrary to G. G‟s comment that Kiriamiti had hit it while still hot, the fact is that 
Kiriamiti manages to write about his life of crime more than ten years into his prison sentence 
and only writes about prison almost twenty years later.
75
 In My Life in Crime Kiriamiti is 
intent on eliciting the readers‟ sympathy. Instead of representing himself as the villainous 
criminal that he was, he depicts himself as a disempowered victim of the Nairobi environment 
in which he found himself. It is through Kiriamiti‟s positioning of himself as a powerless 
victim of the pervasively powerful forces of the Nairobi underworld that he is able to appeal 
to the popular. He writes about his life in crime because fourteen years later, through memory 
re/construction and the distance acquired through the passage of time, he is able to insert 
himself as the hero of the narrative. He is able to narrate his life of crime because he has not 
only survived it, but has also presumably escaped it. In the preface of the book, he appeals to 
the reader not to view him as a criminal: “As concerns my part in it (book), be good and 
forget it, I am a reformed person” (Foreword).  
Compared with My Life in Crime, My Life in Prison, is not only a superlative example of 
prison narrative because part of it was written while Kiriamiti was still “inside”, but more 
importantly because from chapter one up to the last chapter it unflinchingly focuses on prison 
life with Kiriamiti as the likeable hero-survivor-narrator. In this narrative, Kiriamiti captures 
the kind of power equilibrium that is required in the daily interaction between all the prison 
inmates and the unspeakable brutality which occurs when this stability is upset. He shows that 
prison is a place “where everything went opposite” (2004: 110). He writes: “Speak the truth 
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 There is an interesting parallel here with Herman Charles Bosman, one of the few early South African 
proponents of a more “popular” prison literature, who also waited two decades before he managed to record his 
prison experience. 
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or search for it in prison and you might very easily end up in solitary confinement. The rule in 
prison, if you want peace learn to say yes when you know the answer is no” (2004: 99). 
Similarly, Bundeh calls the prison a “jungle” and “a world … of the tragic twist of fate” (7). 
With a slight touch of humour, Kiriamiti further observes: “If you want to get the best picture 
of prison, you have to take everything the opposite way. Doors are locked from outside when 
you go to sleep, instead of from the inside; cigarettes buy money, instead of money buying 
cigarettes” (2004: 110). When he turns to the city Kiriamiti shows that despite its enticing 
vibrancy it is also the inverse of the rural village‟s stability and predictability. This rendition 
of the prison, the city and the village helps to magnify the relativity of all cultural practices, 
especially those that have become a permanent feature of the prison and city that people have 
come to take for granted and assume are cast in stone. 
Kiriamiti‟s narratives suggest that the elusive embeddedness of the auto/biographical subject 
in the city parallels that of the love-hate relationship characteristics of warders and prisoners. 
The very opening page of My Life in Prison reveals disturbing ambivalent entanglements 
between prison authority as it is represented by the warders on one hand, and, on the other, 
that of the criminals over whom they have oversight. Kiriamiti declares: 
I would rather be employed as a grave digger than look for a job as a 
warder. I‟ve never met a warder who is proud of his work in all the years I 
have been with them. Every time I hear them talk of retiring soon. But when 
the time comes, each one starts praying for an additional two or three years 
of service, for one reason or another. I suppose their job is as addictive as 
crime is to some criminals. (Kiriamiti 2004: 1) 
Above, Kiriamiti does not only deride the profession of prison warders but he also captures 
the logic that regulates the warder-prisoner relationship that he chronicles in his narrative. It is 
an ambivalent mutual love-hate relationship characterized by a strange desire to both preserve 
and annihilate the other camp. The warders despise the prisoners for being the scum of the 
earth and the prisoners in turn despise the warders for being social outcasts who have 
somehow become their brutal captors. Prison warders seem to be instinctively aware of the 
lowly social status of their job, and their brutality over prisoners is presented as an attempt to 
assert their power and compensate for their inferiority complex.
76
 Kiriamiti realises that as 
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 In Cold Stone Jug, Bosman suggests the violent relations that characterise the warder-convict relationship are 
similar to those of master-slave relationship captured in Paul Gilroy‟s work. Gilroy argues: “The extreme 
patterns of communication defined by the institution of plantation slavery dictate that we recognize the anti-
discursive and extralinguistic ramifications of power at work in shaping communicative acts. There may, after 
all, be no reciprocity on the plantation outside the possibilities of rebellion and suicide, flight and silent 
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much as crime is addictive, so is being a prison warder. He similarly depicts many city 
cultural practices that urban dwellers have naturalised as irresistible and addictive. The prison 
warder‟s addiction to work beyond the retirement period derives mainly from his or her poor 
remuneration which leaves him or her with little hope of enjoying a financially secure 
retirement.
77
 Similarly, Kiriamiti depicts criminals as addicted to their social deviance. Few 
criminals that Kiriamiti depicts in My Life in Crime have the ability to avoid the illegal 
pleasures that the city dangles in front of them. Using a trope of didactic confessional 
literature, Kiriamiti depicts the city as a place of evil and degradation where innocent young 
men from the countryside are led astray and completely fail to defer happiness and save some 
of their criminal loot for old age. For example, after spending the money in the city on 
women, alcohol and designer suits, Kiriamiti claims that he would be left with only one 
option: going for a last score. This would go on and on, like a warder who hates guarding the 
prisoners but goes on working and having human interaction with them anyway. 
Kiriamiti refuses to present a simplistic view of either his city life, prison life or the warder-
prisoner relationship. He adopts a philosophical stance towards prison and prisoners, 
claiming: “Prison and Prisoners. To tell you the truth, I don‟t know which is worse. In my 
opinion they are equally bad” (2004: 114). Unlike the Number prison gangs depicted in 
Steinberg‟s The Number who view themselves as forces of social justice ranged against the 
evils and excesses of warders, and the Manichean world of Mandela‟s political prisoners 
versus warders and common law prisoners in Long Walk to Freedom, Kiriamiti does not hold 
such illusory conceptions about the warder-prison relationship. Further down the page, with 
tongue in cheek, he declares: “I do not like prisoners in general” (2004: 114). As I have noted, 
Kiriamiti writes and publishes My Life in Crime, which is largely anecdotes about his criminal 
city exploits, while a prisoner at Naivasha Maximum Security Prison. This could not have 
been possible without the co-operation and help of some warders and to a certain extent 
fellow prisoners. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
mourning, and there is certainly no grammatical unity of speech to mediate communicative reason.” (1993: 57). 
Later in this discussion, we will see that Kiriamiti, like Bosman, suggests that as a result of lack of this 
grammatical unity referred to by Gilroy, prisoners have no space for linguistic expression of their feelings 
towards warders except through suicidal violence. In turn, warders respond to the threat to their position as sole 
custodians and possessors of instruments of violence within the prison space with murderous violence.  
 
77
 Breyten Breytenbach also describes the destitute condition and the imprisoned mentality of white prison 
warders during the apartheid regime. He writes: “Their whole life is that of prison. They adopt the stance and 
accents of their charges ... When they leave on holiday it is to a bungalow in another prison compound”. He goes 
on to relate a story of baboons which bolted when someone threatened to recruit them to be prison warders. 
(True Confessions of an Albino Terrorist 1984: 223-225)  
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In both his autobiographies, Kiriamiti suggests that there is moral agency which resides 
within every city dweller and prison inmate (both warders and prisoners), and this is what 
compels him to narrate his experiences. Robert Young (1988) suggests that this agency is a 
product of or is enabled by the auto/biographical process itself. He talks of auto/biography as 
celebrating “the validity of the subject‟s subjectivity” (108). In Kiriamiti‟s case, this 
celebration of the subject‟s subjectivity begins before the accused has even been sentenced 
while he or she is still in remand prison. Kiriamiti says that prison remandees would hold 
mock court sessions in their cells “intended to teach amateur criminals the court procedures 
and the kind of tactics to use in one‟s defence” (2004: 3). This is very similar to Jonny 
Steinberg‟s account in biographical account The Number (2004), where he shows that the 
Number prison gangs have an elaborate penal regime of their own which partly mimics and 
partly subverts that of their captors. While the Number gangs use their mimicry to garner 
oppressive personal power, in the case of Kiriamiti it is meant to empower prisoners by 
demystifying the court procedures. Kiriamiti writes: 
Some of these jailbirds, having been in various courts – some more than 
thirty in their lives – would adopt the roles of judge, prosecutor, defence 
lawyer, and witness. One then saw how the whole thing worked, and a 
criminal would be advised to tell his true story so that those more 
experienced in courtroom defence could give him valuable tips on how to 
defend himself. It was surprising how these experienced jailbirds could 
catch a person telling a lie. They seemed to be experts in law. After this kind 
of drama, the “judge” would pass a mock sentence to give the inexperienced 
ones a taste of what to expect. (Kiriamiti 2004: 3) 
Clearly this is empowering mimicry. The remand prison is turned into a space for both the 
consumption and production of meanings of the penal regime. What the remand prisoners are 
doing when they play-act their forthcoming court appearance is similar to what Michel de 
Certeau (1984) calls the practices of space which “correspond to manipulations of the basic 
elements of constructed order” (455). De Certeau‟s further comment about how walking in 
the city manipulates the panoptic spatial organizations also seems applicable to this 
mimicking of the workings of the justice system. De Certeau writes: “[Walking] is neither 
foreign to them [the city‟s panoptic spatial organization] (it can take place only within them) 
nor in conformity with them (it does not receive its identity from them). It creates shadows 
and ambiguities within them” (de Certeau 456). What Kiriamiti calls “drama” or mock court 
session in the quotation above is also not foreign to the penal panoptic regimes since it can 
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only take place within them. But it is clearly subversive and does not conform to them, since 
its intention is to empower the accused and ensure a favourable court decision. What is 
interesting here is that a prison is a place that proscribes the walking that De Certeau 
describes; it renders the subject immobile. The fact that a similar subversion is nonetheless 
available to prisoners, by their very nature arrested in one place, suggests that they have found 
another way of traversing the space, perhaps one that is ultimately more symbolic in nature 
than in De Certeau‟s account.78 
Kiriamiti‟s My Life in Prison shows that there are many ways in which human objectification 
is contested in prison. His argument that in “prison there [is] very little difference between 
fact and fantasy” (2004:71) seems to suggest that this lack of difference facilitates the 
undermining of authority. He writes: 
[P]risoners like to live in a world of fantasy. Just to escape from 
wretchedness they would indulge in a lot of wishful thinking, telling each 
other the most beautiful, colourful lies, and nobody seemed to mind when 
they found out the dark truth. Beautiful lies are very welcome. (2004: 61) 
These stories, which most prisoners know are not true, but still tell and listen to anyway, 
exemplify what the cultural theorist John Fiske calls “the desire of the subordinate to exert 
control over the meanings of their lives, a control that is typically denied them in their 
material social conditions” (1989: 10). Fiske goes on to argue that activities like these enlarge 
the space of action for the subordinate and effect shifts, however minute, in social relations. 
He argues that these are tactics of the subordinate in “making do” within and against the 
system, rather than opposing it directly (1989: 11). 
Kiriamiti suggests that prisoners deliberately live in fantasy-land because the prison is 
characterized by “a terrible lust for news which [is] never satiated” (2004: 131). A news 
blackout is one way the prison tries to exercise domination over the inmates. To try and wrest 
a measure of control, prisoners disseminate news that claims to be emanating from reliable 
outside sources. The truth of course is that this news is manufactured right within the prison 
walls. As a result, the prison becomes a self-enclosed world of echoes where the only new 
voices that one hears are the rebounding or recycled voices of the prisoners themselves and 
that of their warders. The sarcastic question that one warder asks Kiriamiti about the 
prisoners‟ culture equally applies to the warders‟ culture. He says: “Is there anything else you 
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 What Kiriamiti describes is comparable to the subversive activities of the Glas of the South African Number 
gangs which I discussed in Chapter Four.  
156 
 
people think of except what you have in prison” (2004: 155). Kiriamiti underscores the idea 
that the prison is a cultural cul-de-sac when it comes to news when he notes: 
Our news agency had something for everyone, so we liked it. Word 
travelled from prisoners to warders and then back again. Or maybe it went 
from warders to prisoners and back; it was especially good to listen to news 
from a warder who you believed must have listened to a radio. It was hard 
to realise that whatever news the warder had given you, he had heard first 
from prisoner (2004: 130). 
What is ironic is that as a result of their poor remunerations the prison warders who “did not 
even own radios, and did not even have an idea of how much Taifa Leo (a cheap Swahili daily 
newspaper) cost” (2004: 130), suffer from the same news blackout as the prisoners they 
guard. In light of the above, the prison news becomes a space of popular culture, in the sense 
described by Stuart Hall (2005) for all those who find themselves in it. Hall writes: “It 
(popular culture) is an arena that is profoundly mythic. It is a theatre of desires, a theatre of 
popular fantasies. It is where we discover and play with the identification of ourselves, where 
we are imagined, where we are represented, not only to the audiences out there who do not get 
the message but to ourselves for the first time” (Hall 289). Like the auto/biographical where 
the “subject‟s subjectivity” is celebrated, the fictitious or imaginary prison news as described 
by Kiriamiti functions as a space for the expression of desires and fantasies. It is a space 
where both prisoners and warders construct their identities, (re)imagine and represent 
themselves. It is a space of hope and potential where these mutual prison enemies interact 
almost at the same level, although not quite. 
Although all those involved with the penal regime, including prisoners, have some measure of 
agency, Kiriamiti‟s narratives show that this should not lead us into thinking that it is 
exercised in egalitarian terms. As much as there is a rank structure that ensures that prison 
warders wield unequal power, warders versus prisoners and prisoners versus prisoners also 
occupy different social positions within the prison world. In the South African prison, 
Steinberg shows that the Number gangs occupy important positions of power especially after 
lock up and during weekends. Significantly, Steinberg also indicates that like their captors, 
the Number prison gangs are themselves hierarchically ordered. Kiriamiti also mentions the 
existence of gangs such as the Black Power and the Congo by Force in the Kenyan prison. 
However, these Kenyan gangs do not wield as much power as the South African prison 
Number gangs. For Kiriamiti, whose prison I have argued mirrors the city, the most 
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dangerous people (from the perspective of criminals) are police informers and prostitutes 
because of their ability to move in and out of multiple worlds. Their activities blur the 
boundary between the lawful and the unlawful, the morally upright and the morally 
degenerate. They become the very epicentre of popular culture which Juan Flores (2005: 75) 
claims transverses and transgresses boundaries. For example, both informers and prostitutes 
entertain criminals and law enforcing agents depending simply on who promises to pay better 
(My Life in Crime 59-60). 
Kiriamiti and the other writers mentioned in this chapter show that commodities such as 
cigarettes, rations of ugali and pieces of meat are also important ways in which prison 
subjectivities are constructed and contested. The availability of cigarettes in prison, despite 
the fact that “cigarette smoking is treason” (Bundeh 6), is an example of how the dichotomy 
between warders versus prisoners, or those with power against those without it, is a relative 
concept. Kiriamiti‟s narrative shows that although generally speaking the warders would 
always have more power than prisoners, the practice of everyday prison life is characterised 
by diffuse hierarchical power relations. For example, Kiriamiti is able to establish a constant 
supply of cigarettes through a wader from his section. This allows him to exercise a measure 
of control over the said warder, but more importantly it makes him one of the “prison 
tycoons” (2004: 64). He explains what this means: “I could afford any amount of food I 
needed” (2004: 65). Kiriamiti also indicates that through gambling and betting those with luck 
could become extremely rich by prison standards. He says that these prisoners “would then be 
said to own wholesale shops and they were known as the new prison tycoons” (2004: 125). 
Having cigarettes and other commodities considered valuable in prison also enables the 
individual to obtain sexual favours from “pansies” or beautiful boys. The prison, which 
appears to be only a space of unremitting misery to the uninitiated, when examined closely, 
turns out to be an expansive universe of possibilities and opportunities to the enterprising 
prisoners and warders, much as the city is to many people. 
Kiriamiti‟s narratives suggest that in prison the quest for cigarettes mirror the consumerist 
impulse of Nairobi. Mica Nava (1987) argues that among other things, consumerism is “about 
dreams and consolation, communication and confrontation, image and identity … [and that it] 
is a discourse through which disciplinary power is both exercised and contested” (209). For 
prisoners, cigarettes represent what Werner Graebner (1992) calls “creativity even in the face 
of adverse conditions” (4). Marie Gillespie (1995) also argues that in capitalist societies there 
is what she calls “re-creative consumption” (3). Cigarettes seem to operate within the realm of 
prison popular culture and symbolise what Nachbar and Lause refer to as “a quest for 
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meaning [and] not merely entertainment” (1992: 6).79 Prisoners are ready to face solitary 
punishment and even die for cigarettes. Kiriamiti reports: “In 1975, one unfortunate prisoner 
was beaten to death because he was found in possession of a small piece of Rooster cigarette” 
(2004: 122). Indeed, Kiriamiti shows that smoking is an important activity in prison not only 
because it relieves the boredom of prison life, but because of its empowering effect. He 
writes: “Without a cigarette one felt miserable and empty and there was little joy. With a 
cigarette hidden somewhere, you had something to look forward to after the long monotonous 
hours of the prison regime” (2004: 64). 
In the same way, Kiriamiti indicates that gambling and betting thrive in prison not only for 
their immediate material benefits but for their empowering effect. He says that “the game 
made life pass more easily since the hope of one day winning a piece of meat made life just a 
little sweeter within the prison walls” (2004: 125). If one may appropriate Karl Marx‟s words 
one can say “[t]his fetishism of commodities (such as cigarettes and pieces of meat) has its 
origin … in the peculiar social character of the [prison] labour that produces them” (2005: 
90). Although these products are not necessarily produced in prison, the difficult and 
sometimes painful way in which they are procured and consumed under prison restrictions, 
give them and those who possess them an aura that they would not have under different 
conditions. As a result of these commodities, peculiar class formations start developing in 
prison which may not always be perceptible to a passing observer. 
Another example through which Kiriamiti in particular attempts to exercise agency is that 
immediately after being “sent to prison for twenty years with hard labour and 48 strokes of 
the cane” (Kiriamiti 2004: 4), he decides to resist this fate by murdering two warders. This, he 
imagines, will lead to his own death at the hand of the warders, and will allow him to avoid 
his stiff penalty. He fails in his mission but is beaten unconscious. Four days later, he 
awakens to find himself completely naked in a solitary confinement cell drenched with water. 
When this suicidal route fails, he embarks on a mission to break from prison. But to do this is 
almost impossible in a maximum prison like Naivasha. He then gets advice from a fellow 
prisoner friend named G.G, who says: 
Forget suicide – act mad and be free. But, my dear friend, you will have to 
sweat it out. You will undergo so many tests of insanity that sometimes you 
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 In Bosman‟s Cold Stone Jug, it is dagga that is synonymous with prison life. Bosman claims that dagga 
rookers or smokers were the only prisoners who produced original and haunting soulful songs which captivated 
his emotions (88).  
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will wish you had never started … You will really have to prove you are 
mad. (Kiriamiti 2004: 15) 
G.G‟s words lead us back to de Certeau‟s zone of “shadows and ambiguities”. G.G implies 
that if Kiriamiti is to succeed in being sent to Mathare hospital of the mentally insane where 
there is a chance of breaking from prison, he has to push his mock-madness to a level where 
he enters a zone where neither he nor the prison authorities know the truth about his mental 
state. But what is ironic is that the narrative also casts doubts on the very sanity of G.G, 
Kiriamiti‟s counsellor. G.G says that in order for Kiriamiti to be certified mad, he has to 
empty “the chamber pot into the prisoners‟ porridge, and then drink it”. Upon hearing this, 
Kiriamiti says: “I couldn‟t help laughing weakly. Was G.G already mad?” (2004: 16). There 
is a similar incident in Bosman‟s Cold Stone Jug (1999: 182) where one prisoner called 
Parkins manages to spend five years in the comfort of the prison hospital because he has 
succeeded in keeping the prison medical authorities unsure of his state of mind. He advises 
Bosman on how to go about feigning madness. But when Bosman is almost convinced that 
the prisoner is a brilliant actor, Parkins says something that convinces Bosman that Parkins, 
and probably Bosman himself, may in fact be authentically insane and not play-acting at all.  
The case of Kiriamiti, Bosman and Parkins raises questions which demand further exploration 
about the extent to which the subject‟s agented subjectivity can be celebrated if the individual 
always runs the risk of losing control of it. Parkins thinks that he is successfully exercising his 
agency by pretending to be mad. Parkins has this advice for Bosman: “Act up as if you‟re 
screwy. But not too much, mind. Just enough to get the old horse doctor really interested in 
you. If you overdo it, before you knows where you are you are certified for the Criminal 
Lunatic” (182). Ironically, Kiriamiti‟s mission is to overdo it so that he is certified for the 
Criminal Lunatic in Mathare. But the challenge does not end there. Once certified mad, he has 
to keep his record of madness clean in order for him to continue staying in the Lunatic. As 
Kiriamiti himself writes: “To keep it clean in order to be recommended to stay, you have to 
play dirty, talk dirty, sing dirty songs, play dirty games, do the craziest things. I had to 
remember to stay mad” (Kiriamiti 2004: 33). Kiriamiti‟s narrative suggests that this alone is 
enough to drive one mad. 
While Parkins seems confident that it is possible for the individual to maintain the balance 
between sanity and insanity, Bosman‟s and Kiriamiti‟s examples show that this is not an easy 
task. Both these cases illustrate that in prison, the battle is not only to play insane 
convincingly but also to avoid going insane altogether. While Kiriamiti and Bosman suggest 
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that there is a danger of going mad in prison in general, Bundeh, another Kenyan writer 
whose narrative I explore below, argues that the death cells are the “place where you find 
some of the most imbalanced imaginations” (99). In his over two year stay in the death cells 
of Kamiti Maximum Security Prison, his refrain is: “I must not go mad … Oh God! Don‟t let 
me go mad … I must conquer madness” (99). Similarly, once Kiriamiti has started playing 
insane, he discovers that in prison what is difficult is, in fact, avoiding going crazy. On one 
occasion, he unlocks his handcuffs and breaks them and then spends the entire night singing 
celebrating his victory. But then he writes: 
I was beginning to believe it myself. I was afraid that if this continued, I 
would cross a certain line beyond which I would no longer be pretending, 
and this was a bit threatening. Perhaps, by the time they let me go to 
Mathare I would really be mad, and what was the use? While fighting to 
prove I was insane I realized I had to fight equally hard to keep my sanity. 
(2004: 19) 
Just like Bosman, Kiriamiti realises that while playing mad gives the prisoner some sense of 
agency, it is also a threatening moment since the prisoner cannot be sure when real madness 
may set in. After all, both Bosman and Kiriamiti imply that which makes the prisoner start 
playing insane in the first place may be insanity. The case of Bosman and Kiriamiti‟s madness 
or lack of it is aptly summarised by John Storey‟s observation that “what signifies is not the 
„facts‟ but how the „facts‟ are interpreted, how they are articulated to make meaning in the 
present” (2003b: 83). Kiriamiti, for example, comes to a moment of profound recognition 
when, after he breaks two sets of handcuffs, prison authorities decide to immobilise him with 
a straightjacket. This is how Kiriamiti describes this novel way of restraint: 
This strange apparatus was mainly made of leather. The wide leather band went 
round my waist and was fastened at the back, just below the buttocks. On either 
side of the hips were the cuffs, to immobilise my arms. With my arms locked to 
my sides, there was little I could do. (2004: 21) 
He feels completely cornered and reflects: “I concluded that the people who invented things 
are themselves mad, especially whoever invented this kind of handcuffs” (2004: 21). This 
implies that even the inventor of the prison system may have been thoroughly insane, and all 
those who took up the idea are also by implication mental cases. In the end, the fact that 
Kiriamiti is eventually sent to Mathare Hospital for the mentally insane, where he also finds a 
number of patients who claim to be merely feigning insanity, leaves the reader uncertain 
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whether he was a convincing play-actor or genuinely mad. The case is further complicated by 
the fact that although he escapes from Mathare, he walks right into a trap when he decides to 
go and say goodbye to his parents. Kiriamiti himself says: “One thing was obvious – I was not 
quite sane!” (2004: 49). A little further he writes: “If only I hadn‟t become partially mad, after 
acting thus for so long, I wouldn‟t have taken the risk of going home” (2004: 58). The result 
of his „partial madness‟ meant that his freedom only lasted twenty four hours. 
Madness, with its ability to trouble boundaries of the criminal and the law-abiding, the 
exercise of agency and the process of objectification, outside and inside, almost attains the 
status of an extended metaphor in Kiriamiti‟s My Life in Prison. For example, what he calls 
the Naivasha massacre, which turns the prison into a living hell for almost an entire decade, is 
triggered by the actions of a former inmate of Mathare Mental Hospital called Mwangi. John 
Kiggia Kimani‟s Prison is not a Holiday Camp, the narrative of which I examine below, also 
corroborates Kiriamiti on this incident. What both Kimani and Kiriamiti call the Naivasha 
massacre illustrates that the mentally insane are not only found in mental hospitals. After all, 
Kiriamiti shows that quite a significant number of patients at Mathare Mental Hospital claim 
to be only playing mad. Mwangi, a former mental patient, narrowly misses smashing a 
warder‟s head with a hammer when it slips out off his hand. The warder had repeatedly 
beaten him on the chest with a baton stick because Mwangi had not kept a deadline to finish 
some work assigned to him. Kairu, another former Mathare patient, jumps into the fray and 
cracks open the warder‟s skull with a hammer. When the warder collapses, Kairu loses 
control completely and keeps on hammering the warder‟s head. When the brain mixed with 
blood starts oozing from the open skull, Kairu starts eating it in full view of the terrified 
fellow prisoners and warders. 
In a bizarre manner, this madness of the two prisoners triggers the latent insanity of warders 
which demonstrates that prison relationships are characterized by dormant but potentially 
explosive paranoia. The incident also allows us to see that the prisoner-warder relations are 
regulated by stable but tense power relations. This is similar to what Antonio Gramsci (1971), 
in explaining his concept of hegemony, terms “compromise equilibrium”. Gramsci‟s notion of 
hegemony implies that the dominant group‟s use of force and violence indicates a moment of 
weakness in the functioning of ideological hegemony. In the case of the prison, this is seen 
from the fact that in most cases both Kiriamiti and Kimani show that one of the indispensable 
conditions of prison life is that both warders and prisoners act instinctively according to the 
unwritten cultural code that prevents prison from spiralling into a gladiatory field of warders 
ranged against prisoners. This means that although the prison as a whole may rightly be 
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viewed as a repressive state apparatus, on a daily basis it functions through Gramscian 
hegemonic principles. The cultures of prison warders and prisoners should not be understood 
as being perpetually at war against each other. Stuart Hall (2005) helps us to make sense of 
this situation when he says: “Cultures, conceived not as separate „ways of life‟ but as „ways of 
struggle‟ constantly intersect: the pertinent cultural struggles arise at the points of 
intersection” (70a). If the different way of life of warders versus that of prisoners can be 
viewed as constantly intersecting ways of struggle as Hall points out, the Kairu-Mwangi 
incident offers us a magnified moment where two ways of struggle violently intersect, 
producing devastating consequences for all concerned. After Kairu and Mwangi are arrested 
and put in custody, the paranoid warders from all surrounding prisons converge at Naivasha 
prison to come and teach the prisoners an unforgettable lesson. After spending the entire day 
of the 24th of April 1972 brutalising and seriously maiming hundreds of prisoners, and killing 
eight prisoners to avenge their fallen comrade, the warders were still not satisfied. By 
nightfall, they decided to lock up the prison and start their reign of terror the following 
morning. Kiriamiti reports that he heard them threatening: “Tomorrow is the finishing day … 
That one you killed will have to be paid by half of you” (2004: 107). I have related this 
incident in detail because it illustrates the delicate balance that is needed to keep the Kenyan 
prisons of Kiriamiti‟s narrative functioning with some semblance of sanity. Magadien, in 
Steinberg‟s The Number, indicates that the Number prison gangs understand how far they can 
take their violence against warders without running the risk of being annihilated. After a 
Number initiate gives a warder a non-fatal stab wound he allows himself to be beaten to pulp 
without hitting back. Magadien explains why: “The rule was that you never provoke. If you 
provoke, if you fight back in a situation like that, they will kill you. It was all tactical. 
Sometimes it was necessary to retreat, for the sake of the survival of the Number” (Steinberg 
2004: 178). Unfortunately, Mwangi and Kairu are too crazy to know the prison golden rule: 
Never kill a warder. 
In the above quotation, Magadien implies that prisoners can only survive the overwhelming 
power of warders by employing guerrilla tactics since a frontal attack means certain doom. 
Discussing the kind of resistance that takes place within the arena of popular culture, John 
Fiske (1989b) remarks: “Guerrilla tactics are the art of the weak: they never challenge the 
powerful in an open warfare, for that would be to invite defeat, but maintain their own 
opposition within and against the social order dominated by the powerful” (19). The Naivasha 
incident and Magadien‟s remarks above both suggest that the prison is a principal site for the 
contestation of power relations. The culture produced on the site of the prison is an exemplary 
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example of popular. In the everyday practice of their lives, prisoners employ various evasions 
and other hidden forms of resistance in their struggle against warder-power and the general 
domination induced by their perpetual subordinate condition. For example, in My Life in 
Prison Kiriamiti relates the use of such guerrilla tactics when he orchestrates the formation of 
a syndicate that advocates peace in prison. Using what Spivak (2000: 383) calls “the mind-
changing one-on-one responsible contact”, this group aimed not only to tame violent 
prisoners through love, but it also attempted to transform the minds of cruel warders. But not 
all warders could be won through “love”. At times it was necessary to use “peaceful” intrigue 
to get rid of incorrigible warders. Reporting the success of this group, Kiriamiti writes: “With 
such techniques (such as trapping and framing a warder) and several others, we were able to 
have over ten warders who were on our black list sacked or transferred. The syndicate 
operated secretly and got rid of the enemies of peace” (2004: 179). 
However, if the prison, like the city, can also be viewed as an arena of popular culture as I 
have tried to argue so far, the prison is not just a space of subjection, but also a place “where 
hegemony arises, and where it is secured” Hall (2005a) (71). The Naivasha incident suggests 
that the relationship between prisoners and the dictatorial power of warders probably can be 
seen as participating in a process Achille Mbembe (1992) calls “mutual zombification” and 
cannot be understood in the usual binary terms of outright resistance and co-optation. 
Similarly, Kiriamiti relates other forms of prisoners‟ defiance which cannot be said to 
constitute outright struggle. For example, prisoners are able to communicate their grievances 
to the Prison Commissioner through songs with which prison choirs entertain their important 
guests. The fact that Kiriamiti writes and publishes a book while in prison can also be 
regarded as a guerrilla form of resisting power. If one applies Mbembe‟s notion of mutual 
zombification to the prison situation, the prison becomes an illuminating microcosm of the 
postcolonial city. 
Kiriamiti‟s narratives allow us a rare glimpse into how the post-colonial prison operates and 
how some prisoners experience it. His narratives are informed by his acceptance of his 
criminal status and his ability to exploit this designation by inserting himself as the likeable 
hero of his narratives. John Kiggia Kimani, Kiriamiti‟s contemporary, also does not contest 
his status as a criminal but lacks the self-satirising humour that characterises Kiriamiti‟s 
narratives. Kimani employs different literary techniques to position himself in ways that will 
engage the reader. More than Kiriamiti, Kimani tries to imbue his crime stories, especially in 
the second narrative, with a political theme. Kimani‟s narratives are also marked by a lot of 
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moralising digressions that are absent in Kiriamiti‟s stories. To further explore these and other 
issues, the next section examines mainly Kimani‟s narratives in more detail. 
2. Prison, Crime and Historical Crossings in Kimani’s narratives 
Like Kiriamiti‟s two books examined above, John Kiggia Kimani‟s two narratives also fall 
under the category of what Kurtz (1998) calls the “my life in crime” subgenre of Kenyan 
popular writing which are characterised by the “crime doesn‟t pay” concluding refrain (83). 
Couched as stories of redemption through growth and “pre-meditated examination of 
conscience” (Kimani 1988: 132), Life and times of a Bank Robber (1988) and Prison is not a 
Holiday Camp (1994) are the meeting point of multiple historical passages in which Kimani 
recounts his fifteen years in crime and almost two decades in Kenyan prisons. Kurtz observes: 
“In fact, as these works show, the extralegal activities of city life [and prison life] can not 
only pay quite well, they can be quite exciting at the same time” (83). These narratives help 
us see the truth of Edward Said‟s (1993) post-Foucauldian words when he says: “I do not 
believe that authors are mechanically determined by ideology, class, or economic history, but 
authors are … very much in the history of their societies, shaping and shaped by that history 
and their social experience in different measure” (xxiv). Kimani‟s narratives show that in 
Kenya, criminality and the prison and the narratives of criminality and prison exist in a 
dialectic relationship with the ever changing political, economic and political conditions of 
the nation coupled with global trends. But these narratives also show that individual 
subjectivity is always in a state of formation because the individual‟s fluid consciousness also 
exists in a symbiotic relationship with the unstable material world. These two narratives 
testify to the accuracy of Storey‟s (2003b) observation that “our memories change as we 
change” and that the coherence and bounded-ness of the autobiographical subject is a fiction 
of the narrative itself (84). Examined together, these narratives complement each other to 
reveal a complex matrix between crime and the prison on one hand, and the unfolding of 
multiple Kenyan political, economic and social landscapes on the other. 
Life and times of a Bank Robber skims through the events of burglaries and robberies of 1956 
when Kimani first settled in Nairobi at the age of fourteen up to 1970, and focuses on a 
dramatic and daring daylight armed bank robbery in Nakuru. The narrative dwells on how 
Kimani was arrested, convicted of the crime, and subsequently served a fifteen year jail 
sentence until his release in early 1985. Despite the fact that the narrative Prison is not a 
Holiday Camp, written six years after Life and Times of a Bank Robber and eight years after 
his release from prison, recounts most of the events found in the first autobiography, Storey 
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(2003a) helps us understand some of the reasons (besides the obvious monetary 
considerations) why Kimani might have felt the need to recount the same events twice. He 
writes: 
If meaning is not something fixed and guaranteed in nature, but is the result 
of particular ways of representing nature in culture, then the meaning of 
something can never be fixed, final or true; its meaning will only forever be 
contextual and contingent and, moreover, always open to the changing 
relations of power. (6) 
The existence of the later autobiography is not only justified by the fact that Kimani seems to 
remember more of his life in crime than he had initially done in the first book, but also by the 
fact that the changing relations of power six years after writing his first autobiography called 
for a revision of meanings he had ascribed to certain events. Maurice Halbwachs (1980) helps 
us to make sense of the inclusion of material which had been omitted or the detailing of other 
events which only had been mentioned in passing in the first narrative. He claims that 
“remembrance is in very large measure a reconstruction of the past achieved with the data 
borrowed from the present” (69). Halbwachs further argues that “the individual memory, in 
order to corroborate and make precise and even to cover the gaps in its remembrances, relies 
upon, relocates itself within, momentarily merges with, the collective memory” (50-1). It is in 
the light of Halbwachs‟ above observation that we can explain the apparent contradiction that 
Kimani‟s memory seems to get stronger with the passage of time. A prison sentence of about 
six years in the early 1960s which had been completely omitted in the first autobiography is 
recounted in great detail in the second narrative. Although the title of the later narrative 
suggests that there will be a revelation of more horrors of prison life, Kimani rarely gives new 
information on prison. This is in sharp contrast with Kiriamiti, who, twenty years after his 
release from prison, writes a perceptive exposé of the Kenyan prison of the 1970s and early 
1980s in his 2004 My Life in Prison.  Despite being an almost revised version and differently 
titled copy of Life and Times of a Bank Robber, Holiday Camp allows the reader to see the 
complex nature of crime by showing that it was not just a male dominated pastime. This later 
narrative perceptively shows how and why some women became accomplices and even 
actively participated in Kimani and his gang‟s organized crime. While the first narrative is ten 
chapters long, the three additional chapters of the second narrative provide useful indications 
of the devastating effect of imprisonment on personal relationships. Kimani manages to do 
this by his revealing moralising digressions about his sexual life and his bitterness about being 
deserted by his “wife” while serving his fifteen year prison sentence. He claims that this 
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incident taught him “that women make fragile decisions”. Interestingly, the event of his 
perceived betrayal concludes the narrative and almost eclipses the prison and criminal themes 
of the autobiography despite the fact that its title explicitly refer to  prison tribulations 
(Kimani 1994: 148). While the inclusion of women in the latter narrative who were originally 
excised from the first narrative may point to some changes in Kimani‟s personal relationship 
to his memories, it may also be a reflection of the changing demands of the literary and 
cultural life of Kenya.  
When Kimani‟s A Bank Robber and Holiday Camp are read side by side, they reveal that the 
individual‟s memory and the criminality and the prison that Kimani narrates, like “[p]opular 
culture reflect … change and stability” (Nachbar and Lause 1992: 5). This may also be 
reflective of similar processes that take place in the prison both at the material and discursive 
levels. Some of these entangled but unstable spaces of cultural production, reproduction and 
consumption, can be summarised under the following historical headings: the dying years of 
colonial rule; the period of independence up to the death of Jomo Kenyatta in 1978; Daniel 
Arap Moi‟s presidency up to Kimani‟s release from prison in 1985; and the agitations for 
democracy of the 1990s after the fall of the Berlin wall and the demise of communism in the 
former USSR. These national, continental and global momentous periods together with 
numerous individual vicissitudes shape Kimani‟s consciousness. Consequently, these milieus 
should also frame our reading of his narratives. 
Kimani casts his criminality and imprisonment in the forgiving and self-sacrificing Christian 
ideology of individual responsibility. Read this way, these narratives may be viewed as the 
“concoctions of the culture industry [which] are neither guides for a blissful life, nor a new art 
of moral responsibility, but rather exhortations to toe the line, behind which stand the most 
powerful interests. The consensus which it propagates strengthens blind, opaque authority” 
(Adorno 2005: 107). For example, Kimani writes: 
I shall never blame the freedom struggle for my failure to get education, for 
it was necessary that colonialism be fought so that Kenya could be free. The 
chances that some of us missed in life were the price we had to pay for the 
patriotism of our parents … The conclusion I came to is that life is how you 
shape it. (1994: 1-2) 
However, the larger portions of the narratives tell a story of blame-shifting and collective 
responsibility. For example, in Holiday Camp Kimani‟s bitterness about the lost opportunities 
caused by the struggle against colonialism registers itself in the following passage: 
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I wasn‟t born with a silver spoon in the mouth and so, it was necessary and 
even inevitable for me to go through many ups and downs to understand the 
world better … My life would perhaps have been different if the state of 
emergency had not been declared in Kenya. It is likely that I would not have 
become a criminal. (1994: 2) 
In the above excerpt, Kimani locates his fall into criminality and subsequent lengthy 
imprisonment at the global, national and familial level. His failure to get an education as a 
result of the struggle for liberation, and his father‟s decision to support Mau Mau freedom 
fighters, are clearly placed at the centre of his life of crime and imprisonment. This attempt by 
Kimani to gain sympathy for his fictionalised self from the reader stands in sharp contrast to 
Kiriamiti‟s construction of the self in his two narratives. For example, in My Life in Crime 
Kiriamiti discounts any childhood economic and social privations as causes of his descent 
into criminality. He writes: “I was born to a relatively well-to-do family. My father, Albert 
Kiriamiti, and my mother, Anne Wanjiru, were teachers, and therefore in my youth, I was 
well provided for” (1). Moreover, nowhere does Kiriamiti mention the colonial and post-
colonial political situation as having played a part in the choices that he made in life. 
Kiriamiti also shows that robbery and crime in general are not the preserve of the uneducated 
and poor. A number of Kiriamiti‟s violent robbers are well-educated individuals and most of 
their accomplices are gainfully employed or own prospering businesses. Significantly, Kimani 
himself, in Holiday Camp (39- 41) shows that women, whether employed in the formal sector 
or not, participate in crime to varying degrees. They do this especially by providing criminals 
with vital information and by shielding them from arrest. Most of these individuals who are 
not actively involved in crime precariously negotiate an existence within and without the legal 
economies. 
In both A Bank Robber and Holiday Camp, Kimani offers sociological and political 
explanations for his life of crime. For example, in A Bank Robber it is less the liberation 
struggle than his being enticed by the irresistible glitters of Nairobi at a tender and naïve age 
of ten which leads him to abandoning school. He writes: 
I visited Nairobi for the first time when I was very young and fell in love 
with the city‟s glamour. My young mind was gripped by the city that it was, 
to me, the best of all possible worlds. Little did I know that it would turn me 
from an innocent rural boy into a hardened criminal and eventually into a 
long-serving prisoner. (1988: 1) 
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In this passage, the enticing glamour of Nairobi lures an innocent boy into its underworld. In 
A Bank Robber, Kimani clearly indicates that his studies had been affected long before his 
mother failed to pay school fees as a result of his father‟s arrest and detention. He writes: 
“Every time I returned home from Nairobi, my heart remained in the city. Even while in 
classroom, I could not concentrate on my lessons since my mind was on the city‟s glamour” 
(1994: 2). In this regard, Kimani‟s explanation for his criminality resembles that of Kiriamiti. 
Explaining how he quit secondary school in the rural town of Murang‟a, opting for the 
enticing but perilous existence in the hustle and bustle of the capital, Kiriamiti writes: “I did 
not care what kind of school it was, all I wanted was to be in Nairobi. If only I knew Nairobi 
would turn me into a helpless person I would have hated the look of it for good as I now do” 
(1984: 1). In this way, both Kimani and Kiriamiti portray Nairobi as an alluring place infested 
will all sorts of social ills which the young and inexperienced can neither avoid nor resist. 
Significantly, Jennifer Musangi draws parallels between Kiriamiti‟s perception and depiction 
of his life in the city in My Life in Crime, with his portrayal of his prison life in My Life in 
Prison. She writes: “[P]rison just like the city is the custodian of certain possibilities that 
perhaps he cannot get elsewhere (say in the village)” (10). Musangi further argues that 
Kiriamiti is basically doing the same thing with the city and prison. In the city, he depicts 
himself as a criminal hero who outwits the agents of law and order for a long time. For 
example, after escaping from soldiers who were guarding him armed with machine guns, he 
writes: “If life in crime was like in the legal armed forces, I don‟t see why I should not have 
been decorated” (1984: 150). In prison, Kiriamiti becomes popular to both the prison 
authorities and fellow inmates and maintains his heroic position throughout his prison life. 
With more instances of regret and moralising, Kimani in his two narratives seems to be doing 
exactly what Kiriamiti does in his. 
In writing his life-story, Kimani seems to realise that the theme of an errant school boy who 
runs away from home because of the city‟s allurements will not elicit a lot of sympathy from 
his readers for him. Kimani decides to superimpose a political theme and eventually depicts 
his escape from his village as a heroic fight against colonial oppression. Almost as an 
afterthought and in an almost contrived manner, in A Bank Robber he relates an incident 
where the police put a bullet in his pocket at a roadblock and then accused him of being an 
ammunition courier for the Mau Mau. When he is later released from this traumatic ordeal, he 
says that the women he was walking with consoled him, saying that “even if the sky fell 
down, Kenya would one day become independent and such suffering would end” (Kimani 
1994: 3). Magadien, in Steinberg‟s The Number, also locates his criminal activities within the 
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political domain by claiming that he was initially arrested in 1976 as a student political 
activist. In Holiday Camp, Kimani‟s later autobiography, he tries to foreground the political 
theme with more sophistication. He suggests that he became politically conscious at a very 
tender age. He writes: 
As a young boy then, I would sit nearby my father and his fellow patriots 
and eavesdrop whatever they discussed on colonialists. They said it was 
necessary for all patriots in Kenya to fight colonialists by all possible 
means. They said they would spend their energy to see that the property 
owned by colonialists would be destroyed by all available means. I therefore 
grew up knowing beyond doubt that the British were our enemies and 
robbers of our land and freedom. (1994: 2) 
In a much more pronounced manner, in Holiday Camp, Kimani recasts his criminality and 
imprisonment in the heroic mode of a freedom fighter. For example, on his initial journey to 
Nairobi at the age of ten, he walks 72 kilometres. He reports that he is subsequently 
congratulated by some men who say: “This boy is a future hero and should be congratulated 
for his ability” (1994: 5). Later on, he tells the reader that his trial for the Nakuru bank 
robbery attracted crowds which turned him into a celebrity. These and other anecdotes are 
clear attempts to (re)construct his criminal activities in the mould of the struggle against 
colonialism. In this way, it is implied that his criminal activities and lengthy imprisonment are 
to be consumed at the level of meanings as a just redistribution of resources which the 
colonialists had violently appropriated from the natives. Read this way, Kimani‟s narrative 
challenges the straightforward dichotomy of the criminal versus the lawful. 
Kimani‟s narratives locate the prison alongside repressive colonial state apparatuses which 
were targeted against the entire black population of Kenya. He situates criminality not at the 
level of individual psychology or biology, but at the intersection of adverse social forces, 
repressive and corrupt political systems, and the choices that the individual makes within 
conditions that he/she has not chosen. Both narratives indicate that it is Kimani‟s father‟s 
arrest and detention in 1954 as a Mau Mau sympathizer that precipitates his disastrous sojourn 
to Nairobi at the tender age of fourteen in search of freedom and a better life. Significantly, he 
has to escape from his village which has been immobilised, quarantined and is ceaselessly 
surveilled by the colonial authorities in an attempt to stamp out the Mau Mau insurgence in a 
similar manner to which outbreaks of plagues and contagions were controlled in 18
th
 century 
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Europe, if we follow Foucault‟s (1977: 195) description. Foucault pointedly indicates that 
these surveillance mechanisms were prototypes of the prison. 
Kimani‟s narratives attempt to excuse his criminality and indict his imprisonment by 
implicating colonial confinement and imprisonment in the violent technologies that attended 
the inception of colonial invasion. He writes: “I had indulged in crime as a small boy because 
I had learned from the elders‟ discussions that it wasn‟t wrong to steal from a white man since 
the white race was oppressing us” (Kimani 1994: 118). Colonial places of incarceration are 
not depicted as Durkheimian socially consensual institutions of criminal rehabilitation. This is 
evident in the way villagers are brutalised and their villages turned into huge detention camps 
during the State of Emergency which spanned almost the entire decade of the 1950s. This is 
how Kimani recounts the events of 1956 that drove him to abandon his home village and seek 
refuge in the anonyminity of the beguiling Nairobi: 
People were clubbed with gun butts as they flooded the field, afraid of a 
future they did not know … It was announced that from that day on, people 
would be escorted to their gardens at 5 a.m. to get provisions and at 6 a.m. 
everybody would be required to be in their huts where they would stay until 
the following morning … It had been announced that if anyone wanted to 
confess anything about the alleged [Mau Mau] oath, he or she should open 
the window and hold out a white piece of cloth.  A guard would then come 
and open the door for the willing confessors. (1988: 18) 
It is from this “segmented, immobile, frozen space [where the] gaze is alert everywhere” 
(Foucault 1977: 195) that Kimani escapes from when he finds his way to Nairobi. He recalls: 
“I remember the day very well. It was August 1956 when I looked back on the village where 
people were caged like animals” (Kimani 20). Kimani escapes to the city because in contrast 
to the closely monitored rural village, the colonial city is depicted as offering more spaces of 
freedom from, and resistance to, colonial oppression.  
Interestingly, Bernault (2003) notes that in addition to immobilising people in their own 
villages, colonial authorities put up detention camps where entire villages were imprisoned. 
She writes: 
During the Mau-Mau crisis, in the mid-1950s, the government organized 
fifty additional „emergency camps‟ in which entire villages and thousands 
of Gikuyu prisoners were forced to resettle. At that time, the entire colony - 
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whites excepted – was subjected to incarceration on a massive scale. (2003: 
13) 
Kimani‟s narratives suggest that it is this logic of criminalisation of the entire black 
population and the colonial authority‟s ability to confine with impunity whomever they 
wished which defined the everyday meaning of life for teenagers and adults of the 1950s, both 
in the rural villages and in the urban areas. Although as a youth Kimani does not show serious 
political consciousness or express the need to join forces with an organised group of political 
agitators against these colonial excesses in his pre-1964 criminal activities, his narratives are 
subsequent meditated attempts at persuading the reader to see moments of political defiance 
in his acts of criminal self-aggrandizement. However, Kimani is not very convincing in 
arguing for this coalescence of the criminal and the political. 
Kimani‟s narratives can be seen as attempts to convince the reader that his becoming a 
teenager during the height of Mau Mau activities and the subsequent State of Emergency 
contributed to his choosing a life of crime. Interestingly, the colonial penal history of Kenya 
indicates that confinement technologies played a significant part in the administration of the 
colony even before the Mau Mau activities which led to a dramatic multiplication of 
penitentiaries. As early as 1911, there were already thirty fully fledged prisons in Kenya. 
Florence Bernault observes: “In East Africa, British Kenya offered the most extraordinary 
attempt to organize a full hierarchy of penal institutions” (2003: 13). Kimani insists that this 
ubiquity of prisons is not a reflection of levels of real criminality in Kenya, but rather points 
to Kenya as a settler colony and the colonial social engineering that was aimed at entrenching 
the supremacy of the colonialists. By implicating the colonial administration in criminality, 
Kimani persuades readers to see his own criminal activities in a new positive light. 
In both narratives, Kimani indicates that this great colonial confinement was to hound him 
even in Nairobi. He shows that to be in Nairobi without a valid passbook granted by colonial 
authorities was in itself a serious crime. Recounting his ordeal of sleeping in bushes and 
incomplete urban buildings because no one was willing to give him a place to sleep, he says: 
“I had no valid passbook permitting me to be in Nairobi and so nobody would give me 
accommodation lest they be arrested for harbouring an undesirable element” (988: 22). This 
suggests that criminal or not, it was almost near impossible for boys in the 1950s to totally 
escape confinement of one kind or another. For example, once he arrives in Nairobi he is 
arrested with hundreds of other boys for loitering and street hawking. He writes: “The police 
had launched a round-up campaign against all boys who were out of school in the city and 
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were destined for borstal institutions” (1988: 27). Being in the rural areas did not ensure that a 
boy would not end up in a detention camp or borstal institution either. Kimani writes: “After 
the colonial government discovered that young boys were being used to transport ammunition 
for Mau Mau fighters … some of them were detained with adults in such notorious camps as 
Manyani” (1988: 27). Kimani‟s narratives suggest that this calculated mass confinement of 
the 1950s must have had a long-lasting and devastating effect on the family‟s ability to 
inculcate stable moral values in the younger generation. Kimani‟s narratives imply that most 
young people developed an undesirable independence and bitterness which resulted in the 
burgeoning of criminal activities of the 1970s which Kimani himself gets caught up in. After 
his father‟s arrest, Kimani himself had been put in foster care and some of his gang members 
were former Mau Mau fighters or individuals who had been in detention camps or borstal 
institutions in the 1950s. There is an interesting comparison here with what Jonny Steinberg 
(2004) says was happening in the 1960s in apartheid South Africa. He indicates that in a 
complex and cruel economic management strategy, a whole generation of coloured men was 
imprisoned while the young boys were taken to foster care institutions on the excuse that they 
were living in dysfunctional homes. At the same time, the single mothers and those with 
“irresponsible” husbands were inundated with welfarism projects calculated at both 
developing a dependence syndrome and assuaging the consciences of the oppressors. 
Ironically, Steinberg indicates that most of the boys who were put in foster care institutions 
ended up in prison themselves and most of them joined the notorious prison Number gangs 
which they viewed as offering some spaces to resist the overpowering apartheid penal 
regimes. 
Kimani presents his criminality as one way of resisting colonial oppression. He says: 
“Survival instincts … drove us into escaping the tight nets that were often thrown around us 
by the determined police” (1988: 22). This suggests that for the powerless colonised, escaping 
the tight colonial nets took many forms, which were always viewed as unlawful by the 
authorities.  By arguing that he was already on the wrong side of the law in both his rural 
village and in the streets of Nairobi before he even became criminal, Kimani depicts his 
descent into real criminality as a smooth and normal transition dictated by the harsh 
environment that he has to negotiate in order to eke out an existence. He writes: “The germ of 
the criminal … was sowed by my determination to survive in the city at a time of crisis and 
was watered by friends that I acquired” (1988: 23). In this way, Kimani insists that criminality 
should be perceived as a desperate but heroic means for a black underclass youth to hit back 
at an oppressive and exploitative administration. 
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Interestingly, in Kimani‟s narratives the closely monitored city of Nairobi is an ambivalent 
space of escape and imprisonment.  About the concept-city, Michel de Certeau writes: 
One can analyze the microbe-like, singular and plural practices which an 
urbanistic system was supposed to administer or suppress ... one can follow 
the swarming activity of these procedures that, far from being regulated or 
eliminated by the panoptic administration, have reinforced themselves into 
the networks of surveillance. (2005: 453) 
Kimani insists that the colonial city was especially designed to exclude undesirable persons 
and keep those that it admitted under its surveillance. But the “microbe-like” presence of the 
likes of Kimani who are without valid passbooks and engage in illegal activities, is a result of 
their microbe-like self-insertion into the city‟s networks of surveillance. Similarly, as we saw 
above, Kiriamiti‟s narratives suggest that the prison operates like the city. The prison, which 
is designed to regulate or eliminate undesirable conduct and attitudes through its panoptic 
administration, fails to stamp out these unlawful practices because they make themselves 
almost unreadable and, like a deadly virus, conceal themselves within the very surveillance 
mechanisms of the city. 
After independence, Kimani‟s narratives suggest that the criminal world had to redefine its 
enemies and reinterpret its activities so as to imbue them with meanings which were in line 
with the new dominant discourses. Kimani suggests that after independence, he and his fellow 
criminals tacitly understood their activities as participating in the general resistance against all 
vestiges of colonialism. He writes: “After independence, I believed that banks such as 
Barclays and others belonged to the foreigners and even if I robbed them our country would 
not suffer” (1994: 119). Kimani and his gang also targeted rich Kenyans who had not cared 
for the poor during the struggle. This perception is made clear in an incident in 1969, where 
Kimani and a fellow gang member decide not to rob a woman who is taking the money of 
J.M. Kariuki, a famous anti-colonial nationalist, to the bank. He explains: 
We all knew that he fought for the poor and decided it would be an 
unforgivable crime to steal from him. We left the car then and returned our 
weapons to their hiding places ready for another robbery that would not 
involve a person we knew or liked. (Kimani 61) 
This suggests that, like all social institutions, crime is sustained by the consumption and 
(re)production of definitions that makes it a meaningful activity. It is animated and influenced 
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by, and derives its meanings from, its continual interaction with larger social, political, and 
economic discourses. 
Kimani‟s narratives allow the reader to discern that both before and after independence, with 
crime‟s individualistic streak, it becomes another way in which the powerless are fragmented 
into self-destructive social activities which leave the powerful as a group only lightly scathed. 
Despite his conscious efforts to deny it, Kimani‟s narrative shows that the theme of 
individualism is a dominant one in the criminal world. Foucault argues that the introduction 
of the biographical was important in the history of penality because it established “the 
„criminal‟ as existing before the crime” (1977: 252). Interestingly, as we saw earlier, after 
colonial authorities have turned Kimani‟s entire village into a prison, as it were, they urge 
villagers who want to escape confinement to come forward and confess their involvement 
with Mau Mau activities. After spending many years in confinement, Kimani himself 
develops the urge to confess his life of crime. Ultimately, both his criminal activities and two 
autobiographies can be viewed as sites where he both acquires and relinquishes power. In the 
Gramscian view, these may be seen as hegemonic sites were power is constantly negotiated, 
resulting in transformations but with no outright victories. While achieving literacy and 
becoming a writer are perceived as instances of personal empowerment, at the same time, the 
penal regime can publicly parade him as evidence of the success of its penitentiary efforts. In 
both narratives, Kimani is aware of this ambivalence that his transformation introduces. In A 
Bank Robber he writes: “Having spent a decade and a half in Kenyan prisons I learned that it 
is impossible to rehabilitate a human being through the prison system” (1988: 132). Similarly, 
in Holiday Camp, he says: “I came to believe that a man can only be rehabilitated after going 
over his past himself and finding out where he went wrong. No penal system on its own can 
change a criminal” (1994: 128). Although vanquished, he is unwilling to surrender all the 
honour for his transformation to the Kenyan penal rehabilitative regime. 
In Discipline and Punish, Foucault points out that the aim of the panoptic exercise of power is 
to make it efficient by making individuals internalise power, resulting in the self-monitoring 
of the individual. The subject must be under the illusion that he or she is not under any 
compulsion to act the way he or she does. Foucault writes: “Hence the major effect of the 
Panopticon: to induce in the inmate a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures 
the automatic functioning of power … it automatizes and disindividualizes power … A real 
subjection is born mechanically from a fictitious relation” (1977: 202). By educating himself 
and confessing to his crimes in his autobiographies, Kimani hopes that he has made a 
voluntary, liberating decision. However, Foucault‟s above observations serve as a warning 
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that the individualistic confessional mode of the autobiography may itself be evidence of the 
automatic functioning of power through its internalisation. Kimani is at pains to show that his 
leaving the life of crime was his own voluntary and premeditated decision. He writes: “When 
I was jailed, I was a young man who had not known the value of freedom … I came to the 
conclusion that crime does not pay and if it pays, it would have paid me very well” (1988: 
133). In Holiday Camp he says: “I also learned to accept the inevitable and not to blame 
anybody for my faults since I had led myself into crime” (1994: 147). In the two quotations 
above, Kimani has conveniently forgotten all the political, economic and social pressures that 
he so elaborately documents that limited most young people‟s life options. Evident here, are 
traces of the panoptic functioning of power which requires that the responsibility for one‟s 
actions fall squarely on the shoulders of the individual and his or her conscience. 
The focus on the individual and skirting of collective responsibility seems to be a feature of 
the Kenyan autobiographies by self-confessed criminals. In A Bank Robber, Kimani‟s earlier 
narrative, he refers only in passing to defining moments of Kenya‟s recent history. For 
example, he views Kenyatta‟s death only in terms of how it would affect his personal welfare 
in prison and shows little concern for its national implications. Kimani‟s autobiography is 
largely silent about the imprisonment of political activists during Kenyatta‟s rule. Although 
he mentions the imprisonments of the alleged coup plotters of 1982, there is no sense in 
which he explores the prison in an extended manner as participating in the political and 
economic management of both the colony and post-colony. 
Kimani depicts the post-colonial Kenyan prison as a functional social institution which is 
there to curb crime. For example, in Holiday Camp he says that there was a time when he 
shared a cell with Okello, a political prisoner who had plotted a coup against the sultan of 
Zanzibar. He is very dismissive of Okello and says that he “was only liked by people who 
were imprisoned for political offences” (1994: 125). He vehemently defends the Kenyan 
government and says to Okello: “You and I are suffering here because of breaking the laws of 
this land and we should not blame the government for it” (1994: 125). While his lengthy 
imprisonment as a dangerous criminal can be a source of power in the here and now of prison, 
these also limit Kimani‟s understanding of the prison‟s, and hence the government‟s, 
implicatedness in the individual‟s everyday struggle for survival and the ways in which power 
is deployed to serve mainly the interests of the dominant groups. In fact, this is a very good 
example of how a confessional, individualistic mode plays into the hands of power. Kimani 
does not just fail to address the political dimension; he actively supports the social status quo. 
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Unlike Kimani, Ngugi wa Thiong‟o, who was also imprisoned during the rule of Kenyatta in 
the 1970s for political reasons, views Kenyatta as a mutant nationalist responsible for the 
wave of political imprisonments which began in the late 1960s. Curiously, Kimani attributes 
prison stability and predictability to the Kenyatta period. Individual law-enforcement agents 
and warders can display violent savagery, but Kimani insists that this was not a general 
government decree. For example, on one rare occasion when they pressurise the prison 
authorities to have audience with them, and Kimani stands up to talk on behalf of the 
prisoners, this is what he has to say: 
We are all aware that every year, the government sets aside enough money 
to sustain us … We also know that the government has not decided to kill us 
by starvation. We are jailed so that we could reform and become good 
citizens on the expiry of our terms. The government would not wish us to 
die before the set goal has been achieved. (1988: 118) 
Kimani generally excuses the “government” from the criminality performed by its officials. 
For example, after his arrest he is severely beaten up and subjected to all kinds of torture by 
investigating police officers. When he reports this to the presiding magistrate during his first 
court appearance, he says that the magistrate ordered that such violence should stop. During 
his stay at Naivasha prison, he recounts the same incident which Kiriamiti refers to as the 
„Naivasha massacre‟, where a criminally insane prisoner attacked and killed a warder. 
Unarmed prisoners were then savagely beaten, resulting in the death of eight of them and the 
maiming of many more. To cover up their crime, the warders turn around and call it a 
prisoners‟ riot. Although the violence was sanctioned by the Commissioner of Prisons and his 
deputy, Kimani seems to suggest that this did not represent general government policy 
towards the treatment of prisoners but rather the misdirected zeal of a few powerful 
individuals. He writes: “The violence against the prisoners didn‟t please the Head of State and 
he ordered an investigation into the matter” (1994: 129). 
This inability to discern how the macroeconomic and political conditions impact on the 
individual‟s choices or lack of them is also evident in the way Kimani relates his quest for 
education while still in prison. His educating himself, while heroic, is also a lonely and 
individualistic way of solving problems. It is telling that “the word education …acquired a 
powerful meaning” (1994: 110) for him when he realises that escape from prison has become 
impossible. He understands his prison self-education to be a way of seizing agency by defying 
authorities, just as his criminal career had enabled him to do before his imprisonment. That 
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Kimani understands his studying and learning to be a form of empowering resistance is seen 
from the fact that the violence of prison warders fails to stop him from studying. He tells of an 
incident when he was thoroughly beaten up by warders for possessing a pen. He says: 
The beating that I had received because of possessing a pen and a paper did 
not deter me from wanting to learn. I was determined the harder they tried to 
stop me from reading, the harder I would look for learning material. (1988: 
107) 
It is ironic, however, that prison authorities punish Kimani both for his criminal activities and 
also for his determination to escape them through self-education. He writes: “Instead of 
encouraging me, many prison warders taunted me. They mocked me and asked where my 
prison education could take me” (1988: 110). In My Life in Prison Kiriamiti also spends one 
hundred days in solitary confinement for writing and publishing My Life in Crime while still 
in prison. In Long Walk to Freedom, Mandela also relates how warders made it difficult for 
political prisoners at Robben Island to organise literacy classes. These somewhat disparate 
incidents suggest that attempts to write the self in prison, which is also a process of educating 
the self, is viewed, especially by prison warders, as a dangerous way in which prisoners may 
acquire power. This is the reason why, once in prison, warders resist the prisoners‟ efforts to 
exercise this kind of agency because they are aware that in the prison institutional power 
tactics, prisoners‟ attempts to educate themselves and write their stories will enable them to 
wield a certain measure of control over their prison environment. 
Ironically, in Cold Stone Jug, Bosman lampoons as naive efforts by fellow prisoners to try 
and get an education in prison. In the light of this mixed reaction from both prisoners and 
prison authorities towards education, Paul Willis‟s (1990) adapted words about the capitalist 
market accurately capture the prison situation. We can say that through getting an education 
prisoners find “incentives and possibilities not simply for their own confinement but also their 
own development and growth” (27). This of course is in accord with the Foucauldian view 
that all institutions in modern societies participate in the disciplining of populations. 
According to this view, by educating themselves prisoners do indeed seize agency as they 
master certain kinds of dominant societal discourses, but they also insert themselves more 
powerfully into self-monitoring mode of disciplines, as it were. This is well illustrated by the 
moral lesson which Kimani wrings out of his criminal and prison days. He writes: “I lived to 
write this story which should be a warning to those who might think that the path of crime is 
an easy one” (1994: 127). He also writes: 
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If the urge to continue being in crime had not deserted me, I would not have 
written this book. The bug to write would not have bitten me as it did in 
1977 while still in Naivasha Prison. After my serious attempts to become 
literate, I decided to record my life (Kimani 132). 
It can indeed be said that the successful production of Kimani‟s autobiographies is a 
victorious, empowering moment but it is also the very moment of incorporation into the 
disciplinary mechanism of power. 
Further, Kiriamiti tells of the occasion when he was allowed to do sign-writing, something 
which was considered prestigious in prison. A white fellow prisoner who is an instructor in 
this section sees Kiriamiti‟s excitement and warns him: 
Do you think they brought you here as a special favour for your own good? 
No. It is for their benefit. They know you have education; they know you 
will learn quickly and be productive. You have a long stretch in which to 
serve and serve. (2004: 62) 
In a statement which echoes a Foucauldian insight, Stuart Hall (2005) writes: “Educational 
institutions, along with the many positive things they do, also help to discipline and police 
this boundary [of what becomes canonical and what remains popular]” (69). The eloquent 
words of Karl Marx (1919) aptly describe the situation in which Kiriamiti and Kimani find 
themselves: “Man makes his own history, but he does not make it out of the whole cloth; he 
does not make it out of conditions chosen by himself, but out of such as he finds close at 
hand” (9). Alluding to how choices are always made at the intersection of the individual‟s 
will-power and one‟s material and ideological exigencies, Kiriamiti writes: “The Swahili say 
that what you are not taught by your parents, you‟ll be taught by the world” (1984: 9). In 
making their history, Kiriamiti and Kimani have to contend with the many limitations 
imposed by their material and ideological circumstances. 
As the foregoing shows, Kimani and Kiriamiti admit that their pursuit of education generally 
turned them into disciplined and productive prisoners. But it is the same education which 
enables Kimani to stand up in front of the officer in-charge and more than a thousand other 
prisoners to present their case when they decide to refuse work and demand to be addressed 
by the relevant authorities about their condition of starvation. Similarly, because of having 
some education, Kiriamiti is elected spokesperson by a group of prisoners to demand that the 
officer in-charge meet their basic rights as prisoners. As a result of Kiriamiti‟s eloquence, the 
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officer in charge agrees to most of their requests and says: “I agree that this should be 
different for you, and from now on your food will be prepared differently” (2004: 113). In this 
instance, education allows Kiriamiti to arm-twist the officer in-charge. The idea that 
education is a double-edged sword is summarised by the warder who is in charge of the 
tailoring section where Kimani was working prior to the strike, when he is asked to give a 
character witness of his charge. The warder says: “I cannot explain his involvement in the 
strike. I didn‟t imagine he could ever involve himself in such a daring political move. All the 
same, he is both honest and obedient” (Kimani 1994: 140). This illustrates that there is no 
cultural institution which simply produces passive consumers of its meanings. The world of 
meanings exists both in a state of reproductive consumption and contestation. John Storey‟s 
(2003b) paraphrase of Marx‟s famous words clarifies both Kiriamiti‟s and Kimani‟s situation. 
“[W]e make meanings and we are made by meanings” (x). Kiriamiti and Kimani‟s ambivalent 
educational quest suggests that the cultural field refuses to be concretised and insists on being 
unstable and multi-functional. 
The foregoing comparative examination of Kiriamiti and Kimani offer interesting insights 
into some of the ambivalences that characterise the intersection of the criminal, prison and the 
autobiographical in post-colonial Kenyan prison narratives. Kiriamiti‟s and Kimani‟s self-
confessed criminal statuses compel them to adopt various narrative strategies that gains them 
readers‟ sympathies. The next section examines two post-colonial Kenyan prison narratives of 
a different kind. In Birds of Kamiti, Bundeh has no problem procuring an audience for his 
story since he presents himself as a victim of the miscarriage of justice. On the other hand, 
Githae‟s novel, Comrade Inmate, has the playful tone of a writer who has only encountered 
the post-colonial Kenyan penal regime through the media. The next section offers a detailed 
discussion of Bundeh‟s and Githae‟s narratives.  
3. Criminality and Imprisonment in Bundeh’s Birds of Kamiti and Githae’s Comrade 
Inmate 
Benjamin Garth Bundeh‟s Birds of Kamiti (1991) provides a contrast to the narratives of both 
Kiriamiti and Kimani. While Kiriamiti and Kimani are self-confessed criminals who seem to 
accept their imprisonment as their just deserts, Bundeh claims innocence of the crime he is 
condemned for. Bundeh‟s insistence that he is innocent leads him into presenting a much 
more complicated Kenyan post-colonial prison than that of the almost straightforward 
moralising confessional narratives of Kiriamiti and Kimani. After being accused of murdering 
his white business partner, he is sentenced to death by hanging, and subsequently spends two 
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and half years in Nairobi Remand Prison and in Kamiti Death Cells. While both Kiriamiti and 
Kimani become likeable by depicting themselves as reformed criminals, Bundeh gains the 
sympathies of the reader by consistently portraying himself as a victim of a corrupt criminal 
justice system and an insensitive penal regime. Charles Githae‟s Comrade Inmate (1994) is a 
fictionalised autobiography of Fred, a former police officer, who finds himself in prison with 
a former judge, a lawyer, a member of parliament, a priest, a medical doctor and some 
mentally insane inmates. Githae‟s fictional narrative is a satirical exposé of the entire post-
colonial Kenyan criminal justice system and penal regime. Although there is no evidence to 
suggest that Githae was ever imprisoned himself, in Comrade Inmate he seems interested in 
how the prison is akin to the city in that both places have the ability to facilitate the rapid 
upward or downward social mobility of individuals. Githae‟s detachment from prison 
tribulations allows him to adopt a somewhat philosophical stance about the post-colonial 
Kenyan prison.  
Fred, the narrator in Comrade Inmate, excuses his crime of causing grievious bodily harm to a 
former friend by pointing out that among what he calls “spectators of justice” (2), people who 
attended his court hearing, there are some who are as guilty as he is but remain unprosecuted. 
He claims that “there were others in the same court who had committed offences and their 
rightful place should have been next to [him] in the dock but somehow they had evaded the 
long, and often wrong, arm of the law!” (5). This cynical perception that post-colonial Kenya 
is full of criminals and that only the few unlucky ones find themselves in prisons, inform the 
narrator‟s detachment from his prosecution and his satirical depiction of what happens in 
prison. In a way Githae‟s prison mirrors the city in that it is populated by the “ordinary” 
people who make things happen outside prison. Fred, the criminal narrator, is a former police 
officer-cum-motor mechanic, who finds himself in prison with a former magistrate, a lawyer, 
a member of parliament, a priest, a medical doctor and even some mentally insane 
individuals. Fred contemptuously and satirically refers to this group of prisoners as the V.I.P.s 
or very important prisoners (16). This imprisoned cross-section of society implies that post-
Kenyan society is criminal to the core. 
By the imprisonment of a former police sergeant in the form of Fred, Githae suggests that the 
criminal rot starts with those who are entrusted with ensuring that there is law and order by 
prosecuting law breakers. But not only do police officers commit violent crimes such as the 
one committed by Fred, Githae also implies that the entire Kenyan police force is corrupt. 
Githae has the officer-in-charge of Kamiti Prison, one of the characters in Comrade Inmate, 
say to Fred: “The Police allow only the scum of the society to come and rot here while the 
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rich buy their freedom at the police station no matter what crimes they have committed!” (19). 
Githae goes on to paint a police force and prison service which are characterised by petty 
rivalry which is detrimental to the performance of their constitutional duties. For example, the 
officer-in-charge goes on to complain bitterly to Fred that his stubbornness results from his 
view that “the prison service staff are inferior to the elites in the Police Force” (19). To be 
sure, Fred is very dismissive of the prison staff. On his first morning in prison he 
contemptuously thinks: “In prison, the warders do all the thinking! And what thinking!” (7). 
Dismissing the prison services as stupid and dull, on another occasion he says: “The whole 
damned prison service seems to exist for nothing more than that figure – that is, the number of 
prisoners inside at any given time” (23). 
Githae‟s inclusion of a former magistrate and a former lawyer among these very important 
prisoners suggests that post-colonial Kenya‟s lawlessness is so deep that it has infected the 
very dispensers of justice. Cheruiyot, the former magistrate, indicates that the bribery of 
magistrates and judges in post-colonial Kenya is the order of the day. He becomes embroiled 
in this corrupt activity himself until one of his seniors traps him when he starts taking bribe 
money without sharing it with him. Karugu, the lawyer, misappropriates some money 
entrusted to him by some of his clients when he uses it on a get-rich-quick scheme which goes 
sour. Githae uses their imprisonment not only to show the pervasiveness of crime in post-
colonial Kenya, but also to show how justice is undermined from the inside and from the top. 
While in prison, both Cheruiyot and Karugu use their legal expertise to help some convicted 
prisoners such as Fred to win their appeals against their conviction and sentencing. So not 
only do they undermine justice when they are still inside, serving as magistrate and lawyer, 
respectively, but they also undermine it as convicted criminals when they use their legal 
knowledge to help self-confessed convicted criminals escape their full sentences. 
Githae depicts Kenyan society as incurably sick by including Kigwe, a medical doctor who is 
in prison for stealing state medication. The author seems to be asking: „If doctors are corrupt, 
who is going to take care of the sick?‟ The body politic is also shown to be ailing by the 
imprisonment of a former member of parliament, Mr Kanyanja, who is imprisoned for land 
misappropriation. Religion is also not spared. Kyalo, the former priest, is among these very 
important prisoners, a sure testimony that nobody is to be trusted in post-colonial Kenya. 
Kyalo succumbs to the fleshly temptations by sleeping with one of his teenage congregants. 
The irony of course is that these former society‟s luminaries are now housed together with 
insane inmates in prison. In this way, Githae indicts the entire Kenyan post-colonial society as 
so decadent that its rightful place is the insane section of the prison. 
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The fact that these individuals, who were among society‟s most important functionaries, are 
now housed together with the insane, shows the prison‟s ability to invert and blur social 
hierarchies. Although prison authorities house these formerly influential individuals with the 
insane for fear that they may be harmed by the sane “common” prisoners who may have been 
aggrieved by these “special” inmates as they carried out their duties before coming to prison, 
this strategy also allows Githae to cast doubt on the very sanity of these individuals. This idea 
is suggested by the prison rivalry and bickering that characterise these prisoners‟ 
relationships. Viewed this way, Githae‟s prison, like that of Kiriamiti, is not only a melting 
pot of social hierarchies and cultures, but it is also a site of complex social, political and 
psychological struggles. The cosmopolitan nature of Githae‟s prison allows it to reflect the 
cosmopolitanism of Nairobi. This suggests that both the city and the prison have permeable 
boundaries. Prisoners and warders, the lawful and the unlawful, the sane and the insane have 
zones of convergence which challenge a straightforward classification. 
Clearly then, Fred, the protagonist in Githae‟s Comrade Inmate, finds a moral voice to 
condemn post-colonial Kenya by claiming that the entire society is as guilty or as mad as he 
is. As the title of the narrative implies, all Kenyans, including the insane, are comrades in one 
form of crime or another. This collusion of the law and the unlawful is dramatised when 
Cheruiyot, the former magistrate, and others help Fred to craft an appeal which he goes on to 
win. In Birds of Kamiti Bundeh engages the reader by employing a different strategy. He 
insists that he is an innocent victim of the pervasive police corruption and miscarriage of 
justice. Bundeh‟s claim to innocence results in him depicting an extremely polarised prison 
characterised by an almost impassable divide between warders and prisoners. Prisoners are 
largely depicted as helpless victims of the incorrigible violence of sadistic warders. In his 
description of warders, Bundeh resorts to popular physiological explanations for their brutal 
and strange actions. For example, when Bundeh and fellow prisoners arrive at Nairobi 
Remand Prison, all the newly arrived inmates are searched with military thoroughness. The 
warder in charge of the search relishes touching the inmates‟ private parts and derives 
pleasure from peeping into their anuses. The reader is made to anticipate this kind of 
behaviour from the way Bundeh describes the warder. He writes: “In charge of the operation 
was a warder with a large head sitting squarely on his shoulders. As sporadic orders oozed out 
of his evil mouth, his hands crawled on my naked body like serpents” (4). Bundeh 
automatizes and depicts the warder in beastly terms by referring to his head, which he claims 
sits with mathematically precision on his shoulders, and his hands, which crawl like a snake. 
By satirising the warder Bundeh seems to be taking revenge on the entire Kenyan penal 
183 
 
regime which he views as having failed him. Bundeh similarly renders as sub-human fellow 
prisoners who seem to have a cosy relationship with prison authorities. For example, all the 
prisoners who work in the kitchen and those in charge of the stores are “common criminals of 
the lowest kind, pickpockets, rapists, shoplifters, bhang smokers, peddlers, etc” (31). Since 
the narrative has rendered these warders beastly automatons and the “guilty” prisoners as sub-
humans, the reader is led to anticipate and even excuse their unnatural behaviour. In an 
attempt to portray “innocent” prisoners as excessively disempowered and brutalised victims 
deserving of the reader‟s sympathy and understanding, Bundeh also makes the behaviour of 
warders and their suckers excusable since his narrative removes them from the human moral 
realm. 
While on the surface Bundeh‟s narrative depicts prison as a Manichean universe, the complex 
nature of the warder-prisoner relationship alluded to by other writers is also obvious in Birds 
of Kamiti. For example, like Kiriamiti, Bundeh also writes most of his narrative during his 
stay in the cells of Kamiti Prison. This suggests that as much as the city simultaneously 
represents freedom and entrapment, warder authority is always fractured or leaking, to use 
Mbembe and Nuttall‟s terminology (2004:353). This is evident in his acknowledgements, 
where Bundeh indicates that not all warders were hostile. He writes: “I feel obliged to return 
gratitude to the … few generous warders at Kamiti, with whose help I managed to smuggle 
out pieces of paper and leaves of toilet rolls on which the original of this manuscript was 
written”. Instances like these where prison authorities participate in the subversion of the 
surveillance mechanisms of the penal regime are not a mere reflection of corrupt warders 
seeking material gain from helpless prisoners. Rather, it is also an indication of the existence 
of real fault-lines which exist within the penal system where warders, instead of being brutal 
automatons as Bundeh at times implies, exercise a measure of agency by discreetly and 
selectively implementing the penal surveillance procedures. 
Interestingly, an attentive reading shows that both Githae and Bundeh do not portray the 
criminalised individual as a mere punching bag of the penal system. Within the penal system 
itself the individual is able to exercise some measure of agency. In Birds of Kamiti, Bundeh 
expresses his agency and asserts his subjectivity aggressively in his self-conducted appeal 
against both the judge‟s guilty verdict and the subsequent death sentence. In the appeal, he is 
intent on exposing how post-colonial Kenyan law courts collude with the violence that police 
use to extract statements or confessions from suspects, and then send not only real offenders, 
but also innocent people, into the misery of prison life and even death. For example, in his 
appeal he declares and then asks the judges of appeal: 
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The police were mocking the court when they said they did not torture me. 
Could it be true that our courts secretly consent to the torture of suspects in 
police custody? Could there be collusion? What greater injustice could the 
society perpetrate? (124). 
Bundeh does not entertain the illusion that the state or government cannot commit crimes. As 
Githae‟s novel also shows, crimes are committed right in the halls of justice by the very 
custodians of the law. Bundeh makes it clear that what exacerbates the use of violence by the 
police and the prejudicial manner of the white judge in his case is the fact that the murder 
victim was white. Again in his appeal, he writes: 
Throughout the Kenyan history the death of a white man has always 
received much attention and concern while the life of a black person has 
always appeared insignificant and meaningless. Does my life mean anything 
at all to the State? (128) 
Bundeh‟s words suggest that the spectre of the colonial state which I discussed in Ngugi‟s 
narrative still hangs heavily over the postcolony. This seems to confirm Robert M. Young‟s 
(1988: 108) argument that an auto/biography is not just an exercise in mechanical 
remembrance of an individual mind, as Bundeh himself suggests at the beginning of his 
narrative by claiming that there “is no creativity involved in [his] writing, just remembrance” 
(1). Rather, Bundeh‟s narrative seems to be celebrating the history of ideas, narrative, will, 
character and the validity of the subject‟s subjectivity in the hostile environment of the penal 
regime. Just as Young observes about auto/biography at its best, Bundeh is clearly combining 
the structural and epochal causation and the historicity of the construction of the subject and 
subjectivity (1988: 108). 
However, Bundeh shows that at the heart of the penal regime‟s power in constructing 
subjectivities is its immense ability to commandeer violent technologies. The statement that 
the judge uses to convict Bundeh, a statement extracted in a violent and dubious manner from 
him by a high ranking police officer, offers the reader a classic way in which the subject both 
writes and is written by his or her environment. Before he has gathered any substantial 
information against Bundeh, the officer who investigates the case makes it clear that the 
police have the power not only to arrest criminals but to construct or manufacture them. He 
angrily declares: “Murderers are not people! We can do whatever we like with them” (2). The 
words of the police officer are translated into reality when he tortures Bundeh to the extent 
that he succumbs to signing 35 blank papers. After gathering details about Bundeh‟s personal 
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life from various sources, the police officer surreptitiously proceeds to write a statement 
which, later on in court, he claims was dictated to him by the suspect. This process of 
inscription is then taken to the next level where the state appoints a lawyer for the murder 
suspect. Pointing out the illogicality of the whole process, Bundeh writes: “To this day it still 
strikes me as absurd and irresponsible for a prisoner condemned by the government, to allow 
the same government to engage a lawyer to defend his life” (118). The processes of inscribing 
the suspect is then completed by the judge, who using an extorted confession statement, labels 
the suspect murderer, and then proceeds to condemn him. In this way, power manages to 
write the subject against his own will. 
Interestingly, during his appeal, Bundeh seizes agency by refusing legal help from the state. 
He perceptively observes: “After all, it was the same government that employed the police 
who arrested me, the State counsel who prosecuted me, and the judge who condemned me” 
(119).  Ironically, it is largely from the forged 35 pages of his alleged confession that Bundeh 
re/writes his own subjectivity during his appeal. His becomes a classic case of opposing the 
system from within the system. Using devastating logic, he proceeds to dismantle the case 
against him word for word. Before the judges of appeal, he argues: 
Ex(hibit) 29 is therefore false in its material particulars. The length of Ex 29 
– 35 hand written pages. (Judge says it‟s too detailed P250). Does length 
suggest that the statement is true? A James Hadley Chase novel is about 500 
typed pages - homicide fiction from the imagination of the author. The 
length of a statement does not prove its authenticity. Pw wrote Ex 29 from 
his imagination (130). 
This quotation sheds considerable light on the processes of auto/biographical discourse. What 
is being contested here is a statement which claims to be auto/biographical. In writing the 
suspect, the police officer was meticulous in ensuring that a great deal of biographical details 
cannot be disputed. Around these, the police officer proceeded to use his imagination to fill in 
the gaps that would lead to a subsequent conviction. The method of the police officer mimics 
that of a real auto/biography. An auto/biography appropriates pivotal events that reside in 
what Maurice Halbwachs (1980: 22) calls collective memory. This is memory that, although 
open to re-interpretations, is not susceptible to disputation by the majority of people who 
share the same social and ideological space. 
According to Halbwachs, the individual auto/biographer as well as entire nations, engage in 
the process of (re)construction of personal memory from events that reside in collective 
186 
 
memory. Halbwachs is of course echoing a Freudian insight when he refers to the incomplete 
nature of people‟s memories. The only difference is that Freud sought memory completion 
from the individual‟s unconscious, while Halbwachs is suggesting that it happens within the 
social space itself. It is therefore within this post-Freudian insight that memories are 
fragmented and incomplete, that we should examine Bundeh‟s opening claim that his 
narrative has no creativity at all, but that it is instead a mere product of remembrance. While 
for Sigmund Freud the individual‟s memory gaps can only be completed through the bringing 
of the unconscious to consciousness, an examination of Bundeh‟s narrative and the other 
narratives which I examine here, insist that we adopt a Halbwachsian stance of seeking for 
memory‟s completion in the social world outside the individual or what Pierre Nora (1989: 7) 
refers to as “sites of memory”. This argument is in line with Fiske‟s (1989a) claim that “texts 
are activated, or made meaningful, only in social relations and intertextual relations” (3). 
What makes Bundeh‟s and Githae‟s representation of post-colonial Kenyan criminality and 
imprisonment differ from each other is that Bundeh relates something very close to his heart, 
having escaped execution by a whisker, while Githae‟s text is largely an academic meditation 
and a creative take on the same issues. Despite this difference they are in agreement that the 
Kenyan police force, law courts and prisons are essentiallly corrupt, unjust and brutal. These 
two writers challenge the confessional objectives of post-colonial Kenyan prison narratives by 
suggesting that society and prison mirror each other since prisoners are simply unlucky 
citizens who get caught. Viewed this way, the post-colonial prison becomes a very political 
space, and suggests that as a state repressive apparatus, it still obeys the colonial logic that is 
so passionately documented by Ngugi in Detained. Although not entirely convincing in 
connecting his criminality to colonial injustices, Kimani‟s narratives offer thought-provoking 
ideas about the way colonial power turned the Kenyan landscape into zones of immobility in 
the 1950s. Kiriamiti seems to position the city and prison at the same level by largely 
depicting himself as a hero of both places. The next section focuses on post-apartheid 
representation of crime and imprisonment in an attempt to further explore notions of the self 
and questions of subjectivity in the South African context. 
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Chapter 6: The Post-Apartheid South African Prison and Interdiscursive 
Voices  
Introduction 
The narratives of crime and imprisonment considered so far in this thesis show that in all 
historical epochs the prison, whether narrated by political prisoners or common criminals, is 
largely depicted as a space of physical and psychological domination. While in the political 
autobiographies that I consider earlier in this thesis, historical and social forces seem 
particularly intractable and hostile, there is still a pronounced sense of agency in the writers‟ 
depiction of themselves.
80
 On the other hand, post-colonial Kenyan narratives, which I 
discuss in Chapter Five, suggest that the site of the political is apparently located in 
experiences and moments that seem personal, as when these authors are engaging with 
notions of confession and contrition. In post-apartheid
81
 narratives of crime and imprisonment 
there is a shift – or rather, what Foucault (Essentials 58) calls “interdiscursive dependencies” 
–  resulting from the nation‟s grappling with numerous transitional instabilities and turbulent 
questions of nationhood and personhood. One consequence of this condition of a nation in 
transition is a convergence of discourses leading to what Roux calls “the depoliticisation of 
imprisonment” (2007:261). 
Although I have not discussed issues of gender in imprisonment in detail, it is interesting to 
note that the “depoliticised” post-apartheid narratives re-inscribe gender into the prison 
experience in quite obvious ways. Political prisoners seem to have lacked space to offer a 
gendered experience of their imprisonment. This dimension of experience is deemphasized, 
sometimes even foreclosed. The narratives that I explore in this chapter foreground gender but 
also show that crime and prison remain central in the understanding of both national and 
personal selfhoods despite certain significant shifts in their perception and portrayal. The 
irony is that the gendered focus comes with its own sets of political problems; it seems to 
announce the return of “private” experience but only in order to demonstrate that private 
experience is everywhere continuous with cultural politics. To explore the above 
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Despite the fact that Barbara Schreiner (1992) argues that political prisoners‟ “experience of prison is 
frequently psychologically damaging and tends to bring anti-social, dehumanised and criminal behaviour to the 
fore” (3), unlike the “common criminals”, political prisoners avoid depicting themselves as entirely helpless 
victims of forces beyond their control. 
 
81
I am aware of the pitfalls of using the term post-apartheid narratives since post-apartheid literature may no 
longer be easily classified as a single category, but rather as one with stratifications. However, I find it useful to 
deploy it advisedly as a discussion category. 
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observations, I examine Journey to Myself: Writings by Women from Prison in South Africa 
(2004) compiled and edited by Julia Landau, Fifteen Men: Worlds and Images from Behind 
Bars (2008), compiled and edited by Margie Orford, A Human Being Died that Night: A Story 
of Forgiveness (2003) by Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela and Red Ink (2007) by Angela 
Makholwa. In a way, these narratives illustrate that crime and imprisonment in post-apartheid 
South Africa are still political entities despite the dominant discourses‟s attempt to read them 
otherwise. Ironically, at the discursive level, these narratives participate in this masking of the 
political theme. All of them, although showing an awareness of the political and social 
rootedness of crime and imprisonment, focus on the prisoner as an individual. Although this 
may seem to be empowering the prisoner through voicing, the result is the avoidance or the 
downplaying of what Andrew Dilts (2009:95) calls “the foundational exclusion” that led to 
crime and imprisonment in the first place. All these narratives are characterised by the 
paradox that while the prisoner/criminal is posited as “responsible for all the harm committed 
by that individual” (Dilts 92), the individual is simultaneously represented as a victim of his 
or her macro-environment. 
A common denominator in these four books is that women feature in all as narrators/writers 
or as compilers/editors. In a way, these prison texts written or edited and compiled by women 
can be read as women seizing political and cultural agency. Crime and prison, especially in 
South Africa, have always been predicated upon what Dobash et al call “patriarchal and 
gender-based assumptions” (1986:9).82 Referring to Southern African writing in general, 
Dorothy Driver (2002) points out that gender is disregarded as an analytical tool. She argues: 
“Southern African literary and historical accounts pay unequal attention to women and men, 
and exclude gender as an analytical tool, so that political and cultural agency is still seen as 
male” (153). South African prison literature is surprisingly full of women‟s voices. We have 
Ruth First, Emma Mashinini, Jean Middleton, Caesarina Kona Makhoere, and Fatima Meer, 
among others. There is clearly a long tradition of empowered women intellectuals writing 
about their experiences in both Trade Unions and organisations like the Communist Party. 
However, as the political scaffolding that used to empower women in the struggle against 
apartheid starts to collapse, the fact of women‟s gender starts to matter more – suddenly what 
is interesting is not so much that one is a political prisoner, what matters is that one is a 
woman prisoner. One‟s gender shifts to become the primary frame through which one is 
understood, a more “personal” and apparently immutable and embodied category than one‟s 
politics. In the post-apartheid period there are even more women writing about their 
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experiences, and they are a number of women who are drawn into the post-apartheid dialogue 
about prison. But gender is not an unproblematic ontological ground. My study seeks to 
examine these and other issues through the prison narratives that I mentioned above. 
 
Landau‟s Journey to Myself is a collection of autobiographical and creative writings of 12 
women who were incarcerated at Pollsmoor Women‟s Prison. To use Driver‟s terminology, 
this anthology enables us to trace something of the complexity of responses that “women 
make in different situations around them – the intricate combinations of acceptance, refusal, 
complicity, resistance and revolt” (2002:156). Landau suggests that her book project with 
women prisoners is driven by a Scarryan objective, where language is seen as having the 
ability to destroy pain through objectifying it.
83
 She writes: “The impetus for this collection 
was to provide a healing process for any of the women in prison who wanted to participate in 
the creative writing workshops and to impart an understanding about the experiences [of] 
women inmates to the people on the outside” (2).84 Fifteen Men by Orford can also be seen as 
a journey into the selves of self-confessed male criminals, which the editor sees as a means of 
“objectify[ing] pain through naming it” (Young 2009: 97). Whereas Journey to Myself 
comprises autobiographical and creative pieces by twelve women prisoners, Fifteen Men is 
made up of pieces by fifteen male criminals who are serving various prison sentences and is 
edited and compiled by a well-known South African female writer who experienced 
imprisonment herself under the apartheid regime.
85
 While both projects seem to be driven by 
the noble objective of giving prisoners voice, I want to argue that the editors/compilers 
underestimate questions of hegemony which always trouble the notion of voicing, especially 
in anthology projects such as the ones that they have embarked on. 
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 Elaine Scarry argues: “To bring pain into the world by objectifying it in language, is to destroy one of them” 
(in The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World, 1985: 50). Ada Uwakweh also argues that 
writing in general allows feminist writers healing, attainment of an identity and liberation. She writes: “Voicing 
is self-defining, liberational, and cathartic. It proclaims an individual as a conscious being capable of 
independent thought and action” (“Debunking Patriarchy: The Liberational Quality of Voicing in Tsitsi 
Dangarembga‟s Nervous Conditions” in Research in African Literatures, 75).  
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 Another post-apartheid prison text which has contributions from both female and male political prisoners and 
shares the same objectives as Journey to Myself is Mapping Memory: Former Prisoners Tell their Stories (2006), 
edited by Lauren Segal et al. This book, a project of Constitution Hill, aims at helping former prisoners to re-live 
their trauma and by so doing help them achieve “some degree of completion” (2). The editors of the anthology 
claim that it also benefits the South Africans in general by affording them “collective catharsis by hearing these 
stories” (2). It is clear that the editors of this book, like Landau, are using the same metaphor of seeing the 
prisoner and the nation as a wounded body that will achieve healing by objectifying their pain through narrative 
or confessional language. 
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 Margie Orford is a prolific writer known for her popular crime fiction. Some of her novels include Like 
Clockwork (2006), Blood Rose (2007) and Daddy‟s Girl (2009). 
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Similarly, Gobodo-Madikizela‟s A Human Being Died that Night and Makholwa‟s Red Ink are 
two books about crime and prison that demand to be read side by side because they seem to 
belong to what Dilts calls the “neo-liberal proposal to radically reconceive the human subject 
as a rational actor” (94). Both writers seem to share the objective of trying to understand the 
psyche of an imprisoned serial murderer and connect it with that of the nation. Their quest is 
similar to, but also exceeds, the one Hannah Arendt set herself when she wrote about the Nazi 
killer Eichmann. Her objective was “to know how long it takes an average person to 
overcome his innate repugnance toward crime, and what exactly happens to him once he has 
reached that point” (1994:23).  A Human Being Died is a true account of Gobodo-
Madikizela‟s encounters in 1998with Eugene de Kock, apartheid‟s infamous killer, at Pretoria 
Maximum prison. The book falls within the paradigm of what Driver (2002) calls the 
sentimentalising concept of national reconciliation (164). Gobodo-Madikizela declares the 
purpose of her visit to the C section of Pretoria Central Prison as “to understand the inner 
mind of evil, to follow its thought processes, and to expose [herself] to its human face, 
stripped of the media stereotypes and the easy distance of hatred” (123). While A Human 
Being Died is a true account of the interactions of the author with the imprisoned apartheid 
commissioned killer De Kock, Angela Makholwa‟s Red Ink (2007) is a fictitious crime and 
prison story of the interaction of Lucy and a notorious serial murderer and rapist Napoleon 
Dingiswayo set in post-apartheid Johannesburg, South Africa. Makholwa‟s protagonist, Lucy, 
and the imprisoned serial killer Napoleon, resemble Gobodo-Madikizela‟s rendition of her 
experiences with De Kock in striking ways to the extent that it is possible that Makholwa 
owes aspects of the plot of her novel to Gobodo-Madikizela‟s book.  
 
By translating De Kock‟s purportedly “politically motivated” crimes into obvious criminality 
– that is by making De Kock equivalent to Napoleon Dingiswayo – Makholwa unintentionally 
does at least two things. Firstly, she is confirming and strengthening the juridical view that De 
Kock was guilty of an ordinary crime, and not a political one.  This goes against the grain of 
what Gobodo-Madikizela tries to claim in her book – she presents an argument that De Kock 
is a political scapegoat. So, while Red Ink copies the structure of A Human Being Died, it also 
undermines its primary contention, the idea that organises the narrative. Second, Makholwa 
translates the idea of a political prisoner unambiguously into that of what Mandela and others 
used to call the “common law criminal”. If A Human Being Died starts this process of 
depoliticisation and personalisation, it is at least aware of the fact that the political exercises a 
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complex influence on the personal. In a sense, then, Red Ink completes this trajectory – it goes 
a step further – when it removes the important framing idea of a “political crime” altogether. 
With varying degrees of explicitness, the four texts that I examine here seem to be 
participating in what Dilts calls “the well-intentioned attempt to reform and perfect the liberal 
ideal of an unencumbered, atomistic, and universal subject before the law” without recourse 
to the political redress (94).  In Human Being Died, De Kock “the quintessential apartheid 
killer” (Gordin 1998:14), is a former apartheid secret agent serving two life sentences for his 
political criminal murders of anti-apartheid activists. Although De Kock is a product of a 
particular political milieu, Gobodo-Madikizela‟s narrative ultimately deals with him as an 
individual. Similarly, Makholwa‟s villain, Napoleon, is serving five life sentences for his non-
political criminal offenses of raping, maiming and killing over 41 young women in and 
around Johannesburg. Although Makholwa indicates that Napoleon is a product of his 
fractured past and perverse environment, her narrative foregrounds his individual 
responsibility over and above the concern about the redress of the political and social 
environments that enable Napoleon‟s evolution. Gobodo-Madikizela‟s use of the first person 
narrative voice in relating her conversations and encounters with De Kock makes her 
narrative reflectively compelling. Makholwa‟s narrative is an introspective thriller told in the 
third person which derives its power from the fact that although the narrative perspective 
shifts from time to time, the focaliser is largely the heroine of the novel, Lucy Sibongile 
Khumbule, a 26 year-old public relations consultant and former journalist whom Napoleon 
invites to write his biography. The titles of both books are ominous. Gobodo-Madikizela‟s 
title, A Human Being Died that Night, alludes to one moment in De Kock‟s murderous spree 
when he is haunted by an imaginary smell on his clothes and body after he kills a family 
suspected of being ANC sympathizers in Botswana. Her subtitle, A Story of Forgiveness, 
indicates that she is operating within the paradigms of the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (TRC), which had the objectives of fostering national reconciliation through 
public confessions and forgiveness.
86
  On the other hand, the title of Makholwa‟s book 
derives from the red ink of the ballpoint pen Napoleon uses in prison to write romantically 
haunting letters to Lucy. The title also alludes to Napoleon‟s bloody career and the danger 
that Lucy exposes herself to by closely interacting with him. 
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 Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela was a commissioner in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). It was a 
TRC idea to interview De Kock. Gobodo-Madikizela eventually incorporated some of the information that she 
gathered through her encounters with De Kock into her psychology PhD thesis and she used the rest of the 
information to write the narrative that I am examining. More recently, South African literature has started to 
move beyond the logic of the TRC but its stratification was quite dominant in the early 2000s. At present there 
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1. Gendered and Hegemonic Voices in Journey to Myself and Fifteen Men   
Dobash et al indicate that in its origins and purposes the Western prison has always been a 
gendered space. They write: “From the very beginning, women in prison were treated 
differently from men, considered more morally depraved and corrupt and in need of special, 
closer forms of control and confinement” (1986:1). Ward and Kassebaum (1965: 14) claim 
that imprisonment is “more severe for women that men”, and Nawal El Saadawi (1992) 
advances the same point when she says that “the oppression which is exercised against 
women and against the poor is always greater and more brutal” (9). However, the prison 
narratives explored here suggest that female prisoners do not necessarily suffer more from 
physical and material privations more than their male counterparts, but rather that their 
“greater and more brutal” suffering is due to patriarchal and gender-based assumptions that 
govern prison relations, assumptions which prisoners have also internalised during the 
socialisation process before coming to prison. 
Interestingly, the female editors/compilers who are not prisoners themselves are also victims 
of this internalisation of a gendered understanding of human existence. For example, the blurb 
on the cover of Fifteen Men sees the process of writing the self for the imprisoned criminal as 
an act of heroism due to the self-control it requires, and the courage it calls for, to narrate the 
self for the convicted male prisoner. It reads: “Fifteen Men is a literary tribute to the power of 
quietness, and the quiet heroism of fifteen writers who dared to face the dark places of the 
mind”. Orford herself in the introduction expresses a similar view when she writes: “The 
reason people write is to give voice to the human spirit. Writing demands that one go to the 
dark places of the mind and face them” (2008:13). Although it may seem as if Orford is 
referring to the experience of writing in general, it should be borne in mind that she is 
introducing the autobiographical writing of the male prisoners in her collection. It is 
interesting to compare these comments with Landau‟s view about what writing does for 
women prisoners in Journey to Myself. She writes that the project provides “healing for the 
women and the chance to flex their creative muscles” (2004:2). Both these comments are 
steeped in unconscious gender stereotypes. While for male prisoners writing the self is an 
empowering act of quiet heroism, for their female counterparts it only provides healing 
through the flexing of mental muscles. The female prisoner is viewed as damaged or made 
sick by her imprisonment, and the male prisoner has scary dark places of the mind which can 
only be visited by heroes. A closer analysis of these two compilations indicates that this 
gendered view and experience of the prison and writing the self is not only evident in these 
193 
 
editorial comments, but permeates the actual contributed written pieces, which among other 
reasons may be evidence of editorial interventions and mediations. 
The title, Journey to Myself, suggests that the writing process enabled these women prisoners 
to engage in a confessional self-reflexive autobiographical process and discovered a hidden 
and wounded essential self. While the notion of discovery of an essential autobiographical 
self is a problematic concept on its own,
87
 as we shall see, most of the narratives in this book 
simultaneously confirm and challenge the concept of seeing the prisoner, and especially the 
woman prisoner, as a wounded victim who needs “healing”. The imagery that Landau uses to 
describe the imprisoned women equates them to the post-apartheid state, which was viewed as 
a wounded motherland that needed to be healed through discourses and social projects of 
national confession, forgiveness and reconciliation after the demise of the traumatic apartheid 
era. This impetus towards facilitating reconciliation between the prisoner and the outside 
society from which she is estranged through her confessions is obvious in Landau‟s 
introductory words. She writes: “Too often, they are women who felt disempowered and, 
taking a step in the wrong direction, ended up being relegated to the bottom of the snake pit” 
(5). Landau assumes the role of a psychiatrist who facilitates these women‟s autobiographical 
confessions, which will supposedly rid them of their emotional and psychological pain. In A 
Human Being, Gobodo-Madikizela also takes an interceding and psychotherapeutic role. In 
the closing words of her narrative, she makes an impassioned plea for mercy and empathy 
from society on behalf of De Kock. She argues that our “capacity for such empathy is a 
profound gift in this brutal world we have created for one another as people of different races, 
creeds, and political persuasions” (139). Although Gobodo-Madikizela is clearly self-
reflexive about gender roles, these intercessions may be interpreted, to use Judith Butler‟s 
terminology, as gender performance (1999:24). She ultimately fails to transcend the social 
stereotypes which depict the feminine as empathetic and forgiving, although these qualities 
are not necessarily negative. 
The fact that in its multifarious manifestations, patriarchy is a common denominator of all the 
prison autobiographical texts in the collection Journey to Myself may be evidence of editorial 
directing and prompting. This is very much evident especially in the female prisoners‟ use of 
language of nurturing affiliation and domestic support in narrating their experiences. 
Evidently, compilers bring in their particular ideas about gender, often derived from 
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epistemes that Foucault would say are deeply implicated in the dissemination of knowledge 
and power in society. However, editors‟ preoccupations with gender politics aside, the prison 
really is a gendered institution: the prison makes gender matter. Journey to Myself allows us 
to see two superimposed templates that reveal a faultline. The prisoners are forced to deal 
with sexual politics in a unisex space. Inevitably, they reflect on this experience in ways that 
are somehow but not necessarily critical of gender structures.  
This focus on patriarchy and the gendered nature of imprisonment seems to be typical of post-
apartheid or non-political prison narratives by women. What emerges from this anthology 
from both the editor‟s and the prisoners‟ writings is what Hans Toch (1992) terms the female 
inmate‟s ideal, “a pattern of advertised weakness rather than the self-image of strength and 
ability to withstand the frustrations of prison life dictated by the Manliness Myth” (232; 
emphasis in the original). Ironically, and largely in an unconscious way, most of these women 
also indict the prison as a patriarchal institution participating in perpetuating the autonomous 
but related structures which together exploit and oppress women. The inability to fully 
comprehend and openly confront patriarchy in all its different guises results in these women 
experiencing and narrating the prison with a certain level of ambivalence. The majority of the 
narrators feel that in different ways they are victims of patriarchal macroeconomic and social 
state forces, which compelled them to commit the crimes that lead to their imprisonment. 
Within this large paradigm, they express a range of unique views and perceptions about 
prison. Some see it as place from where they will emerge as better people. Others see prison 
as a place of utter physical, mental and emotional annihilation. Yet still others express 
noncommittal, nonchalant, defiant attitudes towards prison and the penal regime in general, 
and their imprisonment in particular. They are many factors that account for these different 
perceptions. The most determining factors, however, seem to be motherhood or lack thereof, 
age, race, the amount of material loss suffered as a result of imprisonment, the level of 
emotional and material support received from relatives and friends before and during 
imprisonment, level of education, and whether there is any hope of a better life after release. 
In a Journey to Myself, most of these imprisoned women represent themselves as not only 
paying for their actual crimes, but as also experiencing multiple punishments for rebelling 
against social norms of femininity. Cecilia Cox‟s autobiographical narrative “Disconnected” 
and the poem “I Remember” suggest that she experiences prison as being part and parcel of 
what Sylvia Walby (1986) calls “patriarchal structures which together compose the system of 
patriarchy” (69). In an apparent moment of disconnection, Cox rejects her socially defined 
role of motherhood and kills her own daughter and is subsequently sentenced to a fifteen-year 
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jail term. This moment of mental instability suggest intense emotional desperation. The 
killing of her child does not lead to some relief which Cox may have anticipated.  She has 
been socialised to see the nurturing role of a mother not only as natural but as sacrosanct. She 
is therefore not haunted by the long jail term per se, but by the feeling that she is not being 
punished enough for her „unnatural‟ crime. She writes: “I thought that I would be hanged for 
what I had done” (10). Through her admission of guilt, Cox experiences what Dobash et al 
call “personal subjugation” (100), or what Hans Toch (1992) terms “self-victimization” (234). 
Not only does she suffer from self-torment, the nature of her crime also ensures that she is 
disconnected from fellow criminals incarcerated with her. She reports that when she was 
transferred to Worcester prison one woman prisoner looked at her “with hostility because of 
[her] crime” (6). Her crime does not fit into the survival crimes which Landau says are 
synonymous with most imprisoned women, and therefore has the capacity to trouble the 
comfortable boundaries of normative female criminality. Her crime is stigmatised because it 
has elements of madness and transgressive violence that defy proper social containment. That 
prison has the capacity to drive one insane as a result of the malicious talk and rumours of 
fellow prisoners also comes out strongly in Nasheeba Kleinbooi‟s poem “It‟s a mad place”. 
She points out that fellow prisoners wear her down emotionally and psychologically by 
labelling her insane. 
Not only does Cox suffer from self-victimisation, the penal regime exacerbates her 
disconnection by forcibly sterilizing her a week after her conviction and sentence. Dobash et 
al‟s observation that women‟s crimes are likely to be treated as the result of a medical 
condition than men‟s is evident in that there is no parallel account in the South African penal 
history where men are castrated or sterilised for raping or killing little children.
88
 Cox‟s is not 
only held fully responsible for her crime, but she clearly undergoes a gendered experience in 
prison. In a way, by sterilising her, the prison strikes directly at what it sees, in patriarchal 
fashion, as the definition of womanhood, the womb. Cox is devastated by this loss of her 
reproductive capacity, which seems to have been central to her feminine identity, and regrets 
that she did not “die under the anaesthetic” (6). This pre-emptive action of sterilising Cox to 
prevent her from killing any of her future progeny, and the glaring lack of psychological 
therapy to get to the bottom of her bizarre crime by prison authorities, suggest that there is an 
overpowering collusion between the outside forces and the penal regime that serves to widen 
Cox‟s self-disconnection and severance from the world in general. This patriarchal logic of 
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 Although she does not mention the date of her sterilisation, Cox was evidently sterilised under apartheid 
legislation which was still in operation up to the end of 1996. Dr. Aubrey Levin‟s shock therapy and castration of 
homosexual white apartheid soldiers was clearly motivated by gender stereotypes about manhood.   
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the penal regime finds expression in the outside world in the figure of the father of Cox‟s two 
sons, who prevents the boys from visiting their mother because he “felt that it was not 
appropriate for them to come to the prison” (8). In this way, Cox shows that “the legal 
violence of the patriarchal state in the ... prisons ... plays a further role in sustaining 
patriarchy” (Walby 62). Subsequently, her confinement and the physical distance that 
separates her from her boyfriend evidently contribute to her boyfriend‟s vanishing without 
even informing her that their relationship has ended. As a result of this, Cox experiences her 
imprisonment as a paralysing disconnection from all psychologically and emotionally 
sustaining social interactions. Her prison autobiographical narratives are expressions of her 
yearning for what she feels are lost connections that can make her life whole again. Cox‟s 
narrative indicates that, for her, the prison, just like the outside, is another space of 
disorientation where it is impossible to regain lost connections. 
I have pointed out that Ward and Kassebaum (1965) argue that imprisonment is more severe 
for females, especially mothers. They observe that the “confined mother‟s concern is not only 
with separation from her children but also with how they will be cared for” (14). They further 
point out that for the female prisoner “[d]ispossession of the mother role also removes an 
important personal emotional object from the inmate” (15).89 The title of Cox‟s 
autobiographical piece, “Disconnected”, alludes to the feelings of intense disempowerment, 
sense of loneliness and isolation connected with being deprived of not only the physical care 
of her children but also psychologically, of performing her motherly role. Her inability to be 
there for her sons when they need her seems to dominate her experience of prison life. For 
example, on one occasion after being informed that her youngest son is missing, she 
experiences extremely agonizing pain.
90
 She writes: “It was as if a dam had burst. I started 
crying, and not just tears, I sobbed” (9). Natalie Bester‟s prison experience, like Cox‟s, is 
dominated by thoughts of her daughter, and whether she is being taken good care of. 
Similarly, Nicole George in “Circle of sadness” presents herself as mainly thinking about the 
welfare of her two daughters, eleven and five years respectively, and her 60-year old mother. 
She writes: “I feel stressed most of the time and I worry about my children. I am lucky in that 
my mother looks after them” (43). Thinking about these people who matter most in her life 
                                                          
 
89
 Hans Toch also concurs and argues: “A major concern of women in prison is their status of motherhood ... 
Women in confinement experience anxiety because confinement separates them from their families and renders 
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 In Strikes have Followed Me, Emma Mashinini relates a similarly agonising moment in her solitary 
confinement when she forgets the name of her own child. The incident marks Mashinini‟s most destitute moment 
in the narrative as she experiences intense “personal subjugation” and “self-victimization”.  
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seems to both paralyse her and also fill her with hope by giving her something to live for 
despite experiencing her life as a circle of sadness. Nasheeba Kleinbooi also portrays herself 
as a self-sacrificing mother, despite having an abusive and irresponsible spouse. She depicts 
herself as a victim of poverty who committed petty crimes of survival in order to feed her 
children. She writes: “I was married to an abusive man addicted to drugs ... I love my 
[children] dearly. They are everything to me. I breast-feed my son until he was two years old” 
(52). In “These are my children”, the prison is depicted as a vacuum, a space where nothing 
happens, specifically because she does not have her children with her. She writes: “In prison, 
time stands still” (54). These imprisoned women seem to be performing the normative ideal 
of motherhood for the interviewer, or the abstract social order that the interviewer represents. 
If one compares these experiences with the experiences of Magadien, a male prisoner in 
Steinberg‟s narrative The Number (2004) who also has children, it is clear that although he 
thinks of his children his prison existence is not dominated by thoughts of their welfare as is 
the case with Cox. Interestingly, Ruth First hardly talks about her children in 117 Days. 
Mandela in Long Walk to Freedom deliberately avoids talking about his wife and children – 
perhaps because it is too paralysing, but more likely because of his relentless focus on the 
political at the expense of the personal. Although there are always exceptions, the concern 
with the personal in post-apartheid narratives seems symptomatic of a nation in transition 
where there are attempts to strip the prison of its political significance. At the same time it 
allows writers the freedom to reflect on other experiences such as parenthood. 
Cox‟s narratives, like others in this anthology, show evidence of prompting and coaching 
from the convener/editor to enhance the creativity of the pieces. The formulaic structure of 
her poem “I remember” readily shows this mediating, framing, and directing. This 
autobiographical poem, made up of twenty stanzas all beginning with the reminiscing and 
contemplative phrase “I remember”, is presented as Cox‟s attempt to come to grips with her 
loss of motherhood by depicting her own childhood as having been an interconnected 
experience progressively degenerating, and climaxing in the total disconnection that results in 
her taking her own daughter‟s life and her subsequent imprisonment. This editorial prompting 
to portray the prison experience creatively is also suggested by Shireen Nazley Constable‟s 
choice of metaphors. In one of her poems, the clogged basin and broken toilet become 
metaphors of the claustrophobic prison life. She observes that despite their seemingly 
dysfunctional state, the basin and the toilet are still forced somehow to perform their 
functions. Her resigned acceptance of prison privations is problematically captured in the title 
of this poem, “It works for me” (22). The poem gives the impression that as a result of her 
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traumatic experiences outside, prison becomes an ambiguous space of physical hardship, re-
education and a refuge even, from the unpredictable and precarious existence on the outside. 
However, there is little attempt to engage critically with what can be done to redress the wider 
political and social issues that clearly contribute to her crimes and subsequent imprisonment. 
Instead there is an attempt to posit the prison as a place of education completely insulated 
from the traumatic events that characterised the outside. She writes: “Being in Pollsmoor is 
like being in standard eight all over again. I will be a better person for having experienced it 
... I feel that my life is stable, but that can be because this is a controlled environment ... I 
have fears about my release” (20-21).91 Susan Kruger also calls her prison experience an 
“education for the future” from where she will emerge and find “[b]igger things waiting for 
[her]” (65). By depicting the prison as a friendly school environment despite its lack of 
freedom and other privations, these female prisoners may be framing their experiences in a 
way that meets what they assume to be readers‟expectations. 
 The way most women depict their prison experience in a Journey to Myself is comparable to 
what Dobash et al (1986) call “voluntary committals” by 19th century Scottish women. They 
write:  
These women had not committed criminal acts, though occasionally they 
would commit crime in order to be sent to prison. They committed 
themselves because of poverty and starvation created by economic 
depression often accompanied by the desertion or ill-usage of husbands. 
(96)  
Despite their failure to seriously interrogate the connectedness of the prison with the outside, 
both Cox and Constable depict their criminal behaviour as rooted elsewhere and not in the 
incorrigibly criminal individual self. Cox‟s disconnection from herself and the world sets in as 
she becomes a young adult. In “A case of hit and run”, the title of Constable‟s 
autobiographical narrative, she imagines her disconnectedness from the world as having a 
deep-rooted psychological and sociological origin. It begins with her accidental conception. 
She writes: “I was brought into the world as the result of a hit and run accident. My father 
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 It is interesting that even political prisoners during apartheid compare prison to school. Robben Island was 
known as “the university” during Mandela‟s time there. Hugh Lewin in Bandiet (1974) claims that prison taught 
him how to be black. He writes: “Being white, it was a useful lesson to find out what it is like – in a South 
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Constable and Kruger‟s prison is the school, it does not accidentally provide the site for a revolutionary school. 
In both cases we see the prison as a place where normative knowledges are transmitted and disrupted, but in 
other respects these “schools” are instructively extremely different from one another. 
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scored with my mother and then disappeared” (14). Her accidental conception becomes a 
metaphor for her entire existence. It is implied that her lack of parental love and guidance 
makes her life resemble a rudderless ship which is aimlessly tossed hither and thither by 
contrary winds. Her narrative suggests that prison is almost an unavoidable destination for her 
seemingly aimless existence. She claims that her lack of wholeness as a child is worsened by 
the fact that she not only discovers her irresponsible white father at the age of twenty for the 
first time, but her mother too was always absent. As a live-in domestic worker, her mother 
had only one off-work day a week. Even then, when she came to see her daughter she brought 
along an abusive boyfriend who wanted Constable‟s mother all to himself. It is because of 
fatherlessness, near motherlessness, having to live with a rich but cold and loveless aunt, her 
struggle to find employment despite being a matriculant, being raped by a work colleague, 
and having an emotionally abusive boyfriend, that Constable comes to equate prison with a 
haven of peace and security. The failure to position prison alongside the traumatising outside 
experience may be evidence of the directing and framing under which Constable‟s narratives 
were written. 
While political prisoners are guaranteed of readers‟ sympathy based on the fact that they are 
fighters of social injustices, “common criminals” do so by depicting themselves as completely 
lacking in agency due to their social status of poverty or general disempowerment. This is 
what Constable evidently does above. Charlene van Niekerk also portrays both herself and her 
mother as victims of forces beyond their control. Implied in her narratives is that living in 
abject poverty and being homeless for most of her life cushions her from experiencing prison 
as an intolerably harsh space. Similarly, although prison is at the centre of Natalie Bester‟s 
brief autobiographical narrative, her confessional narrative speaks very little about prison 
privations. They indirectly engage with the prison by relating their difficult life before 
entering prison. For example, Van Niekerk‟s “From fields and open spaces” is a story of 
being abandoned by wealthy father, being raised by a poor nomadic mother who keeps having 
children because men have control over her body, and describes how Van Niekerk herself 
subsequently enters into two dysfunctional marriages which end up in divorce. During her 
childhood, she has her first prison experience as a little girl when she is sent to Faure Girls 
Reformatory. Reflecting on this experience, she writes: “Faure Girls Reformatory was another 
story altogether. It was the first time that I had a real bed – and all to myself. I was given free 
meals too” (59). Her later prison experience as an adult is therefore framed by this early 
encounter with the penal regime. Prison experience as an adult becomes something banal. She 
writes: “I was caught for stealing and sentenced to a year in prison” (60). The second spell is 
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similarly related in one sentence: “I started stealing and I was caught and sentenced to a short 
spell in prison” (62). Then her third and current imprisonment:  “I started to steal again; until I 
was caught” (62). Prison deprivations do not dominate her narrative mainly because her life 
outside resembled prison. But another reason for most of the prisoners do not focus much on 
prison deprivations is that they have to live with their fellow inmates and prison officials after 
the publication of the book. It is a case of self-serving censorship. 
In “Sometimes when I‟m happy I cry” Pamela Wagenaar earns the readers‟ sympathies by 
exhibiting candour which borders on naivety about her criminal activities. Her young age – 
she is just over twenty when she writes her account – and the fact that hers are what Landau 
calls petty crimes of survival, all seem to position her as a victim of an intolerably hostile 
environment. Her narrative suggests that at the centre of her criminal activities are a lack of 
parental guidance, poverty and social circumstances where crime is almost the norm. 
Wagenaar‟s father is arrested and imprisoned for seventeen years when she is still a toddler. 
Wagenaar‟s narrative implies that her father‟s extended absence had a debilitating 
psychological effect on her, in addition to placing the obvious financial burden on the single 
mother. She suggests that her father‟s long imprisonment locked her in an infantile stage of 
unfulfilled desire. 
This theme of childhood neglect as a major contributory factor to a descent into a life of crime 
connects quite a number of the narratives in Journey to Myself. Susan Kruger‟s “A letter of 
yearning” also implies that the emotional and psychological gap that was created by her 
growing up without parental support and guidance is responsible for her criminal behaviour. 
Growing up in a children‟s institution, abandoned by both her mother and father, makes 
Kruger very resentful and prepares her for subsequent institutionalisation in prisons. Kruger‟s 
letter registers bitterness in the veiled language of forgiveness about how growing up without 
parents contributed to her becoming a criminal drug addict who has ended up in prison. The 
letter is an ironic moment of achieving „healing‟ at the moment of loss of power. She extends 
forgiveness upon realizing that she has lost her superior moral pedestal by landing in prison. 
She writes: “I have gone from someone of whom a mother could be truly proud, to someone 
who would be ashamed to meet her mother ... Today, I ache for you. I know that when we 
meet, you will not judge me” (65). Her reconcilement with her mother through the letter also 
becomes a moment of making peace with her limiting prison environment and appealing to 
the reader not to judge her harshly for her crimes. 
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Due to their difficult childhoods, most of the women in a Journey to Myself characterise 
themselves as “finely tuned instrument[s] on which malignant forces insist on playing 
cacophonous tunes – until the delicate strings must break” (Toch 245). For example in “Circle 
of sadness”, Nicole George depicts her imprisonment as resulting from a moment of 
uncontrollable disengagement facilitated by an environment where drugs are readily available. 
She writes: 
When I was growing up, it felt as though something was missing. One 
evening, as I was sitting on a chair in the corner of our little kitchen, a little 
inside voice said, “Nicole, why don‟t you try drugs?” So, I went to a party 
and took Ecstasy. (41) 
Moreover, for George, prison is not a refuge but a loveless, impersonal, claustrophobic place 
where personal reflection is rendered impossible. She observes: “Inside Pollsmoor‟s cold 
walls, you want to be alone and have time to think, but people are always disturbing you” 
(40). Margie Orford also captures this irony of the prison when she points out that “[d]espite, 
or perhaps because of, the extreme overcrowding [prisons] are intensely lonely places” 
(2008:13). 
Similarly, Ongeluksvoël‟s use of a pseudonym shows her refusal to accept prison as a place of 
refuge, and indicates a realisation that it has the capacity to wreck her life even after her 
release. This also supports the point I make above about the way these stories are tailored to 
suit quite practical reasons. The prisoners are thinking about their welfare both inside and 
outside prison after the publication of their stories. What distinguishes Ongeluksvoël from 
most women in this anthology is that she seems to experience imprisonment through her 
middle-class background. This might also be why she chooses a pseudonym. The stigma of 
imprisonment is apparently experienced according to class: it is more damaging to be a 
middle-class person with a prison record. She experiences prison as a bewilderingly disabling 
and disempowering space, probably because of what Becker and Geer (1960) call “latent 
social identities” (306). By this they mean that the prisoner‟s response to imprisonment pains 
and deprivations is not only related to prison life but to factors that are germane to outside 
life. Describing her experience of imprisonment, Ongeluksvoël writes: “In prison, it feels as 
though your hands have been cut off. I lost my house, car, job, my friends, my children, and 
my children‟s grandparents; the only family I have” (50). Like Cox in “Disconnected”, 
Ongeluksvoël experiences imprisonment as a process of complete loss and dispossession. 
Early in the narrative she suggests that she experiences prison as a place of ceaseless torment. 
202 
 
She writes: “Ten months into my sentence and it feels like I am in hell” (47). For her, 
imprisonment is characterised by decay and lifelessness. She observes: “Like death, that is 
how prison smells” (47). It is a place where all sustaining hopes perish. “There is no way out 
for me. The room just keeps on getting smaller and smaller” (51). The prison for 
Ongeluksvoël is like a door-less room which keeps on getting smaller and smaller until it 
completely squashes her into thin paste. Ongeluksvoël‟s view of prison is close to that of 
Nicole George‟s, who declares that she feels “like something that is trapped in a cage [and 
that] life is a circle of sadness and [she is] trapped inside it” (43). In the prison of 
Ongeluksvoël and George, there is no possibility of what Raymond Suttner (2010:5) calls 
“liminal moment where one has agency”: their imprisonment is just a continuous nightmare of 
powerlessness. 
Despite the fact that some of these female prisoners, for example Cox and Bester, discount 
poverty and troubled childhoods as important factors that pushed them into crime, they 
nonetheless still employ a particular kind of victim narrative. Rather than poverty, most of the 
women in Journey to Myself suggest that they are pushed into crime by either sexual violence 
or marital problems. About her family and childhood, Bester writes: “I was born into a 
wonderful family. My childhood was magical. My parents gave us everything that we wished 
for” (28). Likewise, Cox in her poem “I remember” indicates that as a child her material and 
emotional needs were quite provided for. Male sexual violence is therefore posited as a 
determining factor in these women‟s descent into lives of crime. For example, while it is rape 
by a trusted work colleague that seems to trigger a chain of events that eventually land 
Constable in prison, Bester also suffers from a gang rape by strangers. But before that, Bester 
claims to have experienced the devastating shock of catching her cherished husband red-
handed in bed with two of her best friends. She maintains that this event so completely 
unhinged her that she descended into a life of drug abuse, drug peddling, fraud and 
shoplifting. Even in the case of Constable, who had a somewhat troubled and unguided 
childhood, ultimately her narrative implies that poverty was not a determining factor in the 
crimes that she committed. Rather, emotional and physical abuse at the hands of a well-
known and trusted male figure seem to completely disorient these women and send them over 
a precipice that ends in prison.  
Jayne Valentino‟s “Is anyone out there listening” also peddles a victim narrative. Her prison 
experience is entirely informed by the extremely violent and traumatic rape incident that she 
experiences before coming to prison. She casts her criminality as an unfortunate consequence 
of this sexual abuse and the injustice that she experiences from the penal regime when it fails 
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to convict her abusers. Her piece is both a plea for justice to be done and a cautionary tale to 
other women in the sex industry to be vigilant. She is kidnapped and raped the whole night by 
two drunken men. Although the men are swiftly arrested, the courts fail to convict them. This 
injustice is what preoccupies Valentine‟s consciousness day and night while in prison and it is 
what gives her piece the flavour of a victim narrative. Revealing what should be the feelings 
of most victims and survivors of such violence and brutal rape who fail to see justice, she 
writes: “I live with scars both inside and out. I have recurring nightmares and have to take 
sleeping tablets” (68). Her living with “scars both inside and outside” becomes a metaphor for 
her entire existence. Her economic vulnerability which makes her susceptible to repressive 
state apparatuses is foregrounded by the fact that her work in the dangerous sex industry leads 
her to drug addiction, which in turn leads to petty theft and ultimately prison.  
Similarly, Micka'yla Weideman indicates that sexual violence hound women not only before 
their imprisonment but even after their release. This is evident in her piece “There is a 
freedom within”. Her experiences confirm Sylvia Walby‟s (1986) argument that the “key sets 
of patriarchal relations are to be found in domestic work, paid work, the state and male 
violence and sexuality” (50). Her narrative has resonances with that of Helene Pastoors, a 
female political prisoner whose narrative “The Road to Solitude” is in the anthology A snake 
with Ice Water (1992). Writing after she has been physically set free from prison in 1990, 
Pastoors laments: “They say they‟re freeing their prisoners. THEY LIE ... Can you help me 
my brother, to free me? Why this endless sentence?” (19). Weideman‟s is an equally painful 
story of power abuse and endemic corruption that characterise the South African Correctional 
Services Department. The title of her narrative alludes to her world that has been turned inside 
out as a result of her prison experience. As in the case of Constable, the prison has ironically 
become more of a place of freedom and security than the outside. Avoiding the likely 
unpleasant crimes that landed her in prison in the first place, Weidenman starts her short 
account at the time when she is released on parole. She is released into the hands of a 
seemingly pleasant male parole officer. As it turns out, this man is disguising his desires since 
he is only interested in sexually abusing Weideman. As in the case of Cox, Constable, and 
Bester, Wiedeman experiences the prison through her traumatically sexed female body. Her 
poem titled “He gave me flowers” apparently refers to the parole officer who would abuse her 
and then buy her flowers as some kind of emotional blackmail. Interestingly, in this poem, she 
shows how she herself feels complicit in her own abuse and is plagued by guilt after each 
instance. She suggests that her toleration of his abuse may one day lead to her being beaten to 
death. She writes: “He bought me flowers today./ ... These flowers are beautiful spray/ of 
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white lilies and red carnations,/ the centrepiece of  on my coffin./ I wonder if this too was my 
fault?” Her narrative suggests that the sexual, emotional and physical abuses that she 
undergoes as a parolee are specifically because she is female and ultimately contribute to her 
going back to prison. 
Ongeluksvoël draws the readers‟ sympathy by using a victim narrative of a different kind 
which nonetheless is ultimately peppered by sexual abuse. The name Ongeluksvoël, which 
means “bird of misfortune” or “one who is unlucky”, alludes to a series of tragic events in the 
narrator‟s life and it suggests that she feels she had no control over the circumstances that led 
to her imprisonment. In addition to her pre-imprisonment traumatic tragic experiences, during 
her first night in prison she is sexually and physically abused by three women prisoners who 
are in prison for murder. They insert sharp objects into her genitals causing her injury which 
subsequently requires surgery. She indicates that for two years after this traumatic prison 
experience she had to see a psychologist. Her narrative suggests that the tragedies she 
experienced as a child remained at the centre of her tragic decisions which led her into prison 
on two occasions. 
Ongeluksvoël‟s use of a pseudonym also suggests that as much as one of the consequences of 
imprisonment is an acquisition of a new and forced identity; “prisoner” or “former prisoner”, 
this identity “carries a stigma that can wreck marriages and destroy employment 
opportunities” (Schreiner 1992: 6). For example, her husband divorces her while she is 
serving time in prison, adding yet another socially stigmatised identity, namely that of being a 
single mother. In the first two sentences of her narrative she boldly declares: “My name is 
Ongeluksvoël. I am a single mother serving three years for shoplifting” (47). As Sandra 
Young (2009) perceptively observes, the “liberating potential of prison narratives is 
circumscribed by the conventions (and, quite simply, the terms) of the genre, creating a 
tension around identification that, for some writers, remains insoluble” (99). Ongeluksvoël‟s 
narrative suggests that negative notions of the self, especially those acquired through one‟s 
encounter with the penal regime, have a way of stubbornly attaching themselves and at times 
even effacing more positive self-perceptions through a relentless layering process. Her 
imprisonment and prison ordeals ensure that she now understands herself as a victim of 
sexual, physical and emotional abuse and a traumatised mentally unstable single mother. 
Contrary to Scarry‟s assertion that language objectifies, diminishes and destroys pain (1985: 
51), Ongeluksvoël‟s refusal to use her real name is a realisation that no amount of voicing can 
do this. Ongeluksvoël persuades the reader to view her criminal activities and imprisonment 
within the larger frame of her being a victim of macro-forces which seem to be ceaselessly 
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driving her towards mental and emotional destruction. Commenting on her being convicted 
and sentenced for shoplifting, she writes: “The magistrate gave me three years. He knew what 
had happened to me in prison, yet he still sent me back” (50). It is significant that the 
magistrate is male, since Ongeluksvoël depicts the prison and its regimes as masculine and 
callous and as participating in the same overpowering process which characterises her entire 
existence. 
Unlike many of her fellow prisoners, in “I know I am free”, Lola Nguza adopts what may be 
called a political victim narrative to explain her descent into crime. Nguza‟s narrative 
highlights the palimpsestic survival of the political narrative even after apartheid. This 
enables her to resist confession and contrition which a purely criminal narrative seems to 
demand. Although the political victim narrative is not a dominant form in Journey to Myself, 
in Nguza‟s case, it provides a completely different kind of frame for experience, and allows 
the possibility of another kind of “I”. In a style not typical of most narratives in Journey to 
Myself, Nguza adopts a daring voice and a tone of defiance in narrating her criminal activities 
which lead to her subsequent imprisonment.
92
 She seems to attribute her criminal activities to 
lack of employment and the inherent and largely racialised economic disparities that still 
characterise post-apartheid South Africa. She views her situation as a prisoner in post-
apartheid South Africa as part of the same process which saw her mother running away from 
Cape Town in the 1980s because she was a wanted UDF activist. About her mother she 
writes: “She was on the organizing committee which was organizing a UDF rally. She had to 
leave Cape Town because the police were looking for her” (44). She seems to see this event 
as shaping her entire childhood and the choices that she makes as an adult. Her 
experimentation with drugs and house burglaries are all framed within this anti-apartheid 
narrative. Her narrative insists that there is a slippery line between activist politics and 
criminality. She suggests that apartheid penal system‟s criminalisation of people for doing 
very normal things made the boundary between the normal and the abnormal seem extremely 
flexible to her generation. In this way, she implies that apartheid prison laid down the 
foundations for present criminality. She goes on to depict prison as a space characterised by 
senseless and rigid routine. She writes: “I didn‟t know that life in prison was like this ... Life 
in prison is different from life outside. I can‟t relax in here because the sound of the keys 
constantly reminds me that I am in prison” (45-6). Despite portraying prison as a space that is 
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 This defiant stance is common with female political prisoners. For example, Caesarina Kona Makhoere in No 
Child‟s Play: In Prison under Apartheid (1988) writes: “I am tough. They did not break me” (75).  Similarly 
after relating a near psychological collapse during the 117 days she spent in detention Ruth First is triumphant. 
She writes: “[In] the depth of my agony I had won” (138; emphasis hers).   
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removed from freedom outside, she insists that she is free. Restating the title of her story she 
writes: “I know I am free. My mother struggled so that black people like us could have our 
freedom. I am free to talk to white people. My life is changing. I am free” (46). This 
insistence on the abstract freedom that she imagines she enjoys in incarceration seems to be 
an attempt at understanding why she should be imprisoned when her crime activities are 
participating in the same liberational process that her mother partook in. Her claim to be free 
therefore is a statement of defiance as there is no trace of remorse about the criminal activities 
that brought her to jail. 
Although not necessarily imbued with a political theme, Jayne Valentine‟s narrative shares 
Nguza‟s defiance in a number of ways. She proclaims herself as a prostitute and is not 
apologetic about her fall into crime. Even though she occasionally falls into the trap of 
depicting herself as a submissive female, her narrative largely challenges the stereotype that 
presents women as passive wounded victims of a monolithic and abusive patriarchal system. 
What emerges from her narrative is not her actual prison experience, but her anger, and her 
determination to survive and see justice done. She writes: “I am consumed with the desire to 
see these men behind bars where they will learn what it feels like to be raped” (68). Valentine 
sees prison as feminising. Men who are sent to prison will be abused like women. In this 
sense, the technologies and beliefs that inscribe women into a passive and victimised social 
position are in some ways analogous to the technologies and beliefs that produce the subject 
of the penal regime, whether male or female.
93
 Her narrative suggests that her self-confessed 
profession of prostitution, a trade that is illegal and still carries social stigma and moral 
condemnation in South Africa, may also have contributed to the failed conviction of her 
abusers who may have claimed that they had consensual sex. Her determination to survive 
and resist all these clearly gendered injustices is expressed by her attempt to re-open her rape 
case even as she is serving a sentence for crime herself. She writes: “I have tried from prison 
to re-open the case against the rapists. I will continue trying until someone listens to me” (68). 
Her own imprisonment is given meaning by this fighting spirit and the determination to see 
justice done. 
The collection Journey to Myself appropriately ends with Nontsikelelo Vivienne Wata‟s “The 
Dreamseller” since her story shows evidence of coaching and directing and encapsulates the 
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 There is also a constant violent aversion in male writing towards the idea of prison homosexuality, despite its 
obvious prevalence. It is seen as a “feminising” effect of the prison, and it is resisted in narrative. Probably a lot 
of contemporary homophobia can actually be drawn back to the forced proximity that colonialism demanded of 
men in mine compounds and prisons. Being “made into a woman”, which is understood under patriarchy as a 
violent and traumatic invasion, becomes analogous to disempowerment at the hands of the “feminising” 
institutions of colonialist modernity. 
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victim narrative foregrounded by most writers in this anthology. She claims that she is 
persuaded by a suave male drug peddler to travel to Brazil and carry 96 condoms filled with 
cocaine in her stomach. She then sells her dream to her 69-year old mother who swallows 24 
condoms, and her son swallows 40. Hers is a risk worth taking because she dreams big. She 
hopes to start a taxi business with her loot and retire from her R1500 a month domestic work 
in Constantia. The swallowing of the cocaine-filled condoms becomes a metaphor for the life 
of poor and vulnerable South African women who have to accept all sorts of dangerous and 
humiliating and invasive procedures in their daily struggle for survival. Later on, her ordeal at 
the hands of law enforcers of being force-fed laxatives until she miscarries (she was three 
months pregnant) also figuratively illustrates how the post-apartheid state wittingly and 
unwittingly colludes with various patriarchies to rob women of their agency and dignity. 
Wata‟s narrative shows a general inability to focus anger on anything in particular. This may 
be an indication of her general powerlessness and being overwhelmed by oppressive and 
exploitative forces. If Judith Lewis Herman (1992: 133) is correct in arguing that the “first 
principle of recovery is the empowerment of the survivor [of traumatic experiences]”, Wata‟s 
fatalistic acceptance of her powerlessness and that of a number of other women in Journey to 
Myself, may offer a sobering counterpoint to Landau‟s optimistic belief that writing provided 
these women with healing. 
The examination of the autobiographical stories in Journey to Myself show that the prison 
imposes narrative forms in a particular social context and that these forms do not only 
transform but also survive across time. Many of these women claim they are in prison because 
of socio-economic deprivation or sexual abuse. Some of these narratives suggest that there is 
a connection between class and what these women perceive as the catalyst for their crimes. 
All the narratives in this anthology are generally victim narratives that nonetheless perform a 
kind of confessional function. The content of these narratives is constantly mediated by the 
(often invisible) interlocution of the editors, who have their own agendas, embedded in 
particular historically located forms of knowledge. All this notwithstanding, these stories also 
provide real insight into the factors that drive women to the ostracisation of prison. 
2. Self-Exculpation in Fifteen Men 
While the women prisoners in Journey to Myself succeed in self-exculpation by depicting 
themselves as victims of complex familial and state patriarchal structures, the fifteen 
prisoners in Orford‟s Fifteen Men do the same by positing their age and harsh economic 
environment as determining factors in their life of crime. Except for two who are in their 
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forties, most of these male prisoners are in their mid and late twenties, and about four are in 
their early thirties. Even where prisoners are in fact older than this at the time of writing their 
autobiographical pieces, there is evidence that they first entered prison when they were in 
their early and mid-twenties. If these fifteen men can be considered a random but fairly 
representative sample of the male prison population in South Africa, this suggests that male 
criminality has a pattern. The prisoners‟ age pattern, social class and race which Orford 
meticulously documents suggests that most of what we read in Fifteen Man is a result of 
editorial prompting, directing and framing as is Landau‟s Journey to Myself. However, Orford 
is more sensitive to the issues of self-representation and the cultural processes of scripting. 
Her attitude towards her collaborators is much more ambivalent and fraught than Landau‟s. 
Most of the men in Fifteen Men place blame for how they turned out upon their respective 
social, economic and political environments. Although one‟s environment shapes one‟s 
character and influences one‟s decisions, this blame shifting may also be evidence of their 
condition of incarceration, the mediation or editorial interventions of their female editor and 
what the prisoners think their intended audience or readers want to read. This is a point 
acknowledged by Arthur Brittan who argues that how people behave depends “upon the 
existing social relations” (2001: 52). Their imprisonment puts these men in a weaker social 
position where they need the protection and sympathies of others. Orford says that several of 
these men sent their stories to their families and a few of them told her “moving stories of 
reconciliation as a result” (14). About the thematic patterns that emerge in this collection 
which she compiles and edits, Orford observes: 
The childhood unearthed, unrelentingly violent; marked by neglect, 
abandonment and the absence of nurturing fathers; by an idea of masculinity 
that is simultaneously brutal and brittle, have scripted the adult lives of these 
men. (13-14) 
Therefore, the way these prisoners write the prison and their life in crime is partly shaped by 
what they think their editor and their families want to hear. This is evident in the five pieces 
by Michael Dakets that open this collection. In “The mysterious boy” Dakets suggests that the 
mysterious boy may ultimately succumb to the temptations of crime because of the 
callousness of the society in which he finds himself. He writes: “All alone at Bob‟s Corner ... 
he stands, neglected and waiting to be seen” (17). He is hungry and poorly dressed for the 
harsh winter of the town. As he stands at Bob‟s Corner begging for food he is completely 
ignored by passers-by. “Fast the people pass him by, not looking nor peeping ... Devastated he 
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turns as he waits for another. And so the day goes by as no one bothers” (17). In the poem “At 
Bob‟s Corner” Dackets shows that the boy came to be viewed as a nuisance that scared away 
customers by Bob, the shop owner who “chased him away/ As he did not want him to stay” 
(19). Eventually the mysterious boy goes to the bins and “wasted food becomes his mother” 
(18). The disappearance of the boy from Bob‟s shop after he suffers from food poisoning, and 
the relief that Bob feels as customers start returning to his shop, all reflect the extent to which 
society is complicit to what this boy would subsequently become. 
The experiences of destitution and the neglect of the mysterious boy are a commentary on 
Michael Dakets‟s imprisonment and the ambivalent feelings of relief and guilt the community 
grapples with as he is incarcerated. The narrative suggests that the mysterious boy is bound 
for prison the same way as Dakets ends up in prison, if the community continues to ignore his 
plight and pleas for food. The fact that most of these young male prisoners feel rejected by 
society and view it as responsible for what they have become also comes out strongly in 
Clayton van Coller‟s piece “The monster within”. In a sarcastic tone, he observes and then 
asks: “They say I must become rehabilitated to meet society‟s standards, but was it not society 
itself that created the monster within?” (Fifteen Man 100). His piece is full of anger and 
accusations against the hostility that Van Coller claims society holds towards him. He writes: 
“People gave me scars, people gave me sabotage” (100). Since he believes that these 
unidentified “people” have “[d]eliberately destroy[ed his] sensibility”, the piece ends in a 
foreboding tone: “Then the monster will grow inside” (100). Robert Morrell (2001) argues 
that for black and coloured men in South Africa, “the harshness of life on the edge of poverty 
and the emasculation of political powerlessness gave their masculinity a dangerous edge” 
(18). Strangely, Van Coller suggests that imprisonment has transformed him into a loving and 
caring man but ironically it is outside society that will determine whether this transformation 
is permanent or not. This is made clear in his piece “This is who I am and want to be”, where 
Van Coller adopts an impersonal and threatening third person narrative voice and makes a 
declaration in a rhetorical question: “His first mission will be to go out of the place they call 
prison to meet society standards, but he keeps asking himself: what if society will change the 
good, strong and courageous person into a monster again?” (101). Van Coller does not see 
himself as exercising agency over what he can become, but views himself as a helpless victim 
of society‟s whims. This contrasts very sharply with the political prisoners‟ sense that they 
have complete agency over their own actions. 
In contrast to Van Coller‟s almost belligerent attitude of “I will not be a monster if you treat 
me well”, Rashied Wewers in his “This is who I am” unconditionally appeals for society‟s 
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understanding on the grounds of a shared humanity. He writes: “I am a living being just like 
you” (Fifteen Man 109). The “you” refers to any section of society which may be prejudicial 
against anyone who has the label of prisoner or former prisoner. Wewers then goes on to 
openly admit, confess and ask for society‟s forgiveness for the mistakes that landed him in 
prison. In an unconditional apology he writes: “I am sorry and I ask for your forgiveness” 
(109). He goes on to call himself “a book with a damaged cover”. Wewers may be using the 
metaphor of the book drawing from what Bhekizizwe Peterson calls the “book motif” which 
dominates the post-apartheid narratives of truth and reconciliation. He argues that both 
national and personal past experiences are cast as books that are full of traumatic experiences, 
hence the need to close them and open new ones filled with hope. Interestingly, Wewers casts 
himself as a book that has never been opened because of its damaged cover.
94
 In other words, 
he does not think his crimes and prison experiences have irreparably damaged his humanity. 
In fact he promises to make restitution for any damage his criminal behaviour may have 
caused by leading an exemplary life from the time of writing these words onwards. In 
desperate sincerity, he declares: “Indeed I have repented and promise to/give back to society 
proof of my regret” (109). In a way, most of these written pieces are different attempts at 
trying to make loved ones and society in general understand that these imprisoned men are 
humans who need to be understood and forgiven, rather than labelled and condemned. The 
sponsor of the writing project, Siri Hustvedt (2008:7), puts the above observation more 
eloquently. She writes: “The writers whose work is presented [in Fifteen Men) shatter the 
comfortable clichés that dictate so much of our perception, not only of criminals and law 
abiding citizens, but of identity itself because who we are is always multiple and often 
conflicted” (Preface Fifteen Men). 
Dakets‟s other poem, “Jessica, where are you”, captures the heart-rending loneliness that a 
prisoner feels when he is abandoned by those he loves upon entering prison. In the poem, the 
speaker is yearning to talk to his girlfriend over the phone on Saturday, since it is on 
weekends only that prisoners are allowed to make phone calls. Despite his numerous attempts 
nobody answers the phone. He complains: “I keep calling but no one answers”. The frantic 
last two lines of the poem “Jazz, please answer/ I am calling”, is a resounding and agonizing 
call for society as a whole to pay attention to the plight of prisoners. This generalised meaning 
of the speaker‟s plea is suggested by a series of rhetorical questions that he poses: “Who can I 
tell?/Who shall I ask?/Is there any help for me?” In his last piece “This is who I am”, Dakets 
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indicates that what landed him in prison is his “seeking purpose in a questionful life ... a life 
filled with people‟s sin” (21). Despite being an imprisoned criminal, he claims a higher moral 
ground and emphatically re-appropriates those tender human qualities which his 
imprisonment has put in question. He declares: “I‟m loving and caring, a person open to 
learn” (21). Interestingly, in Dakets‟ all five written pieces, the word prison or prisoner is 
completely absent. He is so immersed in it that, although he never mentions it directly, all his 
written pieces are permeated by the anxiety of his imprisonment which exists all the more by 
its absence from his narratives. 
In contrast to Dakets, who only engages indirectly with the prison in his written pieces, Paul 
Dromgoole, a 30 year-old man who has already served seven years of his 25-year jail term, 
starts with the description of the prison itself in his autobiographical piece, “Reaching 
Beyond”. Dromgoole is keen on presenting himself as an exemplary prisoner. This is why his 
narrative opens with the description of his first day at Drakenstein Maximum Prisoner after 
his transfer from Pollsmoor Remand Prison without taking the common detour of confessing 
the crimes that result in his imprisonment in the first place. He is aware that dwelling on the 
gory details of his likely murderous career which earned him 25 years in prison may lose him 
the reader‟s sympathy. Reminding the reader of Jonny Steinberg‟s description of the life of 
prison gang members in The Number, Dromgoole indicates that a prison first-timer is 
confronted by the gang menace from day one of entering prison. Despite his attempt to 
present himself as a prison novice, Dromgoole seems quite knowledgeable about the 
workings of the prison gangs. When he is confronted by the various gangs who are keen on 
recruiting him, he identifies himself as a frans or non-gang member and reports that he is 
determined to resist the pressure of joining any of the prison gangs. One old timer who is 
likely a tired and despondent ex-gang member reminiscent of Steinberg‟s Magadien Wentzel, 
tells him that to survive in prison he does not have to be a gang member. All that he requires 
are “good manners, respect for everyone and a strong heart” (24). The piece, “Reaching 
beyond”, as the title suggests, registers his victory in refusing to be swallowed by the 
pessimism that characterises prison existence and his determination to leave crime behind. 
Recalling the terrifying first day when he was pressured to join one of the contending prison 
gangs, he writes: “Seven years later and my last year as a „maximum‟ category prisoner. 
Many things have changed for the better” (24). 
Dromgoole attempts to gain the editor and readers‟ understanding by depicting prison not just 
as a space of barbarous darkness but also as space that provides opportunities for growth and 
self-improvement to a determined prisoner like himself. For example, he manages to pass his 
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matric and also participates in the project that leads to the publication of this autobiographical 
piece and another fictional one titled “Mrs Abrahams‟ last dance”. Written from the 
perspective of his mother Mrs Abrahams, this piece takes the reader back to the time when 
Dromgoole was only seven years old. In vivid language, Dromgoole describes a day in the 
difficult life of his mother as a 30-year old single parent. At the centre of these apparently 
happy childhood memories is the celebration of his mother‟s resilient patience amidst the 
economic and emotional tribulations of bringing up two children alone. Dromgoole also 
suggests that what he became is largely due to his absent father‟s irresponsibility. As the 
focaliser of the narrative, Mrs Abrahams thinks: “Why are men such untrustworthy 
slimeballs? They just dumped the children on her” (26). This dance which the story describes 
is to be the last because Aunty Betsy, who has been taking care of the children for Mrs 
Abraham, has announced “that this will be the last day she will be able to take care of the 
kids” (25). Mrs Abraham uses her last night of freedom from the kids to go for a blind date 
where she dances away a lifetime of accumulated stress and loneliness. She dances with an 
old acquaintance named Mr Lionel King who is endowed with chivalric characteristics when 
he rescues Mrs Abrahams from the clutches of a violently abusive drunk man. The irony is 
that despite blaming men for being “untrustworthy slimeballs” for always dumping the 
children with her, the story ends on a highly suggestive note that Mrs Abrahams is on her way 
to making another “fatherless” child. After their energetic and sexually charged dance which 
enthrals the crowd, the narrator says: “Lionel hugged Jenny closer to him. She drew in under 
his arm, putting her head against his chest and for a single moment she felt as light as the air” 
(31). While the story is indeed a child‟s celebration of her single mother‟s momentary release 
from care, the narrator inadvertently places her mother right into the clutches of another man, 
men who are also portrayed as responsible for her single motherhood. What he perceives as 
his mother‟s moment of freedom seems to be a projection of his own desire to walk free from 
prison and regain his mother‟s favour. In his concluding poem called “This is who I am” he 
verbalises this desire for freedom and says: “But one day when I am free/Stroll a street, touch 
a leaf/ ... Capable to pay my fee/For the writer I wish to be” (31). While her mother‟s freedom 
is momentarily achieved through an actual dance, Dromgoole‟s “last dance” is to be freed 
from prison and realise his dream of being a writer. 
The theme of mothers‟ resilience amidst the pain of being abandoned by their lovers or 
husband is also taken up by more of these imprisoned men. This romanticisation of the 
mother seems to be a prison trope rather than a reflection of reality.
95
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piece “Mothers” celebrates the strength, independence, love, tenderness and faith of single 
mothers. Single mothers are portrayed as both manly and as well as the preservers of 
posterity. Van Coller writes: “You are the shadow of a man, the walking stick of my father. 
You carry in your womb the future of tomorrow” (Fifteen Men 99). In Andile Sehole‟s piece 
“Thandi‟s father”, although apparently about a father who was shot dead while committing a 
robbery, the piece in fact celebrates Stompie, the single mother who single-handedly raises 
her daughter. In the same way Faizel, Ronaldo Plaatjies‟ friend who is killed by gangsters and 
Plaatjies himself are raised by single mothers. When Plaatjies is assailed by a hail of bullets 
from Faizel‟s killers, he is saved by one motherly and courageous woman. When everyone 
has closed their doors as the gun-toting gangsters terrorise the neighbourhood searching for 
Plaatjies, this unnamed woman opens her door and protectively calls out: “„In here boychie‟”. 
It is this selfless courage of mothers, not only in the face of hardship but even death, which 
seems to deeply touch Plaatjies and which prisoners use to masquerade their sensitivity and 
tenderness. The figure of the mother seems to be also used to fill the void that attends on the 
absence of women in the all-male prison space. 
Thandisizwe Mashwawu, in his poem “Prison”, taps from and feeds into the popular notion 
that after the democratic elections of 1994 South African prisons are transformed into places 
of comfort and not punishment and penance, and hence the alarming increase in violent 
crimes. The poem offers a thought-provoking comparison of how a prisoner spends his time 
versus that of a free citizen worker. Most of the poem‟s humour derives from the fact that a 
prisoner seems to have more rights and privileges in comparison to a free citizen. He writes: 
It is at work /Where you get fired for watching TV and playing games/It is 
in prison /Where I can watch TV and play games ... It is at work/ Where 
they are called managers/It is in prison/Where you must deal with sadistic 
wardens/Have a great day at work and I‟ll do in prison. (33) 
While the poem seems to be offering harmless comic relief, it helps the reader reflect on the 
purpose and objectives of prison and whether the South African penal regime at present is 
fulfilling these. Moreover, this suggests that there may not be that much difference between 
life inside and outside for people from particular economic class and from certain 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Bosman makes it clear that there was something insincere about the prisoners‟ show of “emotionalism”. For 
example the Dutch Reformed Church Predikant who was presiding over the service on the occasion brought 
paper labels, coloured respectively green and purple. Prisoners with living mothers were to stick green labels, 
and those with dead mothers purple ones. But what ensued was less than honouring mothers. Bosman reports 
that “through ignorance or misguided zeal” some prisoners “stuck whole rows of labels, purple and green mixed 
up just anyhow, on their jackets, like they were military ribbons” (47-8).     
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neighbourhoods. Mashwawu‟s poem indicates that some prisoners do not perceive prison as a 
complete break with normal existence and do not sense it as a place of destitution and 
complete self-loss. 
3. Manhood, Fathers, Prison and the Failed Postcolony 
The exploration of the idea of modernist rituals of the prison in the postcolony as being yoked 
to the traditional rituals of entry into manhood in Fifteen Men also seems to be a product of 
Orford‟s editorial urging and guidance. In “Becoming a man”, the now 30 year-old 
Thandisizwe Mashwawu is meditating on the emotionally debilitating effect of his 25 year-
long sentence which he got when he was still an impressionable and susceptible 18 year-old 
for the murder of his step-father. In this autobiographical prose piece, Mashwawu is 
ambivalent about the kind of masculinities that are fostered by the Xhosa cultural rituals 
associated with circumcision.
96
 He relates how three months after coming from a three-month 
long circumcision training ritual in the Eastern Cape he comes back to Gugulethu Township 
in Cape Town, and stabs his abusive step-father to death. He sarcastically suggests that 
becoming a man is concretised through heavy drinking, crime and imprisonment. He writes: 
When he came back from the Eastern Cape three months later he was a 
grown man and had totally changed. He was drinking heavy. A week 
wouldn‟t go without drinking. However drinking needed money. Sizwe 
didn‟t have any because he wasn‟t working. He ended up earning money by 
shoplifting. (35) 
This convoluted idea of manhood and how to achieve it is also captured in the short piece 
titled “Thandi‟s father” by Andile Sehole. In this piece, Thandi‟s father thinks that being a 
man is measured by his ability to make his wife pregnant. Once the wife is pregnant he 
realises that he now has to provide not only for the wife but the child who would be born. 
Since he is not employed, he decides to participate in an armed robbery as an attempt at 
making a lot of money and ensuring the financial security of his unborn child. The narrator 
says: “He was shot dead by cops in a robbery which he was doing so that he could raise up his 
unborn child” (Fifteen Men 94). Morrell observes that in South African black townships many 
boys are “brought up in a socially fractured environment with little prospect of well-paid 
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work” (22). The irony in Sehole‟s narrative is that the narrator ambiguously casts the death of 
the armed robber as an act of self-sacrificing love for his unborn child. In a way, the 
ambivalence with which Sehole characterises the dead robber depicts the writer‟s own refusal 
to be labelled a criminal. This rejection of the category criminal is openly expressed in the 
poem “This is who I am”, where Sehole writes: “My name is Andile/...Perceiving me as 
criminal,/That‟s idiotic/ghastly” (Fifteen Men 95). 
Mashwawu seems to suggest that his crime of murdering his step-father can be located at the 
interface of cultural and social definitions of manhood. As I mentioned earlier, Orford (2008) 
argues that the adult lives of these imprisoned men are scripted by an idea of masculinity that 
is simultaneously vicious and fragile (14). It is at the age of 18 that Mashwawu‟s mother 
decides that the boy is old enough to know that the violent man he has been calling father is in 
fact not his biological father. It is only then that efforts are made to locate his biological 
father, who up to now has not played any fatherly role. Despite his eighteen-year old selfish 
irresponsibility, patriarchal social structures ensure that Mashwawu‟s biological father is 
searched for so that he can bless his son for the new manhood role that he is about to assume. 
It will seem that in continuously stabbing his step-father, he is also symbolically killing his 
father who never made any material and emotional contributions for his upkeep. While his 
step-father is physically abusive, his father is even more so because he abdicated his role as a 
provider and spiritual guardian for his son. 
 That spousal abuse has an enduring psychological impact on the individuals is seen from the 
numerous times the writers in Fifteen Men seem to use it as an excuse for their own 
subsequent violent deviance. For example, Steve Sam, in his poem “My father”, indicates that 
whenever his father beat up his mother he felt like an orphan and it turned his dreams into a 
nightmare. He suggests that his father‟s behaviour had a bearing on how he turned out when 
he writes: “My past was tearing apart my future/I was feeling that I was useless as dust under 
feet” (85). These feelings of worthlessness are also evident in the violent manner in which 
Mashwawu butchers his step-father with a kitchen knife. Mashwawu‟s emotional and spiritual 
confusion is illustrated by the fact that after murdering his step-father in cold-blood he “took 
his jacket and left for the shebeen” (36). He does not seem to have any sense of regret for his 
actions at all. 
While the shebeen is portrayed as another place that produces confused and violent 
masculinities, it is revealing that it is the place where Sizwe attempts to find refuge after his 
bloody crime. During his arrest and subsequent conviction and imprisonment, Sizwe shows 
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that brutal masculinities are not only restricted to the „lawless‟ township and shebeen but that 
it permeates the entire South African social fabric, including the penal regime. The manner of 
his arrest shows a dramatic valourisation of violence within the police force. He is arrested by 
“[f]ourteen armed men” (36). There is a sense in which there is dramatisation of violence in 
the way the police officers go about their arrest of an eighteen year old, who at the spur of the 
moment killed his step-father with a kitchen knife. The violence is re-enacted by the prison 
officers when he arrives at Pollsmoor after his sentencing. Yelling obscenities the guards 
shout: “Welcome to Pollsmoor Max Prison! We are going to see that you like it here” (37). 
The narrator shows that the prison warders‟ words are ominous and are not empty threats but 
a sure promise of violence which reigns supreme in the Pollsmoor prison cells. Describing 
their welcoming ceremony at the hands of prison guards he writes: 
Everything was a rush, everything had to be done in a hurry under the 
constant menace of being beaten ... Anything of value was confiscated. 
Sizwe‟s watch which was a present from his mother when he came back 
from circumcision school, attracted a guard‟s attention, and he almost broke 
Sizwe‟s wrist as he ripped it off him. (37) 
The ripping of the watch, a symbol of his newly attained manhood, indicates that he is 
entering into a zone where his manhood would be redefined. This is a place where another 
kind of time predominates, where one does not need a watch because one‟s time is profoundly 
regimented. This also links to the idea of prison as an “unmanning” space. In this sense, the 
violent, insensitive and corrupt masculinities that Sizwe experiences at the hands of his 
abusive step-father, biological father and is inducted into through his circumcision; run full 
circle as he has to confront them again in prison. In prison, Sizwe starts “praying and seeking 
God‟s help” (38). His definition of manhood undergoes a complete re-conceptualisation as he 
is converted to Christianity, and instead of using kitchen knives to solve problems he starts 
speaking of “the sustaining grace of the Lord” (38). But this conversion seems to be a result 
of Sizwe‟s being forced to contemplate his mortality and vulnerability when he is almost 
beaten to death by prison warders (Morrell 2001:31). Moreover, this story of conversion 
seems to be specifically framed by the intention of winning the hearts of Mashwawu‟s 
readers. 
In his poem “Shame”, Rashied Wewers deflects some of the blame for his criminal activities 
that land him in jail onto what he characterises as a failed post-apartheid state. He insists that 
the lawlessness which characterises township and ghetto lives should be viewed within the 
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context of the prevalent corruption of the “[f]athers, the builders of the nation” who have 
become “the destroyers/Of our future, tsunami of all mankind” (50). He points out that in 
post-apartheid South Africa it is “[h]ard to find positive role models/Politicians [have] turned 
to corruption” (50). The poem suggests that as long as the majority of South Africans 
continue to lack economic empowerment “13 years after” the fall of apartheid it will be “hard 
to send little ones to the shop/They are going to be victims/Tomorrow‟s headlines” (50). 
Steve Sam‟s poem “When things fall apart” also takes advantage of this popular notion of 
portraying post-apartheid crime as a symptom of a failed post-colonial state. While Chinua 
Achebe‟s novel Things Fall Apart is preoccupied with the fall of pre-colonial states at the 
direct assault of colonial invasion, Sam sees the same fall in post-colonial/post-apartheid 
[South] Africa as “[r]ebels and autocrats take over on this continent” (85). The result is that 
Africa becomes “just a continent of disease and poverty” because its autocrats “are corrupt 
like wine made from the venom of snakes” (85). In this way, Sam situates his descent into 
crime and prison in the social realm of a continent plagued by a leadership crisis and not as a 
manifestation of individual pathology. 
The theme of lack of leadership both at the family and national level as the explanation for 
crime is further pursued in Ngxeke‟s “I‟ve been there”. The narrator finds himself in the cold 
and violent streets of Cape Town because his father plunges the family into homelessness 
when he gambles everything away. Despite living in a “beautiful city with lots of sites” (50), 
he has no means to enjoy them. He writes: “I have been here in Cape Town for ten years and 
I‟ve been living off handouts for ten years” (50). In the freezing Cape Town winter, the 
desperate narrator chooses what Dobash et al call “voluntary committal”. He writes: “I used 
to use prison as my motel. I would break a window of a shop and admit it at court. They 
would give me two months sentence or more. I was always back on the street after winter” 
(53). Although it can provide shelter and warmth, prison is a home “in ashes” for it can 
neither teach “religion, tradition  [nor] norm” (54). Ngxeke‟s yearning for safety and security 
which the prison does not provide is seen from the rhetorical question that he asks: “With 
whom will I find refuge?” (54). He points out that the street kids who later become criminals 
are just youngsters who lack proper guidance from responsible grown-ups. He observes: 
“They (street children) are just confused youth looking for something better in life, in a wrong 
place at the wrong time. They just need someone older to show them the right side of life” 
(53). Using himself as an example he shows that most street children long for home. But most 
often the fathers are either absent or violent and abusive alcoholics. The painful irony of 
course is that in an attempt to gain “freedom and control” in the streets, the street children 
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discover that they are “not different from [their] father[s] although [they were] so determined 
to make a difference” (54). 
The sense of displacement that the prison engenders for these mainly youthful prisoners and 
the desire for reassuring father figures is also captured in Ronaldo Plaatjies‟ poem “In the 
absence of the father”. As in the case of Ngxeke‟s father, who abandons his family as he 
seeks the solace of alcohol, Plaatjies‟ father also “succumbed to lustful pleasures” leaving his 
wife “forsaken” and his offspring “without a leader” (67). In the case of Plaatjies‟, however, 
the mother quickly takes the abandoned reins as “[s]he embarks on the unforgiving road/With 
a heart that still aches” (67). Plaatjies‟ mother‟s leadership is admirable. In a tone full of 
admiration, respect and love for his mother Plaatjies writes: “The household now with a 
leader/And she‟s outdone her predecessor” (67). Unlike the proverbial home which collapses 
in the absence of a father, Plaatjies‟ mother provides leadership which negates the stereotypes 
which portray a woman who crumbles as soon as she is deserted by her husband. 
While Ngxeke wins the reader‟s sympathy by depicting a father who abdicates his 
responsibilities, Malusi Nkohla achieves it by portraying himself as a prodigal son. He calls 
his father “a hero and breadwinner” (57). In contrast to the alcoholic father of Ngxeke, 
Nkohla‟s father “is not drinking and he is not smoking” (57). The father provides guidance 
and leadership to his family. Nkohla writes: “My father likes to create communication with 
his family by calling each and every member of the family for a meeting” (57). This is the 
kind of a father that Ngxeke says street children need but do not have. In an endearing tone 
Nkohla writes: “My father is a role model” (57). Nkohla‟s short and only piece helps the 
reader appreciate that children do not necessarily end up in crime and prison because of 
hostile home environment. Despite having a father that he „respects very much, a man he talks 
to when he has problems‟, Nkohla still finds himself in prison. 
Sakhumzi Sakhu Nonnies wreaks havoc on the reader‟s emotions by depicting the prison as a 
place where he hears his name being called by mixed, unidentifiable and haunting voices. The 
paradoxical nature of the prison is captured in that it calls his name in a “scary, sweet, soft, 
murmuring ...voice”, and at other times the prison‟s voice is “[a]nxious, curious [and] 
excited” (59). This uncanny voice evokes deep pathos in Nonnies and makes him cry. At the 
same time as it emerges and disappears, it shocks him to the core. Nonnies‟ being deeply 
traumatised by the prison is captured in his other poem titled “My father”. In this poem where 
he uses terms similar to those of Nkohla by calling his father a “role model, example and a 
go-getta” (61), Nonnies also refuses to name the prison and merely calls it “a place like this” 
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(61). In contrast to the indistinct voice of prison which appears and disappears, his father‟s is 
“pure and clear” (61). Where the prison‟s voice is anxious, curious and excited, his father‟s is 
“loving, generous [and] gentle”. While being in prison is “a temporal thing” (61) for Nonnies, 
being his father‟s son is forever. In a desperate voice which captures his youthful fear of 
being rejected by his father and bewilderment at being bereft of fatherly love and guidance, he 
tells his father: “For me being your son I‟ll always be/For together we‟ll always be/As we 
belong together” (61). This desire for a dependable and loving father-figure by Ngxeke and 
Nonnies, results from their experiencing prison as a place of intense deracination. 
In his piece “The father‟s pain”, Clayton van Coller displays an ambivalent view of his father 
in comparison to the views of Ngxeke, Nkohla and Nonnies. The piece is set up in the form of 
a conversation between the father who was never there for his son, and the son who is now in 
prison. The piece opens with two paragraphs where the father is apparently expressing his 
regret for abandoning his child before he was even born. The remorseful and apologetic father 
declares: “My body was not there when you were born, but my heart and soul were there. I 
am not worthy to be called your father. I couldn‟t afford to buy or send you nappies” (97). 
Masking his seething anger in the rhetoric of forgiveness, the son responds: “My father, even 
if you schemed to get away from my mother, I don‟t blame you but I know out there you are 
thinking of me” (97). The son indicates that he has learnt forgiveness as a result of the 
hardships he has faced. He says: “Through chains, pains, gates and jails I have learnt to be 
your son and you my father” (97). Van Coller is plagued by the pain of the fatherless 
childhood that he was subjected to and seems to wonder whether his life would have turned 
out differently if he had had a responsible father. Indicating that fatherhood lies in 
performance and not only in name, van Coller says: “A father is a caring man. He walks 
around the earth like the sun. He is obedient, caring and supportive” (97). Van Coller‟s 
volcanic anger comes through in the question that he immediately directs to his father after 
spelling out the above definition of fatherhood. He asks: “But where were you?” Then in a 
statement that seems directed to all fathers in general, he admonishes: “If you are a father, 
treat your loved ones with love” (97). The irony of course is that noted by Ngxeke above, that 
most of these jailed young man soon discover that they are not different from their fathers 
although they were so determined to make a difference. 
4. Ghetto-Township Streets and Prison 
Loïc Wacquant (2009:198) argues that the ghetto and prison “belong to the same genus of 
organizations, namely, institutions of forced confinement”. He further observes that “the 
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ghetto is a manner of „social prison‟ while the prison functions as a „judicial ghetto‟”. That is 
exactly how some of the writers in Fifteen Men seem to experience the post-apartheid 
coloured ghetto, black township and prison. The stereotypical depiction of the post-apartheid 
streets of the black township and the coloured ghetto as unpredictable, chaotic and violent by 
a number of prisoners in Fifteen Men seems aimed at appealing to the heart of the female 
compiler and editor of the anthology. Similarly, any reader also unfamiliar with the life in the 
townships and ghettos is likely to be intrigued and drawn in by the tragic lived experiences of 
these incarcerated men. Frederick Moses‟ two pieces “14th Avenue, Elsies River” and “In this 
place”, speak of the ubiquitous violent masculinities in the coloured ghettoes of Cape Town 
which ultimately results in the premature death or imprisonment of many young men. Moses‟ 
autobiographical piece “14th Avenue, Elsiesriver” relates the events of 1995 when his friend 
was shot dead and he himself was shot and wounded by unknown male assailants while 
relaxing at the corner of 14
th
 Avenue in Elsiesriver. The story is painfully similar to Ronaldo 
Plaatjies‟ “The day that sticks”, which relates how his friend‟s skull is shattered into 
fragments by a hail of bullets while they are driving through Mitchell‟s Plain. In both stories 
the unidentified assailants are never caught, suggesting that the majority of “[m]urderers, 
rapists, stranglers, thieves and savages” (45) may actually be outside prison rather than inside. 
This complicates the conceptualisation of a rigid boundary between society as a place for law 
abiding citizens and prison as a place for criminals. It is also interesting that in many of these 
stories men locate their criminality on the streets while in Journey to Myself the majority of 
women situate theirs in the domestic space. This implies a gendered experience of space. 
Clearly, although these prisoners largely play to the gallery, there is a sense in which their 
narratives deconstruct and subvert the editor‟s and the ethnographic reader‟s expectations. In 
“In this place”, a euphemistic reference to the prison, Moses grapples with the identity crisis 
and condemns the labelling processes that an accused person experiences as he goes through 
the penal regime. He writes: “Frederick is my name and prisoner I am” (45). As much as 
one‟s name has a way of attaching itself microbe-like in one‟s consciousness, Moses suggests 
that the designation prisoner has a way of permanently etching itself upon the individual‟s 
notion of the self. While he cannot contest the designation prisoner because he is in prison, he 
contests other labels that attempts to dehumanise him. In a sarcastic tone he exclaims: “They 
call me a beast! ... Murderers, rapists, stranglers, thieves and savages are we called by them” 
(45). He indicates that these “they” and “them” are “[j]udges who sentenced [him], and the 
society who went along with it” (45).  Challenging these views which he sees as biased, he 
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asks a series of questions which seek to establish his humanity alongside that of all members 
of society. He asks: 
Does a beast smile like I do? Can it feel lonely like I do? And can it miss 
someone like I‟m missing my family? Can a beast get afraid like I do? ... 
Does a murderer cry like me?  ... If I pray all your lost souls out, then, when 
I pray, am I a savage? (45) 
Since these questions suggest that he is no worse that free members of society, Moses seems 
to be calling for a re-conceptualisation and redefinition of society‟s crippling labels on those it 
regards as incorrigibly deviant because they are in or have been to prison. 
What gives Moses‟s and Plaatjies‟s narratives a disturbing quality is that as much as their 
narratives show that prisons are over-populated by prisoners, the streets are similarly filled 
with murderers, rapists, stranglers, thieves. This is seen in how Moses emphasises the 
ubiquitous fear that characterises people‟s lives in his community, which is filled with 
senseless violence that occurs in the streets where people are going about their everyday 
business of living. We are reminded here of how Steinberg indicates that towards the end of 
apartheid period the Number prison rituals spilled over into the streets and the prison Number 
gangs themselves became indistinguishable from street gangs. Capturing the banality of 
violence of the post-apartheid ghetto streets,Moses writes: 
We were enjoying ourselves. Music was playing, some were dancing while 
others were busy pouring drinks. Everything was cozy as we were chilling, 
making jokes and laughing at each other ... People were moving up and 
down the street, children were playing in the park. (41) 
Without warning, guns start barking and bullets wheezing through the air. Similarly Faizel, 
Plaatjies‟ friend, is shot dead at the traffic lights. Moses and Plaatjies insist that it is in these 
homely scenes that the beastly predominates, and not necessarily in prison. As we have seen 
earlier, Moses and Plaatjies show that these aimless and terrorist-like attacks are committed 
by people who may never see the prison door. 
Mario Rousseau‟s thrilling story of participating in the endemic gang wars in the streets of 
another coloured ghetto, Bonteheuwel, is presented as a repentant confession that appeals to 
the reader‟s understanding and forgiveness. He relates how at one time in 1996 some parts of 
Bonteheuwel became warzones as gangs fought for turf. He writes: “[O]ur township was 
upside down with violence and blood, with gang kids running up and down with guns and 
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knives, and families waiting for their last” (79). After escaping being shot dead by the 
opposing gang, Rousseau proudly declares that he went to his friend who had a gun and then 
they went shooting “through the enemy lines to take [their] stand in the war” (81). During the 
three-year “war” period Rosseau and his friends survive on “[s]tealing, killing and robbery” 
(81). Their motto was: “If you don‟t kill, you‟re going to be killed so stay alive!” (81). 
Rousseau insists that it is the streets that shape the prison. He writes: “I just went on living in 
prison the way I lived outside – fighting for survival” (82). Wacquant‟s perceptive comment 
has resonants with Rousseau‟s above words. He argues that “ghetto and prison tend to evolve 
relational patterns and cultural forms that display striking similarities and intriguing parallels” 
(198).  In order to massage the consciences of some readers who may be overly disturbed by 
his melodramatic narrative of crime, Rousseau makes sure that there is a twist to his life story. 
After being badly beaten and put in isolation for stabbing and sending a fellow prisoner into a 
six months coma, he claims that he gets a personal visit from God and Jesus. The encounter is 
so vivid that Rosseau refuses to give details. But the crux of the divine visitation is that it 
provides him with a choice between life and death. His story ends with an apparent victory of 
life over death. He declares: “I chose life” (83). The title of his piece “Locked up but set free” 
expresses this spiritual freedom that he claims he now experiences even though still in prison. 
Mthetheleli Mcebisi Ngxeke, who has four creative pieces in Fifteen Men, solicits the reader‟s 
sympathy by characterising post-apartheid South Africa as a one-way street that leads to 
crime and ultimately prison, especially for a black homeless street child like himself. All his 
pieces bear out Morrell‟s observation that “township youth generally live dangerous lives on 
the edges of crime” (24). In “Lansdowne Road”, this long and busy road which stretches from 
Lansdowne and weaves through almost all of Cape Town‟s black townships, all the way to 
the end of Khayelitsha, becomes a metaphor for the post-apartheid black condition. While it 
connects and intersects through black township, it has become a deadly trap where one can 
meet untimely death from speeding cars, a stray bullet from bus and taxi drivers who “fight 
about this same road” (47), or at the hands of daring desperate young criminals. About one 
particular spot along this road near Mxenge from Gugulethu, the narrator of “Lansdowne 
Road” says: “This place is famous for its activities. People are being killed, raped, robbed of 
their possessions. Even their body parts” (47). Ngxeke‟s narrative, which he produces while 
serving a long prison sentence, implies that it is in this violent way in which he is forced to 
eke out his livelihood. 
In “Street crisis”, Boebie Samodien elicits the reader‟s sympathies by depicting the post-
apartheid ghetto streets as places of tragic turn of fate. In the story, the narrator is standing in 
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front of his house and witnesses a gangster he knows very well reversing his car at high speed 
oblivious of the danger he posses to a toddler innocently walking into the edge of the street. 
The irony of the story is that although the narrator is the hero of the occasion as he saves the 
toddler from being run over by the car, he ends up being perceived as the criminal and is 
arrested by the police. In a moment of uncontrollable rage he knocks down the reckless driver 
who in turn produces a gun. The gun ends up in the hands of the narrator, and when the police 
arrive they arrest him for attempted murder and possessing an obviously unlicensed firearm 
which had likely been used to commit numerous crimes. Rashied Wewers‟ “On the streets” is 
similarly aimed at manipulating the reader‟s feelings. In this story the narrator is savagely 
attacked by school-going, glue-sniffing kids as he walks “joyfully down Van Zyl Street” 
(Fifteen Men 108). He ends up with broken ribs and jaws as he refuses with his wallet and 
watch which the young criminals are demanding. The criminals beat him unconscious, and to 
cap it all, put an unlicensed gun in his pockets so that when the police arrive they would 
assume he is a criminal beaten up by neighbourhood vigilantes. 
Finally, the prison‟s portrayal as a determined but failed attempt at making a difference in 
these youthful prisoners‟ lives of crime seems to be a product of Orford‟s indirect influence 
upon these imprisoned men. This is seen in Plaatjies story “The morning after” which can be 
read as a metaphor of what happens to most of these young prisoners when they are uprooted 
from society into the „protective custody‟ of the prison. The narrator, who in his other piece, 
“My landscape”, describes the Newlands Forest as providing him “with peace and serenity 
because of the untouched beauty that it holds” (63), depicts himself as an intense nature lover. 
In one of his forays into the mountain he finds a bird nestling in its nest and takes it home 
because he thinks that he can provide it with better care and protection. However, when he 
calls his friend Pedro the next morning to come and celebrate his new find with him, he is 
terribly disappointed. Pedro is infuriated when the narrator tells him that he is going to raise 
the bird. He points out that “by taking the bird out its natural habitat [he] had decreased its 
chances of a healthy life, because it needed its mother” (65). In the end, Pedro convinces his 
friend to take the bird back to its natural habitat. Without mentioning a word about prison, 
Plaatjies‟ story seems to suggest that no matter how good the intention of the penal regime, 
ultimately the prison decreases the chances of a “healthy life” for its youthful occupants. This 
view of prison seems to coincide with Orford‟s. Commenting on her own political 
imprisonment experience in 1985 she completely rejects prison as an institution of 
rehabilitation. She says: “For me that prison experience was the before, of my life, and then 
the after. A watershed. I found it unbearable being incarcerated” (Wordsetc 2010: 32). The 
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prison that emerges out of Fifteen Men therefore belongs to Orford, as much as to the fifteen 
men themselves.  
5. Prison, the Writer and Dis/Continuities of Dysfunctional Masculinities in A Human 
Being Died and Red Ink. 
Among other things, both A Human Being Died and Red Ink are also about how the criminal, 
prison, and unstable masculinities are products of, inscribe themselves into and perpetuate 
themselves through social structures.97 By adopting a functionalist view of social structures, 
Gobodo-Madikizela‟s and Makholwa‟s narratives suggest that the twisted view of manhood 
can initially be located in childhood characterised by dysfunctional families or abusive 
parents. Gobodo-Madikizela observes: “De Kock‟s childhood was marked by emotional 
abuse at the hands of his father” (55). Red Ink also indicates that the mother of the 
Dingiswayo brothers was an abusive alcoholic and that they subsequently suffered abuse at 
the hands of foster parents. Napoleon, the imprisoned rapist murderer, says to Lucy: “D‟you 
think I was born like this? Do you think God decided, yes, this one is going to spend most of 
his life in prison? No. It is people who have made me like this. From my mother to the rest of 
the stinking poison that kept on appearing in my life over and over again” (60). Makholwa‟s 
narrative suggests that malformed notions of manhood are at the heart of violent crimes 
against women, and the general ubiquity of violent crime in the post-apartheid state.98 More 
importantly for the purposes of my study, both narratives are about how the criminal and the 
prison relentlessly haunt the individual, specifically the female writer, and how they possess 
the entire logic of post-apartheid South African state. 
As in Orford‟s Fifteen Men, in Makhowa‟s narrative the post-apartheid street is not only the 
location of many crimes but also has a symbiotic relationship with prison. That the prison 
haunts the streets, and vice versa, is dramatised by the fact that the very first time Khumbule 
                                                          
97
 Makholwa seems to adopt Freud‟s “pleasure principle” model to explain Napoleon‟s and Sifiso‟s violent 
crimes. Freud insisted that the ego‟s goal is to avoid unpleasant states of mind. But since victims of childhood 
violence like Napoleon and Sifiso lack the ability to avoid their traumatic experience, their ego solves the 
problem by identifying with the aggressor. According to this theory, the helpless victim of previously traumatic 
experience turns it into a pleasurable one when he steps into a position of action and power and becomes the 
perpetrator of violence. (See Sigmund Freud‟s Beyond the Pleasure Principle and Anna Freud‟s The Ego and the 
Mechanisms of Defense, vol. 2 ). Gobodo-Madikizela subscribes to the same model and argues: “Whether 
individuals turn out this way or that depends on a complicated set of factors, one being whether they are 
„violently coached,‟ another whether they are exposed to positive experiences that can help mend the humiliation 
they suffered and restore their sense of identity” (2003: 57). 
 
98Katharine Wood and Rachel Jewkes (2001) observe: “Power relations between men and women take multiple 
forms, but in South Africa they are commonly manifested as and imposed through sexual violence. An estimated 
1.3 million rapes take place each year” (“Violence, Rape, and Sexual Coercion: Everyday Love in a South 
African Township” in The Sociology of Masculinity , 2001) 
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steps into prison to meet Napoleon for their proposed book project, her life is turned into a 
nightmare. When Khumbule announces her book project to Patricia Moabelo, her business 
partner, Patricia has a sense of premonition and tries to dissuade her from doing it. When 
Patricia wisely points out that Napoleon is a psychopath who will get her into trouble, 
Khumbule naively retorts: “„I‟ll take my chances, remember, he‟s in jail and I‟m not‟” (21). 
On another occasion, thinking about the possible danger that Napoleon could pose to her, 
Lucy concludes: “Behind bars he was, after all, no more harmless than a trapped mouse” (44). 
Lucy naively imagines that there is something final and permanently secure when a person is 
serving a life prison sentence. Ironically, it is Patricia who is subsequently brutally murdered 
at the orders of Napoleon after Lucy inadvertently confides in Napoleon about how she has 
become selfish and only wants to give her thirty percent share of the company instead of the 
forty percent they had initially agreed upon. Her gullible view of the prison as a space of 
complete isolation and utter powerlessness prevents her from linking Patricia‟s murder with 
her interaction with the incarcerated Napoleon. The novel thus explores the reach of the 
prison beyond its apparently impermeable boundary. Fiction is perhaps a good way of making 
this case precisely because it allows us to model complex chains of human interaction with 
great specificity. 
As for Napoleon, who is in some ways De Kock‟s fictional counterpart, the prison becomes 
for De Kock a space that is simultaneously empowering and disempowering. Firstly, it results 
in his real physical confinement and the hopelessness that forced introspection engenders. 
However, as he uses his prison time to grapple with his past and present condition, the prison 
is transformed into a launching pad for his battles against politicians who used him as a cog in 
the apartheid death machine only to dump him when he became a liability. What the 
imprisoned De Kock is able to achieve proves the truth of Robert Morrell‟s (2001) 
observation that “power is exercised differently depending on the location and the specific 
arrangement of the relations which are in place” (9). De Kock exercises some measure of 
agency by telling the world what he considers to be the extent of apartheid government‟s 
involvement in his criminal offenses. The book that he writes in collaboration with Jeremy 
Gordin, A Long Night‟s Damage: Working for the Apartheid State (1998), is a powerful tool 
that exposes the extent to which apartheid crimes are not reducible to the individual.  Gordin 
writes: “De Kock was merely a continuation of apartheid by other means” (1998:15). The 
moment of writing the book is also empowering since it allows De Kock to articulate in 
language his lived experience of what apartheid meant for him. Gobodo-Madikizela‟s A 
Human Died also serves as evidence that the prison, and his collaborative life writing 
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projects, help to empower De Kock and to a certain extent allows him to see the futility of his 
past murderous actions and state wars in general. Using the self-objectifying third person 
narrative voice to describe the time he spent serving the apartheid regime, he says: “[I]t‟s not 
a life … It‟s not even an existence. You are in some twilight world of no peace, no rest, no 
trust, nothing. Nothing, nothing, nothing, nothing” (109). Being confined in prison does not 
only sober him up by forcing him to take stock of his vain life of violence, it also gives him a 
national audience through the books that he collaborates in writing. 
Although society tries to exclude the prison from everyday life on the outside, Makholwa‟s 
and Gobodo-Madikizela‟s narratives show that both the prison and the outside exist in a state 
of ambivalent mutuality. For example, both writers are drawn to the prison because they hope 
it is an interesting enough subject to draw a sizable readership. Makholwa‟s protagonist, 
Lucy, unashamedly ignores all her moral qualms about being involved with a sex offender 
and murderer because she hopes that Napoleon‟s notoriety will establish her as a writer. As 
the focaliser, Lucy muses: “She‟d give this venture her best shot ... she might end up being an 
accomplished writer” (44). It is interesting here that Lucy needs Napoleon for her own 
purposes as much as Napoleon wants her to “numb the boredom of his lonely life” (44).  
Makholwa engages in a self-reflexive process as she uses the topics of criminality and 
imprisonment to sell her book. Unlike Gobodo-Madikizela‟s A Human Being, Makholwa‟s 
Red Ink is a work of fiction and not an empirical document. Through her fiction, Makholwa 
seems to addresses a number of popular conceptions about criminality and imprisonment in 
the post-apartheid moment. She is not speaking from “inside”; yet her idea of what it is like 
“inside” is interesting because it is one put together from books such as Gobodo-
Madikizela‟s, newspaper stories and everyday discussions. As such, it represents a popular 
understanding of the prison, rather than an informed exegesis of its operation. 
In Gobodo-Madikizela‟s case, De Kock‟s life and imprisonment offer themselves as excellent 
material for her PhD research and her career as a psychologist. Her prison encounters with De 
Kock proved extremely rewarding in advancing her academic career. She writes: “I started to 
see my work on de Kock as culminating in two processes, one that would be purely scholarly 
(a Ph.D. thesis) and another that would be a deeply personal account of my conversations 
with de Kock – this book” (170). Makholwa‟s novel and Gobodo-Madikizela‟s narrative 
illustrate that the post-apartheid prison is a space where the “outside” is shown to exist in a 
parasitically symbiotic relationship with the prison. 
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Makholwa‟s novel demonstrates that the relationship between the “outside” and “inside” is 
not benign at all in the post-apartheid environment. Lucy‟s underestimation of the prison‟s 
virulence leads to disastrous consequences, as we shall see. When one of Lucy‟s friends, 
Fundi, is hesitant about accompanying her to see Napoleon because she suspects that the 
prison has dangerous links with the outside, Khumbule reasons: “[R]elax Dingiswayo‟s 
harmless. Remember, he‟s behind bars, we‟re not, so don‟t give him too much power” (Red 
Ink 105). On an earlier occasion she imagines that behind bars Napoleon is “no more harmful 
than a trapped mouse” (44). Soon, however, it becomes clear that the imprisoned Napoleon 
does not only enjoy disturbing patriarchal power over his female interviewer, but also still 
rules the streets. While Lucy thinks that Napoleon is under her benevolent control, he is busy 
tricking her into playing the role of a gullible lover. Gobodo-Madikizela similarly treads on 
that slippery ground when she empathetically touches De Kock‟s hand. On another occasion 
she is tempted to give the apparently agonized De Kock a hug.  In Napoleon‟s case, that he is 
deeply satisfied by the power games that he is playing with Lucy is seen when he muses that 
it is “better to observe from inside”. He assumes that his imprisonment offers him more 
insight and wisdom about the prison‟s interconnectedness with the power structures of the rest 
of society. De Kock also wastes no time in gaining psychological mileage over Gobodo-
Madikizela as a result of her lapse in professionalism by touching his “trigger hand”. 
Gobodo-Madikizela‟s interaction with De Kock helps her realise that although he may be a 
murderer serving two life sentences, their relationship is still governed by rigid and 
condescending patriarchal notions about gender roles. This helps us see what Sylvia Walby 
(1986) means when she argues that “patriarchal relations form a system, and are not confined 
to discrete occurrences in specific social institutions at isolated points in time and space” (52). 
Gobodo-Madikizela points out that although De Kock “revealed even the most gruesome 
details of his life story in a book written by Jeremy Gordin” (27) he seems reluctant to do so 
when talking to Gobodo-Madikizela. In one of their meetings De Kock has an expression of 
embarrassment on his face and avoids eye contact with Gobodo-Madikizela, apologising 
profusely for being unshaven. Clearly De Kock thinks that it is not gentlemanly to appear 
“unshaven before a lady”.  Gobodo-Madikizela interprets this as an “alarming irony of being 
concerned about rules of social etiquette when one has violated some of the most fundamental 
tenets of morality” (49). What is also obvious is that what Gobodo-Madikizela calls “rules of 
social etiquette” are not just innocent moral tenets but are deeply entrenched patriarchal 
relations of power which allow the imprisoned De Kock to exercise some measure of control 
over Gobodo-Madikizela. Summing up the assumptions which seem to govern her 
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relationship with De Kock, Gobodo-Madikizela observes: “[D]e Kock‟s discomfort 
concerning the details had something to do with my being a woman; ... he perceived my 
sympathy for him and was afraid that if we focused on the gory particulars of his past, he 
would lose it” (28). This is the same relationship which I have argued exists between Margie 
Orford with her fifteen imprisoned male writers. Ironically, De Kock experiences Gobodo-
Madikizela‟s feminine empathy as both empowering and emasculating. “He was more 
comfortable seeing himself as an actor or initiator than as the object of another‟s compassion” 
(Gobodo-Madikizela 42). In so far as prison takes away his agency, De Kock experiences 
prison as a feminising space. In Red Ink, despite suffering from the agonies of confinement, 
Napoleon also holds similar patronizing masculine views about Lucy. He takes a great deal of 
liberty with Lucy, something that he would not dare do to a male interviewer. For example, 
during their second meeting, Napoleon steals a quick kiss on Lucy‟s cheek as she 
momentarily looks aside in distraction. 
The Lucy-Napoleon and Gobodo-Madikizela-De Kock relationship of aversion and attraction, 
fascination and repulsion can be read as a metaphor for the way South African society in 
general views and relates to prison. While the stories of desperate and daring criminals and 
prisoners occasionally shown in the media would hold the audience spell-bound for a few 
moments, at other times crime and prison exist as spectres in the periphery of most people‟s 
imagination. After one of Lucy‟s prison visits, the narrator reports the following thoughts of 
the contented Napoleon: “He was certain that Lucy Sibongile Khumbule had much to learn. 
Their lives touching and penetrating each other so deeply ... that was no accident” (92). 
Lucy‟s naivety may mirror that of many South Africans who assume that their fate is separate 
from that of incarcerated criminals. Napoleon‟s actions and those of Dawie Botha, the corrupt 
prison warder who assists Napoleon get what he wants in exchange for money, indicate that 
the “inside and outside” touch and penetrate each other very deeply, as Napoleon astutely 
observes about his interaction with Lucy. 
Gobodo-Madikizela‟s emotional and empathetic touching of De Kock‟s “trigger hand” makes 
her  realise that her relationship with De Kock cannot remain at the impersonal “interviewer 
and subject” level since it is basically a field of power contestation (40). While in another 
context the hand-touching incident could have been dismissed without any second thought, in 
the constricted confines of the prison its significance explodes into astronomical metaphoric 
level. In retrospect, both De Kock and Gobodo-Madikizela realise that it was a moment when 
power relations became diffuse as the subject-prisoner and his interviewer momentarily 
connect at a purely human level unencumbered by any ideological considerations. For this 
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reason, the moment is empowering for the prisoner but deeply disorienting for the 
interviewer, as it makes her realise how implicated she is in her apparently evil subject. But 
the hand touching is also a moment of ambiguity because in a way Gobodo-Madikizela‟s act 
of empathy draws her “into intimate complicity” (46) with De Kock. Implicitly, De Kock and 
Gobodo-Madikizela symbolically become partners in crime.  
Both Makholwa‟s and Gobodo-Madikizela‟s narratives suggest that not only is there a 
mutually disturbing relationship between prison and the outside but also “that good and evil 
exist in our lives, and that evil like good, is always a possibility” (Gobodo-Madikizela 34). 
This is forcefully brought to Gobodo-Madikizela‟s attention by a coincidental event at 
Westville Prison in Durban. A few months before starting her interviews with De Kock at 
Pretoria Maximum Prison, she has a meeting with Gcina Hlongwane, a black prisoner at 
Westville Prison who was formerly an Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) hit man, who, like De 
Kock, had been abandoned by his organisation when his crimes were exposed. When 
Gobodo-Madikizela learns that she shares a birthday with this man who “had killed so many 
ANC members he couldn‟t tell the exact number”, she is terribly disturbed. For Gobodo-
Madikizela the moment illustrates that the prison, with all its evil and criminals, has an 
unbreakable bond with society. What exacerbates Gobodo-Madikizela‟s distress is that during 
the course of her interview with Hlongwane she finds herself colluding with this notorious 
killer when he indicates in coded language that they should switch over to Zulu since the 
guard who is hovering around them was an IFP spy. As she leaves prison she drives furiously 
as she is seized by paranoia, imagining herself to being followed by IFP spear-wielding men 
in traditional regalia. She experiences the same haunting feeling after the hand touching 
incident with De Kock. During one of her visits to De Kock, he tells her how people were 
killed through letter bombs and even ball-pen bombs. Afterwards, she throws away her pen 
which she had borrowed a young white man at the Home Affairs office because she imagines 
that it has been exchanged with one equipped with a bomb. Even after travelling thousands of 
kilometres to America, she is troubled by the tapes and the interview transcripts with De 
Kock. At the centre of her haunting is her “own empathy for De Kock” (116). She seems to 
have internalised the logic of the penal regime and finds that it has become her own shirt of 
flame that she cannot take off. 
What Gobodo-Madikizela calls “this sense of paper-thin line” between evil and good, prison 
and outside, is also evident in Red Ink. In Makholwa‟s narrative the prison is depicted as 
reaching the outside through the corrupt activities of warders and also through visitors of the 
incarcerated criminals and the criminals‟ connections with the politically influential and 
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criminally inclined figures such as KK. Makholwa illustrates that her protagonist, Lucy, and 
Napoleon‟s brother, Sifiso, become dangerous and tragic links between the prison and the 
outside. Not only does Lucy‟s relationship lead to the death of her business partner and her 
boyfriend Karabo Monare at the hands of Sifiso, the novel shows that right from the first day 
she steps into prison, she is slowly but relentlessly drawn into the corrupt web of prison life. 
In order to record their conversation, she agrees with Napoleon that they discreetly but 
illegally use the notebook and pencil that he provides. Unbeknown to Lucy is the fact that she 
is playing along in a drama that has been set in motion by KK Mabote, The Sponsor, and 
Napoleon, with the aid of his warder friend Dawie Botha. By making Lucy and Dawie 
participate in crime, Napoleon cunningly connects them to himself and the pervasive logic of 
the penal regime. 
Lucy and Napoleon‟s near-romantic involvement can be viewed as a metaphor for prison‟s 
entanglements with politics and society in general. The thin line dividing politics and crime is 
further highlighted by the fact that the friendship between the Dingiswayo brothers and KK 
Mabote has its roots simultaneously in crime and in anti-apartheid politics. As the 
Dingiswayos try to hijack KK Mabote‟s Mercedes Benz during the dying years of apartheid, 
he uses his political demagoguery to convince them that their crime is in fact a political act 
since apartheid has basically dispossessed every black person in one way or another. KK 
Mabote wins over the Dingiswayos, and during the apartheid regime the “two brothers carried 
out a number of hits on the regime‟s policemen and women. They planted bombs, they killed 
black spies and police informants and for this, they were well looked after by The Sponsor, 
known as KK to his friends” (195). The narrator indicates that this complex friendship of the 
Dingiswayos and KK survives well into South Africa‟s rise to democracy. Although the 
Dingiswayos‟ behaviour may be viewed as purely mercenary and perverse, it is clear that their 
behaviour contains both criminal and liberatory elements. They view themselves as fighters 
against forces of oppression of some sort, and their killing and raping sprees give them a 
sense of control as they “overpower, conquer and humiliate” (232). 
Gobodo-Madikizela‟s project with De Kock is an extension of the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (TRC) project, which aimed at healing the post-apartheid nation through the full 
disclosure of autrocities by the perpetrators and the extension of forgiveness by victims99. 
                                                          
99
 About the objectives of the TRC, Gobodo-Madikizela writes: “The Truth and Reconciliation Commission was 
a strategy not only for breaking the cycle of politically motivated violence but also for teaching important 
lessons about how the human spirit can prevail even as victims remember the cruelty visited upon them in the 
past” (2003:103). What is still debated, however, is not only whether these objectives were achieved or even 
achievable, but the fact that the TRC process seems to have been crafted to benefit the perpetrators of autrocities 
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Gobodo-Madikizela‟s approach to her interviews with De Kock seems to be participating in 
the same process driven by the principles of Christian forgiveness and restorative rather than 
retributive justice upon which the TRC was founded.100 However, the extent to which the 
TRC found support from the new government and even from some leaders of former 
apartheid regimes makes it possible that Gobodo-Madikizela and other academics became 
unwittingly complicit in the denial of justice to thousand of South Africans due to the 
euphoria of the democratic dispensation. The fact that Gobodo-Madikizela is haunted by the 
idea that she may be colluding in, legitimising or performing a certain logic of forgetting, as 
the word “amnesty” suggests, is evident in that she devotes the entire last chapter, “I have no 
Hatred in my Heart”, to the defence of the principle of forgiveness and by extension the TRC 
project. She argues: “The act of humanizing is ... at once both punishment and rehabilitation” 
(120). But she experiences inner conflict when she realises that this humanising stance stands 
in violation of the deep-seated desire to see justice done. She writes: “Part of my own struggle 
in my visits with De Kock stemmed from the fear of stepping into the shoes of a murderer 
through empathy” (120). The same observation can be made about the vague achievements of 
the TRC process especially in the light of the considerable human and financial resources that 
were channelled towards the project.101 
In Red Ink, Makholwa also raises the question of the extent to which members of society 
should interact or be fascinated with the prison in general and with incarcerated dangerous 
criminals in particular. The protagonist, Lucy, finds herself in a moral quandary right from the 
time she receives Napoleon‟s letter inviting her to write a book about his criminal exploits. 
While Khumbule thinks that Napoleon‟s is a great story staring her in the face, she also 
realises that it is a story that she cannot share with her parents and even with her boyfriend. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
more than the victims. The question that begs to be asked then is whether the TRC process unwittingly became 
complicit in the apartheid crimes.      
 
100
 Some scholars believe that justice was a prerequisite for reconciliation rather than an alternative to it, and that 
the TRC had been weighted in favour of the perpetrators of abuse. For example, William Kentridge, director of 
Ubu and the Truth Commission, says: "A full confession can bring amnesty and immunity from prosecution or 
civil procedures for the crimes committed. Therein lies the central irony of the Commission. As people give 
more and more evidence of the things they have done they get closer and closer to amnesty and it gets more and 
more intolerable that these people should be given amnesty." (Kentridge 2007, p. viii). (See also Mahmood 
Mamdani, “Reconciliation without Justice”, 1996, and Sandra Young, “Narrative and Healing in the Hearings of 
the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission”, 2004).    
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 Helena Cobban of The Christian Science Monitor reports that the TRC consumed 224 million Rand during 
the five years of its operation. 
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She observes: “He (Napoleon) wants to be immortalised; he enjoyed all the attention he 
received in the media during his heyday. I‟m just worried that I may be glorifying a killer” 
(130). She soon understands that by accepting Napoleon‟s challenge she automatically enters 
the league of the “eccentric”, and into a no-man‟s land which is neither criminal nor non-
criminal. Tellingly Napoleon equates writers‟, and especially journalists‟, quest for fame with 
his own criminal life of rape and murder. From chapter three onwards, Makholwa‟s narrative 
juxtaposes Napoleon‟s prison fantasies with Lucy‟s delusional desire for success and fame in 
an unnerving way which shows that their destinies are intertwined in a manner that Lucy 
could not have imagined. For example, in chapter three the imprisoned Napoleon imagines 
himself having sex with Lucy, whom he has not yet met, and derives great satisfaction from 
self-manipulatinng his genitals. Hinting at the danger that awaits Lucy, the narrator juxtaposes 
Napoleon‟s revolting thoughts and actions in prison with Lucy‟s anxiety in her bedroom as 
she awakes on the morning that she will meet Napoleon for the first time. Her thoughts are 
hauntingly dominated by her daring project as much as Napoleon is fixated on his imaginary 
sexual relationship with Lucy. Read this way, Makholwa‟s novel can be seen as 
foregrounding certain aspects of Gobodo-Madikizela journalistic account that are hidden 
between the lines or paved over in her text. Makholwa provides not so much a parallel story 
as a reading of the tensions and contradictions that Gobodo-Madikizela sometimes raises but 
fails to explore more subtly. 
The way Lucy‟s book project, which seems to be glorifying a serial rapist and murderer, and 
the real danger to her life and that of all those connected to her by her close interaction with a 
brutish killer, raises moral questions which Makholwa‟s protagonist battles with throughout 
the novel. What exacerbates Lucy‟s moral dilemma is that when she goes to meet Napoleon 
for the first time she expects to see a fiend, but upon seeing him she is completely destabilised 
by his “frailty” and his “gentle almost priest-like” appearance (24, 25). He was “a fairly 
normal, really nice guy” (27). This is comparable to what Gobodo-Madikizela‟s friend, 
Marie-Claire Kamin, says after shaking hands with De Kock in one of the public hearings in 
Cape Town. Completely dumbfounded and bewildered, she blurts out: “He looks like my 
brother” (50). Lucy‟s crisis is deepened by Napoleon‟s over-familiarity with her. Instead of a 
formal handshake, Napoleon insists on a hug and basically treats her as if she were his 
lover.102 Eventually when Lucy cannot bear the pangs of her conscience on her own, she 
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 Interestingly, Ruth First in 117 Days reports how her relationship with one of her interrogators Viktor, was 
steeped in some kind of disturbing romance. She writes that “Viktor came laden with calculated charm and 
flattery thick with treacherous intent” (141). Viktor himself declares: “I know you better after a month than 
people who have known you your whole life” (137). Similarly Gobodo-Madikizela indicates that her friends 
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decides to confide in her maverick architect uncle about her weird book project. Uncle Qiniso 
tries to encourage Lucy to proceed with her proposed book by offering the following 
understanding of the function of art: “[Art‟s] role is to expose some facet of the human soul. 
Whether it‟s good or bad, express it the best way you know how, and don‟t give a damn about 
other people. Art doesn‟t kill anyone” (130). Similarly, after commenting on the frightening 
and discomforting moments when our lives connect with the likes of De Kock Gobodo-
Madikizela tries to find a moral justification for her project. She asks: “Could it perhaps also 
be a source of hope, that through our recognition of evil as a constant possibility in human 
experience we can learn to prevent it from taking over our lives?” (50). 
The relentless way in which the prison haunts society in general is illustrated by the imagery 
that Gobodo-Madikizela uses to capture De Kock‟s painful yet futile attempt to rid himself of 
the guilt of his heinous crimes. She calls it the “intolerable shirt of flame” which De Kock 
tries to slip off in vain since “in some ways the cloak [is] part of him” (47). Similarly, both 
Gobodo-Madikizela and Makholwa in their narratives seem to come to a realisation that 
violent crimes and imprisonment are South Africa‟s “intolerable shirt of flame” which she 
cannot slip off without losing a large chunk of her skin since they have painfully attached 
themselves to the political and socio-economic systems of the nation. These two texts help us 
see that steeped in the past of criminal violence of the apartheid state, the violent crimes of the 
formerly oppressed groups in the post-apartheid environment are a disturbing but unsurprising 
extension of the same logic which was once secretly sponsored and publicly condoned by the 
state and anti-apartheid activism. 
Another unsettling aspect in the interface of prison and society highlighted by both Gobodo-
Madikizela and Makholwa is the coalescence of politics, crime and perverse behaviour. KK, 
whom we subsequently learn is the man that Napoleon refers to as The Sponsor, is a tainted 
liberation hero who does not believe that crime and politics are mutually exclusive. About 
KK, the post-apartheid “exemplary” politician-cum-businessman, the narrator in Makholwa‟s 
novel observes with a mild dose of sarcasm: “During the struggle he had spent many a day in 
various prisons, including Robben Island, so his struggle credentials were intact” (209). The 
interconnectedness of apartheid criminal imprisonment with aspirations for liberation is 
suggested by the fact that it is being imprisoned which ironically results in one being viewed 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
thought that she had become romantically attached to De Kock. Commenting on and dismissing this perception, 
she writes: “Romantic interest seemed to carry greater explanatory power for conversing with a murderous 
criminal than compassion ... Casting my professional interest in de Kock in terms of romantic motive ... makes it 
easy for my listeners to distance themselves from the reality of interacting with the man” (122, 123). But her 
narrative casts doubts as to whether their interaction always remained at a professional level. 
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as a valiant fighter against apartheid.103 It is a painful irony that anti-apartheid fighters needed 
the accreditation of the oppressor through imprisonment, so to speak, to feel and be viewed as 
authentic heroes. 
Makholwa‟s narrative seems to question the post-apartheid project of depicting apartheid 
prisons as places were heroes and „real men‟ were manufactured. Her narrative insists on 
portraying the apartheid prison as a space of multiple ironies since it produced unstable 
masculinities. While imprisonment gives political activists an illusory sense of power, 
Napoleon claims that it is only when he rapes women that he enjoys sex and “felt powerful” 
(232). Interestingly, it is also in prison that KK develops bisexual tendencies. The narrator 
observes: “[I]t was also in prison that he discovered a taste for his own sex” (209). Despite the 
positive ideological functions with which anti-apartheid activists try to imbue the prison, 
Makholwa‟s narrative insists that it is a decadent and degraded space giving rise to sexual 
appetites that society finds unpalatable. 
The development of prison homosexual relationships further entrench gender stereotypes. Not 
only does Makholwa show that prison homosexual relationships are modelled on the male-
female patriarchal relations that characterise societal sex roles in general, she also 
demonstrates that they are essentially violent.104 For Makholwa homosexuality is behaviour 
that develops out of a space of oppression and degradation, implicitly a Western space, or at 
least a space that figures modernity in one of its more coercive aspects. After his stint in 
prison, KK Mabote uses both homosexual and heterosexual sex to break the willpower of his 
obstinate underlings. The narrator says: “Homosexual sex was a power game for The 
Sponsor” (203). Early in his relationship with Napoleon‟s brother, Sifiso, KK used to make 
him “scream like a wounded animal from pain of penetration” as he established his 
domination over him (209). For his sexual stimulation he also forces his girlfriend, Fundi, to 
wear a nappy like a baby. After the attainment of democracy, the economically powerful men 
like KK Mabote, while practising homosexuality, never allow themselves to be penetrated, 
                                                          
103
 Mandela and First report of the Defiance Campaign of the 1950s in which political activists deliberately 
courted imprisonment. Gradually, being imprisoned became a badge of honour for those fighting against 
apartheid (See Mandela‟s Long Walk to Freedom pp.129 and First‟s 117 Days). 
 
104
 Jonny Steinberg also shows that right from the start, the Number prison gangs were steeped in homosexual 
relationships which were patriarchal and violent. From 1987 onwards, he indicates that one joined the number by 
being raped, something seen as feminising and disempowering (See The Number 2004). Similarly, in discussing 
Zimbabwean masculinities Muchemwa and Muponde observe: “Although women and children are particularly 
vulnerable in uncontrolled and violent patriarchy, men who belong to marginalised masculinities can be 
feminised through rape and torture” (In Manning the Nation: Father Figures in Zimbabwean Literature and 
Society, 2007: xvii). 
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and this allows them the illusion that their manhood remains intact despite the degradation 
imposed by the apartheid prison experience.105 
Makholwa also suggests that while in prison it is the absence of the opposite sex that seems to 
trigger homosexual desire, and that patriarchal notions of manhood are subsequently 
superimposed to justify and legitimate the behaviour, she indicates that gay relationships 
outside prison are also deeply tainted by the same unequal power relations. The feminisation 
through penetration of either physically weak or materially poor men gives the abuser a false 
sense of power since he starts to view himself as superman who can subdue both men and 
women. Sifiso, gay as he is, does not allow himself to be penetrated for similar reasons. 
Although he does not rape his murder victims because “the female sex represented filth, 
disease and whoring” (209), he ironically views his gay partners as women. The narrator says: 
“Somehow, being the one who always shoved it into them made him feel better about his 
sexual tastes. He was still the alpha male” (204). Interestingly, although he is never 
imprisoned, Makholwa suggests that Sifiso‟s homosexuality is a result of feelings of 
emasculation and childhood trauma that he experienced at the hands of his mother and other 
abusive adults. 
Conclusion 
An examination of Journey to Myself and Fifteen Men has demonstrated that there is no 
evidence that female prisoners experience physical and material deprivations to a greater 
extent than their male counterparts. These narratives do not provide any conclusive evidence 
that prison writing projects provide any emotional healing, since it is problematic in the first 
place to depict these men and women as wounded and sick individuals who need language or 
narrative therapy. What these narratives seem to afford these prisoners is some kind of 
agency, agency rendered complex by their continued imprisoned condition, by their forced 
identity constituted in prison, and by the largely unchanged outside forces which led to their 
imprisonment in the first place. An examination of A Human Being and Red Ink indicates that 
confined male criminals exert considerable patriarchal and masculine power over their female 
interviewers. However, unlike Makholwa‟s protagonist, Lucy, Gobodo-Madikizela is not a 
passive dupe.  She is deeply conscious of the power that De kock exercises over her. Gobodo-
Madikizela‟s book documents her anxiety at slipping into socially prescribed gender roles and 
also represents an attempt to write herself out of them. On the other hand, Makholwa‟s novel 
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 In Mapping Memory: Former Prisoners Tell their Stories (2006) one former prisoner, Zolile Mgweba, relates 
how he was forced to wear a blanket skirt as the „wife of a prison boss‟ (3).  
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highlights a gendered post-apartheid prison which has disturbing and often dangerous links 
with the outside. 
Ultimately, the strand that connects these four texts is that they are all participating in the 
post-apartheid project which apparently prioritises the individual as a category that has more 
authenticity and more value than the collective. All four texts posit dealing with the 
individual, the “real person” behind the mask, the “inner self” supposedly “behind the 
political”, as a woman‟s prerogative. However, the idea of an individual versus community 
ethics is a fraught one since they are always interdiscursive dependencies at any historical 
moment. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
 
Few people would contest Jeremy Sarkin‟s (2008) observation that “[p]risons are still 
universally accepted and located as the central feature of criminal justice system” (2). With 
many nations doing away with capital punishment, imprisonment has emerged as the ultimate 
punishment for criminals. Post-colonial “African governments have unanimously preserved 
the penitentiary apparatus at the center of their judicial systems” (Bernault 2003: 26), despite 
the prison‟s clear links with the coercive and ideological violence of colonialism. As we have 
seen, both colonial/apartheid and post-colonial/post-apartheid prison experiences have led to 
the literary genre of prison narratives in Kenya and South Africa. In my examination of these 
narratives I have been especially interested in the role of crime and prison in the production of 
notions of the self and the literary. I argued that the narratives that I examined demonstrate 
that there is a certain excess that attends on the social production of criminality and the 
practice of imprisonment. This allows criminality and imprisonment to have a haunting effect 
both on individuals‟ notions of „the self‟ and the constitution of national identities and 
nationhoods. 
Both during colonial and apartheid periods, South Africa was characterised by mass 
incarcerations of mainly black people. In colonial times, blacks were imprisoned largely for 
violating Pass Laws legislation. In The Number, Steinberg shows that it was the brutalities of 
early colonial indutrialisation that gave birth to Nongoloza‟s banditry and his subsequent 
imprisonment. Nongoloza‟s ideas resulted in the emergence of the Number prison gangs 
which quickly spread through out South African jails, thanks to the phenomenon of mass 
imprisonment of black and coloured people. On the other hand, the apartheid era led to the 
imprisonment of large numbers of anti-apartheid political activist. Ironically, it is this 
phenomenon that led to the production of political prison narratives that I examined in 
Chapter Two and Three of this thesis. Thinking specifically about these political prison 
narratives that had emerged before 1992, J. U. Jacobs wrote: “The experience of detention and 
imprisonment is a major determinant of literary production in South Africa today” 
(1992:115). Jacobs was referring to the literary production of political detainees and not that 
of “criminals”. Eighteen years later, the narratives produced by the experience of detention 
and imprisonment can no longer be fully theorised without thinking about issues of crime and 
criminality. 
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Locked in the emotive and politically charged space of apartheid detention and imprisonment, 
few writers and literary scholars paused to envision the type of literature that could emerge 
from post-apartheid prisons. Today, with the benefit of hindsight, we see the necessity of a 
prison literary theoretical approach that goes beyond apartheid; as in going back to the pre-
apartheid era; and examining the period after apartheid, as in exploring the current transitional 
post-apartheid period but also imagining a post-post-apartheid prison, or to use Terry 
Eagleton‟s (2003) phrase, an after post-apartheid prison. The South African prison has 
experienced significant material changes since the demise of apartheid. Coupled with this, 
there have also been discursive shifts which were not only results but also causes of the 
material changes that the place and space of prison continue to experience. Through all these 
changes, in South Africa, the prison has maintained its central societal role, either directly as 
in colonial and apartheid times, or indirectly and hauntingly, as in this period where the prison 
is a repressed other of the entire national consciousness. Although there is monumental work 
to be done in so far as theorising South African crime and prison narratives is concerned, my 
study is just but a fraction of a fascinating and enriching field of study which can only keep 
expanding. 
Kenya does not boast political prison narratives of the same size as in South African. While 
the long apartheid years allowed for those detained in its prisons to narrativise their 
experience, the intense detentions of the Mau Mau period, and the longer stretch of colonial 
imprisonment in general, did not lead to a literary phenomenon comparable to the South 
African one. The Trial of Jomo Kenyatta gives us a glimpse of what could have been a 
veritable detention and imprisonment Kenyan literary genre. However, the independence that 
followed the Mau Mau detentions seems to have stifled and eclipsed whatever literary 
productions could have emerged from a different meditation on these experiences. With 
Ngugi‟s Detained we find ourselves dealing with post-colonial political imprisonment. Ngugi 
tries to recuperate Mau Mau mass detentions from ignominy and relate them to his own 
detention in an “independent” state. For him, the post-colonial prison becomes a “colonial” or 
“neo-colonial affair”. What eludes Ngugi, much as it escaped a number of South African 
writers and scholars who have imagined a post-apartheid prison, is the centrality of prison in 
the state‟s exercise of power even when it is not directly used to incarcerate political 
opponents. In other words, the criminal prisoner is an absent other in Ngugi‟s narrative. 
With the publication of John Kiriamiti‟s My Life in Crime (1984), a real genre of popular 
criminal imprisonment narratives was born in post-colonial Kenya. My study devoted 
significant space to this Kenyan literary phenomenon. Approaching these narratives as 
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products of popular culture or at least prison popular culture, enables us not to be evaluative 
and judgemental but to “listen” to these narratives‟ “surplus” or “subterranean currents”, as 
Barber (1987: 7) puts it. I pointed out that a self-confessed criminal prisoner lacks the high 
moral pedestal that a political prisoner commands. More than the political prisoner, a criminal 
prisoner has to improvise literary techniques that gain him/her a sympathetic readership. It is 
ironic that Kiriamiti seems to have given birth to the popular genre of crime and prison 
narratives and also has had the last word through the publication of My Life in Prison (2004). 
From 1994 up to the publication of Kiriamiti‟s narrative, nothing significant was happening in 
the way of the prolific production of crime and prison narratives that had characterised the last 
half of the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s. The few texts that I examined in Chapter Five 
show that the Kenyan prison economy mimics the economies of Nairobi city, the post-
colonial Kenyan nation-state at large and the carceral colonial state. This may not necessarily 
give a complete picture of the forces that dictate the production of, and trends that 
characterise, popular autobiographical narratives of crime and imprisonment. However, this 
selection has enabled us to start peering into important factors that characterise the flux space 
of the interaction of crime and prison and the production of literature. 
In the first sixteen years of the post-apartheid regime, South Africa has experienced a 
significant drought of autobiographical detention and prison narratives, a genre that originated 
with the publication of Herman Charles Bosman‟s Cold Stone Jug (1947) and Ruth First‟s 
117 Days (1963). Mandela‟s Long Walk to Freedom (1994) seems to have marked the 
beginning of the end of political prison narratives in South Africa. What have been emerging 
from South African prisons by way of literary products are collaborative auto/biographies 
between academic/writers and imprisoned criminals. Jonny Steinberg‟s The Number (2004) 
and Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela‟s A Human Being Died (2003) mark the birth of this new 
strand of South African narratives of crime and imprisonment. Steinberg‟s and Gobodo-
Madikizela‟s example has been followed by writers who have worked with imprisoned 
criminals and produced anthologies of auto/biographical pieces by prisoners.  I argued that 
these criminal imprisoned writers face the challenge of imagining their criminality and 
imprisonment creatively, since most of them did not receive much formal schooling. In an 
attempt to procure a sympathetic readership most of these writers resort to the popular victim 
narrative as an attempt at self-exculpation. Nonetheless, these narratives reveal interesting 
insights concerning the complex interactions between society and the prison, links between 
criminality and the notion of political resistance, and insight into popular understandings of 
the prison that the more politically-oriented accounts sometimes simply glossed over or 
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omitted altogether. Beyond these anthologies and other prison writing projects, South Africa 
has not experienced the production of popular prison narratives that matches the Kenyan 
phenomenon. 
The future of the literary study of prison both in Kenya and South Africa seems to lie in 
seeing that political narratives of detention and imprisonment are but one aspect of this 
expanding genre. Attention should be paid to the popular narratives that have been coming 
out of post-colonial Kenya and the collaborative projects, novels and other representational 
projects that are emerging from the post-apartheid South African prison. One of the things 
that I hope my thesis has demonstrated is that these non-canonical narratives of crime and 
imprisonment demand to be “read with respect” for us “to see the complexity and „otherness‟” 
embedded in them, to adapt Dorothy Driver‟s words to my context (2002: 170). To quote 
Julia Kristeva, crime and prison literature allow us to be “familiar ... with our own ghosts” 
(191:191). Whether by way of political prisoners or common criminals, crime and prison 
narratives suggest that the penal regime continues and will continue to play a significant role 
in the literary production of Kenya and South Africa. I believe that the examination of these 
texts sheds light on the subtle and not readily visible participation of crime and prison in 
shaping the mindset of a society and how in turn the entire society‟s destiny becomes, both in 
a real and figurative way, bound up with the fate of its criminals and prisoners. 
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